COMBAT WITH ENEMY NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, FREE ROCKETS, AND GUIDED MISSILES IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF AN ARMY (CONCLUSION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
29
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 13, 2012
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 4, 1962
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8.pdf | 1.21 MB |
Body:
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~ SFPRFT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. G.
IRONBARK
MEMORANDUM FOR; The Acting Director o~ Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free
Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensive
and Defensive Operations of an Army
(Conclusion and Bibliography)
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of the conclusion,
appendix, and bibliography of a seven-chapter TOP SECRET Soviet
publication entitled "Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free
Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensive and Defensive Oper-
ations of an Army'?. It was issued by Scientific-Research
Artillery Institute No. 1 in Leningrad in October 1960.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IIZONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP
SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material.
The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be
used only among persons authorized to read and handle this
material.
3. In the interests of prgtecting our source, IRONBARK
material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within
your office. Requests for extra copies of this report_or for
utilization of any part of this document in any other form
should be addressed to the origitnating office.
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
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CG
[IRONBARK
Originals The Director of Central Y~tel~$gence
cc: The Director~of~Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief~of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided INissiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific $ntelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation
Center
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IRONBARK
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT : Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free
Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensive
and Defensi,ue Operations of an Array
(Conclusion.and Bibliography)
DATE OF INFO ; October 1960
APPRAISAL 0~'
CONTENT ; Documentary
SOURCE A reliable source (B)
Following is a verbatim translation of the Conclusion
and Bibliography of a TOP SECRET Soviet publication
titled "Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets,
and Guided Missiles in Offensive and Defensive Operations
o! an Array". This document contains.se.ve:n. chapters and
was published on 15 October 1960 by Scientific -Research
Artillery .Institute No, 1?f.n Leningrad. Each chapter
will be disseminated as it becomes available and is
translated.
In some casesv, there are imperfections in the
original text which leave doubt as to the accuracy of
translation. Question marks are inserted in brackets
following uncertain words or phrases. Ae in other
IRONBARK reports, transliterated Cyrillic letters axe
underlined in translation, while Greek and Roman letters
are given .as in the original.
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Sf~RET
IRONBARK
Conclusion
The armed forces of our potential enemies have
at their disposal various types of nuclear attack
weapons. The bulk of these weapons consists at
present of tactical and operational-tactical weapons.
In view of this, combat with the enemy's tactical and
operational-tactical nuclear attack weapons becomes a
matter of exceptional importance.
Combat with the enemy's tactical, and to some
extent with his operational-tactical, nuclear attack
weapons cannot be organized on the scale of a front
alone. For carrying on this combat a front must con-
centrate in its hands control of all types and means
of -intelligence and all weapons for inflicting damage
on the enemy, which are deployed in a comparatively
narrow zone stretching for hundreds of kilometers.
Naturally, it is impossible to centralize control at
the front level of all the forces and weapons, brought
in to combat all the enemy's nuclear attack weapons
without exception. Consequently, the front cannot
be the sole organizer of this combat.
The organization of combat with the enemy's
nuclear attack weapons should be carried out at two
echelons or levels: in the front and in the army,
The best version of dividing the tasks in organizing
this combat is for the front to organize in detail
combat with the enemy's operational-tactical nuclear
attack weapons with the forces and weapons directly
subordinate to it (taking into account the capabilities
of the operational-tactical missiles of the armies),
and to restrict itself to giving general directions
only regarding combat with the enemy's tactical nuclear
attack weapons, while the army organizes in detail
combat with the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons,
taking into consideration the tasks which it has been
given by the front for combat with the enemy's opera-
tional-tactical nuclear attack weapons.
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SEC
ET
IRONBARK
In accordance with this, the army must have at
its disposal the necessary .intelligence forces and
means to ensure fulfilment of the tasks with which it
is faced .
It is necessary to note that the :intellig.e,nce
means now in existence can fulfil the requirements for
combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons to a certain
extent.
However, for this it is necessary to create an
efficient system of control of these forces and means,
and, in the first place, to take all measures to re-
duce the time spent on target designation in the case
of such important and mobile targets as nuclear attack
weapons on firing or launching positions,
Bearing in mind the improvement and strengthening
of the antiair defense troops of our probable enemies
and the development of new, more perfected and mobile
nuclear attack weapons, it is essential to pay the
most serious attention to the most rapid development
of new pilotless means of reconnaissance, which would
be capable of fully replacing the existing means of
aerial artillery reconnaissance and of getting accurate
information very quickly regarding the enemy's nuclear
weapons .
The investigations. carried out in this Judy, show
that combat with the enemy.'s tactical nuclear attack
weapons is one of the main tasks for our tactical
missiles and gun artillery. In this connection it is
necessary to note that the views held hitherto re-
garding the limited capabilities of gun artillery in
combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons; are not in
accordance with the facts. Gun artillery is capable
of combatting the enemy's nuclear attack weapons
successfully. Moreover, for carrying on this combat,
i.e., for neutralization and destruction of these
weapons, it is not necessary, as was thought before,
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ET
IRONBARK
to expend an enormous quantity of ammunition and to
concentrate a large quantity of artillery. From the
information given in this study, it is evident that in
the conditions that have been laid down, fire for
destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack weapons re-
quires a comparatively small expenditure of ammunition
and the employment, as a rule, of two or three batteries,
i.e., not more than one battalion of artillery. This
circumstance changes the significance and role of gun
artillery considerably, and shows that at the present
time gun artillery remains one of the main fire weapons
of an army .
The short time that nuclear attack weapons remain
on their firing (launching) positions poses exceptionally
exacting requirements in the speed of carrying out a
strike against them or in the preparation of fire for
destroying these weapons. Timely opening of fire or
delivery of strikes at the targets is the most important
condition for successful combat with the enemy's nuclear
attack weapons.
Under modern conditions, the destruction or neu-
tralization of the enemy's nuclear weapons must not be
postponed to a ~5pe.cific time, as, for instance, the
neutralization of enemy batteries was postponed duting
the Second World War until the time of the artillery
preparation for the assault. If the enemy battery
(platoon, gun or launcher) is not destroyed immediately
on the position it occupies, it will remain whole and
undamaged, as it will most certainly not stay on one
and the same position, especially after firing a nuclear
projectile.
Under modern conditions, there shou~ci also be no
delay in delivering a strike at a target or in opening
fire to destroy it. Delay in opening fire or making a
strike at the target will have the consequence that the
target will escape destruction.
~ SEQRET
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~ SECXET
{RONBARK
Thus, reduction of the time taken for opening
fire at targets of opportunity is one of the chief ,
if not the most important requirements both for or-
ganizing combat with the enemy's nuclear attack weapons,
and for those weapons and that armament which will be
employed in this combat,
In accordance with this, in developing new models
of weapons and in perfecting the combat employment of
those weapon models which are or can be used to destroy
the enemy's nuclear weapons, it is essential to make
every effort to ensure that their preparation for firing
(launching) should require considerably less time than
that required for the preparation for firing (launching)
of the enemy's comparable weapons, Or, in other words,
the weapons employed for combat with nuclear weapons
must be better as regards their basic tactical-technical
characteristics than the enemy's similar weapons.
There is no'doubt that the solution of these and
certain other questions mentioned in this report will
ensure favorable conditions for successful combat with
the enemy's nuclear attack weapons,
The recommendations made in this study regarding
the organization and conduct of combat with the eiemy's
nuclear attack weapons should be tested at
tactical and operational-tactical exercises .of tl~e~ troops.
Responsible author ~ispolnitel~
Senior scientific worker of the 2nd Department
Guards Lieutenant-Colonel ................(KURBATOV)
Author
Senior scientific worker of the 2nd Department
Lieutenant-Colonel ,...>,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(FILIPPOV)
~SFC~iRFT
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IRONBARK
Appendix
Graphs for the determination of Rp and P dependent
on d when the elliptical error of fire has the
characteristics Vp and E
For drawing up the graphs we calculated the
coefficients 1'Ltaking into account the probability of a
hit in a circle with a radius R , dependent on the
characteristics of the elliptical error of fire (gip
and E) and of the displacement d of the center of -
dispersion in relation to the center of the circle.
The values of the coefficients n, were determined
by using the equation:
R,.
K r+ d = K r + d
- _,,P ~ ~ Vp
(1)
To determine n,it is necessary:
to take the values P, E_, and d'+, when Vp = 1;
~p -
by means of P and E to find the value of the
circular error r (in.Vp), equivalent to the
probability of the elliptical error;
to express d in terms of rand, making use of
~p
the graphs K = ~ (P, der ) , for the given values
of P, to determine the values of the coefficients
K;
- to substitute the corresponding values axrived at
in the formula (1) and to calculate R,= f (P, d, E) .
E ET
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IRONBARK
In calculating the coefficients rluse was made of
the graphs K ~- f (P, d, r) and the values.`. _ (P, E)
given in the study (15)?~ T
It should be noted that in calculating coefficient
R , use can also be made of the data in Table 3B, given
in the study (18).
The procedure for calculating the coefficient it
is given in the form of an example.
Example:
Calculate the value of coefficient R for d =
1 Vp , P = 80% and E 0.5.
Solution: 1. for P = 80~ and E = 0.5 ~r= f (P, E)=
0.7$2Vp;
and r as d =
2, we express d = 1V
p
1 _ 1 .29 ; -
0-'T~~
3. for d = 1.29 rand P = 80% K = f-(P, d,'r)
= 1.9;
4. using formula (1) we findrL= 1.9 x Q782
+ 1 = 2,485,
The values of the coefficient rtfor the various d,
P, and E , which have been calculated in a similar way,
are given in the table.
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IRONBARK
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