MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME PROBLEM OF ORGANIZING AND CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF A WAR, BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL B. YEFIMOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700460001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 18, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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SE2GET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
IRONBARK
1 8 JUL 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of.' Central. ntel_i1 c,nce
SUBJECT MILITARY TIOUGII`T (SECRET): "Scrr c> Problcemr, of
Organizing and Conducting Intelligence
Collection in the Initial Period. of a War",
by Lieutenant-Colonel B. Yefimov
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the
SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"
published by the. Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed dtl~in
to the level of division commander.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified, CONFIDENTIAL. and is to be-used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your
office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utili-
zation of any part of this document in any other form should be
addressed to the originating office.
Richard lieisis
Deputy Director (Plans)
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
Pc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
~'SEC6EET
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IRONBARK
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Some Problems
of Organizing and Conducting Intelligence
Collection in the Initial Period of a
War", by Lieutenant-Colonel B. Yefimov
DATE OF INFO December 1961
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT Documentary
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
entitled "Some Problems of Organizing and Conducting
Intelligence Collection in the. Initial Period of a War",
by Lieutenant-Colonel B. Yefimov. This article appeared
in Issue 6 (61) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet
journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by
the Soviets and is published irregularly.
Issue 6 (61) was sent to press on 7 December 1961.
Comment: Military Thought is published by
e nistry of Defense in three versions, classified
RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version
has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two
versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version
was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61
issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of
them during 1961.
The word "razvedka" has been translated as
"intelligence", "intelligence collection", and "reconnais-
sance", according to the context.
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Some-Problems of Organizing and Conducting Intelligence
Collection in the Initial Period of a War
(Review of Military-Scientific Studies of Military
Districts and Groups of Troops)
by
Lieutenant-Colonel B. Yefimov
The successful conduct of operations in the initial
period of a war depends directly on how effectively the
nuclear/missile weapons have been employed, because they
are the main and decisive means to destroy an enemy.
In the successful use of these weapons, intelligence plays
an exceptionally important part, and must be able to supply
authentic and exhaustive information as to the situation,
grouping, nature of operations, and intentions of the enemy,
and primarily, on the objectives for nuclear/missile strikes.
Thus, if one considers that the achievement of vic-
tory in battle, in an operation, and in a war as a whole,
depends first of all on the results attained by nuclear/
missile weapons, then their effective employment can be
attained only through intelligence of good quality.
This is why at the present time such great attention
is given to the study of problems of organizing and con-
ducting intelligence collection, particularly in the
operations in the initial period of a war.
In the unpublished studies and reports of a number
of military districts (groups of troops) carried out
according to the plan for military-scientific studies
for ground troops for 1960, on the basis of'the experi-
ence of operational exercises, the problems of organizing
and conducting intelligence collection with the forces
and means of a border military district (front) in the
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preparation for and during the conduct of the first op-
erations of the initial period of the war have been examined,
Of special interest are the studies prepared by the generals
and intelligence officers of the headquarters of the
Transcaucasias, Carpathian and Belorussian Military Districts.
The recommendations contained in them deserve the
greatest attention, and can be utilized for further dev-
elopment of the theory of intelligence collection and in
practical activity. In connection with this, the present
survey will reflect mainly the contents of the military-scien-
Uif.ic, studies of the above-mentioned districts.
Organization of intelligence activity. In the studies
examined, it is quite correctly stated that the successful
conduct of intelligence collection for the preparation
and implementation of the first operations in the initial
period of a war will depend in many ways on the measures
carried out in peacetime, especially on the thorough
study of the enemy and the theaters of military operations.
It is stressed (Carpathian Military District) that the
command and staff of a border military district must possess
sufficient information on the disposition, grouping, and
state of the troops of the probable enemy, and particularly
on his nuclear/missile weapons and other means of mass
destruction on the main strategic and operational axes
of the theater of military operations. It is essential
to accumulate, verify, and supplement these data con-
tinuously, because this will be the basis for evaluating
the state of the enemy armed forces, determining their
combat readiness, and planning the first operations.
Based on the experience of their practical work, the
authors consider it advisable, even in peacetime, to have
at the headquarters of the district detailed large-scale
maps of the location of means of delivery, assembly bases,
and storage depots for nuclear warheads, disposition
areas of control and guidance systems for guided missiles
and pilotless weapons, maps with locations of ground
troops and their headquarters, air forces bases and air-
fields, radar and radio-navigation systems, and other
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IRONBARK
important objectives subject to immediate destruction by
nuclear weapons when delivering the first strike. Besides
the above-mentioned maps, card indices and files must be
built up on all these objectives at the headquarters of
border military districts,in which their nature is fully
described, including accurate geodetic coordinates.
While agreeing with the views of the authors on
this problem, we also consider that in peacetime it is
essential to keep a thorough and vigilant watch on the
direction of the operational and battle preparation of
the probable enemy, on his views as to the possible
nature of the outbreak of war and the conduct of combat
operations, as well as on his possible alternative deploy-
ment and employment of new combat weapons, especially of
those troops which can be employed in the first operations
of the initial period of a war. In his book "Some Problems
of the Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation
in the Initial Period of a War"l, Marshal of the Soviet
Union M. V. Zakharov deals with this in particular and
also with the study of the enemy and of the theaters of
military operations in general.
In many studios it is pointed out that whatever wea-
pons of armed combat the enemy possesses and however much
he strives for a surprise attack, he will be required
nevertheless, to carry out a whole series of measures
connected with the immediate preparation to deliver a
strike. We think one cannot disagree with this.
Of course, a relative degree of surprise in delivering
the first strike can be achieved by the employment of
missiles and of strategic and carrier aviation. It is,
however, difficult to suppose that immediately before a
war there will be no signs to indicate the preparation
of these weapons and all the types of armed forces avail-
able in the theater of military operations for conducting
1. Marsha.. of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, "Some
Problems of the Preparation and Conduct of a Front
Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of a War",
Voyenizdat, 1961, page 52.
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IRONBARK
combat operations. So, for example, in carrying out his
immediate preparation for attack, the enemy will be moving
up troops from their permanent locations, dispersing and
deploying them for the subsequent conduct of combat operations
as well as moving them away from our possible nuclear strikes.
Obviously, in order to discover in good time the
measures being carried out by the enemy before the out-
break of a war, our intelligence collection, and especially
strategic and certain forms of operational intelligence
collection (agent, aerial, radio, and radio-technical)
of the border military districts (groups of troops) must
be at the highest state of combat readiness. For this
purpose, as is pointed out in the military-scientific
studies of the Transcaucasus Military District, the forces
and means of operational intelligence of a border military
district must be maintained, even in peacetime, as near
as possible at wartime TO&E.
In the studies examined, much attention was given
to the organization of intelligence collection within
limited time periods and to the deployment of forces and
means of operational and tactical intelligence collection.
Successful implementation of these measures is possible
if the command and staff of a border military district
(group of troops) work out in good time the measures
for increasing the combat readiness of the intelligence
forces and means and plan to support the preparation and
conduct of the first offensive operation of the initial
period of a war.
If one tries to summarize all the recommendations,
one finds that, with the existence of a threatening period,
the main intelligence measures carried out by the command
and staff of a border military district (front) must be
the redeployment of the intelligence units and subunits
to previously prepared disposition areas (to positions,
airfields); to inform immediately those concerned of
their intelligence tasks, and plan the use of the intell-
igence forces and means to conform with their capabilities
and the situation; organize reliable communications with
intelligence units (subunits, individuals) and the
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intelligence chiefs of the subordinated and collaborating
formations and large units; to gather rapidly and process
intelligence information, and pass it to the command and
General Staff as well as all other interested levels;
to complete the mobilization of intelligence forces and
means as laid down by the appropriate plan and wartime
TO&E.
Intelligence plan. All the above-mientioned measures
must form a component part of the intelligence plan, in
which, at the same time, it is essential to state clearly
the intelligence tasks, areas (axes), and objectives for
all intelligence forces and means subordinated to the
front (army), as well as the areas and axes on which it
is intended to concentrate the main efforts.
Besides this, the intelligence plan must provide
the conduct of intelligence, taking into account the'scope
of the first and subsequent operations, with the concen-
tration of effort along the main operational axes and
primarily of objectives and areas located within the range
of the nuclear/missile weapons of the front and the armies.
The plan must be elaborated and supplemented not less
than once a day, especially in the period immediately
prior to a war or during'rthe so-called threatening period
which is characterized by its increasing tension, discovery
of new tasks, objectives, and areas for -intelligence collection
(Carpathian Military District).
In connection with the methods of working out and
drawing up of the intelligence collection plan, two
opinions are given. Certain comrades (Transcaucasus
Military District, Southern Group of Troops) suggest the
working out of a written intelligenceiplan.
Such a document can give all the intelligence collection
tasks in more detail, definitely specifying those concerned
and the timgiperiods for carrying out the tasks, etc.
It is suggested that the written plan should have an
attached map with the enemy grouping and with the main
intelligence collection measures. The Carpathian Military
District considers it more advisable -to work out the
intelligence plan graphically on the map
s-~
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IRONBARK
In our opinion, the methods of working out and draw-
ing up the intelligence plan may be of different kinds.
However, the suggestions made on this problem by the Trans-
Caucasus Military District and the Southern Group of
Troops are the soundest. They are also confirmed by the
experience of a whole series of exercises.
Conduct of intelligence collection. In many of the
studies, it is pointed out t at during the period immedi-
ately prior to a war,''intelligence collection carried out
by the forces and means of a border military district
(front) before the commencement of combat operations must
be first of all through agents, by radio and radio-technical
means, by reconnaissance aircraft (flights along the nat-
ional boundary), by unit observation from its own territory,
from ground observation posts (NP), and helicopters, as
well as by the intelligence forces and means of the border
troops. All other intelligence forces and means, and
especially army and dividional ones, are constantly in
combat readiness, but take an active part only when combat
operations begin.
Appraising the capabilities of various types of in-
telligence collection, their employment in the period
immediately prior to a war, and during an operation, the
authors of the studies quite correctly point out that
intelligence collection on the eve of a war must be
conducted first of all to deliver the first
nuclear/missile strikes effectively,
As a result of this, the efforts of intelligence
during this period must be directed to additional intell-
igence collection on previously revealed objectives and
collection-or new enemy objectives, among which it is
essential to include, above all, missile units in their
waiting and siting areas, large units and units of the
ground troops in their areas of concentration, airfields
for bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, control points
for troops and weapons, and other important objectives.
In the period immediately prior to a war, intelligence
collection by agents will probably be about the only
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IRONBARK
intelligence collection means of a border military district
(front) which carries out tasks directly on enemy territory.
Therefore, those who stress that the success of intelligence
collection by agents in operations during the initial per-
iod of a war will greatly depend on the work done in
peacetime are quite right (Belorussian and Carpathian
Military Districts).
The organization of the agent network of a district
(group of troops) must be done in such a way that it
assures firstly, timely warning to the command of the
district (group of troops) of immediate enemy preparation
for unleashing a war; secondly, obtain the necessary data
on enemy objectives against which it would be possible
to use nuclear/missile weapons in order to frustrate the
first enemy strike; thirdly, obtain information necessary
for the command of a district (group of troops) to
accomplish successful defeat of the enemy during offensive
operations.
Accordingly, it is considered that intelligence
collection by agents of a border district (group of
troops) must be conducted to a great depth, taking into
account the scope of the initial and subsequent offensive
operations; i.e., to a depth, of 1000 km and more.
One cannot disagree with this, because under conditions
when a war has already started, with the high tempos of
troop operations, and with rapid development of the
initial operation into subsequent ones, great difficulties
will be encountered in increasing the depth of intelli-
gence collection by agents.
As for the number of agent points (agenturnaya tochka)
in enemy territory, the view of the authors of several
studies is that it must depend on the importance of the
theater of military operations, its equipment, size, and
the possible nature of troop operations. However, the
number of operating agent points in all cases must be
sufficient to ensure continuous and reliable conduct of
intelligence collection before the outbreak, as well as
in the first days, of a war.
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The organization of intelligence subunits and their
technics equipping, Examining the possibilities of using existing intelligence forces and means, many of the
studies stress that their organizational structure and
technical equipment lag behind the development of modern
weapons of armed combat. There is an extreme necessity
to increase the capabilities of the intelligence force's
and means of the combined-arms army and motorized rifle
(tank) division. In connection with this, the comrades
from the Transcaucasus Military District, the Southern
Group of,Troops, and some others advance several sug-
Apstions on' the complement and technical equipment of
intelligence elements at various levels.
According to their view, in a combined-arms army of
a border military district it is necessary to have the
following: a mixed reconnaissance aviation regiment
composed of a squadron of pilotless reconnaissance means
(16 units - yedinitsa), a squadron of reconnaissance
aircraft (16 planes), and a squadron of transport aircraft
and helicopters (10 units); a battalion for reconnaissance
in-depth consisting of three reconnaissance companies and
a s1gnal company; and a battalion for radio reconnaissance
composed of four reconnaissance companies. It is suggest-
ed that a motorized rifle (tank) division should have an
independent reconnaissance battalion composed of a company
of armored personnel carriers (BRDM ~ a company for re-
connaissance in depth, and a company for radio-technical
reconnaissance. Intelligence units and subunits must be
equipped with various electronic equipment, television,
and equipment for accelerated processing of aerial photo-
graphs.
It should be stressed that the recommendations as
to the complement and technical equipment of intelligence
elements presented in the studies by the officers of these
districts deserve the greatest attention and can serve
as a basis in work for the creation of modern and effic-
ient intelligence forces and means and their introduction
into the forces as soon as possible.
,0-/ET
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Some recommendations on control. A considerable
part of mi itary-s ii studies is taken up with the
exposition of views on the problems of intelligence
control, collection, processing, and analysis of intelli-
gence data. This is well understood. In modern operations
and combat, the struggle to gain time in this respect ac-
quires exceptionally important significance.
Now, as never befbr.er one must rapidly and effectively
control intelligence forces and means, be able to receive
a continuous flow of intelligence data, complete their
evaluation in the shortest time, pass them on to the
command, and inform all other interested levels about
them.
The smallest delay in the gathering and processing
of intelligence data can jeopardize making a decision as
to the use of appropriate combat weapons, especially of
nuclear/missile weapons, against important enemy object-
ives which have been located.
For the successful performance of these tasks, the
Transcaucasus Military District suggests reorganization
of the intelligence directorate of the front headquarters
by creating within it an intelligence control point.
The implementation of this measure, and at the same time,
high technical-military preparedness of each intelligence
officer, will permit an increase in efficiency of control
of intelligence elements and will ensure that the command
is supplied with the essential intelligence data in time.
The organization of an intelligence control point of a
front will be the first step toward the automation of
collecting and processing intelligence data and control
of intelligence elements.
The personnel of an intelligence control point must
include combined-arms intelligence officers and specialist-
officers of every type of intelligence. The number of
personnel of 'a control point must be calculated to provide
24-hour service with three shifts and for two locations,
in order to ensure continuity of work during movements.
:, SFr1FT
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The intelligence control point of a front must have
a stable multichannel communications system with secure
equipment with all intelligence elements of the front,
with the intelligence departments of the headquarters of
the armies, with neighboring elements, with the front
command, and with commanding officers of arms of troops
and services.
Besides reliable high-speed radio communications
equipment with secure devices, the intelligence control
point must be equipped with television for pictorial
transmission of intelligence data, as well as with
selector communications (selektornaya svyaz) with the
commander of the troops, chief of staff, operations
directorate, headquarters of missile troops and artillery,
intelligence department of air army headquarters, and the
commanderrc of antiair defense (PVO) troops.
The technical equipment of the control point must
ensure automatic and rapid fixing on the plotting board
(planshet) of the position of all intelligence forces
and means of the front and the intelligence information
being obtained, and after its evaluation, the immediate
dispatch of a report to the command and,simultaneously,
to, all interested levels. It is essential to mount this
technical equipment on fast-moving vehicles with high pass-
ability.
In examining the suggestions on the organization and
conduct of intelligence collection for effective use of
nuclear/missile weapons, it should be stressed that in
many of the studies it is pointed out, that,at best,
intelligence collection must assure missile units the
necessary description and accurate coordinates of important
enemy objectives which have been located. But it is not
disclosed what is meant by the description of an objective,
how accurate should be the determination of coordinates,
and by which most expedient methods and means of intell-
igence collection this accuracy could be attained.
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One must keep in mind that at the present time the
coordinates (of the center of location) of such objectives
as atomic artillery, units and subunits of guided missiles
and free rockets in the areas of concentration and at
the firing positions (launch sites, depots of nuclear
weapons, command posts, and similar places, must be deter-
mined with an accuracy of up to 100 to 200 meters.
Coordinates of larger objectives, such as troops in
concentration areas and airfields, must be determined
with an accuracy of up to 200 to 300 meters.
Without a doubt, this problem is a difficult one,
but all intelligence forces and means must be able to
perform it, particularly reconnaissance and reconnaissance-
artillery spotter aviation and reconnaissance groups for
reconnaissance in depth. Therefore, it is essential to
give special attention to this problem in military-scien-
tific studies and in practice.
The organization and conduct of aerial reconnaissance
under conditions of powerful enemy antiair defense also
merit further serious study. Taking into account the
special complexity of overcoming enemy antiair defense
at the present time, we must proceed from the assumption
that aerial reconnaissance with the commencement of
military operations, particularly in the first few hours
of a war, must be a thoroughly planned operation, an
aerial reconnaissance operation, employing all measures
for the safety of the reconnaissance aircraft, and carried
out according to the unified concept and plan of the con
pand and staff of the air army.
Unfortunately, this problem was not duly reflected
in the military-scientific studies.
It would also be desirable when presenting views on
the organization and conduct of intelligence collection
to consider the effect of radioactive contamination of
large areas of terrain, because this contamination will
be very typical for the first few days of a war. Obviously,
the existence of zones with high levels of radiation will
cause substantial changes in the nature of troop operations
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and, consequently, in the organization and conduct of
intelligence collection.
In conclusion, it is essential to note once more
that the military-scientific studies and lectures worked
out in the military districts (groups of troops) on the
problems of organizing and conducting intelligence coll-
ection in the operations of the initial period of a war,
have great theoretical and practical significance. FNrther
work in this direction will help in working out the most
advisable views on the employment of intelligence forces
and means of border military districts (groups of troops)
in the period immediately prior to a war, as well as
during the first operations of the initial period of
a war.
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