MILITARY THOUGHT: THE USE OF THE FORCES AND MEANS OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, BY COL. G. YELETSKIKH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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IRONBARK
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
2 1 JUN 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "The Use of the
Forces and Means of Aerial Reconnaissance",
by Col. 0. Yeletskikh
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the
SECRET Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" published by
the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level
of division commander.
2. For convenience of reference,by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other, form should be addressed
to the originating office. iii
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
SE RET
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State ''I
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Na.vy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of,Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant
Assistant
Director,
Director fo~ National Estimates
Director fo' Current Intelligence
Director
Director
National
fo' Research and Reports
foi i Scientific Intelligence
Photographic Interpretation
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COUNTRY : UaR
SLTECT : MILITARY T110th111T SECRET : "The Use of the Forces and
Mans of Aerial Reconnaissance", by Colonel G. Yeletskikh
MATE OF INFO' December IG,61
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT Dccwnentery
S JRCE A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled
"The Use of the Forces and Means of Aerial Reconnaissance", by
Colonel G. Yeletski.kh. This article appeared in Issue 6(61) of
1961 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought
which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published
irregularly.
Issue 6(61) was sent to press on 7 December 1961.
Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR
Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED.. SECRET,
and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has
existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By
the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961.
The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued
irregularly.
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( )AI NTS ON A PREY I(XJS ARTICLE
' he Use of ttile Forces and Means of Aerial Reconnaissance"
by
Colonel G. Yeletskikh
Di mo "-:rn highly mobile nuclear/missile warfare, aerial
zr:aoTirvais~.ance will have considerable importance. This, apparently,
explains the att~:ntion which is given to the investigation of the
state of aerial reconnaissance by our military press. In particular,
Colonel F. Yerc.mienk.o, in his article, "The Reconnaissance of Objectives
for Strikes by Nuclear/Missile Weapons in an Offensive Operation by a
C,onibind-Arms Army"* dwelt in detail on an analysis of the forces and
means of oeri'il reconnaissance and expressed his viewpoint on its role
in supporting an offensive. operation by a combined-arms army. We can-
i.ot agree with some of the author's conclusions. For example, he considers
that the rteconnatscance of objectives in a large area within a short
time r3houl.d be carried out by the reconnaissance a,~"iation of an army,
consisting of piloted and pilotless, means, and suggests that within
a combined-arms army there shrnild be an independent (otdel.nyy) army
reconnaissance aviation regiment, made up of two squadrons of tactical
reconnaissance aircraft and one squadron of artillery fire-directing
aircraft, an independent reconnaissance squadron of pilotless aircraft
or missilef~, and an independent reconnaissance squadron of helicopters.
The author thus proposes to include, thee forces of aerial reconnaissance
in the composition of combined-arms, armies and, consequently, to use
them in a front in a decentralized manner.
However, the dispersal of aerial reconnaissance forces among
combir.ea-arms armies will hinder their concentration along the win
a,xi~- of c(irnh')t operations and will require considerably larger forces
0;-.-n if they were used in a centralized manner, while the problems of
their tko-zlri ; and supply, of the combat support of reconnaissance aviation
* L'cllFctlnrr of Articles of the Jtlrnal "Military Thought'. 2 (57), 1961.
SECRE
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?' tH 'iflrj of
rc(cilz 'i :I:1l7c (41 t:)., wil?
h crre c_nwi'ier;lbly moire ec,uplex. It Jr, ennugn to any that the
Fuppty of a recc~nca~i:ss ince 1 vi'it.ion unit (subunit) requires shout
10 thousand item (()wIheIkklatL`r,:) r`f avi,ati on-te:chrieal materiel,
the storage and tran'portiation of ~ahich will burden the rear ore-xi
of a combined arms rar?mv cona.h erably.
In our opinion, the entire reconnaissanee and artillery fire-
directing aviation of a front, equipped with piloted oirervft and
winged missiles (k.,- ylat,aya r~3keta ), ahcoald be included in the
c position of the air army of the front. It is advisable to sub-
ordinate the artillery fire-directing aviation regiment (or inde-
Fe*idcnt artillery fire-directing sq>adrons) operationally to the
c )mmhthder of missile troops and artillery of the front. A part
of the resources of the tactical reconnaissance forces (up to 50
!'~o1f jet), in our view, nciy he ,assigned in the course of combat oper-
ations to the tank end combined-arms armies, especially to those
which are oprritting along the mein axis, separated from the main
forces of the front. The centralized use of serial reconnaissance
forces, with the assignment of part of the resources of tactical
reconn+3issesnce to combined-arms and tank armies, eliminates the
shortcomings mentioned above, which are inherent in decentralized
control, and conforms to the highest degree to the character of
modern combat and operations.
Fxperiersce gained in the twc~-r,1 , two-stage eomnand-staff
exercise conducted in July 1960 gave precise confirmation of the
advisability of centralizes' use ofallthe aerial reconnaissance forces.
During the exercise, the direction of aerial reconnaissance was
carried oat by the intelligence directorate of the front through
the reconnaissance .;,.~~..~..j c.t L..e headquarters of the air army.
2?econrihissance aviation regiuienta of tactical aviation were used to
conduct reconnoissance on be.'a1f of the command of the ground troops.
The activities of the operational reconnaissance aviation regiment
and of the ccxnbut aviation reconnaissance squadrons wt.-re directed by
the headquarters of the air army. Included in the air army on each
side in the exercise were one reconnaissance aviation regiment of
tactical reconnaissance and one regiment of operational reconnaissance.
SEQE
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'~`t c r+sc,ir.~ui:ent ut' a wart of t),2 resouxces of reconnaissance
aviation to oombin"d-arm and tank armies increases the role and
t'lc re.pc.n.s.ihi Li.ty of their r. t.affs in the organization of aer-
ial rcr?~rnraai,:rt ?;c~e. '1'k:ey mry^t uv(ermine and asf;ign missions for
atrial rec')nnsis,,ance correctly. For this purpose it is necessary
to have suitable means of communicationsat combined-arms head-
quvvirters,as well as coded maps and radio-signal tables coordinated
with the headquarters of the air army.
The missile tror)pa of a front and of the combined-arms armies
have become the rnain consumers of reconnaissance data in a front
opcrati.on. Thu^, d'_ring the exercise mentioned above, the total of
flights rrnv'+.e for aerial reconnaissance purposes was made up as
foll('rws: On behalf of the missile troops - 65 to 70 percent; of
the gourd troe,ps - 20 to 22 percent; of aviation - 8 to 10 percent.
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As we know, the Ird.ssile troops ne;ed the coordinates of targets, and speci*tl
photug1?aeanetric centers may be establishs d to determine these. In a
number of exercises, these centers were organized and attached to
operatioril reconnaissance regiments. In a center were included repre-
sentatives of the commander of missile troops and artillery of the
front, and representatives of the topographic.ci'rcrtment. The former
had direct comnntnieations with their hcadquarters.
In our view, the arrangement for organizing the collection and
processing of reconnaissance data with only one photogrammetric center
is far from perfect. It provides only for the establishment of coordin-
ates arid for the processing of reconnaissance information obtained by
the crews of the operational reconnaissance regiment. However, the
tactical reconnaissance regiments and the artillery fire-directing
regiment obtFein considerably more reconnaissance information. We there-
fore consider that it is advisable to establish photogrammctric centers
with these regiments, to include representatives of the combined-arms
armies in whose zones a particular regiment is conducting reconnaissance.
With the aim of reducing, in every way possible, the time it takes
to deliver reronnnivsar:r_e data to the echelons concerned, the following
measures may be recommended:-
- the reception of aerial reconnaissance data (and firstly of
tactical data) directly from the reconnaissance aircraft by all the
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headquarters of tht: ground troops cuncrxned;
-- the orh-u;iz.itiim of dlr.,(,t lines of cornnunicitior;bbetween
recoxavaict;;,nce un!ts' i'wA ti.. i' ,;L,? directorate of the front,
the reconn1ias-3 nee s~ctic,n of ct,. ir iheadquarters, and the
combined-arms armies using security devices ('ippzar?atura z~;sekrechivar;iy;)
and facsimile tel.
egr' ph)
-- the extensive) use of helicopters and of li'~i;;ou aircraft
for the immediate delivery of photographic documents to the headq uartern
concerned.
The highly dynamic nature of comiut operations requires the use of
high-speed, high-performance processing equipment which is easily trans-
portable,for the initial processing of; reconnaissance information. The
system for collecting and processing reconnaissance dr;t3 must be auto-
mated to the maxim m degree. This can be achieved by the employment of
electronic computers (olektronnnyo vychit ittelneyc, mnchiuu ).
Colonel F. Yeremenko's proposal on the conduct of tactical aerial
reconnaissance by single aircraft Instead of by p?iirs of aircraft,also
needs some elaboration.
Aerial reconnaissance may be carried out by using single-seat fighter
aircraft singly, in pairs, or in small groups. It is advisable to conduct
reconnaissance with a single aircraft in daytime in difficult meteoro-
logical conditions, i.e.,when a supporting (vedomyy) aircraft is unable to
follow the leading aircraft.
For the present,orur basic tactical reconnaissance aircraft is still
the MIG-15R bis, whose maximum speed is less than half the speed of the
beat fighter aircraft of our probable enemies. A very important factor
of successful reconnaissance for the crews of these aircraft is observation
of the situation in the air. In a flight by two aircraft, this task is
mainly performed by the supporting aircraft,because the pilot of a single-
seat aircraft is unable to observe the situation in the air and at the
same time to pilot his aircraft, keep his bearings, carry out reconnaissance,
and maintain radio communications. Single-engined aircraft therefore
usually carry out reconnaissance in pairs, although in daytime, under nor-
mal meteorological conditions, and with strong opposition from enemy fighter
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50X1-HUM
IRONBARK
it
plsnes, it may be performed by flights (zveno), or even, sometimeE.,
by large groups.
In conclusion, there are two, further points in the article of
Colonel F. Yeremenko which, in our, opinion, need elaboration.
It is stated on page 73 thatjthe accuracy with which the co-
ordinates of cbjectives (targets)'reconnoitered by air observation
can be determined, may vary between .5 and 1 km, while for the des-
truction of an objective by missiles at a distance of 80 r?] to
100 km, its coordinates must be determined with an accuracy of 50
to 60 meters. We consider that the capabilities of air observation
in obtaining coordinates of objectives have been diminished approxi-
mately three times, while the accuracy required (50 to 60m).has been
increased by as much. Experience of the work of a number of aviation units
proves that, after a certain amount of training, crews are able to deter-
mine the coordinates of targets visually with an accuracy of 100 to 300
meters. As for the accuracy necessary in the determination of co-
ordinates for operational-tactical', missiles, this is between 150 and
200 meters rather than between 50 and 60.
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