MILITARY NEWS: COMBAT WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL OF TANK TROOPS M. SHAPOSHNIKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700510001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
IRONBARK
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . MILITARY NEWS: "Combat with Tactical Nuclear
Weapons", by Lieutenant-General of Tank
Troops M. Shaposhnikov
1 Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the Soviet Ministry of Defense publication Collection
of Articles of the Journal Military News (Voyennyy Vestnik .
This publication is classified SECRET by the Soviets, and the
issue in which this article appeared was distributed to officers
from regimental commander upward.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary'Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your
office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utili-
zation of any part of this document in any other form should be
addressed to the originating office.
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
CSDB-3/650,561
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Divison of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
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;O, SECRET
IRONBARK
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561
SUBJECT
MILITARY NEWS: "Combat with Tactical Nuclear
Weapons", by Lzieutenant-General of Tank Troops
DATE OF INFO:
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT
SOURCE
M. Shaposhnikov
January 1961
Documentary
A reliable source
(B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article en-
titled "Combat with Tactical Nuclear Weapons", by Lieutenant-
General of Tank Troops M. Shaposhnikov. This article appeared
in Issue No. 34, 1961, of the Soviet military publication
Collection of Articles of the Journal Military News (Voyennyy
Vestnik). This publication is classified SECRET by the Soviets
and is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense.
According to the Preface, Issue No. 34 was sent for type-
setting on 14 December 1960 and released to the printer on
25 January 1961.. The Preface states that articles express the
opinions of their authors and are published as a form of dis-
cussion. Distribution of Issue No. 34 was to officers from
regimental commander upward.
Copy No.
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CSDB-3/650,561
Combat with Tactical Nuclear Weapons
by
Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops
M. Shaposhnikov
At the present time the development of nuclear/missile
weapons has attained wide scope from quantitative and
qualitative standpoints. It is the decisive means of fire
action against enemy personnel and combat equipment. At
the same time, enemy nuclear weapons are the main objectives
that must be destroyed first of all with all available wea-
pons. Consequently, the resolution of problems of destroying
enemy nuclear/missile weapons is the basis of antiatomic
troop protection.
Let us examine some problems pertaining to combat against
enemy tactical nuclear weapons with the weapons of the com-
manding officers of a division and regiment.
The principles advanced in our press that one of the
main goals of modern operations is the destruction of enemy
nuclear/missile weapons of strategic designation and of
other objectives, which may be airfields of strategic avia-
tion, depots of nuclear weapon supplies, etc, are wrong.
In the majority of cases, our missile troops of oper-
ational-tactical designation are also regarded as a means
of destroying deep objectives and, first of all, enemy
weapons of nuclear attack located at a relatively great
depth from the line of the front.
The inadequate attention that is alloted to problems
of combating enemy weapons of nuclear attack during command
training and also at exercises with troops leads our officers
and generals to at least two mistakes.
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Firstly, they consider that in the majority of cases
it is necessary to use only the available nuclear/missile
weapons to combat enemy weapons of nuclear attack.
Secondly, not having nuclear weapons at their dis-
posal,or having them in very limited quantities, some
commanding officers of divisions think that problems of
combating enemy weapons of nuclear attack are a function
of the army commander and of senior commanding officers
(nachalnik).
As is known, the basic means for delivering nuclear
warheads to the target in the army of the USA are the NURS
(free rocket - neupravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad) "Honest
John", URS (guided missile - upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy
snaryad) "Lacrosse", "Corporal", "Redstone", and others.
The 203.2mm gun is also used for tactical targets. These
weapons, with the exception of the URS "Redstone", probably. . .
/One page missing 7
. . . weapons with conventional artillery weapons.
Maybe the example given was accidental? It is possible.
But the investigation should be continued.
But here is a different result. To investigate the
effectiveness of tank and SAU (assault guns
samokhodnaya artilleriyskaya ustanovka) fire from covered
positions against enemy weapons of nuclear attack during
combat operations, battalions of medium and heavy tanks and
a battalion of tank destroyers were brought in.
Missions were assigned by the artillery commanding officer
by radio: to commanding officers of tank battalions through
the commanding officers of regiments, and directly to the com-
manding officer of the tank destroyer battalion.
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At night, the tanks and SAU required 30 minutes to cross
6 to 8km from the concentration area to the area of fire posi-
tions, to assume positions, and to find their bearings. The
coordinates of the targets, the sizes of the sectors, the
expenditure of ammunition, the procedure of firing, and
corrections for meteorological and ballistic firing conditions
were determined by the artillery staff of the division.
Topographic data for planned targets were prepared
analytically. Twelve minutes were required to prepare
initial data for the firing.
In practice, the fire was conducted by part of the
tanks taken out for the exercise, the remainder conducted
dry fire.
Thus, a battalion of medium tanks conducted fire against
a 203.2mm howitzer located on an area 100 by 150m at a range
of 9270m. Fire was conducted with one setting of the sight
according to complete initial data prepared directly for the
target. Of thirty 100mm caliber shells expended, 8 shells
exploded on the area of the, gun".positiozi. A satisfactory re-
sult was achieved. Two shells exploded in the immediate
proximity of the gun.. .
To destroy a 280mm atomic cannon at a range of 9520m,
a battalion of heavy tanks was used. The preparation of
data was carried out in the same way as for the medium tank
battalion.
Of the 30 shells fired at the gun, 22 shells ex-
ploded on the firing position (an area 100 X 150m), and this
was 73 percent hits. The fire of the heavy tanks put out of
action the means of traction, crew (prisluga), and with one
hit broke the breech and mount of the gu.n. This was an
excellent result. It shows the high effectiveness of heavy
tank fire on nuclear weapons located at a distance of up to
10km.
The fire of a tank destroyer (SU-122) battalion against
antitank guided missiles of 'a missile-destroyer antitank
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company is of interest. The battalion of tank destroyers
conducted fire at a range of 8140m. Of 30 shells fired
at the target located on an area 300 by 200m, 9 shells hit
the target, and this is 29.7 percent hits.
Our three-year experience in combat firing by tanks
from covered positions showed that when firing at a range
of up to 10km against targets that cannot be observed, the
tank subunits are equal to the artillery in accuracy of
fire and time of readiness and are capable of carrying on
combat with enemy nuclear weapons located within the field
of fire as successfully as artillery.
Thus, the results of the firing show the advisability
of using tube artillery with conventional ammunition and. . .
/-One page missing 7
. the increased norm of ammunition expenditure and does
not give an answer to the problem of whether fire should be
conducted if success is not fully guaranteed? These problems
are answered by experience: it not only should be, but it is
vitally necessary!
Consequently, the norms that are foreseen in the Manual
already do not correspond to the changed conditions. Now,
more flexible recommendations are necessary that will assist
all commanding officers of large units in combating enemy
nuclear weapons.
One of the most important conditions for combating enemy
nuclear weapons is correctly organized and actively conducted
reconnaissance. The concentration of up to 40 units of enemy
nuclear weapon delivery means in the zone of the division
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makes it essential to have in large units and regiments
forces and means of reconnaissance capable of handling tasks
which have increased in volume and quality.
The most effective means of reconnaissance in the tank
(motorized rifle) division is the ~ dispatch ?. ': of reconnaissance
groups into the enemy rear area.
At one of the exercises, 3 reconnaissance groups composed
of 5 or 6 persons were sent out to reconnoiter the "enemy" nu-
clear attack weapons. Moving on foot, each group was assigned
the task of penetrating into the "enemy" rear area and carry-
ing out reconnaissance in an area 1 to 2km2 . The groups
fulfilled their combat task by observation. Communications
were maintained only with the division intelligence; chief.
The personnel of the groups did not have special training in
the reconnaissance of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the reconnaissance personnel were unable to
fulfil the mission quickly and headquarters was unable to
take timely measures to destroy disclosed targets. The
slowness was a result of the fact that reconnaissance groups
did not search for targets but waited until they arrived in
specific areas. Having discovered the ..means of nuclear
attack, however they were unable to report quickly because
their report passed through several echelons of command, and
this took much time, during which the "enemy" had time to
deliver a strike and to move the mounts to reserve positions.
Undoubtedly, the reconnaissance would have been success-
ful if the personnel of the reconnaissance groups had been
specially trained, had been expert in orientation on unfamiliar
terrain by day and night, had known and had quickly identified
"enemy" tactical nuclear weapons on the terrain, had used the
map freely, and had known how to transmit the coordinates of
targets accurately and quickly.
Under the conditions of modern,highly maneuverable combat
operations, reconnaissance groups must fulfil their missions
on mobile means. In our opinion, the best one of these so far
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is the armored personnel carrier of the BRDM type that
has radio sets.
The tactics of conducting reconnaissance of enemy
nuclear weapons are of definite interest. Even now it
is possible to say that the tactical weapons of nuclear
attack with which the army of the USA is armed are capable
of being moved over all dirt roads and of assuming fire or
launch sites anywhere.
In connection with this, it is impossible to limit one-
self to conducting reconnaissance on separate axes,,or in
small areas because this will not ensure the disclosure of
enemy tactical nuclear weapons. It is most advisable to. . .
/One, page missing -7
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Tactics of conducting reconnaissance in the rear area of the enemy
with reconnaissance groups of the large units.
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