MILITARY THOUGH: CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION OF ARMY MISSILE WEAPONS IN THE INITIAL NUCLEAR STRIKE, BY MAJOR-GENERAL N. STASHEK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 6, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Considering
the Initial Nuclear Strike", by Mayor
General N.Stashek
4- n , erbat 1 mAranwletion of an article from the
_, o
E
se
"
published. by
SECRET Collection of the Journal "Military lrougnt
the level
t
d d
own
o
the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distribute
of division commander.
For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
2
.
codeword IRONBARK has- been `assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. .The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDMIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
ld be handled on a needyto-know basis within your office.
h
ou
s
Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
?
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
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Enclosure
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON ZS. 0. C.
Participation of Army Missile Weapons in
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
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V ) SFCT
USSR
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET)t 11QonSJdar1p
ar c pa on of Army Missile Weapon
in the Initial Nuclear Strike", by
Major-General N. Stashek
DATE OF INFO: December 1961
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary
SOURCE : A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
entitled "Conoidering Participation of Army Missile
17oapone in the Initial Nuclear Strike", by Major-
General N. Ctaehek. This article appeared in Issue
6(61) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet
journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET
by the Soviets and is published irregularly.
Issue 6(61) was sent to press on 7 December
1961.
Coamient: "Military Thought" is published by
the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified
RESTRICTED,-SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is
issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version
is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been
published, 6 of them during 1961'. The TOP SECRET. version vas
initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.
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Considering Participation of Army Missile Weapons
in the Initial Nuclear Strike
by
Major-General N. Stashek
There has been some talk lately in the military
press to the effect that there is no sense in bringing
in missile weapons of combined-arms and tank armies
of border military districts (groups of troops) to
participate in delivering the initial nuclear strike
against the enemy at the start of war. The reasons
given are that with the existing numerical strength
of army missile weapons and their limited capabilities
of making repeated launchings, the army may find itself
in an unfavorable position: it will be unable to
exert the necessary force with its missile/nuclear
weapons against those enemy objectives which survive
the initial strikes and which would impede the
successful advance of our troops.
This indeed is a weighty argument. However, it
is considerably worse to keep in reserve a large
number of missile troops during the initial strike,
because this may cause a considerable reduction of
its power and effectiveness.
There is no doubt that the predominant role
in delivering the initial nuclear strike against the
enemy will belong to strategic nuclear weapons and
primarily to missile troops of strategic designation.
However, strikes with these weapons will be delivered
mainly against enemy strategic objectives, usually
found at a considerable depth. As such objectives
one must consider intercontinental missile launch.
sites, depots of nuclear warheads, air and naval bases,
administrative and political centers, industrial and
economic. areas, important railroad junctions, etc.
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Aside from the objectives of strategic sig-
nif icance~, it is also advi; able to destroy enemy
operational and tactical objectives by the initial
nuclear strike. After all, following the initial
nuclear strike and utilizing its results, operations
will be started by ground troops, which will be
subjected first of all to the effect of enemy
operational and tactical weapons. Unquestionably,
it is more advantageous to-destroy as large as
possible an amount of such enemy weapons during the
initial strike, and in this way deny him the
possibility of their unhindered use against our
troops.
The organizational structure and experience
drawn from exercises of foreign armies show that
there will be a great amount of enemy operational
and tactical objectives in the zone of.advanceof the
combined-arms (tank) army, and especially of a front.
To this category belong operational-tactical nuclear
weapons, groupings of combined-arms large units with
their tactical nuclear weapons, tactical aviation,
land army and aircraft control points, and other
objectives.
On the basis of the experience of combat and
operational training of troops and staffs, it is
considered perfectly normal when a combined-arms
army conducts an offensive operation during the
initial period of a war in a zone 120 to 150 km
wide)and in some cases even wider. In such a zone,
according to the views of our probable enemies,
there may be in operation on their side as much
as one field army consisting of two or three army
corps (10 to 12 divisions), two or three "Corporal"
battalions, and a group of "Redstone" missile mounts.
Besides this, it is necessary to take into account
the presence in the divisions of "Honest John"
.organic batteries and batteries of 203.2 mm
howdtzers as well as the possible reinforcing of a
field army by nuclear weapons - up'to 12 battalions
of "Lacrosse' and. "Honest John", up to 6 battalions of
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203.2 mm howitzers, and one battalion. of 280 mm
guns. Depending on the number of army corps in the
first army echelon, the reans of reinforcement may
even be more substantial.
All the above-mentioned means may have the
most direct influence upon the course and the out-
come of the initial army offensive operation. There
is no doubt about the need to destroy them first of
all. However, a very substantial number of nuclear/
missile strikes will be necessary to accomplish this.
Front missile troops and aircraft, naturally,
will participate in the initial strike jointly with
nuclear weapons of strategic designation. But, as
figures show, they are totally inadequate for the
simultaneous or even a successive destruction of
even the basic operational-tactical enemy objectives
within the zone of the front offensive'. Besides
front nuclear weapons, this circumstance also makes
it necessary to bring in ai`my missile troops t6'participate
in the initial strike.
By delivering nuclear/missile strikes against
the enemy in its owr offensive zone, army missile
weapons thus fulfil aissions which are of direct
interest to the fortacoming army offensive operation.
At the same time, one does not have to fear a sharp
reduction of the army's capabilities after the initial
missile launch. Action against the enemy will continue
by means of missile mounts assigned to the army
reserve, by certain amounts of front nuclear weapons,
and also by artillery fire onslaughts and aircraft
strikes - using ammunition with conventional and'chemical
charges. Besides this,,,-sometime after the initial
strike., contact with -the enemy will be made by the
advancing army large units which have shifted to the
offens.ive._ and which will also be able to deliver
nuclear/missile strikes.
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The most important mission of army missile
s in delivering the initial nuclear/missile
troo
p
strikes is destruction of enemy operational-tactical
and tactical nuclear means within the zone if the
army advance. Together with this, the successful
development of the offensive by army troops during the
initial operation will be furthered to a large
degree by the destruction of enemy combined-arms
large units (tank and infantry divisions).
When speaking of the need to deliver nuclear
strikes against enemy combined-arms large units,
here we have in mind the destruction not only of
motorized infantry, tanks, artillery, and other
arms of troops, but mainly of the nuclear weapons
of these large units. As is known, the complement
of a US Army division includes two free rocket.:
mounts of the "Honest John" type and four 3. mm
howitzers. These nuclear weapons cap be destroyed
simultaneously with the nuclear strikes delivered
against combined-arms large units.
By destroying enemy combined-arms large units
and units, in this way-we prevent him from realizing
the results of his own nuclear strikes. This means
that even in case the enemy does succeed in deliver
.ing strikes using his remaining nuclear weapons, he
will not have available sufficient forces of ground
troops to. launch an attack or establish a stable
defense. It must also be taken into account that
enemy combined-arms large units and units, during
combat operations provide cover for siting areas
of nuclear weapons. Therefore, prior to penetrating
these areas for the final destruction or capture
of missile mounts, nuclear warhead depots, and
other nuclear means,.. the advancing army troops
must destroy the enemy covering units.
As regards the use of nuclear weapons to
.destroy enemy combined-arms large units, there is
a directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR ox1 HUrvi
Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy,
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rich demands that when planning and conducting a
battle and an operation the main efforts of front,
army, and divisional nuclear/missile means be
aimed not only at the immediate destruction of
nuclear weapons,but also at the destruction of
enemy tank and infantry divisions, so as to create
conditions favorable for capturing or destroying
enemy means of nuclear attack by swift operations
by our own tank and motorized rifle large units.
What then is the practical resolution of
the problem of getting army missile troops of
border military districts 'groups of troops) to
participate in the initial nuclear strike, taking
into account the comparatively short range of
operation of army missiles and the various
distances of areas of peacetime disposition from
the border?
It seems to us that missile troops of border
military district armies (groups of troops) assigned
to cover the State border, and for operations in the
first echelon o the front, must be kept in a degree
of combat readiness which would allow them to
participate in the delivery of the initial nuclear
strikes. For this purpose, missions for army, as
well as front missile troops must be designated
beforehand, even in peacetime. Targets must be
selected for each army missile large unit, and
unremitting observation of these targets must be
established even before the beginning of hostilities,
and especially during the period of threat (if it
exists).
To ensure the successful fulfilment of missions
by army missile troops, it is necessary to carry out,
also in advance, all the preparatory measures. These
are, first of all,the secret preparation of siting
areas and launch sites, routes of approaches to them,
and control points. Siting areas for missile troops
of those armies which provide cover for the border
and are assigned for operations in the first echelon
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of the front must be prepared at least in the
topographical.-geodetical sense,, taking into
account the possibility of the maxirrum use of the
greatest effective range of missile mounts1so that
the initial strikes cruld be delivered against the
most distantly located enemy objectives. In doing
this, at least two positions must be prepared for
each lai;.nch battery. The distance of these
positions from the border may be between 30 and
40 km, and from the arE as of permanent disposition
of missile largc ur.itst it has to be such as to
ensure the occupation of positions within the
shortest possible tire and at the same time ensure
the safety of missile troops during the delivery of
enemy nuclear strikes against the disposition areas.
When the launch sites of army missile weapons
are 30 to 40 km from the border, they will be able
to deliver the initial iuclear strikes to a depth
of 100 to 140 km from the border. As is known,
within this depth is located a large number of
those objectives which are liable to destruction
first of all (r.iss ile mounts of the "Corporal"
type, tactical aviation airfields, combined-arms
large units, control points, etc.).
As for the missile troops of the army compris-
ing the second echelon of the front and located
a large distance from the border, their use in the
initial strike is considerably more complicated.
Figures show that even if the army missile
troops are employed, the total ntamber of launching
mounts may be insufficient, to perform the tasks
wher delivering the ,initial nuclear strikes.
Therefore, in the.-initial strikes it is advisable
to employ nuclear charges with the greatest yield,
and this would lessen the need for launching mounts.
The most irrportant thing, however, is to increase
at this time the capabilities of the combined-arms
and tank armies to use nuclear weapons by increasing
the number of their missile troops, and also by
assigning for the support of each advancing army a
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large amount of bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft
which will deliver nuclear strikes during the change
of launch sites and while missile troops prepare
for subsequent launchings. For the same reasons
it is necessary to intensify scientific-research
and desi n work in order 'o resolve as soon as
possible the problem cf. increasing the maximum rate
of fire nd the maximum effective range of army
missile *eapons. All this will considerably increase
the comb t. capabilities of army formations, and with
thorough and comprehensive training of missile troops
and thei complete readiness even in peacetime will
allow them to fulfil successfully the complex
missions bf initial operations in the initial
period ofI war.
As f r as tactical missiles are concerned,
their use'in the initial strike is in all probability
inadvisable. This is due to the following reasons.
Firstly, our probable enemies do not envisage
the preparation of defense lines near the border
and their occupation by troops in advance (even in
case of a period of threat). Under these conditions
the low maximum range of tactical missiles will
disallow their use aga;nt c-mparatively distant
enemy objectives.
Secondly, a future war will most likely start
suddenly, without even the shortest period of threat,
and the armies operating within the complement of a
front will be committed to battle precipitately after
they have been brought. up from the depth. Consequent-
ly, tactical missiles cannot be brought to launch
sites directly at the boarder and participate in the
initial strike even if the enemy objectives are ,
located within the border zone. On the other hand,
bringing up missile troops of tactical designation
to the border in advance would be completely in-
advisable,iecause it would lead to a large concentra-
tion of nuclear weapons in the border. zone and would
create the danger of heavy losses from the initial
enemy nuclear strikes.
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In view of the above, the use of tactical missiles
must be carried out directly for the successful
performance of the tasks by combined-arms large
units of the army at the beginning and during the
initial offensive operation.
Enemy tactical nuclear weapons and troops
directly opposing the advancing'army large units
will be the primary objectives of missile battalions
of motorized rifle and tank divisions during delivery
of nuclear/missile strikes. This pertains especially
to the tank divisions after their separation from
the main forces of the army during the development of
the' off?ensiv-e in the operational depth.
The participation of missile battalions of
motorized rifle and tank divisions in the initial
nuclear strike will become feasible with the
increase of maximum range of tactical missiles and
the increase Of the number of launching mounts in
battalions.
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