MILITARY THOUGHT : THE CENTRALIZATION OF FORCES AND MEANS - ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONDITIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF RADIO COUNTERMEASURES, BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL Z. MERKIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029800050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 17, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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11-4 1 CE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT SECRET
of Forces and Means - One of the Most Important
Conditions for the Success of Radio Counter-
measures", by Lieutenant-Colonel Z. Merkin
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the
SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"
published by the Ministry of efense, USSR, and distributed down
to the level of division commander.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your
office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utili-
zation of any part of this document in any other form should be
addressed to the originating office.
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State'
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence..
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
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IRONBARK
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "The
Centralization of Forces and Means -
One of the Most Important Conditions
For the Success of Radio Countermeasures",
by Lieutenant-Colonel Z. Merkin.
DATE OF INFO : August 1961
APPRAISAL OF : Documentary
CONTENT
SOURCE A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
entitled "The Centralization of Forces and Means -
One of the Most Important Conditions For the Success
of Radio Countermeasures", by Lieutenant-Colonel
Z. Merkin.
This article appeared in Issue 5 (60) of 1961
of a special version of the Soviet journal Military
Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets
and is published irregularly. Issue 5 (60) was sent'
to press on 25 August 1961. 151 contained
the Table of Contents for this issue.
(Comment: Military Thought is published
bthe USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions,
classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The
RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937,
while the other two versions are issued irregularly.
The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960.
By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version
had been published, 6 of them during 1961.
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IRONBARK
COMMENT ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE
The Centralization of Forces and Means - One of the
Most Important Conditions For the
Success of Radio Countermeasures
by
Lieutenant-Colonel Z. Merkin
Radio countermeasures have already existed in the
Soviet Army as a form of operational support for some
time. However, in spite of this, in the overwhelming
majority of articles devoted to this problem, the
authors remark that there is still much that is un-
clear and debatable in the organization and execution
of radio countermeasures. It is impossible not to
agree with this.
It is true that many problems of radio counter-
measures require further study. This evidently
explains the frequent appearance in the journal
"Military Thought" of articles in which problems of
radio countermeasures are set forth and fairly acutely
examined. In their articles, Comrades A. Ovchinnikov,
Yu. Tsybin, F. Bologov and A. Kosinovl produce un-
answerable arguments in favor of centralizing forces
and means for radio countermeasures.
1. A. Ovchinnikov "Radio Countermeasures in Operation
by Ground Forces". Collection of -Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought" No. 1 (56), 1961; Yu. Tsybin,
"The Organization of Radio Countermeasures in Operations
During the Initial Stages of a War," !Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 1 (56),
1961 ;F. Bologov and A. Kosinov "More on Radio Counter-
measures" Collection of Articles of the Journal
"Military Thought" No. 2 (57), 1961,
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In fact, as a result of the decentralized subordination
of SPETSNAZ units, the radio countermeasures sections of
the headquarters of military districts (fronts) do not,
essentially, exert any serious influence on the combat
and operational training of these units, even though
they are expected to carry out the unified planning
of radio countermeasures to organize them in a centralized
manner at the military district (front) level.
It would be a mistake to demand the subordination
to the radio countermeasures section of such means for
combat with the enemy's radiotechnical system, as
aviation, missile troops and artillery, for which the
destruction and neutralization of radiotechnical means
is not the chief task. As regards SPETSNAZ units, which
are intended purely for jamming, their subordination to
different commanders is indefensible.
Since the questions of radio jamming are not
fundamental for the defense of either the communications
troops or the antiair troops of military districts,
their solution is not given sufficient attention. It
is, therefore, not by chance that there is not a single
specialist on radio jamming in the communications section
of a military district, while officers without special
knowledge and experience are occupied with the combat
and operational training of SPETSNAZ units.
Matters are no better with the antiair defense troops.
The solitary officer concerned with radio countermeasures
on the staff (apparat) Of the chief of the antiair cfense troops
ofamilitary district is not in a position to supervise
the combat and operational training of SPETSNAZ units.
When exercises are carried out involving large quantities
of forces and means for jamming, one must fall back on
people who happen to be available and who do not possess
the necessary qualifications.
In spite of the fact that there is a department
(otdel) which was specially set up to direct the
operational and combat training of SPETSNAZ units and
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ET
to control them in a combat situation, the control
of jamming units is handed over during exercises to
the radio countermeasures sections. The chiefs of
communications, who are actually left as chiefs of the
commanding officers of these units, themselves try to
arrange the jamming in such a way that the main channels
of communications remain untouched. As a result, it
only seems that the exercise is being carried out under
conditions of intensive jamming, for in reality jamming
has no substantial effect on the communications system
of the front, since it is beamed against secondary
communications. In addition, communications chiefs
not infrequently exercise pressure on unit commanders
in the choice of positions for jamming equipment,
attempting to locate them as far as possible from
communications centers and, by so doing, to diminish
the effectiveness of the jamming.
It is quite obvious that such a situation cannot
be considered normal. The desire of certain communi-
cations chiefs to retain the direction of SPETSNAZ
units can be explained simply by their fear of being
helpless if jamming is carried out, not at their
direction, but in accordance with the needs of combat
training and as it will be carried out in a combat
situation.
We have become convinced that SPETSNAZ units should
be transferred to the subordination of the chiefs of
the 9thdepartmentof military districts. This will
radically improve the operational and combat training
of these units, will make it possible to set up
jamming correctly and without limitations during
exercises, and, finally,will put the organs of troop
control into the conditions in which they will have
to work in an actual combat situation.
A second problem on which we wish to dwell is that
of providing intelligence data to SPETSNAZ units.
Comrade Ovchinnikov devotes the greater part of his
SECEI
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article to the problems of conducting radio intelligence
and of organizing the coordination of radio intelligence
with SPETSNAZ units. It is Necessary to demonstrate
the correctness of Comrade Ovchinnikov's statements
on the importance of close and uninterrupted coordination
between OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ radio units. However, in
our view, the forms and methods for organizing this
coordination are not understood with complete correctness
by the author.
It is quite obvious that if the command post of a
radio-jamming unit does not possess detailed data on
the radiotechnical system of the enemy, there can be,.
no question of setting up effective jamming.
But where should these data come from? The most
detailed information about the enemy's radiotechnical
system is held, naturally enough, by the OSNAZ radio
intelligence units. Consequently, there should be the
closest connection between these units and radio-
jamming units. At the present time, there is a wide-
spread opinion that it is desirable to have communications
officers attached to radio intelligence units and sub-
units in order to ensure the uninterrupted provision
of intelligence data to SPETSNAZ units. It is supposed
that such officers, being with the commanding officer
(chief of staff) will be constantly abreast of the
radio situation and will be able to transmit information
to their radio-jamming units over special communications
channels.
However, as the experience of a series of command-
staff field exercises, carried out by the Commander-in-
Chief of Ground Troops in 1957-1960, and the experience
of headquarters aLid troop exercises in the Transcaucasus
and Turkestan Military Districts have shown, one can
conclude that such organization of coordination is not
entirely successful. The fact is that, with frequent
movement by OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ units and subunits, the
routing and conditions for the passing of radio communi-
cations change sharply, a phenomenon which is particularly
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apparent in mountainous and desert theaters of military
operations. Radio communications frequently become
uncertain and are sometimes lost completely for fairly
prolonged periods, as a result of which intelligence
information arrives at the command posts of radio
jamming units after a considerable delay.
Bearing these circumstances in mind, one might
recommend that OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ command posts should
be jointly located, thus significantly facilitating
and accelerating the arrival of information. However,
one cannr-? assume that these units will act jointly
and move simultaneously during the whole course of an
operation, and in such vast theaters as the Middle East-
ern for example, this is entirely impossible.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the trans-
mittal of information to SPETSNAZ units is a secondary
rather than a basic task for radio intelligence
personnel, and that, as has been shown in practice)
data on enemy radio networks which have been discovered
were not always transmitted in good time to radio
jamming units.
All of this leads to the conclusion that SPETSNAZ
units should not be as wholly dependent as they now
are on radio intelligence, since an interruption in
communications or insufficient promptness by opera';
tional personnel on duty can condemn jamming facilities
to inaction. We consider that the basic intelligence
material necessary for the work of SPETSNAZ units
should be obtained by them independently. If necessary,
SPETSNAZ units can then carry out their work indepen-
dently of the quality and quantity of information
received from outside.
For this, of course, it will be necessary to
provide SPETSNAZ radio units with appropriate radio
intelligence equipment and to make up the staff of
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their operational sections with radio intelligence
specialists which will call for certain additional
expenditures. However, the practical work of radio
units shows that radio jamming units can only carry
out their tasks under all circumstances when they
have their own radio intelligence.
4M SF,.~RET
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