MILITARY THOUGHT: THE PREPARATION AND USE OF STRATEGIC RESERVES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR, BY COLONEL A. GRYLEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700180001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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MILITARY HISTORY SECTION
The Preparation and Use of Strategic Reserves
in the Second World War
by
Colonel A. Grylev
The experience of all warfar.e, and in particular the direct
experience of the Russian army in the First World War and of
the Soviet Army in the civil war in the USSR, has convincingly
demonstrated the significance of reserves. For this reason,
in the period preceding the Second World War, Soviet military-
theoretical thought devoted much attention to working out the
problem of the creation and use of strategic reserves.
According to the views existing before the war, the High
Command Reserves (RGK - Rezerv Glavnogo Komandovaniya) consisted
of: that part of the nation's armed forces directly under the
orders of the High Command, and specialized units (artillery,
tank, chemical, engineer, etc.) not an organic part of combined-
arms large units, but intended for the reinforcement of the
latter depending on the operational and tactical missions being
fulfilled by them.
In the pre-war years a great deal of work was done in our
country on the creation of strategic reserves. This was re-
flected in the practical measures adopted by the Soviet command
on the eve of the war. The existing estimates for strategic
deployment of our armed forces called for the creation of five
armies in the High Command Reserve - the 16th, 19th, 22nd, 24th,
and 28th. The 16th and 19th Armies were destined for the south-
western axis and the 22nd for the western, and the 24th and 28th
were to constitute the central reserve of the High Command,
located northwest and southwest of Moscow. Just before the war
the 21st Army was formed, and at the very beginning of the war -
the 20th Afmy, which were also included in the High Command
Reserve. Thus, at the very beginning of the war there were eight
armies under the direct orders of the High Command, consisting
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of 77 divisions (58 rifle, 13 tank, and 6 motorized). To 50X1-HUM
be sure, the combat effectiveness of these troops was rather
low - the rifle divisions were at their cut-back peacetime
strength, while most of the tank and motorized divisions of
the mechanized corps had still not completed their formation,
had few tanks and little artillery, and were weakly knit.
One very important circumstance should be emphasized.
Just before the beginning of the war, the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
reached the decision to unite the armies of the High Command
Reserve under a single command. On 25 June this decision
was put into a directive of the People's Commissariat of
Defense, creating a group of armies under the command of
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budennyy. Thus, at the
very start of the war a powerful formation of strategic
reserves had already been created, which was not organically
committed to a front.
In comparison we should point out that the reserve of
the German-Fascist command had only 24 divisions, of which
12 were designated for army groups "North", "Center", and
"South".
Our situation with regard to
the
specially formed units
(formirovaniye) of the RGK on the
eve
of the war was consider-
ably worse. The artillery of the
High
Command Reserve was
very small in number, even though
the
experience of the First
World War had shown that the RGK
must
have strong artillery.
At the start of the Second World War we had in the RGK 14
gun regiments, 60 howitzer regiments, 1,5 separate battalions,
and 2 separate batteries. They numbered 4326 artillery pieces,
or about 5 percent of the over-all number of such weapons in
the Soviet Army. Howitzer systems predominated in the
artillery of the RGK and were intended for ensuring the
breach of the enemy's defense, but gun artillery was in short
supply and antiaircraft artillery was completely lacking.
As for the antitank artillery of the RGK, it was only just
before the war (in May 1941) that the formation was begun of
ten antitank brigades (with two regiments in eachl4. The
engineer units of the RGK consisted of 18 engineer regiments,
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16 pontoon-bridging regiments, 3 separate battalions, and
one company. These units were far below strength and were
very poorly supplied with engineer equipment. Tank and
aviation units and large units were completely absent from
the High Command Reserve.
In contrast to the combined-arms formations, which were
under the direct orders of the High Command, the specially
formed units of the RGK were transferred as reinforcement for
the troops in the military districts. The distribution of
the existing artillery and engineer units of the RGK at the
beginning of the war represented, on the whole,a situation
in which the overwhelming mass of them were in the Baltic, Wes t-
ern, and Kiev Border Districts.
Once the war began, it introduced great changes both
in the preparation of the strategic reserves and in the pre-
liminary plans for their use. These can be seen in the
following:
--the troops of the border districts were unable to
perform the task assigned to them - to repel the
enemy attack, to halt his advance,,and to create
the conditions for our armed forces to go over
to the offensive. For this reason it was necessary
to use the existing strategic reserves, not for a
joint offensive with the troops of the western
border districts as had been planned, but for defense;
--in the first days of the war it became clear that
the enemy had concentrated his main efforts on the
western axis, where a very difficult situation was
created for our troops. Allthe strategic reserves
were therefore redirected onto this axis. This
required, specifically, the rapid transfer to the
western axis of the 16th and 19th Armies, which
had earlier been moved into the Ukraine;
--by the end of June 1941 it was already clear that
the Western Front was in no condition to perform
its tasks with the forces which it had left. There-
fore, the 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd Armies
yruewnrr
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were
about
incorporated into this front, which brought
the liquidation of the army group of the
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High
Command Reserve. Consequently, already at
the beginning of July, the High Command had under
its orders only two armies (the 24th and the 28th),
which had been moved up to the line Nelidovo-
Yelnya-Zhukovka;
--at the very beginning of the war the serious
shortage of artillery and engineer units under
the RGK began to be felt, and the lack of tank
and aircraft reserves of General Headquarters
(Stavka) greatly complicated the conduct of
armed combat.
The Soviet command was presented with an exceptionally
complex task - the rapid preparation of strategic reserves,
but such methods of creating them as drawing them from the
formations and large units of the army in the field,or
transferring a large number of troops from the Far Eastern,
Central Asian, or Transcaucas us. Military Districts were
practically out of the question.
Under these conditions the only solution was to create
strategic reserves out of newly formed units, but this
involved great difficulties. The fact was that the buildup
of our armed forces in accordance with the mobilization plans
which existed on the eve of the war had already been completed.
Further buildup had not been foreseen by any pre-war plans,
and consequently a reserve of officer personnel and stockpiles
of arms and combat equipment for these purposes had not been
created. In addition, the enemy's seizure of important indus-
trial areas and the necessity to evacuate industry to the
east considerably reduced our capabilities for producing
combat equipment and arms.
The solution of so vast and incredibly difficult a
task was within the power only of the Soviet State and our
people, as led by the experienced Communist Party.
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First of all, the large-scale buildup of rifle troops
was begun. On 29 June 1941 the decision had already been
taken for the supplementary formation of 15 rifle divisions;
on 8 July there followed a decision to form 56 rifle divisions
and 25 divisions of people's militia (narodnoye opolcheniye)
and on 19 August, still another 85 rifle divisions. The
formation also began of a large number of cavalry large
units (from July to November 1941, 64 cavalry divisions were
formed). The establishment of new army commands took place
simultaneously. From 1 July to 5 December 1941, 25 commands
of combined-arms armies were newly created in the General
Headquarters reserve and 16 armies directly within fronts. To
be sure, in this same period1however, 15 army commands were
disbanded. 50X1-HUM
In connection with the growing need for command personnel,
urgent measures were adopted for their training: the system
of training institutions and courses was broadened and the
number of those in training was increased. But these could
produce results only in the future. Meanwhile, for the immedi-
ate satisfaction of the need for command personnel it was
decided to disband the rifle corps commands. To fulfil the
need for combat equipment and arms, literally all possibilities
were used, including the issuance to the troops of obsolete
models.
Quite naturally, the b u i l d u p , of a large number of
formations and large units in a short period could not help
but reflect on their quality. Many large units were dispatched
to the front inadequately organized and armed. Because of
the need for the rapid commitment of large units to the army
in the field,,a considerable number of rifle and ski brigades
were created.
The war demonstrated that infantry on the defensive, and
even more on the offensive, was in need of tanks designated
for its direct support(NPP). But, there were no such tanks,
either within the rifle large units or in the separate tank
units of the RGK. In connection with this, the formation was
begun of separate tank brigades and battalions of the RGK.
As for the mechanized corps, they were liquidated in July
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and August 1941. On the base of the 26th and 27th Mechanized
Corps, ten tank divisions were formed in the Moscow Military
District, but they did not last long,because it proved
impossible to supply them with tanks.
50X1-HUM
The experience of even the first weeks of the war
revealed a real need for a sharp increase in the artillery
of the RGK. The difficulty of resolving this problem was
aggravated by the fact that the shortage of the materiel
portion and of command personnel was keenly felt. For this
reason, all the corps regiments were transferred to the
artillery of the RGK, as well as the second artillery regi-
ments from each of the regular army (?kp,drovyy) rifle divisions,
and also the eleven chemical mortar battalions which had
existed before the war. Because of the unwieldiness and the
difficulty of controlling the RGK regiments which had been in
existence before the war, their authorized personnel strength
was considerably reduced. The antitank brigades were also
disbanded, but their component regiments were detached and
became independent. There also took place a supplemental
formation of RGK artillery, particul.a rly antitank. Suffice
it to say that in 1941, 72 antitank regiments, 41 artillery,
and 2 mortar. regiments, and 74 battalions and 5 regiments of
rocket artillery were formed. However, the number of weapons
in the RGK artillery not only did not increase, but,as a
consequence of losses sustained, it even decreased in comparison
with the beginning of the war, and at the end of 1941 it
consisted of 4180 pieces.
In the very first months of the war the need arose
for aircraft reserves of General Headquarters. In August 1941
began the creation of reserve aviation groups intended as
reinforcement for the air forces of the fronts.
The need for engineer troops in the RGK gave rise to the
necessity for forming a large number of engineer units. By
1 August 1941, 84 engineer battalions, 25 engineer-construction
battalions, 43 pontoon battalions, 34 light river-crossing
units (park), 18 electrotechnical companies, 18 camouflage
companies, 19 hydrotechnical companies, and other units had
been newly established. In October 1941, 10 combat engineer
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armies were formed for the construction of rear defense
lines. 50X1-HUM
In the heated engagements that developed in the summer
and fall of 1941, the enemy achieved outstanding successes.
But he failed to attain his basic political and strategic
goals. In these battles the German-Fascist army was exhausted
and bled white; the enemy was checked.
The strategic reserves played an enormous role in the
performance of this very important task. During the summer-
fall campaign of 1941 a total of 21 combined-arms armies,
about 290 divisions, and up to 90 brigades were committed
to the army in the field from the General Headquarters reserve.
The strategic reserves were used for various purposes, depending
on the actually developing situation: for the restoration of
a disrupted strategic front (the 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and
22nd Armies in July 1941 on the line of the Western Dvina
and Dnepr Rivers and the 5th Army in October 1941 on the
Mozhaysk defense line), for the creation of a strategic depth
of defense on the main axis (the 24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st,
32nd, 33rd, 43rd, and 49th Armies from July to September 19411),
for the delivery of powerful counterstrikes against the most
dangerous enemy groupings (the 34th Army in the area of Staraya
Russa, the 50th Army on the Starodub axis, and the lst Assault
Army; and the 20th Army in the area of Yakhroma), and also as
screening forces for important objectives of strategic signi-
ficance,(the Maritime /rimorskaya7, Army in Odessa, the
51st Army in the Crimea, the 4th Army in the vicinity of
Tikhvin,and the 56th Army in Rostov). To perform important
operational-strategic tasks, use was also made of armies
formed directly within the fronts.
1. On 14 July 1941, the 24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, and
32nd Armies were combined into the Front of Reserve
Armies. On 30 July this front was disbanded, and the
24th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 43rd Armies were incorporated
into the newly formed Reserve Front.
50X1-HUM
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The experience of the summer-fall campaign of 1941 clearly
demonstrated that the Soviet command,,in an extraordinarily
complex and difficult situation,was capable of employing
strategic reserves not only on a mass scale, but also purpose-
fully. The great bulk of them were committed to the operation
as entire formations (armies and even fronts), and chiefly on
the main axis, which at that time was the western. Suffice
it to say that of the 21 armies drawn from the General Head-
quarters reserve, 15 were used on the western axis. The
same thing also applied to the disposition of the specially
formed units of the RGK. Thus, of the 92 artillery regiments
of the RGK, 69 were transferred to fronts on the western
axis, 3 to the northwestern, 15 to the southwestern and 5
to separate armies. The overwhelming majority of the RGK
tank and engineer units were also transferred to fronts on
the western axis.
By the end of the summer-fall campaign of 1941, the
German-Fascist command had completely expended all the
reserves allotted to the Soviet-German front. At the same
time the Soviet Supreme High Command had at its disposal
sufficiently large reserves - the 10th, 26th, 28th, 39th,
57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, and 61st Armies.
The great work which had been performed in our country
on the formation of strategic reserves produced brilliant
results. At the moment that the German-Fascist army, despite
its serious defeat before Rostov and the powerful blows of
our troops before Tikhvin, was still making desperate
efforts to seize Moscow, General Headquarters of the
Supreme High Command (Stavka Verkhovnogo Glavnokomandovaniya)
moved up its reserves. They were used originally to reinforce
the troops of the Western Front and to put a final halt to
the enemy offensive. Later, these reserves participated in
the counteroffensive. In the period from 20 November to
20 December 1941, 26 divisions and 34 brigades were committed
to battle and played an important role in defeating the
enemy before Moscow. At the end of November and during
December 1941, as in the preceding months, the great bulk
of the reserves were concentrated on the main (western) axis.
50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
Committed here were the 10th, 39th, and 61st Armies and also
part ofthetroops from the 28th and 60th Armies.
The successful counteroffensives by Soviet troops before
Moscow, Rostov, and Tikhvin convinced the Soviet command of
the. possibility of developing a broad general offensive with
decisive aims on all the main axes of the Soviet-German
front. Without going into a detailed analysis of this
decision, one can only note that, as was shown by the
subsequent course of events, it was not adequately grounded.
The conversion of this decision into reality required an
appropriate distribution of strategic reserves. Beginning
in January 1942, the General Headquarters reserve was
moved to the northwestern axis (the 3rdl and 2nd2 Assault
Armies and the 59th Army), and to the southwestern axis
(the 47th and 57th Armies). During this period, not even
one army was given to the western axis. Furthermore, on
19 January 1942 the 1st Assault Army was taken from the
Western Front and regrouped on the Northwestern Front.
The offensive by Soviet troops from January to March
1942 did not produce decisive success on even one of the
axes. The inconclusiveness of the 1942 winter operations
was the result of many reasons, which have been thoroughly
elucidated in our literature. One of these reasons was
the scattering of the General Headquarters reserves. If
they had been more purposefully employed on the main axis,
the task of completing the defeat of Army Group "Center"
would have been achieved, and this would have had great.
significance for the further course of the battle along
the entire Soviet-German front.
In March 1942, for the first time after many months
of heated engagements, there appeared signs of a strategic
pause. In individual areas he a v y combat still continued,
1. /ootnote missing?
2. /Footnote missing?
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but broad combat operations.,in effect, came to a halt. Both
sides, in different ways but with great energy, started
preparations for summer operations. 50X1-HUM
The German-Fascist command, making use of the absence
of a second front, in rapid order mustered divisions from
all over Western Europe and transferred them to the Soviet-
German front. They made harsh demands on their satellites,
obliging them to allot as many troops as possible for the
war against the USSR. As a result of these measures, ,the
strength of enemy troops on our front in the period from
March to June 1942 increased by 20 divisions. In
addition, from July to October 1942 inclusive, another
30 divisions and 5 brigades were added.
The enormous task of deploying and amassing strategic
reserves took place in our country under the direct leader-
ship of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. In
this period, for the first time during the Second World War,
the creation of strategic reserves began to occur at the
expense of withdrawing troops from the army in the field,
but the number of troops withdrawn was still insignificant.
From March to the beginning of July 1941 it consisted of only
10 rifle divisions in all. For this reason, both in the
period of preparation for the summer-fall campaign of 1942
as well as during it, strategic reserves were being created
from newly formed units. But with this, essentially new
phenomena began to appear. Thus, in the first half of 1942,
9 guards rifle corps were formed. Each of these was composed
of 1 division, 4 rifle brigades, and 1 tank brigade, an
artillery regiment, and a guards mortar battalion. From
April to June 1942 the formation was begun of major tank
formations and large units. In the first days of June began
th e creation of 2 tank armies (the 3rd and the 5th). By
May 1942, 11 tank corps had been formed, and during May and
June the formation of another 14 was begun. The creation of
tank brigades and battalions continued at the same time.
In the RGK artillery took place the formation of new
artillery and mortar regiments. Suffice it to say that from
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January to May 1942 alone, 75 antitank, 110 gun or howitzer,
and 63 mortar, regiments were created. In July 1942 the RGK
antitank regiments were reformed into tank-destroyer regiments
.(istrebitelno-protivotankovyy polk). In June 1942, the for-
mation began of units of heavy rocket artillery. Specifically,
the first 20 M-30 separate guards mortar battalions were
organized between 9 June and 10 July.
Among the engineer troops began the creation in May
1942 of 8 engineer brigades, separate pools of engineer
vehicles and also other units. As for the combat engineer
armies, at the beginning of 1942 they were disbanded and
used for the formation of rifle and engineer units and large
units.
Especially important was the format.on,which had begun,
of large-scale air reserves for General Headquarters. In
place of the reserve air groups, 3 aviation armies were
organized ~2 fighter and 1 bomber), but it was later recog-
nized to be more advisable to have air corps in the General
Headquarters reserve. In the summer and fall of 1942, 9
such corps were formed.
Thus, by the summer of 1942 the changes in the qualita-
tive make-up of the strategic reserves had already been decided.
They had come to include not only combined-arms formations and
large units and artillery and tank units, but also major for-
mations and large units of armored troops and aviation.
In the summer of 1942 the Soviet Supreme High Command
was planning to conduct offensive operations on all the main
axes of the Soviet-German front. A considerable part of the
strategic reserves which had been amassed was transferred to
the fronts. Thus, during April 1942, the fronts received
29 rifle divisions, 10 rifle brigades, 11 tank corps, and 24
tank brigades from the General Headquarters reserve. The
distribution of the strategic reserves on all the axes of
the Soviet-German front was relativelyeven. In the General
Headquarters reserve, at the beginning of May, there remained
comparatively small forces - 3 combined-arms:, armies and
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2 tank armies. The greater part of the General Headquarters
reserves was in the process of formation. At the end of May,
in connection with the sharply worsening situation, the rapid
formation was begun of 10 reserve combined-arms armies.
The combat operations on the Soviet-German front which
were develop .i n g in M, a y and June 1942 in the Crimea,
and before Kharkov and Lyuban,ended unsuccessfully for our
troops. One of the major reasons for this was the scattering
of the strategic reserves without a sufficiently decisive
concentration of them on only one axis considered by the
Supreme High Command to be the main one.
The unsuccessful outcome of the combat operations of
May and June 1942 and the shift of our troops to the stra-
tegic defense once again demanded a radical re-examination
of the timing and the purposes for committing strategic
reserves to battle. Instead of being used to develop an
offensive, they were being used for defensive operations.
In addition to this, the serious situation which had taken
shape compelled the committing to battle of the majority of
the newly formed units (combined-arms reserve armies and
tank corps) before they were adequately knit together and
trained.
The main events of the summer-fall campaign of 1942
developed on the southwestern axis, where the main mass of
the General Headquarters reserves was also being used.
Eight of the 10 newly formed reserve armies, almost all
the tank corps, the main mass of the tank brigades, and the
artillery regiments were moved here. Six combined-arms
armies and two tank armies, which had been newly formed in
June to October 1942, were also used on this axis. In the
period from May to October 1942,a total of about 160 divisions,
about 70 rifle brigades, and 14 tank and 5 mechanized corps
were committed to battle from the General Headquarters
reserve. Of these, more than 100 rifle divisions, more than
30 rifle brigades, 12 tank and 5 mechanized, corps were on
the southwestern axis.
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The strategic reserves were committed to battle for
various purposes: for the formation of a new front in
depth (the 6th and 60th Armies before Voronezh, the 62nd,
63rd, and 64th Armies on the Stalingrad axis), for the
reinforcement of the fronts in the field (the 44th Army
in the Northern Caucasus), and for delivering strong counter-
strikes against the enemy (the 5th Tank Army northeast of
Voronezh, the 1st and 4th Tank Armies in the area of Kalach,
and the 24th, 66th, and 1st Guards Armies north of Stalin-
grad). Thus, the purposeful and massed use of strategic
reserves was already very typical of the defensive period
of this campaign. The great bulk of the reserves were
committed in the form of formations (obyedineniye). Speci-
fically, two new fronts were created from the General Head-
quarters reserves, the Voronezh and the Stalingrad. But
a considerable number of divisions, brigades, and artillery
regiments were committed piecemeal, which was caused by the
intensity of combat created in the Stalingrad area.
In the difficult engagements of the summer and fall of
1942, the enemy succeeded in seizing important areas of our
country and in breaking through to the Volga near Stalingrad
and to the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains. But even
this time he was not able to attain his basic goals. Soviet
troops wore out and bled white the strike groupings of the
German-Fascist army. In October, the German-Fascist command
was compelled to issue an order for a shift to strategic
defense along the whole front, and only immediately within
Stalingrad and before Moscow did it attempt to continue
offensive operations. The purposeful and massed use of the
strategic reserves of General Headquarters played an impor-
tant role in performing the task of exhausting and draining
the lifeblood of the enemy.
Although the heavy battles in the area of Stalingrad
and Mozdok continued during October and at the beginning of
November 1942, they were still not determining the strategic
decisions of the Soviet Supreme High Command with regard to
the preparation and use of its reserves. The main attention
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at this time was directed toward preparations for shifting
to offensive operations, and above all to the organization
of a counteroffensive in the area of Stalingrad. On this
axis, work was also being done on the preparation and con-
centration of the strategic reserves.
In the fall of 1942, on a larger scale than earlier,
General Headquarters was creating its reserves by with-
drawing combined-arms large units from the fronts in the
field. To be sure, only individual. large units were with-
drawn, and after being built up to strength they were sent
to the necessary area and incorporated into the fronts
operating there. Along with this, a considerable part of
the strategic reserves even at that period consisted of the
troops of newly formed units.
As for the newly formed units, there was here an even
clearer s hift to armored and mechanized troops. The
setting up of rifle large units had almost ceased (in
October and November 1942 only 10 rifle divisions and 7
brigades were formed), but, on the other hand, by December
1942 we already had 20 tank corps and 7 mechanized corps.
The creation of such a number of armored and mechanized
large units was connected with the preparations for broad
offensive operations. The successful carrying out of these
measures was naturally aided by the growing capacity of our
industry to produce combat equipment and arms.
In the organization of the newly formed specialized
units of.the RGK,one could also observe very distinctive
changes which had, been caused by the preparations for the
impending offensive operations. From October 1942 the
formation began of artillery divisions in the RGK artillery
(up to the end of the year, 26 such divisions had been formed) ,
and in November antiaircraft divisions started to be formed
(up to the end of 1942, 46 divisions had been formed). The
formation was continued of units of rocket artillery, and by
November 1942 there were 106 separate battalions of rocket
artillery (69 of them heavy) and 85 regiments (4 of them
heavy). In November and December 1942; on the base of the
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existing battalions and regiments of heavy rocket artillery,
heavy guards mortar brigades were created, and at the end
of December, by order of General Headquarters - 4 guards
heavy mortar divisions. In the tank troops, together with
the tank and mechanized corps, the formation continued,
although, to be sure, on a considerably smaller scale than
formerly, of tank brigades and battalions; 19 separate heavy
tank regiments were newly organized, and in December the
formation was begun of assault gun regiments. In the
engineer troops of the RGK, 15 combat engineer brigades,
2 pontoon-bridging brigades, and 1 heavy pontoon regiment
were created in October 1942. The formation of the RGK
air corps also continued. By November 1942, there were
already 13 fighter, attack, bomber, and mixed, corps of the
RGK.
In preparing for decisive offensive operations, the
Supreme High Command, in the period between October and
20 November 1942, dispatched to the army in the field,27
rifle divisions, 18 rifle brigades, 2 tank corps, and 5
mechanized corps. These forces were used only in part for
defensive operations, and were mainly designated for future
offensive operations.
Along with this, by 20 November 1942 there remained in
the General Headquarters reserve quite large forces: the
1st and 2nd Guards Armies, the 2nd, 3rd, and 10th Reserve
Armies, and the 3rd Tank Army.
The winter campaign of 1942/43 began with the counter-
offensive by the Soviet troops before Stalingrad, which
ended with the encirclement and destruction of a very large
enemy grouping. Supreme in its scale and intensity, the
battle before Stalingrad ended in victory for the Soviet
Armed Forces. It determined the beginning of a radical
turning point in the Second World War, and it ensured the
development of a broad offensive of Soviet troops which
continued until March 1943.
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The preparations for and the course of the winter cam-
paign of 1942/43 were marked by an exceptionally purposeful
employment of the strategic reserves. Both in the process
of preparation and during the campaign, no less than 70
percent of all the reserves allotted to the army in the
field were committed on the main (the southwestern) axis.
The strategic reserves were used to strengthen the
fronts during the preparation for and during the offensive
operations, to repel the enemy's counterstrikes (the 2nd
Guards Army before Stalingrad), to repel the enemy's counter-
offensive before Kharkov (the 21st and 64th Armies), and also
to create a strike grouping for a newly opened strategic axis
(the Central Front). Very typical of this campaign was the
creation of a new front for the counteroffensive (the South-
western Frontl) and also the regrouping of the entire front
from the Stalingrad area onto the Orel axis (the Central
Front). In this campaign the reserves were committed to
the main axis chiefly as whole armies, or even fronts. The
overwhelming bulk of the air, artillery, tank, and engineer
large units of the RGK were also used on the main (the
southwestern) axis.
The shattering defeat of the German-Fascist troops in
the winter campaign of 1942/43 shook the war machine of
Fascist Germany to its foundations and brought on a sharp
deterioration of its external and internal political position.
Discord appeared in the coalition of the Fascist aggressors.
In an attempt to raise its shaken prestige, the Hitlerite
leadership decided in the summer of 1943 to undertake active
offensive operations with decisive goals and to concentrate
the main forces for the first stage of the operation in the
area of the Kursk salient, in order to destroy the Soviet
troops in it.
1. The Southwestern Front was formed on 31 October 1942.
It included the 63rd and 21st Combined-Arms Armies, the
5th Tank Army and the 17th : ... /a few words missing7.
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The Soviet Armed Forces, firmly holding the strategic 50X1-HUM
initiative in their hands, also got ready for active operations
with decisive goals. However, considering the actual situation
and the proposals of the fronts, General Headquarters decided
to wear down the enemy's strike groupings in defensive en-
gagements in the Kursk salient, and then to complete his
defeat by a powerful blow, and, once having launched a
general offensive, to fulfil the tasks set forth for the
summer of 1943. The course of events demonstrated the
correctness and the advisabliity of this decision.
Beginning in April 1943, both sides developed their
preparations for summer operations. The German-Fascist
command, in accordance with Hitler's order of 22 March 1943,
brought up to full prescribed strength all infantry, tank,
and motorized divisions, especially those which were to
attack on the Kursk axis. Formed at the same time and trans-
ferred to the Soviet-German front were a large number of
heavy tank battalions (batalon) armed with "Tiger" tanks,
and of battalions (divizion) of "Ferdinand" assault guns.
The enemy did not succeed, however, in creating large-scale
reserves. The high command of the German ground troops had
in all 6 divisions and 4 brigades in reserve. To be sure,
there were 18 divisions in the reserve of the army groups.
The Soviet Supreme High Command resolved the problem in
a completely different way. Together with heavy reinforce-
ment of the fronts in the field, it set up powerful reserves
under its own orders. The strategic reserves were now
being created almost exclusively by the withdrawal of troops
(whole armies as a rule) from the complement of the fronts
in the field. Thus, in April and May 1943 the 11th, 27th,
47th, 52nd, 53rd, and 68th Armies, and somewhat earlier the
4th and 5th Guards Armiesjwere assigned to the General Head-
quarters reserve. It is particularly important that all
these troops had already had combat experience.
As for the formation of new large units, it proceeded
mainly by the creation of tank and mechanized corps, and
also of tank armies. It is especially important to note
a basic feature of the formation of tank armies: although
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in 1942 they had a mixed composition, i.e., included rifle
divisions along with tank corps, in 1943 tank armies were
created which consisted of 2 tank and 1 mechanized corps,
and also of artillery, engineer, and other units. These
armies were more mobile and more powerful. In January and
February 1943, the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Guards Tank Armies,
in May the 3rd Guards Tank Army, and in July 1943 the 4th
Tank Army, were created with this composition.
Some very important measures were also introduced for
the further improvement of the specialized new formations
of the RGK. In April 1943, the creation of RGK corps was
begun within the RGK artillery. (Up to the end of the
year, 6 corps in all were created) In the same year, 2
gun divisions, 28 mortar brigades, and also 50 tank-des-
troyer brigades, were formed. The RGK artillery began to
shift over to mechanized traction. In the armored troops,
the formation continued of assault gun regiments with light
and medium assault guns, and the creation was also begun
of heavy assault gun regiments. In the RGK engineer troops,
assault (shturmovoy) combat engineer brigades were formed,
and also new pontoon-bridging brigades. By the summer of
1943, the aviation reserves of General Headquarters con-
sisted of 23 air corps.
In the period of preparation for the campaign, part of
the strategic reserves were shifted to the fronts, mainly
to those operating on the southwestern axis. Specifically
dispatched here were the 1st Tank and the 8th Guards Armies,
9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, and 8 air corps.
By the beginning of July the remainder of the strategic
reserves were also concentrated mainly on the southwestern
axis (8 combined-arms armies, 2 tank armies, and 1 airborne
army). Most worthy of note is the fact that on the axis
where the main enemy strike was expected, in the rear of
the Central and Voronezh Fronts, the Steppe Front was de-
ployed (the 4th and 5th Guards Armies, the 27th, 47th, and
53rd Combined-Arms Armies,:the 5th Guards Tank Army, and the
5th Air, Army), which was the most powerful formation
of strategic reserves ever formed during the war. This
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front had the task of preparing defense lines and of being
ready to deliver counterstrikes on the axis of both faces
of the Kursk salient and also for active operations on
special orders of General Headquarters.
The summer-fall campaign of 1943, which began with the
heated engagements before Kursk, ended in massive defeat
for the German-Fascist troops and brought Fascist Germany
to the brink of catastrophe. By the end of the campaign,
our troops had liberated a huge part of the territory of
the USSR and had come out on the approaches to Vitebsk,
Orsha, and Bobruysk, and they had forced the Dnepr, seizing
large bridgeheads on its right bank. In the attainment of
this great success a large role was played by the bold,
purposeful, and massed use of the General Headquarters
reserves.
In accordance with the plan for the conduct of the
summer-fall campaign of 1943, which provided for the con-
centration of the main efforts of Soviet troops on the south-
western axis, the overwhelming bulk of the strategic reserves
was also used on this axis. Six combined-arms armies out
of 8, 3 tank armies (the 3rd and 5th Guards and the 4th),
and an air' army were committed here. A number of
armies drawn into the General Headquarters reserve during
the campaign were also used on the southwestern axis (the
1st Guards, the 18th, 37th, and 61st). The 20th, 21st, and
6th Guards Armies were committed on the western axis.
The General Headquarters reserves in existence at the
beginning of July 1943 were used partially in the defensive
engagement, mainly in the zone of the Voronezh Front (the
5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Combined-Arms Army
of the Steppe Front), but mostly for the counteroffensive
(the main forces of the Steppe Front, the 4th Tank Army, the
11th Army, and others). As for the general offensive which
followed immediately the counteroffensive before Kursk, the
reserves used in it were those created during the campaign.
It must be noted that the greater part of the tank armies
suffered considerable losses during the defensive engagement
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and the counteroffensive, and for this reason they had to
be taken into the General Headquarters reserve in July and
August, a fact which was reflected in the speed and results
of the offensive operations in the Ukraine east of the
Dnepr (Levoberezhnaya Ukraina).
The summer-fall campaign of 1943 was very strenuous
and required the commitment of major forces. Nevertheless,
by the beginning of the winter campaign of 1944, General
Headquarters had succeeded in creating sufficiently strong
reserves: 6 combined-arms armies (17 rifle and cavalry
divisions), 2 tank armies, and 9 separate tank and mechanized
corps. In this campaign as in the preceding one, the main
events developed in the southern sector of the Soviet-German
front. For this reason, all the strategic reserves present
at the beginning of the campaign were wholly used to reinforce
the troops operating in the Ukraine. Committed here during
the period from January to March 1944 were the 47th, 69th,
and 70th Combined-Arms Armies, the 2nd and 4th Tank Armies,
the 6th Air _ : Army, and also a tank corps and some
cavalry corps. It must be emphasized that during the cam-
paign, General Headquarters created, mainly from its own
reserves, a new front, the 2nd Belorussian, and deployed
it on the Kovel-Lublin axis.1
Having successfully completed the winter campaign of
1944, Soviet troops already by the middle of April had
begun active preparations for summer operations. These
preparations were conducted very strenuously, on a grand
scale, and with the observance of very strict concealment
measures.
In preparing for summer operations, the Soviet Supreme High
Command decided to shift its efforts to the western axis, so
that with the forces of the 1st Baltic, the 1st, 2nd, and
1. The 2nd Belorussian Front was formed on 17 February 1944...
r few words missing7... included the 47th, 61st, and 70th
Combined-Arms... Li few words missing7.
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3rd Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian Fronts, it could des-
troy two powerful strategic groupings of enemy troops
(army groups "Center" and "Northern Ukraine"), liberate
important areas of our country and the eastern part of our
ally, Poland, and create favorable conditions to deliver
the final strike on the Berlin axis.
It is easy. to understand that this required major
inter-frontal regroupings of troops, which began at the end
of March and continued to the middle of June 1944. During
this period,76 rifle and cavalry divisions, 13 tank and
mechanized corps, 11 air corps, about 25 artillery divisions,
53 artillery brigades, and many other units and large units
were regrouped. All these regroupings were undertaken with
the goal of reinforcing the fronts which were operating on
the main axis, and also the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts.
In line with this, the troops were not simply shifted from
one front to another, but as a rule were withdrawn from
fronts in the field into the General Headquarters reserve,
and only after replacement and building up to required
strength were they shifted to other fronts. On the western
axis the new 2nd Belorussian Front was created.1
At the same time, General Headquarters retained con-
siderable forces under its own command. By the middle of
June the General Headquarters reserve contained the command
of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the 2nd Guards Army, the 51st
Combined-Arms Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army, 6 separate
tank corps, 7 mechanized corps, and 1 cavalry corps, grouped
mainly on the western axis.
1. Created in February 1944, the 2nd Belorussian Front was
disbanded on 5 April 1944. On 19 April, on the base of
the command of the 10th Army, a new command was formed
for the 2nd Belorussian Front. Included in it were the
33rd, 49th, and 50th Combined-Arms Armies and the 4th
Air Army.
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As for the preparation of : specialized new forma-
tions of the RGK, one may note the creation of guards heavy
tank brigades and breakthrough regiments, and also heavy
assault gun brigades and regiments. Also formed, in addition,
were 5 artillery breakthrough divisions, 4 artillery corps,
14 heavy mortar brigades, and 7 brigades and 2 regiments
of rocket artillery. In the RGK aviation, an assault air
corps and 5 divisions were formed.
The summer-fall campaign of 1944 was one of the major
ones, both in its results and in the scope of the use of
strategic reserves. During the campaign, General Headquarters
committed not only all the forces then in its reserve (the
2nd Guards, the 51st Combined-Arms, and the 5th Guards Tank
Armies) but also 14 combined-arms armies attached to the
reserve during the campaign itself. By far the greater part
of these forces were used on the main (western) axis, while
2 armies were used on the northwestern axis and 1 on the
southwestern.
It should be noted in connection with this that almost
half the forces (7 armies) were committed in November and
December 1944, i.e., as preparation for the new, and final,
1945 campaign in Europe. Of these, 6 armies (the 6th, 21st,
33rd, 52nd, 59th, and 61st) were on the western axis, where
our troops were to deliver the main strike, and 1 army (the
4th Guards) was on the Budapest axis. By committing such
considerable forces, Supreme High Command General Headquarters
ensured the creation by the beginning of 1945 of powerful
strike groupings on all the most important axes of the
Soviet-German front, especially on the Warsaw-Berlin axis.
By the beginning of January 1945, the 9th Guards and the
19th and 26th Combined-Arms Armies remained under direct
command of General Headquarters.
Although, during the 1945 campaign in Europe, strategic
reserves were committed on a relatively small scale, their
use was purposeful and effective. Thus, the commitment fo
battle of the 19th Army in East Pomerania, of the 26th and
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9th Guards Armies in the area of Budapest, and of the 28th
Armyl before Berlin exerted a very real influence on the
development of operations. Together with this it must be
noted that the reserves remaining under the command of
General Headquarters at the beginning of the campaign
were limited, and this was one of the reasons for the
delay in the destruction of the enemy's East Pomeranian 50X1-HUM
grouping, and this in turn caused a delay in carrying out
the operation aimed at the decisive destruction of the
enemy in the area of Berlin.
As a result of the 1945 campaign in Europe the Soviet
Armed Forces completed the defeat of the German-Fascist
Army. Fascist Germany surrendered unconditionally. But
the Second World War had still not come to an end. Imperi-
alist Japan continued its opposition. The Soviet Union,
striving to end the world war as quickly as possible, to
help liberate the peoples of Southeast Asia from Japanese
imperialist oppression, and to guarantee the security of
its own Far East borders decided, in fulfilment of the
obligations to its allies, to enter the war against im-
perialist Japan.
Already during the final campaign in Europe, Supreme
High Command General Headquarters had begun to create
strategic reserves for transfer to the Far East. In April,
the 5th Army was attached to the reserve, on 1 May the 39th
Army, and after the end of the war in Europe, the 53rd
Combined-Arms Army, the 6th Guards Tank Army, and a number
of artillery, engineer, and other units and large units.
The transfer of these troops to the Far East was begun.
One of the largest strategic regroupings during the Second
World War was accomplished in a short period of time.
Transferred from west to east were 2 front commands, 3
combined-arms armies, and 1 tank army - in all 39 divisions,
1. The 28th Army was attached to the General Headquarters
reserve after the liquidation of the enemy grouping
southwest of Koenigsberg.
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a tank and 2 mechanized corps, and also a large number of
artillery, engineer, and other units.
50X1-HUM
Once the strategic reserves arrived in the Far East,
they were used to reinforce troops already there. These
reserves, consisting of formations and large units which
had travelled a glorious combat route and amassed great
combat experience, were the main nucleus of the grouping
of Soviet troops whose crushing blow ensured the quick
defeat of the Kwantung Army and compelled imperialist Japan
to surrender unconditionally.
Even a brief survey permits one to form a definite
idea of the colossal scope of the preparation and the scale
of the use of strategic reserves during the Second World
War, and also of the significance of these reserves for
condlx ting defensive and offensive operations by the Soviet
Armed Forces. The experience of the preparation and use
of strategic reserves in the past war, in certain of its
elements, has not lost significance even at the present
time.
First of all,,it has demonstrated with complete clarity
the paramount, fundamental significance of the thesis of our
military science that without reserves the con-
duct of modern warfare is impossible. For this reason,
problems of the creation of reserves, and most of all of
strategic reserves, must be the subject of deep study and
definite practical measures even in peacetime. This is not
just a matter of having a specific part of the armed forces
and specially formed units under the direct orders of the
Supreme High Command, but also the preparation of human
resources, command personnel, and stockpiles'of arms and
combat equipment for newly formed units and for the restora-
tion of large units and units of troops in the field who
have lost their combat effectiveness.
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There is no doubt that in the future not only the
number but even the composition of strategic reserves will
be completely different from what they were in the last
war. However, certain general principles of their creation
and use have retained their significance even at the present
time. In our view, the difference between the two types of
strategic reserves has maintained its significance: the
first is that part of the armed forces (missile and ground
troops, aviation and navy) under the direct orders of the
Supreme High Command; and the second are those newly formed
units of missile, engineer, and chemical troops, communi-
cations troops and others, which are not organically a
part of formations and large units, but are intended for
their reinforcement. Although such a distinction may appear
arbitrary, still it is necessary, because the preparation
and use of each kind of reserve has its own particular and
very real features which must be taken into account.
During the Second World War, the strategic reserves
were created out of newly formed units or by withdrawal of
troops from the army in the field, with their subsequent
reinforcement and building up to strength at the expense
of the means of Supreme High Command General Headquarters.
This will be done even in modern warfare. In either case,
as was emphasized earlier, appropriate reserves are required
of command personnel, of enlisted men and NCOs trained as
specialists, and of stockpiles of arms and combat equipment.
For the formation of missile, engineer, chemical, and other
units and large units however, it is necessary to have
appropriate centers which are capable of performing such a
task quickly and competently.
The strategic reserves in the last war were used to
perform various tasks: to relieve large units and formations
that had lost their combat effectiveness; to set up the
defense in the depth of the disposition of one's own troops;
to reinforce the fronts in the field, on defense and offense;
to create strike groupings with the aim of delivering strong
counterstrikes against the enemy or of going over to the
counteroffensive; to create strike groupings on newly opened
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axes of a given strategic front; and to reinforce troops on
a new strategic front. Strategic reserves may also be used
for such purposes in the future, and the demand on them to
relieve troops who have lost their combat effectiveness may
increase considerably.
As shown by the experience of war, the purposeful and
massed use of strategic reserves, i.e., their commitment as
major formations on the main axes, has great significance.
This made it possible to have a decisive influence on the
development of events, ensuring the successful conduct of both
defensive and offensive operations. But,on the other hand,
in those cases where strategic reserves were scattered and
distributed relatively evenly on many axes, success was
usually not attained. Naturally, under modern conditions
there cannot be such compact disposition and movement of
strategic reserves as there was in the Second World War.
However, the principle of their use on the main axes to
perform the main tasks retains its significance even today.
The creation of strategic reserves, as shown by the
experience of the past, is one of the most important com-
ponents of strategic planning for armed combat. Any plan
will be realistic if it makes provision not only for the
appropriate reinforcement of the fronts to perform the
tasks ahead, but also for the allotment to the direct control
of the Supreme High Command of sufficiently large reserves
which could be used to build up the forces of the first
strategic echelon. In their approach to the performance of
this task, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the German
command differed fundamentally. The Soviet command, as is
obvious from the foregoing account, in preparing for cam-
paigns, not only reinforced the fronts, but also kept major
forces under its own control. In some cases this consisted
of powerful formations of strategic reserves in the form of
a front (the Steppe Front, before Kursk in 1943). At the
same time, the German-Fascist command, as a rule, incor_
porated almost all its forces in the army groups, retaining
under its own control a very limited number of large units
which did not have adequate combat effectiveness. For this
s~rerr.r
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reason, during the development of operations it was com-
pelled to resort to the rapid transfer of forces, mainly
from the west, and to their partial regrouping within
the limits of the Soviet-German front. The commitment
of these forces was often delayed and took place by units,
and this did not produce the necessary result.
In an article in a journal it is not possible to
elucidate completely all the problems of such an important
and vast problem as the creation and use of strategic
reserves in the last war. One can only hope that this
article will be of help in the further working out of this
problem.
Copy No.10
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