MILITARY THOUGHT: THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF A WAR, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL OF THE RESERVES L. SKVIRSKIY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700580001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Meeting Engagement in the Initial Period of a War
by
Lieutenant-General of the Reserves
L. Skvirskiy
At the present time, as is generally known, the mobile
conditions of military operations, stemming from the very
nature of nuclear/missile warfare, are becoming more sharply
outlined. Under these conditions, meeting engagements and
battles, quite obviously, are becoming almost the predominant
y~ pe of troop combat operations. But it is right here that
one discovers that the theory and practice of preparation
and conduct of a meeting engagement have been poorly worked
out by us. One does not have to look far for examples. It
is sufficient to consider the course of operational-strategic
exercises of recent years, and to study the theoretical worka
(including those published in 1960) on the problems of the
art of operations in order to be convinced of this.
Strange as it seems, at the present time we do not have
an officially determined definition of the term "meeting
engagement". The Field Service Regulations, published in
1959, state. that "a meeting engagement is a type of offensive
combat in which both sides strive to attain a goal by offensive
operations". The concept of a meeting engagement does not fit
within the framework of this definition. Are the definitions
of a meeting engagement which are found in the theoretical
works acceptable, and do they correspond, in principle, to
the new nature of nuclear/missile warfare?
To answer these questions, let us examine some of the
definitions. In one of the Collections of Works of the General
Staff Academy it is stated that "a meeting engagement can be
described as the sum total of combat operations of the troops
of operational formations and large units conducted under such
conditions when during an operation both sides are striving
simultaneously to execute operational tasks by conducting
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offensive operations along the same axes".
The authors' collective of the Military Academy i/n 50X1-HUM
M. V. Frunze, maintains in one of its works that "the de-
sire of both opponents to perform their tasks by using
offensive operations will lead inevitably to a series of
meeting battles and engagements during an offensive oper-
ation".
Marshal of the Armored Troops, P. A. Rotmistrov, points
out that "a meeting engagement represents the sum total of
simultaneous or consecutive battles during which both op-
ponents strive to attain their objectives by an offensive".
In the pages of our journal Colonel S. N. Kozlov writes:
"One must understand a meeting engagement as the clash of the
operational groupings of the sides which are mutually striving
to achieve their operational aims primarily by means of an
off ens ive . " 50X1-HUM
Apparently, foreign armies have studied this problem
even less than we because foreign literature (we are speaking
here only about that which is known to us) has thrown very
little light on the theory and practice of a meeting engage-
ment. From official American source~_7it is known that the50X1-HUM
meeting engagement pertains to offensive operations under
mobile conditions and is defined as a clash'of formations
and large units of the opposing sides which in the majority
of instances are not completely deployed and are striving
to perform their tasks by offensive operations on the very
same axes. 50X1-HUM
It is easy to observe that all these definitions are
similar. The difference is that some authors consider that
supposedly the meeting engagement begins from the march and
others that it begins only during the conduct of an operation.
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The basic principle that in a meeting engagement both
sides attack each other from opposite directions is held by
all authors. At first glance it seems that this principle
is correct and corresponds completely to modern conditions.
Moreover, even in the past the essence of a meeting engage-
ment was understood in a similar manner. This can be seen
from Andogskiy's monograph The Meeting Engagement, published
in 1918, from Triandafillov's work The Nature o Operations
of Modern Armies, or from prewar articles by Varfolomeyev,
Sh!llovskiy, ~sserson, and others on the subject of the meet-
ing engagement.
Actually, however, it pains us to state that as a re-
sult of precisely such an understanding of the essence of
the meeting engagement, at operational-tactical exercises
conducted in recent years against a background of the initial
period of a nuclear/missile war.,the same unfortunate errors
have been repeated. The two sides usually draw their main
groupings into protracted meeting combat operations instead
of using the results of nuclear/missile strikes, open or
poorly covered flanks, and often areas not occupied by any-
one and then swiftly advancing to the operational depth.
It seems to us that the definitions cited above of the
meeting engagement on which our command cadres and operational
staffs are educated even today guide them to an obligatory
deployment of the operational groupings of the two sides in
a meeting engagement and to the participation of as large a
number as possible of divisions in these clashes. As a re-
sult, in practice one observes that the main forces are
drawn away from the performance of the basic tasks of a
modern offensive operation in order to participate in a tank
engagement or in the destruction of several advancing enemy
divisions.
It is obvious that the definitions which have been cited
of a meeting engagement are not calculated for the conditions
of nuclear/missile warfare. For more than five years now we
havr. admitted that meeting engagements will begin and develop
mu,,.Hi more often than before and that they will become a nor~~
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phenomenon, taking precedence over the remaining types-of
troop combat operations. And yet in defining the term 50X1-HUM
"meeting engagement" we still use anachronisms. Right now
when the goal of any offensive operation by ground troops
is the destruction of enemy nuclear/missile weapons and
aircraft, and the capture of important operational-strategic
areas, the troops must not be oriented to the idea that a
meeting engagement is nothing but the sum total of meeting
battles or the offensive actions of the operational groupings
of the two sides.
We suggest the following definition. A meeting engage-
ment consists of meeting nuclear/missile strikes and swift
offensive thrusts of the operational groupings of both sides
during which each side uses the results of its nuclear/missile
strikes to perform important operational-strategic tasks in
the given theater of military operations (TVD) or along the
operational axis.
Because to attain victory it is necessary to destroy
the enemy's means of mass destruction, the main factor in
the suggested definition of the meeting engagement are the
nuclear/missile strikes of both sides. Successful results
of these strikes can inflict a maximum loss on the enemy and
force him to abandon the offensive, even long before the direct
clash of the forward detachments. This comprises the basic
distinguishing feature of the meeting engagement of the future.
The given definition does not refute but rather stresses the
possibility of a clash between large units of the strike group-
ings of the opponents. The encounters will occur most fre-
quently when at the very outset of the engagement the nuclear/
missile strikes do not produce a radical change in the balance
of forces and, thus, in the situation as a whole. When we
speak of swift offensive operations, we give preference to
the troop maneuver immediately following nuclear strikes)that
is, an advance primarily at the speed of a march, and not to
deployment and attack.
A modern meeting engagement does not necessarily start
with combat between reconnaissance subunits, forward detachments,
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and advance guards as before, although all these organs must
be detached and are actively engaged, but, as a rule, by
meeting nuclear/missile and aviation strikes. Here, deploy-
ment of the majority of large units and units of the opponents
and a direct encounter between them may not even take place.
It is interesting to clarify whether -a._:meeting engagement
takes place in this instance. We answer this question in the
affirmative. A meeting engagement occurs because the basic
fire and strike forces and weapons of both sides participate
in it. It is not at all obligatory to deploy large formations
and large units for an engagement or battle. If the nuclear/
missile weapons of the opponents entered the operation and
performed their missions, then it is up to the armies and
divisions of the front to execute a swift thrust against the
enemy flank and rear in order to use the results of nuclear/
missile strikes, and to complete the enemy's destruction.
In`our opinion, only during this maneuver it may possibly
become necessary to deploy part of the forces to attack from
the march and destroy theuenemy. Such an outcome of a meet-
ing engagement will be most typical although in the past most
frequently one of the sides passed to the defensive.
The capabilities of the nuclear/missile weapons are so
great that they have led to a rejection of position defense
(pozitsionnaya oborona) and consequently have cisnceled the
need for a deliberate breakthrough. Massed nuclear/missile
strikes delivered simultaneously along the entire depth of the
operational-strategic formation of the enemy create conditions
for the beginning of a meeting engagement. An increase- nn
firepower, the strike force, and in the mobility of modern
troops is conducive to the beginning of meeting battles and
engagements and to a significant degree guarantees freedom
in the selection of maneuver for each side.
Now there is every reason to consider that not Only
offensive operations but also modern defensive ones, by the
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aim of the troop operation, have mainly an active nature by
their form. In other words, the fundamental change in the
method of waging defense is objectively creating favorable
conditions for the beginning of a meeting engagement which
will occur much more often than before. 50X1-HUM
The goal of a meeting engagement is the destruction of
the specific advancing enemy grouping and the seizure of the
important operational-strategic area being covered by it in
the least amount of time. This is achieved mainly by massed
nuclear/missile strikes and a skillful maneuver by the strike
grouping. The destruction of one definite opposing enemy
grouping on the way to achieving the general goal of the
whole operation makes a meeting engagement a very important
part of the offensive operation of a front or army and not at
all an "episode".
Meeting engagements during the initial period of a war
are distinguished by some special features. The first of
these is that these engagements most likely will be con-
ducted by strong groupings intended to wage offensive opera-
tions and created even before the beginning of the war. This
gives one a basis to suppose that an offensive operation will
begin with meeting engagements which will have a decisive
nature, and their results canthave a significant influence
on the whole subsequent course of armed combat in the theater
of military operations. On some axes, after having destroyed
the enemy with nuclear/missile strikes in the border zone
during the first hours and days of the war, our troops will
quickly carry the combat operations to the operational depth,
but on other axes these engagements may be dragged out or
even proceed unfavorably for our troops.
The second special feature of meeting engagements is
that to achieve a superiority in the balance of forces and
a change in the situation in our favor, there will have to
be additional efforts by nuclear/missile weapons and air-
craft and, possibly, a regrouping of part of the forces and
weapons of the front. The meeting engagements conducted
according to a single plan simultaneously or consecutively
50X1-HUM
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on several axes in the zone of the offensive of the front
with unavoidable large gaps between operational formations
and large units will demand great efforts and mobility in
supporting troop combat operations which are coordinated 50X1-HUM
according to their time, space, and aim, and undoubtedly
they will be conducted most often on the scale of a front.
The statement that the scale of a meeting engagement
is limited to an army is current even now although historical
experience and the practice of recent operational-stra egic
exercises do not confirm this. Quite the opposite, the
theory and practice of today and historical experience show
quite obviously that the scope of a meeting engagement has
expanded. These engagements may be by a front as well as
by an army. It is important to stress also the increase
in the spatial scope of a meeting engagement -- the width
of the zone and particularly of the depth of conducting com-
bat operations. Although formerly the depth of a meeting
engagement was determined by the operational formation of
a given specific grouping and waw,:;*easure$ usually by the
location of the second echelons and reserves, at present it
is determined by the distance of the missile troop groupings.
The fast speed of an offensive during a meeting engage-
ment is assuming special meaning now when the time for de-
livering strikes and other operations is calculated in
hours and minutes.
It is quite clear that it is difficult to make fixed
estimates regarding speed in a meeting en agement. However,
experience gained from exercises indicates that speeds of
100 km and over in a 24 hour period are feasible for modern
troops. The decisive defeat of the enemy by nuclear/missile
weapons and the high mobility of formations and large units
permit a meeting engagement to be waited at the fastest speeds.
To a considerable degree, the latter depend on reliable aerial
cover and, primarily, on combatting successfully the enemy's
missile weapons. Here, one should bear in mipd that destruc-
tion and obstacles resulting from the use of nuclear weapons
and especially areas with high levels of radiation can slow
dbwn the troop progress.
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As for the time factor, it should be expected that the
periods of time during which a meeting encounter may start,
proceed, and reach an end will be shortened considerably.
Another special feature is that meeting engagements
may take place not only at the beginning of an operation 50X1-HUM
but also during the fulfilment of an immediate or sub-
sequent mission of the front, in the process of destroying
the first enemy operational echelon, or during a swift
advance into the operational depth, i.e., under the most
diverse conditions. This will consist of nuclear/,.missile
surprise counterstrikes (vstrechnyy udar) and encounters
between the forward moving groupings of both sides making
up the complement of the front (armies) and the enemy
operational reserves approaching from the depth.
One can easily be convinced of this after studying
the materials based on our operational-strategic exercises
in 1959 to 1960 and the exercises of NATO troops of re-
cent years. According to the known views of the enemy
regarding the early operations during the initial period
of a war, following sudden massed nuclear strikes strong
troop groupings will be moved forward from the depth in
order to deliver strikes in a meeting engagement.
This happens firstly because, in contrast to the past,
the advancing side will have to deal not only with the
defender but primarily with the enemy advancing to meet
him; secondly, the methods of operations of even the enemy
on the defense are now mainly offensive ones; and finally,
thirdly, due to the use of nuclear/missile weapons con-
ditions are created which give rise to meeting engagements.
All this leads us to the thought of a new phenomenon
in the art of operations -- a meeting operation (vstrechnaya
operatsiya) . This problem was examinec~~ ack-!1 1957 on the
pages of Voyennaya Mysl in an article by Colonel S.N. Kozlov.
previously, ~iowe~er; for some reason it was considered im-
possible to plan meeting operations in advance, and tha
problem passed into oblivion. 50X1-HUM
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Although previously the side which suffered defeat
in a meeting engagement and passed to the defense could
count on being able to halt the enemy advance at least
temporarily, no* it cannot hope to create a stable fron150X1-HUM
The side which emerged victorious in the first meeting
engagement can operate so skillfully and; swiftly that
it will not give the other side a chance to collect it-
self and will penetrate into its operational depth before
the defeated enemy /3 words missing7 access. If he is
successful in quickly organizing a defense on a certain
axis, then he may be destroyed by nuclear weapons.
i
We are far from thinking that all the aims of a
modern offensive operation of a front will be achieved by
victory (if, of course, one considers that in the main
theater of military operations they may be at a depth
of 1000 km and more). Evaluating realistically the ways
to develop the first offensive operation, it is easy to
become convinced that after victory in the first major
meeting engagement the troops will have several meetings
with the enemy in the depth. The enemy will strive to de-
liver destruction, change the balance of forces in his
favor, and thus seize the initiative by using strikes by
nuclear/missile weapons, aircraft, by shifting reserves to
the theater of military operations, and by counterstrikes
by the surviving forces and weapons. The result will be
that the troops of the front which were rushing into the
enemy's operational depth will conduct their own combat
operations in a sharp and dynamic situation which demands
the constant forestalling of the enemy in the use of
nuclear/missile weapons, in seizing advantageous areas and
important water lines, in deploying part of his forces, and
in the constant movement forward of the main forces to
occupy vitally important enemy areas to prevent his organi-
zing resistance.
All that has been said convinces us of the advisability
of distinguishing a meeting offensive operation from the
established and conventional understanding connected with
an offensive against a defending enemy and with a break-
through of the defense. Obviously, such an operation in 50X1-HUM
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the main theater of military operations will be more
typical for the initial period of a war. Now reality
itself and the practice of operational-strategic ex-
ercises demand a scientific working out of the theory 50X1-HUM
of a meeting offensive operation.
Such problems as how to choose nuclear/missile
weapons, how to choose the axis for the main strike,
the role of superiority of forces and weapons over
the enemy, the preparation for a meeting engagement,
the creation of troop groupings, and the bases of
control are also of definite interest for the practice
of operational training.
The use of nuclear/missile weapons makes it possible
to perform the basic tasks and to inf uence the whole
course of a meeting engagement by a maneuver of even single
or tens of nuclear warheads without having to resort to
a maneuver by a large amount of artillery, tanks, air-
craft, or formations and large units as:was-the case
previously. The necessary amount of nuclear/missile wea-
pons will depend on the total aim of the operation and
the a:.m of the specific meeting engagement on the given
strategic axis, on the tasks being fulfilled by the missile
troops of strategic designation in the zone of the frontal
offensive or on the axis of the army's operations, and on
the results achieved by them.
The greatest effectiveness in the use of nuclear wea-
pons can'be achieved in the first sudden massed nuclear
strike against the most important enemy objectives and
groupings, primarily against his nuclear weapons. This
principle was advanced in the directives on operational
training during recent years. Incidentally, at the large
exercise in 1960, the "southern" forces planned to deliver
the first nuclear strike by 44 nuclear warheads of which
only 14 were used against the enemy's weapons of mass de-
struction, 24 against troop groupings, and 6 against enemy
control points and radiotechnical means. The unsoundness
of such a use of nuclear weapons was confirmed rather
quickly. The absence of trustworthy reconnaissance data 50X1-HUM
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before the beginning of combat operations and an incom-
plete disclosure of the enemy's plan led to the result for
the "south" that 80 percent of all the warheads designated
for the first nuclear strike against the enemy fell wide50X1-HUM
of the mark.
This is not an accidental phenomenon. If an analysis
is made of effectiveness in the use of nuclear weapons in
the 1958 to 1960 exercises, it will be found that at each
of them there was permitted a large percentage of waste
in the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently here we encounter
difficulties in preparing for the first meeting offensive
operation when neither side is free to choose the methods
and means of conducting reconnaissance. It is especially
important in the advance planning for and during a meeting
engagement that reconnaissance makes it possible for the
front and army command to deliver accurate and preemptive
nuclear strikes.
The basic criterion in selecting objectives to be hit
by nuclear strikes should be their importance and the de-
gree of effect they may have on the course of a meeting
engagement. It is appropriate to mention here that in
several instances unsuccessful maneuvering operations
during the 1959 to 1960 exercises are explained by unskill-
ful use of nuclear weapons during the engagement. In our
opinion, the most advantageous use of nuclear weapons should
be during the deployment of enemy groupings in a meeting
engagement. Successful massed nuclear strikes against enemy
large units and the destruction of his nuclear/missile wea-
pons at this moment may sharply change the balance of
forces and the entire situation.
The organization of a massed nuclear strike delivery
may be carried out at the beginning of a meeting engagement
more often on a front level, and during the engagement on
an army level, especially if one considers the considerable
independence of the latter. However, we must bear in mind
that it is considerably more difficult to organize and
deliver a massed nuclear strike during a meeting engagement
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than at its beginning. It seems to us that if the first
massed strike is successful, it is unlikely that there
will be a need to repeat it during the meeting engagement.
Most likely, there will be a sufficient number of individual
or group strikes against newly revealed nuclear, missile,
aircraft, and radiotechnical weapons and means, control
points, reserves, and other objectives. Here, it is very
important to achieve speed in making calculations and 50X1-HUM
preparing the initial data to launch missiles and to use
aircraft.
The essential factor in the use of nuclear missile
weapons should be ensuring the capability to deliver strikes
of high yield against the enemy during a meeting engagement
with a minimum expenditure of time. Here it is extremely
important that the methods of using front and army missile
troops should be conducive to?a quick transfer of nuclear
strikes from one axis to another. This is especially
necessary during the sharp changes in a situation during
a meeting engagement.
At the same time it must be considered that during a
developed meeting engagement there will also be several
targets and objectives against which it will be inadvisable
to use nuclear/missile strikes. The neutralization and
destruction of these can be assigned completely to the
fighter-bombers, tanks, and artillery.
The problem of the main strike and of the superiority
of forces In a meeting engagem-e must also be resolved in
a different manner at the present time. It consists of
destroying the enemy's nuclear weapons of attack,and of his
ground troops and occupying his vitally important areas.
The main strike is aimed primarily against nuclear weapons,
missiles, and tactical aviation although the destruction of
the nuclear weapons of attack is not an end in itself. 50X1-HUM
As a rule, nuclear weapons of strategic and operational
designation will be located a considerable distance from
important enemy industrial and political centers and group-
ings of ground troops operating on very short and convenient
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axes leading to these centers. Despite Colonel Mikitenko's
statement, we consider that it is not at all necessary for
the axis of operations of the main grouping of front or
army ground troops to be directly dependent on, the axis on
which the nuclear weapons are concentrated.) /fhe footnote
is miss ing7 .
50X1-HUM
For example, it cannot be considered normal to direct
the main efforts of tank armies of a front to the side, let
us say, of a mountainous area for the sole reason that the
main strike by missile troops is directed there against the
enemy's nuclear weapons. It is also impossible to use the
basic mass of nuclear weapons against a weak enemy grouping
just because the main forces of a front or army are operating
on this axis. This leads to a waste of nuclear weapons.
Thus, at the operational game in January 1961 both sides con-
centrated up to 80 percent of the nuclear warheads expended
on the axes of the offensive by their basic groupings al-
though these strikes were not delivered against the main
enemy forces. As a result, the troops of both sides did
not fulfil even their immediate tasks although they fired
about 300 nuclear warheads during the three days.
It is obvious that in a meeting engagement the basic
efforts of the nuclear/missile weapons of a front and of
armies will be directed against the main enemy forces on
axes which make it possible to come out in the shortest
possible time in the rear areas and flanks of his basic
groupings and toward vitally important areas. The art.of
leading troops, apparently, will be most clearly expressed
when the enemy nuclear weapons and divisions are destroyed
by massed nuclear/missile strikes and by our smaller forces
connected from the front, but the main forces will be
directed around or across the existing gaps in the enemy's
operational formation at speeds approaching those of a march.
This will be possible if a grouping of front (army) troops
which is stronger in its fire, strike, and maneuvering
capabilities begins to operate in the meeting engagement on
the axis of the main strike and if this grouping is able to
conduct a successful offensive in a broad zone which ensures
it the needed area for dispersion and mobility. 50X1-HUM
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Success in a meeting engagement does not depend on
concentrating a large number of troops but on superiority50X1-H UM
of nuclear weapons and on their skillful use. In this
connection, the problem about the role of superiority in
forces and weapons on the axis of the main strike n a meet-
ing engagement must be resolved primarily in favor of nuclear/
missile weapons. A surprise nuclear strike against the
basic enemy grouping in a matter of minutes may change the
balance of forces and weapons.
It is appropriate to stress here that modern re-
connaissance means exclude the possibility of a sudden
beginning of a meeting engagement of operational formations
not only at the beginning but also during the whole offen-
sive operation. Here one sees still one more important
distinctive trait of a meeting engagement which has lost
its uncertainty and quality of chance. In the past these
were typical for this type of operation.
As is shown by experience, the planning and preparation
of a meeting engagement in the initial period of a war is
carried out during the preparation for the first offensive
operation because the meeting engagement comprises its main
and most crucial part. The following have considerable
bearing on its preparation: more rigid conditions of
secrecy and security during peacetime, the absence of a set
date for beginning the operation, restrictions in conducting
reconnaissance activities, and the organization of final
,operational troop formations. 50X1-HUM
In addition to the general preparation, while preparing
to carry out the first operation it will be necessary to re-
solve also some specific problems inherent in the organization
of a meeting engagement. Among these, first of all, are
continuous reconnaissance and study of the enemy, determining
the plan of the first meeting engagement in relation to the
overall plan for the operation, determining the timing, the
methods, and means of informing the troops of the tasks, and
setting up launch sites and siting areas for missile troops
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50X1-HUM
and airfields to base aircraft, taking into account the
conduct of the impending meeting engagement. The disposi-
tion of troops is so organized that during their advance
it would be possible in a short period of time to set up
the needed grouping to conduct a meeting engagement.
Setting up control points and communication centers and
systems, organizing reliable and timely warning, as well
as screening the troops and objectives of the front (armies)
by the antiair defense (PVO) weapons of the country and the
army troops' PVO, carrying out preparation of the terrain
by engineer means, and the accumulation and distribution
of supplies are all carried out subject to the accepted
plan for the operation and the meeting engagement.
Operational training of the command and staffs and
combat training of the troops are improved along specific
lines but under conditions of keeping secret the real
operational plans. All these preparatory measures are
directly related to the first meeting engagement and
demand centralized leadership and planned execution despite
the opinions of some comrades who generally doubt the
possibility of preparing for a meeting engagement in peace-
time. The preparation of the first offensive operation can-
not be detached or examined apart from its decisive act --
the first meeting engagement. Of course, several measures
will be carried out over a rather prolonged period of time
and will undergo many changes; however, the execution of
the basic ones must conform to the requirements of ensuring
constant troop combat readiness. Therein lies the peculiarity
of the preparation for a meeting engagement in peacetime.
One should dwell in more detail on the contents of and
the conditions under which a decision is made by the com-
mander of the front troops. In several recent exercises
and war games a wrong approach to making a decision was
observed, and its contents did not correspond to the require-
ments of the present. In our opinion, this occurred, through
the lack of thorough knowledge of combat equipment, foresight,
and correct operational calculations which would ensure a
valid evaluation of a situation and the making of a confident
operational decision.
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On the basis of intelligence data during peacetime,
it is necessary to scrutinize the plans and concept of
the enemy, be well versed in the capabilities of his
nuclear/missile weapons, and foresee the quantitative and
qualitative changes which may occur in his groupings, in
the near future and during a more prolonged period of
time. For instance, at the present time an infantry divi-
sion of the US Army has an "Honest John" battery, and in
a year there will be two or three of them. Moreover, the
type of missiles, apparently, will become different and
more improved.
One must also consider the state of our troops at
the present time and their, capabilities in the future, the
nature of operational training, and how it will change.
All these circumstances force us to work out a decision
for the first meeting engagement of the initial period of
a war, and this decision must meet the modern conditions of
the situation and must contain elements of foresight for
the near future. This decision must be free from pre-
conceptions and must leave room for corrections to be intro-
duced into it in accordance with the changes which occur.
In the decision about the meeting engagement, on the
basis of thorough analysis and calculations one must deter-
mine the enemy's plan and grouping, primarily the location
of his weapons of nuclear attack; the possible radiation
situation; and the complement, state, and general task of
our own troops and those of our neighbors, and the concept
of our own decision. On the basis of the decision, one
must fix the axis of the main strike and the main efforts
of nuclear/missile weapons as well as the expected result
from the nuclear strikes. The commander of the front troops
and the commander of the army determine the tasks of nuclear/
missile weapons for the whole depth of the meeting engagement
and by days allot nuclear warheads according to the tasks
and among formations and large units, and they indicate the
tasks for front and army weapons and the procedure for con-
trolling large units and units of missile troops.
50X1-HUM
Missile troops must receive in advance the needed data
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on objectives to be destroyed by nuclear weapons and must
draw up tables and programs for launching missiles. Here
formations and large units make provisions for variations
in troop operations according to axes and times for ful- 50X1-HUM
filling their tasks in coordination with missile troops,
aircraft, and airborne forces, for routes of movement, and
orientation areas for adjustment (regulirovaniye) and,
rarely, lines of probable deployment. Later the tasks are
determined for the airborne forces, areas are indicated for
their landing (dropping), the tasks of aircraft and arms of
troops are indicated, and finally measures to ensure the
meeting engagement and the organization of troop control are
indicated.
In determining the tasks for armies and divisions,
particularly for those assigned for operations in front and
separated from the main forces, in some instances it will
be advisable not to cut the zone of the offensive but to
indicate the directions of the strikes, which enemy troop
grouping to destroy, and which areas or objectives to seize
and by what time.
Variations in the decision of the front troop commander
for the destruction of the enemy during a meeting engagement
in the border zone must be made known to the commanders of
armies and to the commanding officers of large units in ad-
vance.
Particular attention must be given to organizing com-
bat reconnaissance of the enemy?s weapons of nuclear attack
before the very beginning of the first meeting engagement,
to covering one?s own troops from the air, to protecting
them from the weapons of mass destruction, and also to carry-
ing out effective radio countermeasures. It is very impor-
tant to foresee the radiation situation which may arise as
a result of the use of nuclear warheads by both sides and
to work out variations of the plan for troop operations with
a thorough and detailed calculation of this factor.
The preparation for the subsequent meeting engagement
during the first offensive front operation apparently will5OX1-HUM
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begin during the execution of the precediAg one or during
a swift advance of the main forces of the front and armies
into the operational depth immediately after receiving the
intelligence data about the advance of the enemy reserves, 50X1-HUM
and it will be carried out in a minimum amount of time.
The decision to annihilate the advancing enemy grouping
is made and relayed to the subordinates in advance so that
the troops will have a chance to execute a maneuver corres-
ponding to the given mission and goal of the forthcoming;,-
meeting engagement, to deliver nuclear/missile and aircraft
strikes against enemy groupings, and to forestall their de-
ployment. Making such a decision should take literally no
more than a few hours, and in-this the commander and the chief
of staff will work jointly. The execution of the adopted
decision must be based on the highest degree of creative initi-
ative and independence of commanding officers on all levels.
The grouping of the troops of the front and the armies
will depend mainly on a tasks being executed by the missile
troops of strategic designation for the front. The possibility
of simultaneously destroying the resisting enemy along the
entire depth of his operational formation makes it possible
to perform the tasks in a meeting engagement in a single
echelon operational formation. Such a formation ensures the
most correct use of nuclear/missile weapons, aircraft,
airborne forces, and the tank and mechanized troops of the
,front and army for the most effective exploitation .6f tie
results of.nuclear/missile strikes.
It is obvious that the efforts of the front troops
during a meeting engagement can be intensified by
the delivery