MILITARY THOUGHT : SOME CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NATO ARMED FORCES MANEUVERS, BY COLONEL I. MILEVSKIY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029800070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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FOREIGN ARMED FORCES SURVEY
Some Conclusions Concerning NATO Armed Forces
Maneuvers
by
Colonel I. Milevskiy
. In the NATO Command's system of military measures,
a prominent place is occupied by operational-tactical
training for the combined armed forces of the bloc,
overall direction of which is carried out by the
Supreme High Commands in Europe and on the Atlantic,
as well as by the principal commands in the theaters
of military operations, One of the most important
forms of such training is exercises and maneuvers.
What distinguishing features can be noted in
the operational training of NATO's Armed Forces?
First of all, large-scale exercises and man-
euvers are carried out in the context of the initial
stage of a war which, in the opinion of the NATO
Command, will decisively influence the further
course of the war and, possibly, the outcome of the
war altogether. The goals of the exercises are to
examine and work out problems in organizing and
conducting combined operations of all branches of
the armed forces and of the individual branches
as well, to check on possible variations in operation-
al-strategic war plans, and to increase the overall
combat readiness of all troops. In this connection,
special attention is devoted to the problems of
conducting nuclear operations which are considered
to be of primary importance. 50X1-HUM
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The exercises and maneuvers carried out are
combined and multi-staged. Participating in them
are commands and staffs, from the level of divisions
and separate units of combined ground troops and an
air wing, and of corresponding levels of command of 50X1-HUM
naval forces, up to the staff of the Supreme High
Command in a theater of war. Such exercises are
considered the most typical for combat conditions
and permit the working out of coordination between
the branches of armed forces, the arms of troops,
and the various command levels.
The commands, staffs and troops which participate
in the maneuvers operate primarily on those lines and
operational axes on which it is assumed combat operations
will be conducted. A complex operational-strategic
situation is created for the exercises.
The combined method is usually used in conducting
exercises, i.e., combining command-staff and troop
exercises. Formations and large units of ground
troops down to a division and a separate unit subordin-
ate to a corps and army usually use the command-staff
method. Their units of nuclear artillery, guided
missiles, and free rockets participate in the exercises
with limited personnel. Troop exercises are sometimes
conducted along some of the operational axes. The
exercises include not only the staffs of large units
and formations from the combined air forces, but also
aviation units which work out practical flight assign-
ments. In this connection, the air forces conduct
exercisesusing the method of two opposing sides. In
this method the aviation PVO units, together with the
other PVO forces and means, represent the "defending"
side, while the tactical, strategic and aircraft
carrier aviation act as the "attacking" side, deliver-
ing strikes against simulated targets on the territory
of NATO member countries. Naval forces use approximate-
ly the same methods in conducting exercises as the air
forces. 50X1-HUM
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The majority of these exercises are characterized
by a combined and comprehensive study and working out
of the problems relating to the organization and
conduct of strategic operations and armed combat in
general. 50X1-HUM
In the opinion of the NATO Command, modern
warfare embraces all aspects of military and civilian
life. In this connection, not only commands and staffs
participate in exercises, but also numerous quasi-
military (poluvo.yentiyy) and civilian organizations
which are directly or indirectly involved in military
planning- and in procurement for the armed forces.
Among these are military-territorial organs, para-
military organizations (for example, the heimvern in
Denmark and Norway), central and provincial communi-
cations '.Organss, health departments, surface, air,
river and sea transport, economic and interior affairs
ministries, etc.
During the exercises considerable attention is
devoted to working out such problems as bringing the
armed forces-.to a state of combat readiness in acc-
ordance with the system of alerts now existing in
NATO; the use of nuclear weapons; the organization
of reliable control over all levels, all types of
intelligence, antinuclear and antiair defense; and
materiel, technical and medical supply.
During recent years, it has been noted that
operational-strategic exercises and maneuvers of the
NATO A.xmed Forces have been highly intensified.
Army multi-stage exercises are usually held twice a
year and last 3 to 5 days each, while combined,
multi-stage exercises involving army groups and
combined tactical air commands are held once or
twice a year, and last 4 to 6 days each. Once or
twice a year a multi-stage exercise is held involving
the armed forces of a theater of military operations
and a theater of war and lasts 5 to 6 days, while
every three years comprehensive maneuvers are held
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of the combined armed forces of the entire bloc and
last 10 to 12 days.
Along with this, a large number of specialized
exercises are also held. Among these are exercises
on supplying ammunition and other items to nuclear
weapons units, communications exercises, aerial
reconnaissance exercises, exercises on the evacu-
ation of non-combat personnel of the armed foredo,
and a number of other so-called stand ,rd (tipovpy)
exercises.
The content and goals of operational preparation
are particularly evident in the NATO combined armed
forces maneuvers designated "FALLEX 60" which were
held from 20 Se itember to 1 October 1960 simultaneously
in all European Theaters of Military Operations and
in the Eastern Atlantic, including the English Channel.
During the 12 years of NATO's existence, two such
maneuvers have been had, in 1953 and 1957. However,
the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers exceeded all previous man-
euvers with respect to the composition of the partici-
pating staffs, formations and large units of ground,
air, and naval forces and of civilian organs; and
with respect to its-scope and particularly the goals
and nature of the tasks that were to be carried out.
Also, they were the largest in NATO's history. They
culminated the training of commands and staffs at
all .evels, and also checked the combat readiness of
the bloc as a whole.
The maneuver area, north to south, extended
from the North Cape in Northern Norway to the Island
of Malta in the Mediterranean, more than 4,000
kilometers; and east,-west ' from the eastern boundary
of Turkey to the Island of Madeira in the Atlantic,
about 6,400 kilometers. These figures show that the
American-British bloc is preparing not for a local
war so much as for a world war.
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Participating in the maneuvers were all the
commands and staffs in the European Theaters of Military
Operations in the Eastern Atlantic and English Channel
area, important air and naval forces, and several
large units and units of NATO ground-troops,, principally
nuclear weapons units. Also present from all European
NATO countries, with the exception of Portugal and Ice-
land, were the general staffs and the main staffs of
the branches of the armed forces, PVO staffs and units,
and a large number of diverse military add civilian
agencies engaged in military planning problems,
The basic goal of the maneuvers was to check the
work of commands, staffs and national organs, to work
out operations of NATO' combined armed forces (princi-
pally air, naval and missile units) in conducting
joint operations, particularly nuclear, during the
initial stage in the European Theater of War, and to
raise the overall combat readiness of the armed forces.
The "FALLEX 60" maneuvers consisted of 20 exercises,
conducted according to a single strategic concept in
two stages. The first stage, from 20 to 24 September,
covered the period`from Dl to D4, i.e., basically the
first four , days of war; the second stage, from 26 to
30 September, covered the operational period Dll to
D15 inclusively.
What did the first stage of the maneuvers look
like, and what were the basic conclusions to be derived
from its concept, its progress while under way,, and
its results?
Eleven exercises were carried out during the
first stage, the most important of which were "FLASH
BACK-1" and "SWORD THRUST-1".
The"FLASH BACK-l" Exercise was carried out mainly
in the Central European, inc uding the territory of
Great Britain, and the South European Theaters of
Military Operations. It covered the period D1 to D3,
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an elapsed time of about 60 hours from the start of
military operations.
During the exercise, commands and staffs worked
out operations for carrying out a nuclear attack in
the first 72 hours of war and for organizing and
conducting antiair defense and ground operations in
the Central European and Southern European Theaters
of Military Operations. Particular attention was
paid to instructing commands and staffs in the methods
of controlling subordinate troops, large units and
formations while carrying out tasks under the complex
conditions which can arise at the beginning of a
nuclear/missile war; checking the effectiveness of
the communications system; working out coordination
between the types of armed forces, the arms of troops,
as well as between the command levels of NATO and
national military and civilian organizations. Also
afforded considerable attention were problems in
organizing antinuclear defense, including studying
the effect of enemy nuclear strikes on the conduct
of operations and the progress of armed combat in
general, and the organization of materiel and
technical supply, including the replacement of
personnel losses.
The exercise "SWORD THRUST-1,11 carried out in
the Norwegian Sea, was the largest and most important
of all the naval exercises in the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers.
About 90 combat and auxiliary vessels of the U.S.,
British, Canadian, Dutch and Norwegian navies part-
icipated, including four strike carriers (two U.S.
and two British) with about 260 aircraft and heli-
copters, a heavy ASW carrier, and two cruisers armed
with surface-to-surface guided missiles (URS) and
surface-to-air guided missiles (ZURS).
This exercise represented an operation of the
NATO strike fleet in coordination with an overall
nuclear attack in the European Theater of War.
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During the exercise naval operations were worked
out for carrying out nuclear strikes against previously
designated objectives, a check was made of the fleet's
effectiveness against attacks by enemy submarines,
bomber aircraft, and missile-carrying surface vessels,
and problems were worked out for resupplying the
vessels in an area of combat operations.
Let us examine the basic elements of the initial
situation and the concept of the maneuvers, particularly
its most important part, the "FLASH BACK-1" exercise.
The commencement of military operations between
the NATO countries ("Blue") and the Warsaw Pact countries
("Orange") was preceded by a period of gradually de-
teriorating international relations, especially between
the respective leading countries of the two coalitions.
As a result of several covert undertakings of a pre-
cautionary nature by both sides, international relations
became even more aggravated. Then began a threatening
period during which both sides, under the pretext of
conducting various exercises began to carry out the
necessary minimal measures in preparing for war and
bringing the armed forces from a peacetime to a
wartime footing..
The basic concept of the maneuvers anticipated
that at the beginning of military operations the
"Orange" would concentrate large groupings of air,
-ground and missile troops on the strategic and most
important operational axes of the Central and Southern
European Theaters of Military Operations (TVD) and
that on the morning of 21 September (D-Day) they would
assume the offensive on land and in the air, in coast-
al areas with naval forces.
The basic task of the "Orange" was to destroy
the "Blue's" nuclear potential and materiel and tech-
nical reserves by delivering mass nuclear strikes with
missiles and aircraft against missile bases, airfields,
troop supply centers and other important objectives,
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thus depriving the "Blue" commanders of the possibility
of executing their planned operations.
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Simultaneously with the launching of nuclear/
missile operations, the "Orange" were to undertake
offensive operations on the land and on the sea with
the following immediate goals:
-- to destroy the main forces of the "Blue's" first
strategic echelon in the Central European Theater of
Military Operations, to seize the Ruhr and Rhine-
Palatinate industrial regions, to take possession of
beachheads on the west bank of the Rhine for a subse-
quent development of the attack into the Netherlands,
Belgium and France;
-- to take over Denmark and establish control over
the Danish Straits, thus assuring an outlet to the
Atlantic so that the navy could operate on the Atlantic
line of communications;
-- to seize the most important strategic areas in
the Southern European Theaters of Military Operations,
the northeastern part of Italy, northern Greece, the
Dardenelles and Bosphorus, and the eastern areas of
Turkey;
-- to destroy the "Blue's" merchant fleet, to
disrupt his maritime communications, and to cut off
the transport of troops, combat equipment and strategic
goods from the US to Europe and between the European
countries,
The "Blue" Command envisaged taking immediate
retaliatory action against the "Orange" by conducting
a nuclear offensive with all available forces and
weapons for the purpose of gaining nuclear and air
superiority, and to deprive the "Orange" of the
opportunity of conducting offensive operations on
the land, sea, and air. As a result of this, the
"Blue" expected to seize the strategic initiative
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and go over to a general counteroffensive with ground
forces in the Central European, and the principal axes
of the Southern European Theaters of Military Operations.
Without dwelling on the course of the first stage
of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers, we shall try to draw
several conclusions.
Above all, these maneuvers demonstrate that, in
order to solve the strategic problems in the initial
periodcf war, the NATO Command intends to conduct a
global nuclear attack with maximum use of all available
forces and weapons for the mass delivery of nuclear
weapons in the shortest possible time against targets
and objectives in the theaters of military operations,
as well as against all vitally important centers in
the countries of the Socialist Camp, above all the
Soviet Union,
The goal of the nuclear offensive is to destroy
the strategic nuclear/missile means and to inflict
major casualties on the enemy's armed forces in the
theaters of military operations, as well as to dis-
organize control; to disrupt the mobilization and
deployment of the armed forces; and to undermine the
military and economic potential and morale of Social-
ist Camp nations, and in this way create a sharp
turning point in the strategic situation in favor of
the U.8-British bloc.
To carry out these tasks, it is intended to use
the maximum possible number of forces and means cap-
able of utilizing nuclear weapons. Among such forces
and means the Americans give primary consideration to
strategic, tactical and carrier aircraft, long-range
and medium-range missiles, tactical cruise-missiles,
missile-carrying submarines and surface ships, and
missile units of the ground troops.
An analysis of the exercises and particularly
the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers permit one to conclude
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that a total nuclear attack presupposes coordinated,
independent strategic air operations (strategic
aviation and missiles) against the deep interior of
Socialist damp countries.
Thus, simultaneously with and against the operational-
strategic background of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers,
the U.S. Air Force Command carried out an exercise
designated "SEPTEMBER -1" during 20-23 September over
U.S. continental territory. The participating Strategic
Air Command staffs and units worked out problems of
conducting an, independent air operation during the
initial period of war, i.e., the participation of
strategic means in a total nuclear attack, executed
jointly with the combined Armed Forces of NATO.
The general concept and course in the first stage
of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers show that the main consid-
eration of the initial strategic operation of combined
NATO Armed'Forces is a nuclear attack in the European
Theater of War as the most important aspect in a global
nuclear attack. It was carried out in a centralized
manner under the direction of the Supreme High Commanders
of the combined Armed Forces of NATO in Europe (the
"FLASH BACK-1" Exercise) and on the Atlantic (the "SWORD
THRUST-1" Exercise) with use made of all available
forces and means.
The goal of the nuclear attack carried out within
the European Theater of War was to quickly gain nuclear
superiority and supremacy in the air and to seize the
strategic initiative from the very beginning of military
operations. The achievement of this goal presupposed
the simultaneous solution of a number of the most im-
portant tasks which in the aggregate constitute the
content of a nuclear attack.
The first and principal task confronting the
Armed Forces of NATO was to destroy nuclear/missile
means and the forward air groupings of the Warsaw
Pact countries, and to disrupt the control over missile
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units and aviation. In the fulfillment of this task,
nuclear blows were "delivered" against missiles in
firing positions and 3n missile-assembly areas, against
nuclear weapon bases and depots, against air bases and
airfields with the simultaneous destruction of aircraft
based on them, against command posts and communication
centers for missile units, against large units and
formations of the air forces, and against radiotechnical
means of detection and of guiding missiles and aviation
to their targets.
The goal of the second task was to interdict the
regrouping of troops, especially their transfer from
the depths of the operational and strategic reserves,
and to inflict heavy casualties on the reserves. At
the same time, it was proposed to disrupt the trans-
port of all types of supply into the zone of combat
operations. This task was to be fulfilled by setting
up barriers in the enemy's rear at'-gregt.'deoth The
principal obstacles to be used were soicaTTed barriers
which could be set up at the most important natural
lines of operational significance. In the Central
European Theater of Military Operations, these lines
were considered to be at the Oder, NeiSse, Elbe and
Sakle Rivers and at the mountains of the Thuringian
Forest, the Bohemian Forest and of Sumava. In the
Southern European Theater of Military Operations,
obstruction barriers were set up on the Danube and
Maritsa Rivers and on the Lju:b:l,jana:. axis. This
barrier is created by using nuclear means to destroy
railroad and highway bridges, defiles and major
junctions, and naval bases and ports in coastal areas.
And, finally, the third task which was carried
out during the course of the nuclear attack was to
use nuclear weapons to rout the main troop groupings
of t e enemy's first strategic echelon and to ensure
successful combat operations by NATO ground troops.
In carry ng out this tas , NATO troops were to carry
out mass nuclear strikes against enemy troops in
concentration areas, in their staging areas, and
against the combat formations of large units and units 50X1-HUM
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leading the attack.
The nuclear attack was to begin after the, Supreme
High Commander gave the signal permitting the use of
nuclear weapons, With the receipt of this signal, all
units and large units which were to take part in the
nuclear attack automatically and without further orders
proceeded to deliver nuclear strikes against previously
designated objectives.
Nuclear strikes were delivered against the.most
important stationary objectives without preliminary
reconnaissance, but mobile targets and certain less
important stationary targets were first subjected,
as a rule, to preliminary reconnaissance with con-
sideration being given to other tasks arising as a
result of combat actions.
According to the concept of the maneuvers, the
nuclear attack in the European 'heater was carried out
to a depth of 1,000 kilometers and more, and lasted
about 7 days. However, in actuality, during the course
of the maneuvers operations were worked out for the
units, large units and formations in the nuclear attack
only in the first 72 hours of military operations.
What means were called on to fulfil the tasks of
a nuclear attack?
To carry out this task in the European heater,
the following means were used: about 200 U.S. and
British strategic bombers, based in Europe and North
Africa; 620 tactical and 200 carrier aircraft; 60
"Thor" ballistic missile installations in Great Britain,
and 30 in West Germany; over 55 battalions of nuclear
artillery, guided missiles and free rockets.
Thus, such forces and means as were actually
available in the European Theaters of Military Operations
at that time were used in the nuclear attack.
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The air forces were the basic means of carrying
out the nuclear attack in these maneuvers. They were
first called on to destroy the enemy's nuclear/missile
means and aviation, to set up barriers and disrupt
his communications thereby, and to rout his operation-
al and strategic reserves. An important task of the
air forces was to conduct aerial reconnaissance to
ensure a successful nuclear assault. Only limited
forces of tactical aviation were called upon for the
direct support of ground troops.
The following number of combat operations for
tactical aviation was planned for the first days of
the war: first 24 hours, three sorties per plane;
second 24 hours, 1.8 sorties per plane; third
24 hours, 1.2 sorties per plane.
Judging by the activity of the air forces in
the course of the maneuvers, the allocation of tactical
aircraft efforts for carrying out the basic tasks of
a nuclear attack in the first days of combat operations
might be about as follows:
65 to 70 percent for the destruction of enemy
nuclear/missile means and aviation, as well as for
the neutralization of his missile control posts;
-- about 20 percent for the disruption of enemy
communications and for combat against his operational
and strategic reserves;
-- 10 to 15 percent for 'direct' air support to
ground troops.
However, as the tasks connected with the nuclear
attack were fulfilled, the number of tactical aircraft
used in support of ground troops increased. Thus,
during the period of nuclear assault of the "FLASH
BACK-1" Exercise the 5th and 7th U.S. Army Corps
made 110 requests for air support which were, in the
main., satisfied; and while carrying out the offensive
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operation from the 13th to the 15th days of the war
("FLASH BACK-2") more than 260 requests were made and
satisfied, or more than 2.3 times more than during the
first days of the war.
The nature of operations of the NATO naval forces
was quite varied. NATO naval strike fleets in the
Atlantic and Southern European Theaters of Military
Operations participated in the overall nuclear attack
by carrying out tasks relating to the destruction of
the enemy navy's nuclear missile forces and means,
primarily his submarine forces in bases and at sea,
as well as other objectives.
The "FALLEX 60" maneuvers showed that NATO strike
fleets continue to play a prominent part in modern
strategic operations in the initial period of a war.
This is evident just from the following data. Of the
total number of simulated nuclear strikes delivered in
the course of the nuclear attack, some 400 (about 25
percent) were delivered by carrier-based aviation of
the NATO strike fleets in the Atlantic and the Southern
European Theaters of Military Operations.
The part played by the NATO strike fleet in the
Southern European Theater was also proportionately
great. Of the total number of nuclear strikes deliver-
ed during the first 72 hours of war in this Theater
of Military Operations, more than half (54 percent)
were delivered by carrier-based aviation.
The task given the combined ground troops of
NATO during the first stage of maneuvers was to repel
or delay the enemy's advance at lines as near as ;.
possible to the national boundaries of the Warsaw Pact
countries, thus assuring the successful execution
of the nuclear attack. If the situation took an
unfavorable turn, they were to go over to holding
actions. In either of these two situations, the
basic goal of ground forces operations was to inflict
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heavy losses on the enemy's advancing troops through
the mass use of nuclear weapons and to create conditions
for a subsequent transition to a counterattack along
the most important strategic and operational axes. 50X1-HUM
The groupings of NATO ground troops adopted at
the maneuvers basically corresponded to the groupings
which exist in peacetime. Thus, in the Central
European theater at the beginning of the war, there
were 25 divisions (two of which were simulated
(ekvivalentnyy)), of which 21 were deployed in the
first echelon and four were in the reserves of oper-
ational formations. The operational density of troops
was 28 kilometers to a division. On some of the axes,
for example, in the zone of the Central Group of Armies,
the density was 35 kilometers to a division. Such a
density, in our opinion, is inadequate for the success-
ful execution of defensive operations, especially in
view of the fact that the ratio of ground troops adopted
for the maneuvers was about 1.8 to 1 in favor of the
Warsaw Pact armed forces. This deficiency of ground
troops was compensated for by the mass use of nuclear
weapons which according to the evaluation of the NATO
Command, assured the successful fulfilment' of assigned
tasks.
In contrast to previous maneuvers, in the first
48 hours of war, combat operations in the Central
European' Theater were conducted mainly in a cover'
zone 25 to 80 kilometers deep. It was considered
that only toward the end of the third day of the
operation would the "Orange" troops succeed in achiev-
ing a few tactical successes and drive a wedge into
NATO defenses to a depth of 15-25 kilometers.
It will be not without interest to examine briefly
the nature and content of other exercises carried out
during the first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers.
A two-sided exercise designated "HOLD FAST", in
which West German, Danish, British and Canadian large
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units and units totaling over 45,000 men participated,
was held in Schleswig-Holstein and Southern Jutland,
or at the junction of the Northern European and 50X1-HUM
Central European Theaters of Military Operations.
The problems of organizing and conducting a
defense on a broad front with limited forces of West
German and Danish ground troops supported by air and
naval forces were worked out during this exercise.
This exercise was characterized by the formation,
for the first time of an "Allied Corps" composed of
West German and Danish divisions and various units
of reinforcement. The NATO Command gave it the task
of defending Schleswig-Holstein and Southern Jutland,
with the main line of defense along the Kiel Canal,..
Also noteworthy was the utilization on a broad scale
of tactical airborne troops in diversionary and re-
connaissance groups charged with carrying out various
tasks in support of the advancing troops, destroying
important objectives, conducting reconnaissance
in the enemy's rear area.
The exercise "BON'E DRY", which closely resembled
the exercise "HOLD FAST" in concept and in the nature
of the tasks carried out, was conducted in the Danish
Straits. The West German and Danish naval forces
participating in it worked out the problems of setting
up a blockade in the Danish Straits in order to deny
entry into the Atlantic -to-., the navies of the Warsaw
Pact countries and to conduct a defense against land-
ings in the channel zone in coordination with ground
and air forces.
The NATO Command, judging by the experience
from the exercise, consider it unlikely that any
significant forces of the Baltic Fleet will be able
to break out into the Atlantic without having first
captured the key areas in the channel zone. A:lbng
with this, the NATO Command believes that the re-
tention of the Danish Straits by NATO Armed Forces
50X1-HUM
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will be of great: importance for operations in the
Atlantic.
The exercises "TIGER GRIS-l" and "FIRST WATCH",
which were similar in the nature of their tasks and
in the composition of their forces, were conducted in
the southern part of the North Sea and English Channel,
including the western approaches to this zone. These
exercises checked the readiness of the combined NATO
fleets and of certain national staffs and agencies in
organizing the defense of the sea lanes during the
first days of the war. The main concernshere .were
the problems of evacuating ports and dispersing
vessels and merchant ships immediately before and 50X1-HUM
in the initial days of war.
The naval forces exercise, under the designation
"BLUE SHIELD; conducted in the vicinity of Iceland
and the Faroe and Shetland Islands, was important in
the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers. The combined operations
of ships and aviation on the antisubmarine line of
Iceland and the Faroe and Shetland Islands were worked
out during this exercise for the purpose of preventing
enemy submarines from breaking out of the Norwegian
Sea into the Atlantic Ocean, i.e., Onto NATO's sea
communications lines.
Activity on the antisubmarine line during the
exercise was mainly carried out by U.S. and British
submarines, and by antisubmarine aviation operating
from the airfields in Iceland and Scotland. The
average depth of this line was 350 to 400 nautical
miles.
The exercise "PROTECTION-l", held in the Med-
iterranean Theater of Military Operations, was
participated in by all the armed forces staffs in
this theater and by the numerous agencies of Italy,
Greece, Turkey and France concerned with maritime
transport problems, as well as by up to 320 ships
and vessels and about 100 aircraft, 50X1-HUM
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This exercise checked and worked out operations
of staffs, naval forces and agencies of NATO countries
on the evacuation and dispersal. of ships and vessels
out of" bases and major ports; on the defense of mar-
itime communications and control over shipping lanes
during the initial days of war; and on the organization
of antisubmarine defen.e of the NATO strike fleet
(which participated in the nuclear attack) in the South-
ern European Theater of Military Operations. During
the course of the exercises considerable attention was
paid to working out measures for removing the effects
of enemy nuclear strikes. 50X1-HUM
The exercise "BALLAST-l" was basically concerned
with providing antisubmarine defense for convoys and
individual vessels proceeding along the coast of the
Iberian Peninsula, as well as combatting enemy sub-
marines along the western approaches to the Straits
of 'Gibraltar.
Thus, the first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers
represented, so to speak, the first stage of an initial
strategic operation, conducted jointly by all the
branches of armed forces, and in essence encompassed
the armed struggle in the European Theater of War.
No further military operations were worked out
during the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers. However, the initial
operational-Strategic situation which had taken shape
on Dr0. in the European Theater of War and which act-
ually summarized the initial strategic operation of
the combined NATO Armed Forces was drawn up for the
second stage of the maneuvers.
This initial situation was based on the assumption
that on the seventh day of the war the Armed Forces
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries bad completed
their nuclear attacksyincluding strategic nuclear
operations, in accordance with plans which had been
worked out in peacetime.
50X1-HUM
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According to theevaluation of the NATO Command,
the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries suffered
heavier losses from nuclear strikes than the Armed
Forces of NATO. This gave the latter a certain ad-
vantage in the organization and conduct of subsequent
operations on the ground, sea, and air.
It was considered that on Dli., as a result
of the successfully executed nuclear attack,the 50X1-HUM
combined Armed Forces of NATO had achieved a slight
nuclear superiority and air supremacy, had arrested
the advance of the enemy's ground troops in the Central
European and Southern European (except for the north-
eastern part of Italy) Theaters of Military Operations,
and had considerably curtailed his ability to bring up
reserves and supplies from his depth to the zone of
military operations.
By this time, also according to the evaluation
of the leadership of the maneuvers, the air forces of
the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries had lost five-sixths
of their original strength.
The advance of the Warsaw Pact troops along the
basic axes of the Central European and Southern
European Theaters of Military Operations and in
Schleswig-Holstein had been arrested or significantly
slowed down. In the Central European Theater of
Military Operations, the advance of these troops
had been stopped 130 to 160 kms east of the Rhine
along the Ruhr axis, 40 to 80 kmseast of the Rhine
along the Frankfurt axis, and 130 to 100 kms east
of the Rhine along the southern part of the Theater.
In the Southern European Theater of Military Operations,
the First Greek Army had halted the advance of the
enemy along the line of the Struma River (60 km north-
east of Salonika), while the First Turkish Army had
halted the enemy's advance 100 kms west of the
Bosphorus and 30 to 40 kms north of Gallipoli, Only
in the northeastern areas of Italy had the enemy
continued his advance, causing NATO troops to con-
duct a delaying action. 50X1-HUM
.~iwr~rie
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Thus, in spite of the loss of several forward
areas in the Central European and Southern European
Theaters of Military Operations, NATO troops continued
to hold lines which were important in an operational
and strategic sense.
As a result of the mass utilizatipon of nuclear
weapons, losses of the combined NATO ground troops
in the Central European Theater of Military Operations
were 40 to 45 percent of their original strength.
However, after the reinforcement of units with per-
sonnel and arms, at the beginning of D,1a, the actual
strength of the large units of the Central Group of
Armies was brought up to 65 percent, and of the 50X1-HUM
Northern Group of Armies up to 70 percent of T/O
strength.
The NATO Command assumes that the combat eff-
ectiveness of the large units of ground forces will
drop an average of 45 to 50 percent as a result of
the first operation of the initial period of war,
lasting about 10-days.
Along with this, significant losses were in-
flicted on materiel-technical supply facilities of
the armed forces in the theaters of military
operations, and serious destruction was caused to a
large number of objectives in the NATO troop, and
operational rear.
The degree of destruction to rear area objectives
and of losses to the materiel-technical means of the
NATO ground troops in the Central European Theater of
Military Operations by Dili can be judged by the foll-
owing figures: 35 to 40 percent of the depots and
various repair facilities of the NATO countries were
destroyed in the zone of military operations and 25
to 30 percent along the lines of communications. The
enormous destruction of NATO POL depots in this area
of military operations resulted in a 50 to 60 percent
drop in the supply of POL,and even more in a number
of cases.
50X1-HUM
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NATO communications were significantly disrupted
as a result of enemy nuclear strikes. Thus,. of the
17 railroad and 26 highway bridges and over 60 ferry
crossings over the Rhine River available before the
beginning of military operations in the Central
European Theater of Military Operations, only one
railroad bridge, one highway. bridge and 11 ferry 50X1-HUM
crossings remained by Dll.. As a result of this,
the railroad and highway network in the theater was
divided into two parts: east of the Rhine River,
where NATO ground troops were conducting combat operations;
and west of the Rhine, where the larger part of materiel-
technical means, hospitals and other objectives were
located.
The traffic capacity of frontal railroads and
highways along the line cof the Seine River, and the
cities of Dijon and Pontarlier, which divides the
entire Central Eurbpean Theater of Military Operations,
was reduced by 40 percent. As a result of nuclear
strikes by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries,
the main ports of the NATO countries were destroyed.
Thus, of the 20 ports within the Central European
Theater of Military Operations, one suffered 20 percent
damage, 3 suffered 40 percent damage, 5 suffered 50
percent damage, 3 suffered 60 to 75 percent damage and
8 suffered 80 to 100 percent damage. This compelled
the NATO Command and the national agencies to use
medium and small-sized ports and unequipped beaches
for unloading and servicing ships, which led to a
sharp drop in the freight turnover.
The first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers
shows that the NATO Command pays serious attention to
problems of organizing and conducting the first
operations in the initial period of war, and is
striving to automate the work of staffs and troops
in carrying out operational-strategic plans,
especially in carrying out a nuclear attack. 50X1-HUM
err
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