MILITARY THOUGHT: "PROBLEMS OF THE STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES IN MODERN WARFARE", BY MAJOR-GENERAL KH. DZHELAUKHOV

• Document Type: CREST
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 16, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Problems of the Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces
In Modern Warfare
by
Major-General Kh. Dzhelaukhov
Our press has devoted adequate attention to the problems
of strategic deployment as an importa ement of the pre-
paredness of the armed forces for war. [The publication
of a work entitled The Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces
in a Modern War', by a group of authors under the direction
of Lieutenant-General K. F. Skorobogatkin, represents a
continuation of efforts to study the problems mentioned.2
With its appearance, the large gap which existed in the com-
plete scientific elaboration of one of the most important
sections of Soviet military strategy - the theory of stra-
tegic deployment - has been filled.
The book consists of an introduction and ten chapters.
The first chal.: is devoted to an analysis of the
strategic deployment of armed forces in the 2nd World War.
In it are examined the strategic deployment of both sides
in the German-Polish War of 1939, on the western frontier
in 1939-1940, and the strategic deployment of the German-
Fascist troops and of the Soviet armed forces in 1941, to
which the main attention is devoted.
One of the important conditions in the strategic de-
ployment of the German-Fascist Army, arising from the aggres-
sive nature of German imperialism, was the camouflage by all
possible means of military preparation for aggression, and
2. The Strateic Deployment of Armed Forces in Modern War
Editor-in-chief -: Lieutenant-General K. F. Skorobogatkin.
Military Publishing House, Moscow, 308 pages, 3 diagrams, 1961.
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the protraction of the process of strategic deployment.
For example, the strategic deployment of German-Fascist troops
on the German-Polish border continued for about two months,
while in the vest, against France, and in the east, against
the Soviet Union, it continued for 5 to 6 months.
The build-up of the German-Fascist troops on our
border was carried out gradually. Troops destined for the
offensive on the first day of the war were brought up in
four echelons (from 4 February to the beginning of June 19).4.1).
Movement was carried out exclusively at night, with the
strict observance of camouflage measures. By 21 June, the
German-Fascist troops were ready to take up the offensive.
Thus, a new factor in strategic deployment during
the 2nd World War was represented by its protraction over
an extended period.
In speaking of the shortcomings in the Soviet Army's
strategic deployment in the summer of 1941, the authors make
a number of most valuable critical comments, which are
useful even today. The reality of the threat to the Soviet
Union posed by Fascist Germany called for the adoption of
appropriate measures to strengthen our defense. This was
all the more true, since, when "... German-Fascist troops
were brought into Rumania and Finland, as early, that is)
as Autumn 1940, our country found itself in a threatened
position. The enemy was able to forestall us in strategic
deployment and to catch us unprepared to ward off a sudden
blow. Yet, decisive measures to bring our s.rmed forces to
combat readiness were not taken. Instead of a full, planned
and concealed mobilization of large units and units, which
could have been carried out in different military districts
at various times for the sake of camouflage, we began hastily
to call up those who were registered (pripisnoy sostav) in
the internal military districts in May 1941 and to transport
to theaters of military operations divisions which were not
yet cohesive, which were inadequately prepared for combat
operations, and which were without rear services and trans-
port..." (page 41). Further on, on pages 42 to 56, the
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authors examine the basic shortcomings in the strategic
and operational deployment of our border military districts
on the western border and evaluate the condition of the
types of armed forces, the extent to which they were equipped,
and the degree of their combat readiness. From this, the
conclusion is drawn that: "The experience gained from
strategic deployment of our armed forces in 1941 shows that
deployment has acquired decisive importance under modern
conditions and has become a most complex and crucial measure
for the State." (page 56).
It should be noted that the lamentable experience of
the preparation and deployment of our armed forces in 1941
is fully taken into consideration by the Central Committee of
our Party and by the Soviet Government. "The tragedy of the
first months of the 2nd World War, when Hitler attacked the
USSR after assuring himself of superiority in combat equip-
ment, is too fresh in people's minds for this to be per-
mitted now",-- states the Declaration of the Soviet Gov-
ernment of 31 August 1961. Therefore, in view of the re-
inforcement of the armed forces of the U.S.A. and of its
partners in NATO in Europe, and the performance of other
hostile actions in response to the proposal of the Soviet
Union for the concluion of a peace treaty with both
German nations, our Government was obliged to undertake a
number of grave measures to reinforce the security of the
USSR and to heighten the combat readiness of the armed
forces. This found concrete expression in the temporary
retention in the army of some contingents due for discharge
in the autumn of 1961, in a partial call-up for service from
the reserve, in the reinforcement of troops of the border
military districts (groups of forces), in the conduct of
maneuvers participated in by all arms of troops, including
troops of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact,
and in the resumption of experimental nuclear explosions.
The second chapter is devoted to a brief study of the
nature of a future war and of the probable deployment of the
types of armed forces of the imperialist aggressive blocs in
the respective theaters of military operations. Naturally,
the contents of this chapter are of a conjectural nature,
since the real plans of the imperialist blocs are kept in
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strict secrecy, while the numerical composition of the
armed forces in the various theaters changes periodically.
Nevertheless, a correct orientation is given on the major
theaters of military operations, on the probable forces
and means deployed in them, and on the possible nature of
armed combat by the enemy during the period of strategic de-
ployment.
The third chapter/ "The Essentials of Strategic Deploy-
ment ", is,in our opinion, the main chapter in the book.
Its value lies in the fact that it reveals the content and
essence of the modern concept of strategic deployment, based
on criticism of concepts of strategic deployment which have
grown up historically.
The author's point of view can be summarized by the
statement that "... strategic deployment is the process of the
setting up--by the beginning of a war, of strategic groupings
of armed forces, including their concealment, mobilization,
concentration and deployment" (page 91). In principle,
such a definition characterizes quite completely the content
and essence of strategic deployment. It emphasizes that
strategic deployment represents the single process of set-
ting up groupings of armed forces by the beginning of a
war, in which there are separate, individual elements which
are closely interconnected.
In the view of the authors, the entire process of set-
ting up strategic groupings under modern conditions pre-
supposes, in the first place, that part of the peacetime
armed forces is at full combat readiness and is capable of
repulsing a sudden attack by the enemy, of delivering an
immediate strike and of conducting the first operations, and,
in the second place, that full mobilization, transport (con-
centration), and deployment of new contingents of the armed
forces in the theaters of military operations are carried
out in accordance with the operational plan for the war.
The relationship which should exist between regular
troops, ready for immediate operations, and those troops
which are being mobilized and transported to the theaters
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of military operations can be debated. But the nature of
this relationship will not change the essence and content
of the strategic deployment itself. Whatever the conditions
(here we are thinking of a modern world war) it is not
possible to reject the carrying out of mobilization entirely
or, consequently, the need to transport and concentrate
troops in ,o various theaters of military operations and to
set up the groupings necessary for the performance of stra-
tegic tasks.
The objection can be made that under modern conditions
strategic deployment will not always be carried out according
to the proposed plan.
There are regular large units of various types of
armed forces which are maintained above strength or at war-
time strength in peacetime and ready for immediate operations.
Consequently, the process of mobilized deployment does not,
in essence, apply to these troops. This can be explained as
follows: in the first place, the regular troops mentioned
comprise only a part of the first strategic echelon deployed
in accordance with the operation plan; in the second place,
even these completely combat-ready troops will, in some cases,
need the supplementary mobilization of some rear units, es-
tablishments, communications or service units and subunits
etc.; in the third place, the mobilized deployment of the
regular large units mentioned has actually been carried out
in good time, i.e., long before the time for the strategic
deployment of our main armed forces. Thus, the presence of
regular, combat-ready large units and formations of types
of armed forces actually deployed in theaters of military
operations and in the depth of the country, does not con-
tradict the definition of strategic deployment given by
the authors in their book.
In our opinion, greater emphasis should have been
given to the dual nature of the process of strategic de-
ployment, which includes on the one hand the deployed forces
and means of groups of forces, of border military districts
and of the other regular formations in the country which
are ready for immediate operations; and on the other hand,
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of the mobilization and formation of new large units and
units, of their transportation and concentration in the-
aters of military operations, and of their combat deploy-
ment independently or within the composition of regular
troops already there. This, essentially, is the first
strategic echelon of the armed forces.
The whole process of creating strategic groupings
occupies a secondary position, and it must not be trans-
formed into something self-contained, equatable with a
plan of war, as was done by Professor Melikov in his work
Strategic Deployment. .1 Strategic deployment is planned
and carried out on the basis of the general plan for
strategic operations, which are the direct expression of
the military-political goals for the initial period of war
in any given theater of military operations. Its content
is decisively influenced by the nature of a future war,
by the military doctrine which has been adopted in a
given country, and by the plan for impending strategic
operations. Strategic deployment is the concluding act
of peace and the initial act of a war.
The essence of the operational plan is shown in the
boldest relief by the nature of strategic deployment.
Thus, from the very beginning of a war, the plan finds its
material expression in the deployment,which,in tux/10.s
carried out in the name of those strategic operations
which are provided for in the operational plan. In this
sense, although strategic deployment is one of the most
important elements in the preparation of the armed
forces forwar, it occupies a dependent, subordinate posi-
tion in the theory of strategy, as well as in its practical
realization. Nevertheless, elaboration of the problem of
strategic deployment under the conditions of modern warfare
is extremely urgent, and the value of the book under review
lies precisely in the fact that the authors have elaborated
this little-studied topic with sufficient fullness and have
1. Professor V. A. Melikov, Division Commander, "Strategic
Deployment, 1st World War 1914-1918' Volume 1, Military
Publishing House, 1939.
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presented their views on all the basic questions of the
theory of strategic deployment.
The experience of recent wars shows that, as a rule,
an operational plan undergoes changes during the course
of its realization. An example of this is represented by
the operational plan of the Polish command in 1939, and by
our own plan,which underwent a radical change after the
beginning of the war.
From this it follows that, under certain circumstances,
strategic deployment, as a derivative of an operational
plan (the plan for the first operations), can exert a
substantial influence on the realization of the plan itself.
It is possible to possess an ideal operational plan and yet
to suffer defeat, if the armed forces delay in completing
their strategic deployment.
It is known that in a modern war it may be necessary
to mobilize a second, and possibly even a third, strategic
echelon to reinforce existing strategic groupings or to
set up new ones.
The experience of the world wars shows that strategic de-
ployment in new theaters of military operations took place
during the course of these wars (the deployment of the
German-Fascist armed forces first against Poland, then
against the West, and, finally, against us; our deploy-
ment in the west and, in the summer of 1945, in the Far
East against Japan). Such a phenomenon is defined by the
authors as a successive strategic deployment during a new
war (page 92). This is, in essence, a new deployment in
a new theater of military operations during the course of
a major war. One cannot but agree with such a definition.
In this connection, this is an appropriate place to examine
the concept of mobilization and to elaborate upon the defin-
ition of strategic deployment.
A careful comparison between the concept of mobiliza-
tion (page 96) and the formulation of the concept of stra-
tegic deployment (page 91) reveals a certain discrepancy.
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It is envisaged that strategic groupings will be created
by the beginning of a war or at its outbreak, while the
concept of mobilization includes various measures which
are connected not only with strategic deployment (for
example, the creation of reserve troops for the replace-
ment of losses and the establishment of new units to fill
out existing strategic groupings). From what has been
said, it follows that mobilization is a more protracted
process than strategic deployment. The authors themselves
take this point of view and give a stage-by-stage account
of the entire process of mobilization. The reference to
Professor Mikhnevich (page 90), stating that strategic
deployment consists of the mobilization of an army and
of its concentration in a theater of war, provides only
a relative explanation of the thesis advanced by the authors
that mobilization is an element of strategic deployment,
since such a definition is justified to a certain degree
only when related to the past. It is necessary, therefore,
to emphasize that mobilization is a composite element of
strategic deployment in its initial stage, i.e., while
strategic groupings are being set up in accordance with
the operational war plan. However, mobilization cannot
be entirely incorporated in strategic deployment since
the latter is a relatively short-term measure for the
initial period of a given war.
Mobilization occupies a special place in a country's
system of preparation for war. Since it provides for the
bringing up to their authorized wartime strength of large
units, units and establishments existing in peacetime and
for the creation of new formations, intended to replenish
and reinforce the groupings of the armed forces which
perform tasks in the opening operations,this part of mo-
bilization is to this extent a component element of
strategic deployment. However, as we know, mobilization
continues further. If we are not to take the point of
view of "permanent mobilization", that is, of measures for
mobilization carried out throughout the entire course of
the war, then we must concede that mobilization can cer-
tainly not be enclosed within the framework of strategic
deployment in terms of time and of the measures being
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carried out. In this connection, the authors should
have elaborated upulthe formulation of the concept of
strategic deployment and its elements. In our opinion, when
listing the elements of strategic deployment, instead of
referring to "the mobilization of the armed forces", or
simply to "mobilization", one should speak of "mobilizational
deployment' understanding by this all measures for mobiliza-
tion taken at the beginning of a war, in order to ensure the
deployment of strategic groupings in accordance with the
operational war plan.
As regards the mobilization and deployment of the
second and subsequent echelons carried out during the
course of the war, the latter will be intended for the re-
inforcement of strategic groupings already in existence.
If the strategic echelons mentioned are intended to open a
new front of armed combat, one can clearly speak of de-
ployment in a new theater of military operations against a
new enemy and, essentially, in a new war (during the course
of a world war). Thus, the concept of strategic. deployment
as the creation of groupings by the beginning of a war is
justified in this instance also.
chazIaLkfairly detailed examination is
given to the problems of the preparation for and planning
of strategic deployment; of the preparation of a nation's
territory for strategic deployment, and of the deployment
of types of armed forces and of the rear services.
Chp.pter five reveals the elements of cover, which are
understood as actions by a unit of the armed forces at
a high degree of combat readiness to support mobilization,
concentration and deployment in the event of a sudden
attack by the enemy from the air., land or sea.
In past wars, cover was effected by large units which
were especially assigned for this purpose. The tasks of
cover became extremely complicated with the development of
military technology, the appearance on a mass scale of
air forces, of tank and motorized large units, of naval
submarine forces and of airborne landing troops. Along
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with cover from land and sea there arose the necessity for
cover from the air as well. By the 2nd World War it had
already outgrown operational boundaries and had extended
to a considerable depth into the territory of a country
within the range of the bomber aircraft which existed at
the time. Under these conditions, cover changed from
something of local importance, intended to create a favor-
able setting for the deployment of troops in shallow zones
of theaters of military operations, and acquired the sig-
nificance of an important strategic measure throughout the
entire country, especially for countries with small territories.
Cover has become all the more complicated in the age of
nuclear/missile weapons. It has become an important component
of a country's defense. At the same time, coyer, by per-
forming specific functions to support the complete mobiliza-
tion, concentration and deployment of troops, forms a con-
stituent of strategic deployment. This dual nature of cover
leads certain comrades into confusion: to negation of the
particular functions of cover and to its equation with
national defense as a whole.
It seems to us that in defining the concept of cover,
the authors have, intentionally or not, expanded its
functions. This is particularly noticeable in the section
in which cover from the air is examined. Here a full
picture is given of the cover (defense) of the entire
territory by the antiair defense troops of the country in
cooperation with other forces and means, but no emphasis
is given to the special nature of cover which is carried
out to help strategic deployment in the overall defense system
of the nation. This should have been done, since incorrect
views exist equating cover from the air with antiair de-
fense in general, and cover on land and sea with the de-
fense of troops in the appropriate theaters of military
operations.
The fact is that, as an operation by a unit of the
armed forces intended to support mobilization, concentration
and deployment, cover has a specific purpose-- to support
the deployment of one's own armed forces and, also, to create
operational-strategic groupings for military operations in
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the depth of the country, in accordance with the operational
plan. Upon the conclusion of strategic deploymentpcover is
discontinued and the troops detailed for this purpose go
over to the performance of other tasks specified in the
operational plan. In this sense, cover is a temporary
military operation: it begins in the period of threat
(ugrozhayemyy period) and ends when the major groupings
of the armed forces go over to the performance of their
tasks in an operation. It should also be noted that in
various theaters of military operations and for different
types of armed forces the boundaries of space (territory)
and time and the forces and means for cover will vary.
Because of this, the taskS of cover will be performed dif-
ferently. Along those axes of a theater of military opera-
tions on which offensive operations by ground forces are
planned in the initial period of war, the tasks of cover
will be performed by a part of the forces carrying out the
offensive operation: periods for the fulfillment of tasks
of cover will, obviously, not be of great duration. In
those theaters of military operations and on those strategic
axes where it is intended to organize strategic defense
during the initial period of the war, the basic forces for
cover will, as a rule, be the same troops as are charged
with the conduct of defense.
Tasks for cover in naval theaters of operations will
be performed in a similar manner.
Cover from the air is being performed on a continuing
basis during peacetime. At the outset of military operations
the troops of the antiair defense of the country will per-
form specific tasks with part of their forces to cover the
mobilization, concentration and deployment of the armed
forces at the same time as they are carrying out the tasks of
covering the territory of the whole nation from air strikes.
A significant proportion of the forces and means of the
antiair defense troops will also be used for cover from the
air.
The fundamental principles of the mobilization of
armed forces are elaborated in chapter six. The authors
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regard it as the deployment of the armed forces to a strength
which ensures the achievement of the political purposes of
the war, and which includes bringing peacetime large units
and units up to wartime strength; the formation of new large
units, units and establishments based on concealed cadres;
the creation of a large troop reserve to replenish large
units who have lost their combat effectiveness and for the
formation of new units.
In c_12.15,2,a, the authors make a detailed examin-
ation of the concentration of troops as one of the important
elements of strategic deployment. Concentration is under-
stood as the assembly of forces and means in theaters of
military operations in order to bring the groupings of armed
forces already there up to the required strength and to
ensurethgir rapid deployment.
The concentration of troops in theaters of military
operations from disposition areas or from areas of completed
mobilization will be carried out by available facilities
(svoim khodom) in organic truck transport and through the
mass transport of formations and large units by railroad.
When navigable rivers are available,and in coastal theaters,
river (sea) transport can also be used. The authors
emphasize that as a result of major destruction of transport
from strikes by nuclear weapons and aircraft, strategic
concentration under modern conditions is an extremely dif-
ficult and complex matter.
The process of concentration (transport and movement)
is closely linked with full mobilization, with the prepared-
ness of the troops for transport?and with the general concept
of the initial operations-- the idea of strategic deployment.
The implementation of transport,therefore, depends not
only on technical conditions and on the degree of destruction
of transport facilities,or the need to transport a large
quantity of troops in a short period of time, but also on the
preparedness of the troops for transportation and on those
changes in strategic deployment which are unavoidable under
modern conditions. The major problem of concentration is
preservation of the viability of transport and the skillful
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use of all its categories. The experience of past wars,
the modern state of transport, and the various measures
destined to strengthen our armed forces, show that the
most probable procedure for carrying out strategic con-
centration will be a mixed one, by which concentration of
a part of the armed forces can be accomplished before the
beginning of hostilities, and of the rest when hostilities
begin. It is clear that when a threatening situation
arises (or even before this) a part of the armed forces
will be fully mobilized in secret and brought to the the-
aters of military actions. Sometimes, the concentration
of troops can also be carried out openly, with the aim
of exerting pressure on the enemy, in order to force him
to give up aggressive operations which he is undertaking.
In any event, it is necessary to keep in mind the
fact that a secret, slow concentration is not an end in
itself. The international situation and the conditions
under which a war breaks out can compel one to carry out
transportation openly in the shortest possible time and in
a massive flow, in order to forestall the enemy in the
deployment of his basic strategic groupings.
In view of the need for the extensive and compre-
hensive use of all types of transport to achieve the
prompt concentration of troops, the decision to concentrate
the use of all types of transport, including truck5sin the
hands of the Central Directorateibr Military Communication,
with unified planning as a basis, the decision, in other
words, to have a single military transport center, seems
to us a correct one.
saluter eight of the book is devoted to the combat
deployment of the armed forces.
The main substance of combat deployment is the creation,
in theaters of military operations and in the depth of the
country, of appropriate groupings of the armed forces, the
assembly of strategic and operational formations and their
occupation of departure areas in readiness to perform the
tasks assignedby the operational plan in the opening operations
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of the initial period of the war.
On pages 99-100 and in chapter eight (pages 229-255)) the
authors have introduced the concept of "combat deployment"
("boyevoye razvertyvaniye"), investing it with a wider
connotation than that of operational deployment. "Combat
deployment (as an element of strategic deployment) should
be taken as meaning the creation of a specific assembly of
forces and their occupation of an initial position for the
conduct of combat operations of differing scales" (page 10Q).
One could accept or dispute this definition. The one thing
which is clear is that strategic deployment can only be
considered complete when it has been brought to the stage
of operational-tactical deployment and of the creation of
groupings of troops for the performance of impending tasks.
We agree with the authors when, basing themselves on the
principle of deep-echeloned strategic deployment, they
divide the armed forces deployed in a main theater of
military operations into two operational echelons. It
has already been stated above that the first strategic
echelon of the armed forces should consist of a number of
operational echelons. It is natural that the first operational
echelon should incorporate all the regular large units of the
strategic missile troops, groups of forces, border military
districts and naval forces, and of the antiair defense troops,
which are at constant combat readiness. The formations and
large units which are deployed closer to national boundaries
will be made up of covering troops, while the troops located
deep in the theaters of military operations will be made up
of the main forces of the first operational echelon. The
second operational echelon will be composed of formations and
large units of the internal military districts and of some
large units of the border military districts which need to
complete their mobilization. Irrespective of the availability
of troops comprising the first and second operational echelons,
strategic reserves of all types, subordinate to the High
Command, may be deployed in the theaters of military operations.
Depending on the plan proposed for impending operations,
combat deployment must support the conduct of any and all
operations. At the same time, combat deployment and the
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creation of operational-strategic groupings must be
sufficiently flexible to permit rapid transition to an
alternate deployment plan conforming to new conditions
at the beginning of a war if the proposed plans are
nullified. The complexity of such a supplementary or
new deployment is confirmed by the experience of the
2nd World War. It will be even harder to accomplish
under modern conditions.
A theater of military operations, particularly
one in a zone in which deployment is impending, must
be prepared ahead of time so that combat deployment
can be carried out in a compressed time period and in
order that one's own armed forces may be used as effectively
as possible at the beginning of operations. Missile troops,
artillery, aviation, and combined-arms large units intended
for an opening strike must have the advantage of being
assured of deployment in good time (in engineering, communi-
cations and material-technical respects).
In chap..t.2.1:_glat,the authors examine specific problems
of the combat deployment of types of armed forces on the
basis of experience from the 2nd World War, from postwar
exercises, and from an analysis of the possible nature of
deployment in a future war.
A great virtue of the book under review is that the
collective authors constantly bear in mind the importance
of material-technical support and of the rear area in
strategic deployment. These problems are also examined in
a special, Kaill_glapIgx "The Deployment of the Rear Area
of Armed Forces".
By deployment of the rear area of the armed forces is
meant the full mobilization of rear services large units,
units and establishments, their concentration andoeployment
in the theaters of military operations for materiel, technical
and medical support of the troops. It is explained that the
deployment of the rear area should correspond to the concept
of the operations planned, to the grouping of forces and to
the degree of combat readiness of the large units and formations.
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Thus, there should be a minimum of prepared units and
establishments of the rear services in each border
military district (group of forces) so that support can
be given to the large units and formations in their
opening operations, pending the complete deployment of
the rear areas in the particular theater of military
operations.
Thel......41at...chapter is devoted to the problems
of the control of armed forces in the period of strategic
deployment.
As the authors correctly point out, the complexity of
the control of armed forces in the period of strategic de-
plOyment lies in the fact that powerful nuclear/missile
strikes will probably be being delivered and the formations
of types of armed forces which are at constant readiness
will probably be conducting the opening operations simul-
taneously with the full mobilization, concentration and
deployment of the troops. During this period aontrol must
be exercised on the basis of plans drawn up in peacetime,
taking into consideration the actual developments of the
situation at the beginning of a war. Major difficulties in
the control of deployment can arise because of great destruc-
tion of transport, or an abrupt change in the military-polit-
ical and strategic situation. The operational plan in in-
dividual theaters of military operations may therefore be
partially changed, and consequently the introduction of
changes into the plans for concentration and deployment may
also be required.
Thus, the entire system of control must be as stable as
possible, in order to withstand strikes by modern means of
armed combat and to preserve continuity at all levels in the
complex situation of the initial period of a nuclear/missile
war.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the book is
written from the vantage point of Marxist-Leninist teaching
on war, in the light of the requirements of the Central
Committee of the CPSU and of our Party documents, and reflects
modern views on the problems of strategic deployment in a
future war with complete correctness.
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