MILITARY THOUGHT: PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIAIR DEFENSE OF THE GROUND TROOPS AND WAYS TO RESOLVE THEM, BY COLONEL V. ZEMSKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029800260001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 6, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Problems in the Development of Antiair Defense
of the Ground Troops and
Ways to Resolve Them*
by
Under modern conditions, the role of antiair defense has
grown so much that the course and outcome of ground troop op-
erations depend to a large extent on its effectiveness.
This is conditioned by the fact that our probable enemies
consider a nuclear offensive, in which the leading role is
assigned to missiles and aircraft~to be the main substance
of the first strategic operation of the united Armed'Forces
of NATO in the initial period of a war. The goal of such
an offensive is to achieve,,in a short period of time, nuclear
superiority, supremacy in the air and seizure of the strategic
initiative from the very start of the war. Its scope can be
judged from the experience of the "FALLER-60" NATO maneuvers
where, during three calendar days of the nuclear offensive,
1660 nuclear strikes were conditionally delivered, and up
to 5000 aircraft, and also a large number of cruise missiles,
"Thor" ballistic missile launchers, URS (upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy
snaryad - guided missiles) and NURS (neupravlyayemyy reaktivnyy
snaryad - free rockets) of the ground troops participated.
Effective combat with this large number of carriers of nuclear
charges represents one of the most important tasks of the
ground troops in conducting operations during the entire
war.
In the light of this, it should be noted that the work
being reviewed has great theoretical and practical signifi-
cance. Its authors, examining the most important problems 50X1-HUM
of ground troop PWO, took a basically new tenet as the basis of
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their investigation, which consists of the fact that
antiair defense has now outgrown the framework of support
and is one of the main component parts of the substance of
troop combat operations, directed toward the destruction
in the air of the enemy's basic carriers of nuclear weapons--
his aircraft and missiles, 50X1-HUM
Proceeding from this concept, in the first chapter the
influence of modern troop combat operations on the organi-
zation of antiair defense is correctly brought to light,
and the basic requirements for it, resulting from the
peculiarities of the operations of the air enemy under the
conditions of a nuclear/missile war and the employment
of new attack weapons by him, are validly formulated. It
is stressed that the antiair defense weapons of the ground
troops, by their active operations to destroy enemy air-
craft and missiles, actually participate in the struggle
for nuclear superiority over the enemy.
The process of changing weapons of air attack has
unavoidably required a sound determination of the line
of further development Of the antiair defense weapons
of the ground troops. This most important question is
examined in the second chapter,
For combatting operational-tactical ballistic missiles,
it is proposed to have special weapons., antimissile mis-
siles, and for destroying high-speed piloted aircraft and
cruise missiles at all altitudes, antiaircraft guided
missiles of three types: --long-range (ZUR-D) (zenitnaya
upravlyayemaya raketa-dalnyaya), --intermediate and short
range (ZUR-S) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa - srednyaya)
and (ZUR-M) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa - malaya).
These types of missiles must comprise the basis of the
antiair defense of ground troops; Close action antiair-
craft guided missiles (ZUR-B) (zenitnaya upravlyavemaya
raketa - blizhnyaya) manual and mounted (ruchnaya i stankovaya)
are recommended as the basic means of cL.mbat with low-flying)
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mainly low-speed, aerial targets.
Concerning small-caliber antiaircraft artillery
and fighter aviation, in the work it is pointed out
that so far they have not yet lost their significance,
but they will be ousted by antiaircraft guided missiles,
as the weapons having the greatest future promise. It
is possible to agree with this only in regard to anti-
aircraft artillery, Nevertheless, the authors persis- 50X1-HUM
tently adhere to the idea that there is a need to
improve antiaircraft artillery)even to create new
models of multiple small-caliber antiaircraft artil-
lery with autonomous radar sights, The question
arises, is there any sense in expending considerable
scientific-technical and productive efforts to create
new models of these weapons? Isn't it better to work
out more quickly, and introduce into the troops,
the most effective antiaircraft guided missiles of
all types?
The conclusions of the authors concerning fighter
aircraft;,in our opinion, are premature and not quite
correct, Modern fighter aircraft, armed with "air-
to-air" class missiles, are, at the present time,
one of the basic means of antiair defense, In the
future their significance and proportion in the over-
all system of antiair defense will undoubtedly decrease.
However, it is impossible to fully replace them with
antiaircraft missiles, and is hardly advisable, be-
cause both fighter aircraft and antiaircraft missiles
have their merits and deficiencies, which can be com-
pensated, and,consequently,,continuous reliable antiair
defense may be achieved only by joint use of all the
forces and weapons of the PVO,
The tactical-technical requirements for all the
weapons of ground troop antiair defense are, in our
opinion, basically determined correctly in the book.
But the proposed combat altitude of long-range and
medium--range antiaircraft guided missiles is the same -
from 2 to 4 to 25 to 30 km, It seems to us that these
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figures are only applicable for medium-range missiles.
For long-range antiaircraft guided missiles it is
necessary to increase them to 35 to 40 km. The ceil-
ing of enemy aircraft operations now has already
reached 25 to 30 km, and for automatic b alto ons of
strategic designation--30 to 35 km, And, undoubtedly,
in the near future the flight altitude of these 50X1-HUM
weapons will increase.
In order to conduct modern operations, the aver-
age tempo of which reaches 100 km per calendar day,
it is necessary to have highly maneuverable PVO weapons.
The existing (S-?75) missile complexes are not maneuver-
able enough because of the low mobility, not only of
the launching mounts, but mainly of the missile guidance
stations. However, the authors have not examined this
question and have not formulated the scientifically
based tactical-technical requirements for the missile
guidance and target allocating stations which must be in-
cluded in future antiaircraft missile complexes.
In examining the fundamentals of the operational-
tactical employment of troop antiair defense weapons
and the most acceptable ways to resolve the problems of
firing against aerial targets (Chapter Three), in the
beginning the authors give brief recommendations for
employing antimissile weapons that are not yet avail-
able in the armament of the troops. Despite the fact
that these recommendations are presented in a theoreti-
cal way, they may be examined as the basis for the prac-
tical combat employment of those antimissile missiles
that will enter the armament.
In the book being reviewed, the bases for employing
antiaircraft missile weapons are presented in a fairly
detailed manner, based on theoretical research and a
collation of accumulated experience. It is stressed 50X1-HUM
that the employment of long-range and intermediate-
range antiaircraft guided missiles, because they are
a means of zonal cover, must have a clearly expressed
operational nature. Short-range antiaircraft guided
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missiles may be used for both zonal and direct covering
of troops and objectives. Therefore their grouping
must have an operational-tactical or only a tactical 50X1-HUM
nature. Recommendations on the grouping of missile
units are also argued with adequate conviction and may
be incorporated into the basis of p2?actical activity;
in creating them it is necessary to observe the prin-
ciple of deep echelonment, including the larger part
of them in the first, most powerful, echelon of the PVO.
In modern operations, observance ofthe principle
of continuity in covering troops and objectives attains
exceptionally great significance. In investigating
this question special attention should be given to the
organization of coordination of antiaircraft guided
missiles with fighter aviation in order to ipsure true
continuity of troop PVO in an offensive and the organi-
zation of the employment of antiaircraft missile units
during combat operations conducted at a tempo of more
than 4 km per hour.
However, the possibility of further increasing the
tempo of an offensive is not sufficiently considered in
the work. Only one version of displacement is given and
it is stressed that continuity of troop cover will be
disrupted with an average offensive tempo of more than
4 km per hour. Consequently, during pursuit, when troops
will be moving at higher tempos, this task cannot be
performed at all. However, the organization of coordin-
ation of antiaircraft guided missiles with fighter avia-
tion, with the goal of insuring continuity of troop cover
during an offensive operation, has not been examined at
all.
Under modern conditions, in view of the fact that
the most varied, including high-speed, weapons of aerial 50X1-HUM
attack exist, the problem of organizing coordination
between antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aviation
has become considerably more complicated. On the whole,
in the work the basic propositions are correctly formula-
ted on these three types of coordination: --distributing
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efforts by zones; in one zone, and by time. The most
complex and at the same time the most effective in
practice, is the organization of coordination by means
of distributing efforts in one zone. It should be
expected that this very question will be given the greatest
attention. Unfortunately, very few specific practical
recommendations on it are given. 50X1-HUM
The problem of organizing radio countermeasurest/
against the air enemy in ground troop operations is fairly
new. Nevertheless the authors were able to formulate
the basic tasks of radio countermeasures fairly accurately
and correctly and point out the general scheme for the
utilization atid the principles for organizing the combat
operations of these means. However the recommendations
made require comprehensive practical checking. On the
whole it is essential to continue constantly and persis-
tently to work on this problem.
Questions of methods for determining the required
quantity of the basic active weapons of antiair defense
are thoroughly- brought to light in 'the work. However
the collective authorship proceeded from the potential
scale and nature of the operations of the enemy's
weapons of aerial attack according to data for only up
to the beginning of 1960. In a problematical work the
nature of possible changes in the development of these
weapons should have been pointed'outin general terms.
The reader who will use the data on the quantitative
and qualitative composition of the aviation-missile
grouping of the probable enemy must keep in mind that
even now it has already undergone substantial changes.
This is especially applicable as far as the missile
weapons are concerned. Besides, it should be taken into
consideration that since 1960 the NATO Command has begun
widescale adoption of carrier-borne aircraft, which was
not so in the past, and also "Thor" and "Polaris" missiles-
to participate in a nuclear offensive and to support 50X1-HUM
combat operations of the ground troops.
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In principle, the method for determining the
required number of active PVO weapons for front troops, 50X1-HUM
proposed by the authors, is acceptable. But a slightly
overestimated version of the composition of the front
troops was used as the basis of the calculation. Exper-
ience from operational-strategic exercises of the last
few years shows that the composition of the front troops
usually includes only 17 to 20 up to 25 to 26 combined-
arms divisions, and not 26 to 3 5,as indicated on page 89.
And in the future, in our opinion, the composition of
the front, as the number of nuclear weapons allocated for
an operation increases, can only decrease somewhat, but
not increase. Besides~in the given version of the cal-
culation, it is not pointed out which operation is being
carried out by the front, defensive or offensive. Con-
sequently.,some abstract version of the amount of active
PVO weapons required by the front troops is proposed.
This would be justified only if the authors considered
that such a factor as the nature of the operations of
the troops being covered does not influence this. Butt
on page 80, they themselves point out that .the nature
of the use of the troops being covered in an operation
and a battle" should be taken into consideration.
Moreover.on pages 208 and 213 (tables 17 and 18), two more
versions of the composition of the active PVO weapons of
the front are given, but here separately for offensive
and defensive operations.
On the whole, despite the fact that this question
is given a great deal of attention, it is still stated
in a contradictory manner and without adequate bases.
In our opinion, when determining the required quantity
of active PVO weapons, it is most correct first of all
to take into consideration the nature and the proposed
scope of the front operation, and in all".cases to be
guided by this, together with consideration of other
factors.
Up until recently, many varying opinions and views
existed on questions of the control of PVO troops and
their coordination, both in theory and in practice.
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In our opinion the authors, onthe basis of a thorough
analysis of theoretical research and accumulated exper-
ience in the troops, were able, on the whole, to make
completely correct conclusions and practical recommenda-
tions (Chapter Four). 50X1-HUM
It is stressed completely fairly that under modern
conditions the front must carry out only operational con-
trol of all the PVO weapons of the front. The functions
of tactical control should be given to the army level.
In connection with this, in the front and army; it is
proposed to have a PVO troop staff or a control organ
that would be capable of insuring firm and continuous
direction of all PVO weapons during an operation. But
having, on the whole, made a-correct conclusion-concerning
the inadvisability of carrying out tactical functions at
the front level, the authors for some reason recommend
that the chief of the PVO troops of the front should
have part of the PVO weapons under his direct control,
while failing to point out the purpose for which-these
means are necessary, as well as specifically how. and
by whom their fire will be controlled.
Reliable cover from nuclear strikes of the main rear
area objectives, especially missile-technical units and
also of transportation centers, has great significance.
The authors correctly stress that with the modern spatial
scope of operations it is impossible successfully to per-
form this task without creating control organs for
PVO weapons within the front rear area headquarters.
For effective control of modern PVO weapons, the authors
of the reviewed book propose the creation of a special
autonomous system of communications. In addition, the need
to use the channels of the combined-arms communications
system for the control of PVO troops of the front (army)
is pointed out. At the given stage of the development of com-
munications equipments this, for the time being, is the
most correct resolution of the above problem.
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In the work a great deal of attention is
given to an examination of the problem of comprehen- 50X1-HUM
sive automation of the processes for controlling
active PVO weapons. It is stressed that when solving
this problem the required speed for transmitting
data and commands, maximum centralization of the
control of the basic active PVO means, and correct
organization of coordination among them must be in-
sured. The rapid development of aerial attack and
PVO weapons already requires ara.immediate practical
solution of this problem. But having resolved it in
the shortest possible time, it will be difficult to
count on the successful fulfilment of the tasks
that face the PVO troops. The recommendations devel-
oped by the authors on this question, taking into con-
sideration projected tendencies in the development of
communications and control equipment and prospects.
of domestic science and technology, can, in our opinion,
also be incorporated into the basis for resolving
the problem of the comprehensive automation of the
processes of controlling PVO weapons.
Support of the combat operations of the PVO troops
of the ground troops is examined in a special fifth
chapter. In this, special stress is laid on radar
support.
In modern operations success in the antiair
defense of troops depends, to a great degree, on the
timely and complete receipt of necessary intelligence
and target designation data by all the active PVO
weapons simultaneously. Having analyzed the capabili-
ties of the existing system of radar support for PVO
weapons of the front and army, the authors have come
to the correct conclusion -that it is not only not
capable of providing all the active PVO weapons with
data simultaneously, but is not even capable of pro- 50X1-HUM
viding each of them singly (page 148).
The proposals of the authors on radar support are
basically fully acceptable. However, for some reason,
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the work does not take into consideration those means
of reconnaissance and target designation that the anti-
aircraft missile large units and units have at their
disposal. At the present time, and in the near future,
they should be examined as a very substantial reserve
of radar equipment in the hands of the chief of the 50X1-HUM
PVO troops of the front (army). The indicated equip-
ment can play a very important part in case operating
radar posts, in those areas where combat formations
of antiaircraft missile units and large units are
deployed, are put out of commission. It seems to us
that this question deserves investigation and practical.
verification in the troops.
In the reviewed work the authors devote a great
deal of attention to providing PVO troops with missiles
and, in our opinion, came to the correct conclusion,
that it is impossible precisely to plan the expenditure
of missiles by days of an operation.7 because it depends
on the intensity of the air enemy's operations. And
this factor, as is known, cannot be predicted accurately
in advance. However,when presenting practical recom-
mendations, the authors depart from this conclusion
and still propose planning the expenditure of missiles
released for the front by days of the operation, and
even hold to the tentatively planned expenditure of
missiles by days of the operation for the front. It
seems to us that the authors are acting incorrectly
in artificially limiting the expenditure of antiair-
craft missiles and antimissile missiles. Obviously,
it will be limited mainly by technical capabilities.
If there is still a need to plan the expenditure of
missiles by days of the operation, then it is more
advisable to take the technical capabilities for
assembling, equipping and delivering the missiles to
fire subunits and units as the basis of the plan,
taking into consideration the extremely tentative
nature of the air enemy's operations.
Effectiveness in the operations of PVO weapons,
to a large extent, depends on their rapid and high
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quality engineer support. And we fully support the
authors, who write about the urgent need to have
organic engineer subunits, equipped with modern
highly efficient and portable equipment.,in the PVO 50X1-HUM
troops of the ground troops.
In the sixth chapter the future organizational
structure of the PVO troops of the ground troops is
examined. Several versions of how large units, units
and subunits should be organized are proposed. On
the who.le)the recommendations have many positive
features, but they require checking in practice.
Thus, according to the opinion of the authors, in
the tank and motorized-rifle division it is more
advisable to have a regiment of close action anti-
aircraft guided missiles than a regiment of ZUR-M.
According to our deep conviction, both divisions must
have antiaircraft missile regiments with short-range
missiles composed of 3 to 4 fire units, and in the
motorized-rifle and tank regiment there must be a
battery of mounted close action antiaircraft guided
missiles composed of 3 to 4 mounts. We base this
on the fact that in modern operations, the operations
of large units and units on separate axes and in
broader zones will be most characteristic. This will
require the large units to have great independence in
reliably covering troops from strikes by the air enemy.
In addition, it is also necessary to take into con-
sideration the fact that motorized-rifle and tank large
units and units, having ground missiles, tanks, and
artillery in their composition, have great fire and
striking power, and will be the most important objec-
tives for a strike by the air enemy. For this reason,
they must be reliably and continuously covered during
the entire operation, not only at low, but also at
medium, altitudes, which can be accomplished more simply
and reliably when there are both close action antiair-
craft missiles and ZUR--M in the composition of the
division.
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On the whole the proposed organization of a
brigade of medium-and short-range antiaircraft
guided missiles corresponds to modern requirements,
but even the brigade, in our opinion, must have no
less than three regiments or battalions (with three
fire units in each) in its composition. By having.
brigades composed of three regiments (battalions)., it
will be possible to achieve continuity in covering
troops during an offensive conducted at an average 50X1-HUM
tempo of 6 km per hour.
In the last chapter the fundamentals of the
antiair defense of troops in offensive and in de,
fensive front (army) operations of the initial period
of a war are set forth. Under these conditions, the
PVO of the troops and rear area objectives of deploy-
ing fronts will be carried out only with those weapons
that are at the disposal of the troops of the first
strategic echelon, i::e.,formations and large units of
the border military districts and groups of .or_Ces.
In the reviewed work, the requirement that the anti-
aircraft missile units, fighter aviation and radio
countermeasure means existing in groups of farces and
in border military districts, must be at full strength,
deployed, and be in constant combat readiness to con-
duct active combat with enemy weapons of aerial attack,
is correctly formulated. It should be stressed that
this requirement has an extremely important signifi-
cance when the aggressor is preparing for a surprise
nuclear attack. Experience from the past war con-
clusively showed that the success Of the attacking
side was usually explained not only by,the factor
of surprise, but also by the:.incomplete combat readi-
ness of the armed forces.
In conclusion, it is essential to stress that all
the deficiencies noted by us are of a specific nature.,
and cannot lower, as a whole, a highly positive evalu-
ation 9f the work. The reviewed book is the first one
oni.t11e, given subject in the postw.ar_, period. The 50X1-HUM
authors deserve great credit for being able to create '
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a really problematical and perceptive work. It
does not reiterate principles..that are common knowledge,
but creatively, on the basis of an analysis of the
modern requirements of operational art and scientific-
technical capabilities, trends, probable paths of
development, and solutions to-the vitally important
problems of the PVO of the ground troops are brought
to light and practical, acceptable recommendations
are given. The work examined by us may be adopted as
the basis for a practical resolution of the basic
problems of PVO of the ground troops, not only for
the present time but also for the near future.
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