MILITARY THOUGHT: FIRE SUUPORT OF THE LANDING OPERATION OF AN AIRBORNE DIVISION, BY COLONEL I. KOTOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700670001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Fire Support of the Landing Operation of an
Airborne Division
by
Colonel I. Kotov
In modern warfare airborne troops will have very wide
application to the operations of ground troops. Until
recently, however, such important problems of the combat
use of airborne forces as fire support for their landing
operations had still not been worked out to a sufficient
degree.
In our opinion the following things relate to tasks
of this kind:
1) ,support of the division's movement to the de-
parture area for the landing operation and its preparations
in this area, of the loading of combat equipment, of the
boarding of the aircraft by personnel, and of the take-off
of the military-transport aircraft; this is achieved by
destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack - "Redstone"
guided missiles and "Matador" and "Mace" cruise-missiles,
the employment of which is possible while the division and the
military-transport aircraft are in the departure zone, and
also by destroying enemy bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft
at airfields and in the air;
2) support of the flight of the military-transport air-
ciaft:with the airborne force across the line of the front
and over the enemy's territory by destroying and neutral-
izing PVO weapons in the zone of the flight and on the
flanks;
3) support of the drop (landing) of an airborne
division by destroying the enemy's fire weapons and troops
in the area of the landing operation;
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4) support of the combat operations of the airborne
division in the enemy rear.
The first three tasks areiaccomplished by the front
missile units and subunits, bybomber aircraft, and by the
PVO means of the front (the country) . The fourth task
is fulfilled by the fire ..means of the airborne division
in coordination with the front missile troops and bomber
aircraft, and, in proportion to the approach of the advanc-
ing troops, in coordination with their missile units and
artillery.
The destruction of "Redstone" guided missile batteries,
of cruise missile groups, and of enemy aircraft at airfields
is carried out for the entire front offensive operation
immediately after the certain discovery of the targets.
Consequently, the movement of an airborne division to the
departure area for a landing operation and its preparations
will be ensured by the fulfilment of the tasks of attaining
fire superiority for the entire front offensive operation.
Success in the use of an airborne force depends to a
considerable degree on the power of the fire support for
the flight of the military-transport aviation group (VTAG)
with the airborne force to the area of the landing operation.
Fire support for the flight is achieved by destroying the
enemy's active PVO means : antiaircraft guided missiles,
antiaircraft artillery, fighter aircraft, and PVO radio-
technical means. The quantity. of these means depends _
on the strength of the antiair defense of the enemy field army
(group of armies), on the distribution of the fire weapons in
the zone of defense, on the tactical-technical characteristics
of these weapons, on the depth of the landing operation of
the airborne division, on the column formation of the
military-transport aviation group, and on the route and
altitude of its flight.
Taking account of the factors mentioned, Table 1 gives
a summary of the data on the number of enemy PVO means
which must be destroyed in order to ensure the flight of
a VTAG to the landing operations.
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It appears from the table that during the support
of the flight of a VTAG the largest number of nuclear 50X1-HUM
warheads will be required for the destruction of "Hawk"
and "Nike" antiaircraft guided missile (ZURS) batteries
(about 85 percent), and this number is little altered by
an increase in the number of VTAG flight routes-, provided
the distance between them does not exceed 10 to` 15 km.
But if this distance is increased to 70 km, then the
number of nuclear warheads required for these same targets
must be doubled or even tripled. In our opinion the most
advisable flight of a VTAG to a landing operation is one
along two routes, separated from each other by a distance
of about 15 km.
Table 2 shows the quantity of means essential to a
front to destroy all enemy PVO means located in a VTAG
flight zone in the Western European theater of military
operations.
The calculations have been made for conditions where
the enemy's PVO means are at full strength and where he
has at his disposal additional', means- corresponding to
the existing norms for reinforcement. For this reason,
the data shown for the quantity of nuclear warheads,
artillery, and aircraft needed to support a VTAG Might
should be regarded as one of the maximum versions.
In a situation where the VTAG;.flight route passes over an
area lacking a strong antiair defense, the quantity of
these .means may be reduced approximately two or three
times.
In the delivery of nuclear; strikes against the enemy's
PVO ..means. it is essential to ensure the security of the
flight of the aircraft, while striving at the same time
toward a minimum time lag between the nuclear strikes and
the flight of the VTAG.
The security of a VTAG flight requires that the distance
between it and the place of the nuclear bursts be such'that
damage to the aircraft and personnel of the airborne force
which are nearest to the center of the burst is precluded.
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Without burdening our article with detailed calculations,
let us examine the influence of the factors of a nuclear
burst on a VTAG flight, and in connection with this let us
determine the safety boundaries of its flight.
Shockwave. The safe maximum; overpressure of a shock-
wave front for transport aircraft! in the air may be taken
as equal to 0.02 to 0.04 kg/cm2.~ At such a pressure the
velocity of air displacement in the shockwave front is
5 to 10 m/sec.
In accordance with the agreed magnitude of safe over-
pressure, we ma figure that, depending on the yield of the
nuclear bursts from 3 to 100 k), ,the distance between trans-
port aircraft and the center of a, nuclear burst will vary
between 6 and 17 km.
Thermal radiation. In our view, 15 to 24 cal/cm2 is
the minimum thermal radiation which will ignite highly
flammable materials in aircraft. IThe safe maximum radiation
intensity is equal to approximately 8 cal/cm2. Correspondingly,
the safe distance for transport aircraft, calculated for the
thermal radiation of various yields of nuclear bursts, will
vary within the limits of 2 and 8 km.
Penetrating radiation. Practically speaking, the
effects of penetrating radiation cease about 2.5 km from the
center of a burst and about 10 seconds after the burst.
Consequently, an airborne force in aircraft which are from
3.5 to 4 km away at the moment ofa nuclear burst and flying
at a speed of 500 km/hr will be safe by the time it approaches
the area of the burst.
The radioactive cloud. Thirty minutes after a burst,
with a wind velocity of a out 50 km/hr, the average radiation
levels in the cloud do not exceedj50 to 100 r/hr for low-
yield nuclear bursts, and 250 to 500 r/hr for medium and
high-yield bursts.
Although the external irradiation of the airborne
force personnel and the aircraft crew, when passing through
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a cloud at a speed of 500 km/hr 30 minutes after the burst
of low, medium, or high-yield;' nuclear warheads, does not
exceed the permissible one-time dose, everything possible
must be done to avoid passing! through a radioactive cloud
because the airborne force still has to conduct combat op-
erations during which it may be subjected to additional
irradiation.
Considering the maximum height of rise of the lower
edge of a radioactive cloud, one may figure that the flight
of a VTAG with an airborne force over ground zero d'f a nuclear
burst is possible at an altitude ep of 5000m 10 minutes after the
o r450um aa fterpanburst wi heaayieldk?foJ3ktore, and at an altitude
So that VTAG aircraft inlflight will not be damaged
by shells of our own artillery, a flight altitude is
chosen which exceeds the maximum altitude of the shell
trajectories.
Calculations show that the enemy's antiair defense
means must be destroyed by the simultaneous strike of
nuclear/missile -means- and artillery of the front, armies,
and divisions 15 to 20 minutes before the lead aircraft of
a military-transport aviation group approach the forward
line of resistance. Ten to fifteen minutes after the
nuclear/missile strikes, bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft
may deliver strikes against targets assigned to them, as
a rule on the flanks of the flight zone of the military-
transport aircraft.
To deliver nuclear strikes against the enemy's PVO
means, . the requirements may be about 5 launchers for
operational-tactical missiles 1, with a range of 300 to
500 km, about 10 launchers for missiles with a range of
160 km, and about 15 launchers for tactical missiles.
The neutralization of newly ., detected PVC means
and the escort of military-transport aircraft in flight
are best accomplished by squadrons of fighter-bombers.
Prior to the drop (landing) of the airborne force, the
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50X1-HUM
destruction of the enemy tr-oops and fire weapons located in
the area of the landing operatiian(ar.d the areas adjacent to
it can be ensured by the front (army) missile troops and
by aircraft assigned to support the airborne force. It is
best to draw on the former to deliver nuclear strikes
against the most important objectives (the means of nuclear
attack, reserves in concentrationlareas, and tank troops);
and on the front supporting aviation t o neutralize fire
means in the area of the landing operation and to destroy
approaching enemy reserves.
In view of the participation in the fire support of
the landing operation of an airborne division by various
fire means of a front, armies, and divisions, it is
essential to centralize the organization of the combat
use of all these means, mainly injront headquarters
and then in army headquarters, in the zone of the offensive
where the airborne division is being dropped.
The basis of organizing the',combat use of all fire
means to support a landing -operation is the front commander's
decision to use the airborne division. In this decision,
he defines: the tasks of missile troops, artillery, and
aviation for the fire support of the flight of the military-
transport aviation group and the drop (landing) of the
airborne division; the time to deliver nuclear strikes
against targets in the zone of thelflight and in the area
of the landing operation; the time to deliver a strike with
chemical ammunition; the start and duration of artillery
concentration; the number of nuclear warheads for missile
troops and aviation and the quantity of missiles with chemical
filler and of ammunition with conventional filler allotted
for the fire support of the flight )f the military=transport
aviation group and the drop (landing) of the airborne force;
and the large units (units) of fighter and fighter-bomber air-
craft assigned to escort the column of the military-transport
aviation group and to destroy the enemy's antiair defense
means during the flight to the landing area.
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In planning the fire support :)f a landing operation,
the staff of missile troops and artillery of a front must
determine which missile large units and units of a front,
armies, and divisions, what quantity of artillery, and which
and how many divisions it is advisable to draw on to fulfil
the tasks levied by the front commander, and also how to
diYide these tasks among them.
Considering the effective range of various missiles
and the yields being employed for nuclear charges, it is
advisable to draw on the front missile large units and
units to destroy the most remote objectives and targets in
the flight zone, in the area of the landing operation, and
in the areas adjacent to it: the enemy's surface-to-surface
and surface-to-air means if nuclear attack, aircraft on
airfields, and tank groupings; and on the army missile large
units and units to destroy the enemy's means of antiair
defense in the flight zone, as a rule beyond the reach of
tactical missiles. Where the depth of the drop of an air-
borne division is insignificant, army missile troops must
also be used to destroy objectives in the area of the
landing operation.
The missile units and artillery of the divisions can
best be drawn on to destroy antiair defense - means in the
flight zone from the enemy's forward edge of resistance to
the depth of reach of artillery and tactical missiles.
In planning for the fire supp,irt ~.)f a landing operation,
it is essential to pinpoint the siting areas of the missile
large units and units and artillery which will be drawn on,
especially if the landing operation is carried out during
a front offensive operation; t3 set the time for launching
missiles by large units and units so that the nuclear strikes
will be delivered right at the designated time and against
all targets at once; to determine theexpenditure of various
types of ammunition, the procedure for transporting it,
storing it, and safeguarding it by missile large units and
units and the artillery; and to organize communications
with all fire ..means. participating in the support of the
operations of the airborne division.
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The successful accomplishment of the tasks of fire
support for the landing operation and for the combat operations
of an airborne division laf-gel'y depends on the proper or-
ganization of coordination between all the fire means
designated for this purpose and also between the airborne
division and the large units of front troops in the area of
the combat operations of the airborne force.
In organizing coordination, it is very important in
our opinion to specify the flight routes and flight speed;
the formation of the columns of military-transport aviation;
the tasks of missile troops, aviation , and artillery in
combatting the enemy's nuclear means and the means of
his antiair defense; the time to deliver nuclear strikes
and strikes with chemical ammunitl(cr, the begir9ning and duration
of the artillery concentratioff;and the siting areas of
missile troops and artillery, To ensure the sffety of the
military-transport aviation group and the personnel of the
airborne force, the time to deliver nuclear strikes must
be determined with regard for the necessary distance between
the lead aircraft and the nearest nuclear bursts.
If it is proposed to use an airb- me division as an
operational airborne force during a front offensive operation,
then in organizing the coordination of fire weapons one must
consider the possible advance of the front troops but in
this case it is advisable immediately before the start of
the landing operation to establish the time to deliver
nuclear strikes in the flight,zone of the military-transport
aviation group.
By the time the lead aircraft of the military-transport
aviation group reach the specified line planned during the
organization of coordtnation,missile troops must deliver
nuclear strikes and strikes with chemical missiles, and the
artillery must carry out its attack against the enemy's
antiair defense - means in the' f light zone.
Immediately after the nuclear strikes of the missile
troops, bomber aircraft and cruise missiles must deliver
strikes against the objectives and targets assigned to them.
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50X1-HUM
Army (front) missile subunits may be designated to
destroy such newly detected PVO'i mewls as "Hawk" and
"Nike" guided missiles located -)n the flanks of the flight
zone, if the safety of the flight of the military-transport
aviation can be ensured while firing against these targets.
In the part of the flight zone where the possibility
of using missile troops is precluded, the enemy's antiair
defense means can be destroyed only by the fighter-bomber
and bomber aircraft escorting the column of the military-
transport aviation group.
By the time the military-transport aviation group
approaches the area of the landing operation, missile troops
must have delivered nuclear strikes and strikes with chemical
missiles against objectives andjtargets in the area of the
landing operation and also against the enemy reserves which
are closest to this zone.
Where the depth of the landing operation is insignificant,
the nuclear/missile strikes in the flight zone and against
objectives and targets in the area of the landing operation
may be delivered simultaneously.!
In our view, these are thejmost essential aspects of
the organization of fire support! for the landing operation
of an airborne division, further; research into which will
ensure the successful use of operational and tactical air-
borne forces in front offensive ,operations.
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Quantity or F:u,m "
(v (u Army) i'VO 14'Ina to he (:.,.rojed 1n Llggortinf
U VTAU F11ght In n L,tnlii (>lu.rutio" 50X1-HUM
Width in km of th4
zone in which I'VO;
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troyed and which
the VTAa is to
follow,
"Hawk" Betteriesi 73 X82-%191_99
"Nike Hercules" (320 - 33~
Batteries
"Nike Ajax
Batteries
Batteries of
90 sr,, entisir.
craft guns
83 I92-96I1oo-10
27
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&,tteries of
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B9tteriee of
a,oblle 40 sm
11
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Fighter ulrcraft
airfields
L2
LURS guidance 85 9`i 110 ( 40
radar
Centers for air-
craft control in
sectors
Aircraft con-
trol wad warning
centers
Aircraft con-
trol and warn-
ing poste
'ntisircraft
target-acqula-
ltlon radar
j22.2(
20 1 29 4
Quuntity of 1ucsy PVO Wane Nequlrtn.j Dcntruction with a Landing OEr rotion
Depth oft
100 Km :xxJ Km __.300 Km j 4tn Km
and with th.. VTAU followin0t
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Fire Support of the Landing Operation of an
Airborne Division
by
Colonel I. Kotov
In modern warfare airborne troops will have very wide
application to the operations of ground troops. Until
recently, however, such important problems of the combat
use of airborne forces as fire support for their landing
operations had still not been worked out to a sufficient
degree.
In our opinion the following things relate to tasks
of this kind:
1) Support; Of the division's movement to the de-
parture area for the landing operation and its preparations
in this area, of the loading of combat equipment, of the
boarding of the aircraft by personnel, and of the take-off
of the military-transport aircraft; this is achieved by
destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack - "Redstone"
guided missiles and "Matador" and "Mace" cruise-missiles,
the employment of which is possible while the division and the
military-transport aircraft are in the departure -zone, and
also by destroying enemy bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft
at airfields and in the air;
2) ,'upport of the flight of the military-transport air-
craft,~ with the airborne force across the line of the front
and over the enemy's territory by destroying and neutral-
izing PVO weapons in the zone of the flight and on the
flanks ;
3) auppdr.t of the drop (landing) of an airborne
division by destroying the enemy's fire weapons and troops
in the area of the landing operation;
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buxi -HUM
4) support of the combat operations of the airborne
division in the enemy rear.
The first three tasks are accomplished by the front
missile units and subunits, by bomber aircraft, and by the
PVO -..means..- of the front (the .countzy) , The fourth task
is fulfilled by the fire ..means of the airborne division
in coordination with the front missile troops and bomber
aircraft, and, in proportion to the approach of the advanc-
ing troops, in coordination with their missile units and
artillery.
The destruction of "Redstone" guided missile batteries,
of cruise missile groups, and of enemy aircraft at airfields
is carried out for the entire front offensive operation
immediately after the certain discovery of they targets.
Consequently, the movement of an airborne division to the
departure area for a landing operation and its preparations
will be ensured by the fulfilment of the tasks of attaining
fire superiority for the entire front offensive operation.
Success in the use of an airborne force depends to a
considerable degree on the power of the fire support for
the flight of the military-transport aviation group (VTAG)
with the airborne force to the area of the landing operation.
Fire support for the flight is achieved by destroying the
enemy's active PVO -.means : antiaircraft guided missiles,
antiaircraft artillery, fighter aircraft, and PVO radio-
technical means. The q.uant.ity.:of these. means .depends _..::_
on the strength of the antiair defense of the enemy field army
group of armies), on the distribution of the fire weapons in
the zone of defense, on the tactical-technical characteristics
of these weapons, on the depth of the landing operation of
the airborne division, on the column formation of the
military-transport aviation group, and on the route and
altitude of its flight.
Taking account of the factors mentioned, Table 1 gives
a summary of the data on the number of enemy PVO means
which must be destroyed in order to ensure the flight of
a VTAG to the landing operation.
asw
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It appears from the table that during the support
of the flight of a VTAG the largest number of nuclear
warheads will be required for the destruction of "Hawk"
and "Nike" antiaircraft guided missile (ZURS) batteries
(about 85 percent), and this number is little altered by
an increase in the number of VTAG flight routes', provided
the distance between them does not exceed 10 to 15 km.
But if this distance is increased to 70 km, then the
number of nuclear warheads required for these same targets
must be doubled or even tripled. In our opinion the most
advisable flight of a VTAG to a landing operation is one
along two routes, separated from each other by a distance
of about 15 km.
Table 2 shows the quantity of means. essential to a
front to destroy all enemy PVO `means. located in a VTAG
flight zone in the Western European theater of military
operations.
The calculations have been made for conditions where
the enemy's PVQ.means are at full strength and where he
has at his disposal additional means- corresponding to
the existing norms for reinforcement. For this reason,
the data shown for the quantity of nuclear warheads,
artillery, and aircraft needed to support a VTAG fl..igJ.t
should be regarded as one of the maximum versions.
In a situation where the VTAG flight route passes over an
area lacking a strong antiair defense, the quantity of
these -..means,. may be reduced approximately two or three
times.
In the delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy's
PVO .means,; it is essential to ensure the security of the
flight of the aircraft, while striving at the same time
toward a minimum time lag between the nuclear strikes and
the flight of the VTAG.
The security of a VTAG flight requires that the distance
between it and the place of the nuclear bursts be such"that
damage to the aircraft and personnel of the airborne force
which are nearest to the center of the burst is precluded.
50X1-HUM
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Without burdening our article with detailed calculations,
let us examine the influence of the factors of a nuclear
burst on a VTAG flight, and in connection with this let us
determine the safety boundaries of its flight.
Shockwave. The safe maximum overpressure of a shock-
wave front for transport aircraft in the air may be taken
as equal to 0.02 to 0.04 kg/cm2. At such a pressure the
velocity of air displacement in the shockwave front is
5 to 10 m/sec.
In accordance with the agreed magnitude of safe over-
pressure, we ma figure that, depending on the yield of the
nuclear bursts from 3 to 100 k , the distance between trans-
port aircraft and the center of a nuclear burst will vary
between 6 and 17 km.
Thermal radiation. In our view, 15 to 24 cal/cm2 is
the minimum thermal radiation which will ignite highly
flammable materials in aircraft. The safe maximum radiation
intensity is equal to approximately 8 cal/cm24. Correspondingly,
the safe distance for transport aircraft, calculated for the
thermal radiation of various yields of nuclear bursts, will
vary within the limits of 2 and 8 km.
Penetrating radiation. Practically speaking, the
effects of penetrating radiation cease about 2.5 km from the
center of a burst and about 10 seconds after the burst.
Consequently, an airborne force in aircraft which are from
3.5 to 4 km away at the moment of a nuclear burst and flying
at a speed of 500 km/hr will be safe by the time it approaches
the area of the burst.
The radioactive cloud. Thirty minutes after a burst,
with a wind velocity of a out 50 km/hr, the average radiation
levels in the cloud do not exceed 50 to 100 r/hr for low-
yield nuclear bursts, and 250 to 500 r/hr for medium and
high-yield bursts.
Although the external irradiation of the airborne
force personnel and the aircraft crew, when passing through
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29700670001-9
a cloud at a speed of 500 km/hr 30 minutes after the burst
of low, medium, or high-yield nuclear warheads, does not
exceed the permissible one-time dose, everything possible
must be done to avoid passing through a radioactive cloud
because the airborne force still has to conduct combat op-
erations during which it may be subjected to additional
irradiation.
50X1-HUM
Considering the maximum height of rise of the lower
edge of a radioactive cloud, one may figure that the flight
of a VTAG with an aiib?rne force "over ground zero 6f a nuclear
burst is possible at an altitude of 5000m 10 minutes after the
b rstt of a weapon with a yield f 5kt o more, and at an altitude
ox 4500m after a burst with a yield of Skt.
So that VTAG aircraft in flight will not be damaged
by shells of our own artillery, a flight altitude is
chosen which exceeds the maximum altitude of the shell
trajectories.
Calculations show that the enemy's antiair defense
means _, must be destroyed by the simultaneous strike of
nuclear/missile -:means,, and artillery of the front, armies,
and divisions 15 to 20 minutes before the lead aircraft of
a military-transport aviation group approach the forward
line of resistance. Ten to fifteen minutes after the
nuclear/missile strikes, bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft
may deliver strikes against targets assigned to them, as
a rule on the flanks of the flight zone of the military-
transport aircraft.
To deliver nuclear strikes against the enemy's PVO
means,. the requirements may be about 5 launchers for
operational-tactical missiles with a range of 300 to
500 km, about 10 launchers for missiles with a range of
160 km, and about 15 launchers for tactical missiles.
The neutralization of newly,, detected PVC means
and the escort of military-transport aircraft in flight
are best accomplished by squadrons of fighter-bombers.
Prior to the drop (landing) of the airborne force, the
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29700670001-9
destruction of the enemy troops and fire weapons located in
the area of the landing operation and the areas adjacent to
-it--can be ensured by the front (army) missile troops and
by aircraft assigned to support the airborne force. It is
best to draw on the former to deliver nuclear strikes
against the most important objectives (the means of nuclear
attack, reserves in concentration areas, and tank troops);
and on the front supporting aviation to neutralize fire
means in the area of the landing operation and to destroy
approaching enemy reserves.
In view of the participation in the fire support of
the landing operation of an airborne division by various
fire means of a front, armies, and divisions, it is
essential to centralize the organization of the combat
use of all these means, mainly in front headquarters
and then in army headquarters, in the zone of the offensive
where the airborne division is being dropped.
The basis of organizing the combat use of all fire
means to support a landing operation is the front commander's
decision to use the airborne division. In this decision,
he defines: the tasks of missile troops, artillery, and
aviation for the fire support of the flight of the military-
transport aviation group and the drop (landing) of the
airborne division; the time to deliver nuclear strikes
against targets in the zone of the flight and in the area
of the landing operation; the time to deliver a strike with
chemical ammunition; the start and duration of artillery
concentration; the number of nuclear warheads for missile
troops and aviation and the quantity of missiles with chemical
filler and of ammunition with conventional filler allotted
for the fire support of the flight of the military-transport
aviation group and the drop (landing) of the airborne force;
and the large units (units) of fighter and fighter-bomber air-
craft assigned to escort the column of the military-transport
aviation group and to destroy the enemy's antiair defense
means during the flight to the landing area,
50X1-HUM
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29700670001-9
In planning the fire support of a landing operation,
the staff of missile troops and artillery of a front must
determine which missile large units and units of a front,
armies, and divisions, what quantity of artillery, and which
and how many divisions it is advisable to draw on to fulfil
the tasks levied by the front commander, and also how to
diitide these tasks among them
Considering the effective range of various missiles
and the yields being employed for nuclear charges, it is
advisable to draw on the front missile large units and
units to destroy the most remote objectives and targets in
the flight zone, in the area of the landing operation, and
in the areas adjacent to it: the enemy's surface-to-surface
and surface-to-air means if nuclear attack, aircraft on
airfields, and tank groupings; and on the army missile large
units and units to destroy the enemy's means of antiair
defense in the flight zone, as a rule beyond the reach of
tactical missiles. Where the depth of the drop of an air-
borne division is insignificant, army missile troops must
also be used to destroy objectives in the area of the
landing operation.
The missile units and artillery of the divisions can
best be drawn on to destroy antiair defense - means, in the
flight zone from the enemy's forward edge of resistance to
the depth of reach of artillery and tactical missiles.
In planning for the fire support of a landing operation,
it is essential to pinpoint the siting areas of the missile
large units and units and artillery which will be drawn on,
especially if the landing operation is carried out during
a front offensive operation, to set the time for launching
missiles by large units and units so that the nuclear strikes
will be delivered right at the designated time and against
all targets at once; to determine the expenditure of various
types of ammunition, the procedure for transporting it,
storing it, and safeguarding it by missile large units and
units and the artillery; and to organize communications
with all fire .,means participating in the support of the
operations of the airborne division.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29700670001-9
The successful accomplishment of the tasks of fire
support for the landing operation and for the combat operations
of an airborne division laf?gely depends on the proper or-
ganization of coordination between all the fire means
designated for this purpose and also between the airborne
division and the large units of front troops in the area of
the combat operations of the airborne force,
In organizing coordination, it is very important in
our opinion to specify the flight routes and flight speed;
the formation of the columns of military-transport aviation;
the tasks of missile troops, aviation, and artillery in
combatting the enemy's nuclear means and the means (uf
his antiair defense; the time to deliver nuclear strikes
and strikes with chemical ammunitivr-1 the beginning and duration
of the artillery concentratiofijand the siting areas of
missile troops and artillery, To ensure the safety of the
military-transport aviation group and the personnel of the
airborne force, the time to deliver nuclear strikes must
be determined with regard for the necessary distance between
the lead aircraft and the nearest nuclear bursts.
If it is proposed to use an airborne division as an
operational airborne force during a front offensive operation,
then in organizing the coordination of fire weapons one must
consider the possible advance of the front troops but in
this case it is advisable immediately before the start of
the landing operation to establish the time to deliver
nuclear strikes in the flight zone of the military-transport
aviation group.
By the time the lead aircraft of the military-transport
aviation group reach the specified line planned dtaring the
organization of coordination, missile troops must deliver
nuclear strikes and strikes with chemical missiles, and the
artillery must carry out its attack against the enemy's
antiair defense - means in the flight zone.
Immediately after the nuclear strikes of the missile
troops, bomber aircraft and cruise u:issiles must deliver
strikes against the objectives and targets assigned to theme
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 5nxl -HUM
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Army (frbnt) missile subunits may be designated to
destroy such newly detected PVO means as "Hawk" and
"Nike" guided missiles located on the flanks of the flight
zones if the safety of the flight of the military-transport
aviation can be ensured while firing against these targets.
In the part of the flight zone where the possibility
of using missile troops is precluded, the enemy's antiair
defense means can be destroyed only by the fighter-bomber
and bomber aircraft escorting the column of the military-
transport aviation group.
By the time the military-transport aviation group
approaches the area of the landing operation, missile troops
must have delivered nuclear strikes and strikes with chemical
missiles against objectives and targets in the area of the
landing operation and also against the enemy reserves which
are closest to this zone.
Where the depth of the landing operation is insignificant,
the nuclear/missile strikes in the flight zone and against
objectives and targets in the area of the landing operation
may be delivered simultaneously.
In our view, these are the most essential aspects of
the organization of fire support for the landing operation
of an airborne division, further research into which will
ensure the successful use of operational and tactical air-
borne forces in front offensive operations.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29700670001-9
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29700670001-9
Quantity of Ell"Ny (US Army) t'VO Wine to he fa:. ruye in Supporting
50X1-HUM
a VTAG Flight in a Landiiq, Operation
Width in km of th4
tone in which PVOi
means must be des}
troyed and which
the VTAG is to
follow:
Y
444) war !yymi~ww
n o O ,q 0
q 0
y-O E -`~_ 1. N ti o n
"Hawk" Batteries! 73 82-86191-99 19
t
"Nike Hercules"
Batteries
"Nike Ajax"
Batteries
320 - 33i
83 92-96 1,00-10S
Batteries of
90 mm antiair-
craft guns
Batteries of
75 mm antiair-
craft guns
Batteries of
40 mm antiair-
craft guns
27
13
11
4
Quantity of Enemy PVO Means Requiring fastruction with a Landing Operation
ikpth of:
?~M
100 Km f( Km 300 K'm _ 1100 K, 500 Km
and with tO. VTAU fol.lowlno;:
22
3-I+
a ' a
h
44 no
a Io
~2 Ir>
22 25 27 122
3-5 3-5 14-6
4-5 0-7 7-8
31-39 1-2 3 ', 5-6
Batteries of 11 20 1 29
mobile 40 mm
antiaircraft guns
Fighter aircraft
airfields
ZURS guidance 85
radar
Centers for air-
craft control in
sectors
Aircraft con-
trol and warning
centers
Aircraft con-
trol and warn-
ing posts
Antiaircraft
target-acqui.s-
ition radar
Inup in to
1 '7 ';
~31
2
(_.J 7-66 ), -5 6-7 7-99
-14 4-f; ;6_1o I
4 10 4
3..) 5-9 2 3-4 5-6
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