MILITARY THOUGHT: THE PROBLEM OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF FRONT AND ARMY FIELD COMMANDS, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL N. VOLODIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700200001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Problem of the Organizational Structure
of Front and Army Field Commands
by
Lieutenant--General N. Volodin
Recently, in the pages of the Special Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", consideration
has been given widely to the problem o the organizational
structure of operational headquarters. On this point a
number of authors have properly pointed out that the existing
organizational structure and equipment of front and army
field commands require radical reexamination, as they are
inconsistent with the changed nature of modern operations
and the demands made on troop control. We are fully in
agreement with this view.
Under modern conditions, control points (punka
upravleniya),as the organs for directing combat operations,
are one of the important objectives for enemy nuclear strikes.
This is especially true of the major operational headquarters
- those of fronts and armies.
For this reason the most important condition for en-
suring firm and uninterrupted troop control is, in our
opinion, an increase in the viability, mobility, and man-
euverability of headquarters. This can be attained provided
the headquarters have few personnel and are well equipped
with the latest technical means of control, and also wit4
staff cars having good cross-country ability and suited for
the work. Only under these conditions will a headquarters
be able to move rapidly behind the troops, and more frequently
change its location, and thus sharply reduce the possibility
of its discovery by the enemy and destruction by nuclear
weapons.
As already noted in the press, the front and army field
commands in existence at the present time in accordance with
the provisional TO&E, are too unwieldy, insufficiently mobile,
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i ouA1-HUM
and inadequately supplied with means of control and
movement. By virtue of this, as has been shown by the
experience of exercises in postwar years, the headquarters
of a front is able to move not more than once in two or
three days, and an army headquarters, once a day. It is
entirely obvious that with modern tempos of attack of 100
km and more per day, such a situation is fraught with the
danger of loss of troop control and may lead to failure
of the operation.
Before taking a look at the organizational structure
of the control organs, let us dwell briefly on the new
technical means of-troop-control, by which we mean first
of a13 the means of "elementary mechanization" ("malaya
mekhanizatsi a ). ~ In our opinion it is necessary to
introduce more widely into all headquarters selector
communications, communications scrambling devices, radio-
commutation, photocopying devices, electronic-electric
screens and plotting boards (these last particularly in
the headquarters of missile troops and artillery and of
chiefs of PVO troops), and it is also necessary to improve
the sets of various stamps, etc. It is especially necessary
to create models of staff cars and of field equipment for
the work of headquarters. All this will play a positive
role in increasing the operational efficiency of headquarters
work.
As a positive example one may even cite the use in
one of the exercises .of- the Carpathian Military .District,
in the spring off` 1961, of the mobile_photo_laboratory of
an airborne army, '"for the reproduction of smal
lw graphic
documents and diagrams. The laboratory crew of three
men, headed by an officer, reproduced in a very short time
hundreds of various diagrams, graphs, designs and schedules,
substituting for the labor of no less than 30 officers and
draftsmen. Positive results have also been achieved by the
use of a field cartographic unit for the reproduction of
documents supplemented by maps. Despite the duration and
imperfection of the technological process, because of the
improved organization of the work, the time for the issuance
of the documents was significantly decreased. In one of
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the divisional exercises in the Carpathian Military District,
a field cartographic unit, staffed by a small group of
officers, NCO's and enlisted men, reproduced hundreds of
graphic documents, a thing which was not within the capa
bilities of the entire district headquarters.
Passing on to the problem of the or an'
1
structure of control points, we believe that the existing
division o m""irio' forward command
posts (PKp) , command
posts (KP) and rear control points (TPU) is correct in
principl`e`, since this does increase the viability and
operational efficiency of headquarters to a considerable
degree. Such a system, however, does not fully guarantee
the firm and uninterrupted direction of the combat operations
of troops, especially of missile troops and the forces and
means of PVO and of aviation. Such a system does not permit
the effecting of coordination of the control points in case
one of them is put out of action, and it leads to parallelism
in the work and to duplication of one another.
The experience of exercises underscores the views ex-
pressed in previous articles of the Special Collection to
the effect that the forward command post of a front
or
army, by virtue of its small staff and inadequate equipment
of control means, cannot fully substitute for a KP when
the latter is put out of-'action. In?fact, how can one speak
of such interchangeability of a PKP and KP when, for example,
the missile troop and artillery chiefs of a front or army
are at the PKP, and have the basic means for controlling
missile troops at the KP and do control them through their
headquarters, which is also located at the KP. Such a
situation can occur also for the chief of the PVO troops
of a front or for the commander of an airborne army, where
the basic means of control are located at the command post
of the front or airborne army.
Besides this, it is from the command post that the
basic communications are maintained for coordination and
communications with higher headquarters. Together with
this, the attachment of almost all the responsible persons,
the best and most highly trained generals and officers, and
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also a considerable part of the control means, to the
forward command post, seriously weakens the command pos+.
which, in case the PKP is put out of action, will ,
experience great difficulties in troop control.
Therefore, in our view the personnel and equipment
of control points must be such that in case one of them
is put out of action, another can substitute fully for it.
The orga izatiou,al structure which we are proposing
for a front field command (Diagram"No, 1) basically comes
to the f-61_16
ws ng
A command post and an alternate command post (ZKP),
are created within the front, which are capable of inde-
pendently carrying out full and purposeful direction of
troops. In addition, a rear control point is set up which
will carry out the functions of missile, material-technical
and medical support of operations, and in case of necessity
may even temporarily assume control of the troops.
The command post and alternate command post of a front
command are made up of personnel of directorates and de-
partments of all arms of troops (or services) at reduced
strength, which must ensure the direction of all arms
of troops, as well as the organization and maintenance
of uninterrupted cooperation among them.
In order to guarantee stability of troop control,
each KP and ZKP must be provided with identical communications
regiments, the forces and means of which will permit the
organization of communications in two positions. The rear
control point is provided with a communications battalion
and a separate communications company of the missile rear.
The makeup of the remaining communications units may be the
same as that stipulated by the provisional TO&E.
Correspondingly the communications within a front are
also organized into a KP, ZKP, and TPU.
Thus,, all the control points of a front are equipped
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witn autonomous communications, thus guaranteeing their
independence and reliable communications with the troops
and among themselves.
This system of organizing troop ZKP, and TPU_ was tested in the op erational_reartservi~ces
exercise 'in the Carpathian Military District in July 19
'
under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of Ground61
Troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I, Chuykov, and
produced positive results.
As has been shown by the experience of this exercise,
it is advisable to ate the ZKP 40 to 50 km from the KP,
to the side or in front of it, and, in the interests of
security, for a specified period of time complete radio
silence is observed in it, and strict limitation of
messages over technical means of communication. The ZKP
receives all information on troop positions and combat
operations from the command post by "VCh" telephone, by
telegraph with a communications_scrafnbling device, or by
mobile means. During this period
othe"
f the ZKP may be used for work withatheotroopsofficers
If the KP should be put out of action, the alternate
command post is automatically transformed into the command
post and completely takes over troop control. During
shifts of the KP, the control of troops may temporarily
rest with the ZKP.
Because of the importance of intelligence in modern
operations, all means of it are concentrated in the hands
of the chief ofa intelligence of a front, in order to ensure
the purposeful use of _tI se means for the prompt and full
acquisition of information on the enemy, and above all on
his means of nuclear attack.
Missile, material,technical, and medical support, as
already pointed out, is effected from the rear control
point
the front. The building up to strength and trainingnt
of the reserves are directed from here, for which purpose
the TPU will have a deputy troop commander of the front
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-Lur a training with a directorate of organization
and replacements and a department of combat training.
In connection with the fact that problems of missile
support have acquired exceptionally ane-are one of the main tasks of thegrearH sit isica pos
n
to introduce the position of-deputy chief of the reared
area of a front for missile support, su ordinate to whom
would be the directorate of missile and artillery armament
and the missile fuels department.
As for tank.-technical and motor-tractor su
experience of-the las-t war and of postwar ces the
shown that it is most convenient to solve these ipro les
from the command post of the front, since it is from here
that the planning of the operation is carried out, within
whibh the problems of the use of armored and motor trans-
port troops occupy a large place. Therefore, with the
aim of increasing operational efficiency in the solution
of these problems, it is more expedient to put the depart-
ments for armor and motor-tractor equipment in the command
post, subordinating them to the deputy troop commander of
the front for technical matters. hanges in the title of
t is posztion are is ate y considerations of eliminating
varying interpretations of the problem.
In our opinion the positive ,aspects of the
proosed
structure of a front field command are:
--achievement of interchangeability of control points,
increase in their viability and stability, and ensuring
uninterrupted troop control;
--decrease in the personnel of the field command of a
front by one sixth in comparison with the provisional TO&E
in force; the attainment of a greater reduction in the
personnel of a field command obviously is not possible,
since the means of automation and mechanization of control
procedures are actually still only being developed and have
not been tested in troop exercises; with the introduction
of these means into troop units, the personnel of a front
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xiexa command can be further reduced by about one third;
--increase in the mobilit
y of contl
ro points and in
their capacity for rapidly changing their location, thus
increasing the operational efficiency and flexibility of
troop control.
The organizational structure of the field command of
a combined-arms or a tank
army can be analogous to that
proposed for a front field command. Other forms, however,
are also possible, one of which we have presented in
Diagram No. 2. In essence it consists of creating two
equal cofiTrooints (the first and the second) in an army
field command, which are capable of independently planning
and carrying out operational troop control. A rear control
point is also set up.
The basic directing nucleus of an army field command
is the operations center. It includes the chief of staff,
the chiefs of the arms of troops and of special troops
(missile troops and artillery, engineer and chemical troops,
PVO and comminications), the chief of the operations de-
partment, the chief of intelligence, the deputy army commander
for, the rear, and five officers (three from the operations
department, one for the rear, and one for the armored and
motor-tractor service).
The operations center, which is headed by the army
commander, will be located at one of the control points,
and will direct the troops on the main axis, and the second
control point will at the same time direct the troops operating
on separate axes or cut off from the main forces. Part of
the officers of the second control point can also be used
to carry out occasional assignments in the troop units.
When necessary, an operations center headed by the
commanding officer can quickly be transformed into the
second control point. When one of the points is put out
of action, complete direction of troop operations can be
assumed by the second control point,
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e rear control point carries out all the functions
inherent in the missile, material-technical, and medical
support of the troops of an army. If the first and second
control points are put out of action, the TPU may temporarily
assume troop control. With this aim, officer-operators
from the basic arms of troops are included in its makeup,
and communications and cipher sections are set up.
All three control points ensure autonomous communications
with the troops and among themselves.
points of a combined-
arms oretankharmyfobv~ouslynhashadi~antrol
organizational structure and is more responsover exis
ive toemoderning
requirements.
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