MILITARY THOUGHT: COORDINATION OF ADJACENT UNITS DURING THE USE OF NUCLEAR/MISSILE WEAPONS IN OPERATION, BY COLONEL G. YEFIMOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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SEQ ET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
IRONBARK
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Coordination of
Adjacent Units During the Use of Nuclear/
Missile Weapons in Operation", by Colonel
G. Yefimov
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the
SECRET Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" published by
the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level
of division commander.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
.CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the intereste:of protecting our source, IRONBARK
should be handled-on a aaeed.to-know basis within your office.
Request for extra .opies of this, report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
CSDB-3/650,277
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1IRONBARK
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretat-_on Cen5OX1-HUM
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4 SFOfRFT
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,277
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Coordination
of Adjacent Units During-The Use of
Nuclear/Missile Weapons in Operations",
by Colonel G. Yefimov
DATE, Qg,,- TXAO-: December 1961
APPRA,4, QF
CONTEN1 Documentary
SOURCE A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
entitled "Coordination of Adjacent Units During The
Use of Nuclear/Missile Weapons in Operations", by
Colonel G. Yefimov. This article appeared in Issue
601) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet
j:ournal Military Thought which is classified SECRET
by the Soviets and is published irregularly.
Issue 6(61) was sent to press on 7 December
Comment: "Military Thought" is published by
the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified
RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is
issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version
is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been
published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was
initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.
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IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,277
Coordination of Adjacent Units During The Use
of Nuclear/Missile Weapons in Operations
by
Nuclear/missile weapons are intended for the
fulfilment of the basic missions in an operation.
This is precisely the reason that every effort must
be made to employ them with maximum effectiveness
and to work out all problems related to their combat
use in the greatest possible detail.
Unfortunately we have still not achieved this
either in theory or in training practice. The
tactical-technical capabilities of nuclear/missile
weapons have not been exploited to the fullest, and
this applies, first of all, to maneuver at the
maximum range of fire. In the majority of cases the
maneuver of missile troops in an operation is essentially
limited to the zone of the formation or large unit
within which they are operating. Maneuver at the
maximum range of fire of the missiles takes place only
on the authorization of the senior commander. The
mutual use of missile weapons at the request of
adjacent units, or with their consent, has not been
provided or planned for, and this fact considerably
limits the capabilities of missile troops.
Ensuring the safety of adjacent troops during
the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes near the
dividing lines or during troop operations on
converging axes has also not been worked out. At
the present time there are no established, to say
nothing of official, principles which would complete-
ly preclude simultaneous missile strikes by adjacent
units against the same objective.
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We shall try to find the solutions to these
problems which, in our opinion, will improve the
coordination between adjacent units and ensure
more complete utilization of the capabilities of
nuclear/missile weapons in an operation.
It is known that one of the advantages of
missiles over all other weapons is their great
range of fire and the broad capabilities for
maneuver by fire toward the flanks. For example,
the range of fire of tactical missiles is more
than twice the usual width of a divisional offensive
zone. Consequently, a tactical missile battalion
of one division can easily deliver nuclear strikes
along almost the entire zone of two adjacent
divisions. Army and front missile units are like-
wise capable of destroying,with nuclear/missile
strikes, objectives within a significant part of
the offensive zone of an adjacent army or front.
In exercises, however, a maneuver by tactical and
army missiles to the zone of adjacent units is
still carried out only after the assignment of a
special mission by the troop commander of the front
(army), while interfrontal maneuver by missile fire
has not, generally speaking, been fully developed
in practice.
Before the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons,
special means were allocated to provide for the
security of flank juncture lines (styk). At the
tactical level these missions were assigned to
machine gun subunits and to artillery and mortar
batteries and battalions. In an army or front,
the flank juncture lines were made secure by the
fire of several artillery units, or even large
units. In modern operations, when troops will be
operating along separate axes, without a continuous
front, and with gaps, in some cases amounting to
several tens of kilometers, between large units,
there is a real need to raise the question of the
security of the flanks of large units and formations.
Aft SEGftET
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We feel that the presence of nuclear/missile
weapons in divisions, in armies, and in a front has
created real conditions for reliable flank security
by nuclear/missile strikes, using air bursts or even
surface bursts if conditions are favorable, and for
making broad use of the maneuver by fire of missile
troops in the tactical and operational plan.
In addition to securing the flanks, the
maneuver by fire of missile troops is advisable,
and even necessary, in those cases where a front
(army) is organizing a group or massed nuclear/missile
strike but does not have a sufficient quantity of means of
its own ready to open fire. In the course of an
operation, a considerable part of the weapons may
be moved or withdrawn from the zones of radioactive
contamination. Sometimes the nuclear weapons of
a front (army) may not be ready for use or may not
have been brought up to the launch sites. -Possible
losses of missile units must also be taken into
account. All these conditions may sharply reduce
the capability of a front, and even mores o in the
case of armies, to carry out group or massed nuclear/
missile strikes. In suchdases, the, adjacent units
can offer some aid to an army or front by executing
a maneuver by trajectories of nuclear/missile weapons.
Modern operations are distinguished by their
exceptional dynamism. The situation in the zone of
a formation frequently changes in the course of
several hours, and, after massed nuclear strikes
by the enemy, even in the course of minutes. Fre-
quently, it is necessary to transfer the main efforts
to a new axis at a considerable distance, measured
in tens or hundreds of kilometers. This can be
successfully accomplished in a matter of minutes
by a maneuver by fire of the missile troops,
provided such a maneuver had been previously
provided for in the plan for the combat use of
the missile troops of a front or of armies.
SFCZRFT
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It must also be noted that the use of missiles
with chemical or conventional filling will have an
appropriate -, effect only if they are used in great
quantities in the launching of a strike against a
given objective. In connection with this, the use
of even 10 to 15 missiles with chemical filling in
a limited interval of time is beyond the capability
not only of an army but also of a front. This is
explained as follows. It has been established by
experience in exercises that, in the course of an
operation, up to 50 percent of the missile units
are usually moving or are preparing to open fire
from new siting areas. In addition to this, of those
missile battalions which are ready for firing, not
less than one third of the launching mounts will be
on a duty basis with nuclear missiles. Not all
battalions will have missiles with chemical filling.
Some of the battalions of army missile brigades will
not be able to support the firing on the selected
objective because of the great distance involved.
If a front, let us say, has in its composition two
front and three or four army missile brigades (30
to 36 launching mounts) then no more than 8 to 10
launching mounts can be allotted to the destruction
,.of the selected objective with missiles with
chemical or conventional filling.
This is precisely the reason that frequently
during front exercises the majority of missiles
with chemical filling allotted for an operation
remain unexpended; and, when they are used, the
required reliability of destruction of targets is
not attained in the majority of cases. It is
obvious that, even in this case, the employment of
interfrontal maneuver by missile fire will make
the use of missiles with chemical or conventional
filling more effective and will greatly assist in
the complete exploitation of the combat capabilities
of missile weapons in an operation.
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{RONBARK
CSDB-3 /650 , 277
In our opinion, in order to achieve the mutual
use of nuclear/missile weapons in adjacent zones, it
is necessary to indicate the following in the
directive to a front or army on the conduct of an
operation: the number of missile units, the type of
nuclear warheads, and, also, the type of weapons
with chemical or conventional filling they must
have on hand in case of a request from an adjacent
unit to launch strikes against targets which it
has selected. It is clear that, at the same time,
there must be an indication of the quantity of
weapons that were planned for the purpose of being
called on from adjacent units to the zone of a
front or army.
Ensuring the safety of one's own troops during
the employment of fire weapons is not a new problem.
Even during World War II, commanding officers and
staffs, in working out coordination efforts, adopted
special measures to prevent cases of casualties
among their own troops from air strikes or from
artillery and tank fire. Thus, with troops operating
along converging axes, lines were set up where the
troops were to meet, and corresponding lines were
set up to limit air strikes and the fire of artillery
and tanks. These boundaries were usually reference
lines joining landmarks which were shown on the map
and clearly visible on the terrain, and sometimes,
they were roads or rivers. Fire to the flanks was
limited by the dividing lines, beyond which artillery
and mortars could fire only at the request of an
adjacent unit.
In modern operations with the use of nuclear
weapons, linear boundaries can no longer guarantee
the safety of adjacent troops operating on the flanks
or advancing on converging axes. It is clearly
necessary to replace lines With zones, the widths
of which correspond to the radii of destruction of
nuclear weapons. A missile with a 100 kt nuclear
warhead is capable of inflicting casualties on troops
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not in shelters within a radius of 3100 m. The
safe distance from ground zero of the burst of such
a missile is determined by the pressure in front of
the shock wave (0.1 kg/cm ), and is approximately
5300 m. If one takes into consideration the missile's
probable deviation from the intended ground zero,
then one is easily convinced that it is not possible
to plan for the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes
of such a yield closer than six to seven thousand
meters from one's own troops.
Unfortunately, this fact is considered in
connection with our own troops only in the narrow
sense of the word. In training exercises, nuclear
strikes have frequently been planned for delivery
for three to five km from the dividing line with an
adjacent unit and without any agreement with the unit,
which does not always ensure the safety of adjacent
troops. An exception is nuclear surface bursts,
for which the zones of radioactive contamination are
so extensive that they require advance detailed
calculations in order to ensure the safety of the
troops of an adjacent front or army.
When we consider that in modern operations
troops will be operating along separate axes without
a continuous front and at exceptionally high speeds,
it is obvious that neither a front nor an army will
have any precise information on the position of an
adjacent unit. This information will always be
obsolete - even under the best conditions, in two
to three hours. In this time, by taking advantage of
open flanks, the forward units will be able to advance
10 to 15 km. It is quite clear that under such
conditions the launching of.nuclear strikes, even
within the zone of one's own formation, at distances
of three to five km from the dividing lines of an
adjacent unit, is fraught with grave risks.
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Other great difficulties may arise from the
launching of nuclear strikes under conditions where
troops are operating along converging axes with the
mission of encirclement, where they are gaining
the rear of large enemy groupings, or where they
are making a detour of extensive zones of radio-
active contamination with high radiation levels.
In consideration of these facts, we propose,
in the interests of ensuring the safety of our own
troops, the establishment of special zones within
the boundaries of which the grounds zero for
nuclear strikes may be designated only with the
consent of the adjacent unit. For armies, such
zones should be designated on the orders of the
troop commander of the front and should follow
the dividing lines. In the case of operations of
strike groupings of two armies along converging
axes, it is also necessary to set up such special
zones on the line of their proposed meeting.
The width of this zone will. be determined
with reference to the highest-yield nuclear war-
heads which the troops possess, and to the maximum
possible deviation of ground zero of the burst
from the intended point. Thus, if the armies
have 40 kt warheads, the maximum possible deviation
(VO - vozmozhnoye otkloneniye) of the weapons from
tie point selected for ground zero, depending on
errors in the preparation of the initial data for
firing and dispersal (4 x range probable error
(Vdp) or 4 x direction probable error (Vbp)) is
equal to 1600 m; and if the distance (R, - rasstoyaniye)
from ground zero of the burst which is safe for
personnel is that at which the pressure in front
of the shock wave at ground level for that particular
burst corresponds to 0.1 kg/cm2, then the width of
the zone (P - polosa) can be defined by the formula:
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For the conditions we have given, the zone
where nuclear weapons are used with the consent of
adjacent units is P = 1600 + 3950 = 5550 in, and
should overlap the sector of terrain from the
dividing lines by not less than 5550 in. These zones
will ensure the safety of our own troops only in
the case of air nuclear bursts. For surface bursts,
it is necessary in each specific case to carry out
calculations, taking into consideration the yield
of the weapon, the wind direction and velocity, and
the position of one's own and the adjacent troops,
as well as the nature of their operations in the
next hours or days.
The limited number of nuclear weapons allotted
to armies for an operation and their great value
demand that there be no instances of inefficient
use of nuclear weapons. Despite this, there are
still no restrictions preventing the simultaneous
launching of two nuclear strikes by adjacent units
against a single target detected at the dividing
line. During training exercises the situation
often arises in which, after the detection of an
important target, e.g., a "Corporal" guided missile
battery, close to the dividing line between two
armies, both army commanders may give the order for
its destruction by nuclear missiles. As a result,
two missiles are expended instead of one. The
establishment of zones which we have proposed would
play a positive role even in such a case.
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