MILITARY THOUGHT: ON REGROUPING A COMBINED-ARMS ARMY FROM THE DEPTH OF THE COUNTRY IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF A WAR, BY MAJOR-GENERAL P. STEPSHIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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On Regrouping a Combined-Arms Army from the Depth
of the Country in the Initial Period of a War
by
Major-General P. Stepshin
From the very beginning of a future war there will
be a requirement for the stepping up of the efforts of
the operating fronts with troops being moved up from the
depth. Not only individual units and large units, but
also whole formations, will be moved up to the line of
the front. The demand for this may result from the need
to create strong groupings in short periods of time to
develop an offensive, 'to deliver counterstrikes or to go
over to a counteroffensive, to close large gaps which
have formed, and to replace troops who have been weakened
or who have lost their combat effectiveness.
In recent years considerable experience has been
accumulated from exercises in the organization and
carrying out of regroupings of a combined-arms army from
the depth of a country in the initial period of a war, in
different theaters of military operations and in different
situations. Thus, in one of the exercises in the North
Caucasus Military District, a combined-arms army consist-
ing of a missile brigade, and of one tank and four
motorized rifle divisions, moved 1,400 to 1,600 km in the
first days of the war to participate in the fulfilment of
the further task of a front attacking in a mountain theater.
The regrouping was carried out by crossing a mountain
ridge along one railroad and three highway axes. A large
part of the troops (up to 80 percent) moved under their
own power, and the remainder by railroad, air, and water
transportation. The army was sent into battle on the
seventh day after beginning its forward' movement.
In another exercise, an army with the same complement
and the same assignment moved 1,000 to 1,200 km across
territory with a developed road network and was sent into
battle in five days. About 40 percent of the complement 50X1-HUM
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of the army moved by railroad, up to 45 percent moved under
their own power, and about 15 percent of the whole volume 50X1-HUM
of transportation fell to the ;lot of air transport.
The procedure and time for moving troops within the
complement of an army during a regrouping can be most
varied. Together with this, an analysis of the experience
of exercises and games reveals a number of general laws
characterizing the conditions and methods of organizing
and conducting the regrouping of a combined-arms army from
the depth of the country in the initial period of a nuclear/
missile war.
The law of nuclear/missile warfare, formulated by
N. S. Khrushchev, which states that from the very beginning
of an armed conflict the primary efforts of both sides are
aimed at the depth of the hostile camp, is bringing about
basic changes in the conditions for moving troops and will
give a new character to regroupings.
Troops and communications will now be subjected to
enemy action at any distance from the front. The scale
and effectiveness of this action have increased immeasur-
ably. It is sufficient to note that the probable enemy
can take special measures at the beginning of a war to
upset the movement of reserves forward from the depth of
the country by setting up so-called "nuclear obstruction
barrjers" along the natural lines intersecting the basic
lines of communication. Simultaneously, a large number
of nuclear strikes can be delivered against troops, road
junctions, stations,tunnels, ports, and wharves.
Judging by the exercises held, for struggle against
reserves moving up in the most important theaters of
military operations, the command of NATO envisages the
use of a large number of nuclear warheads, of thousands
of aircraft, of bacterial and toxic chemical agents, of
airborne forces, and of specially trained and equipped
sabotage groups and detachments. This is also taken into
consideration in our command games and operational exercises50X1-HUM
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Thus, during one of the military command games, during
the first two days of the war alone, the "enemy" delivered
19 ground and 3 air nuclear strikes against the lines of
communication of our troops. Calculations showed that
even such relatively small action by the "enemy" resulted
in the radioactive contamination of large areas. Moreover,
as a result of the nuclear strikes,9 railroad junctions,
whose restoration took 4 to 14 days, were destroyed. The
railroad network was broken up into 6 isolated sections.
Of two through railroad lines leading toward the front,
one was put out of action for a prolonged period, and the
other was subjected to constant action by "enemy" sabotage
groups and detachments. The total carrying capacity of
the railroads decreased by 60 percent, and the length of
the route for the greater part of the military echelons
increased twofold and more. As the result of the
destruction of a hydrotechnical installation , terrain
over an area of 200 by 25 km was flooded. Very important
highway junctions were also destroyed, and the roads
themselves became clogged with streams of people and
civilian transportation.
In a short time the forces and weapons of the army
had to be brought in to ensure the continuation of its
regrouping, which was in progress-to carry out engineer
work to overcome the obstacles which had appeared and
to restore the roads, to carry out antiair defense and
protection against atomic and chemical attack, to
eliminate the consequences of the "enemy" nuclear attack,
to increase sharply the commandant's service and the
regulation of traffic,, to destroy "enemy" sabotage groups
and landings, and also to wage a struggle against isolated
groupings of his troops which remained in the rear of the
attacking front in the zone near the border.
Further "enemy" action against lines of communication
and against troops moving up turned out to be so effective
that it threatened the regrouping with possible failure.
Special measures had to be taken to provide reliable support
for the troops moving up.
The need for fire support of the regrouping was already
felt during the past war. However, at that time, it amounted
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to passive measures, mainly to the antigir defense of
troops and lines of communication. Now this is no longer
sufficient. To ensure the movement of large reserves from
the zone of interior:?, operational nuclear/missile means
must be actively combatted and strikes must be delivered
against his airfields. This combat will be waged in the
framework of the general plan of the General Headquarters
of the Supreme High Command for the gaining of fire
superiority in the initial period of a wai,. At the same
time, the planning and carrying out of the fire support
of troops moving up must become an important duty for a
front and even for an army.
Consequently, the regrouping of an army from the
rear to the front -- something which formerly had the
nature of "peacetime transportation" and which was
frequently connected only with the expenditure of time,
vehicle resources, and fuel -- has now been transformed
into a distinctive combat operation whose purpose, after
active and constant enemy counteraction has been overcome,
is to.maintain the combat effectiveness of the troops
and build 'up the complement of the front to the grouping
necessary for the performance of the new task. During
a regrouping, the troops will now cease to be simply
passengers being transported from one area to another.
They will be forced to overcome various obstacles along
the paths of their movement and to cross contaminated
sectors of terrain, to take active measures to upset or
to decrease enemy pressure to a maximum, and, in several
instances, to eliminate the consequences of his nuclear
strikes.
The definition of regrouping as a combat operation
shows sufficiently fully the qualitative change which it
has undergone in connection with the shift in the center
of gravity of armed struggle to the depth of the belligerents,,
reflects the essence of the process of moving troops under
modern conditions, and favors the correct solution of a
number of problems connected with the organization of re-
grouping.
The different methods in which it can be carried out
are also in keeping with the changed nature of regrouping.
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Methods of moving troops which are not connected with the
use of the large, permanent transportation installations
most subject to enemy action and which ensure reliable
regrouping and maintenance of the combat effectiveness of
the troops, are acquiring very great significance. Among
these are the following: moving an army as a whole by
air transportation, with the loading arriunloading of troops
and equipment at temporary field airfields, combined
regrouping with the comprehensive use of various types of
transportation,with the predominant role given to movement
under their own power, and the movement of all the forces
of an army under their own power. We believe that the
last method will become the most widespread in regroupings
over a distance of up to 1,000 km, i.e., in the zone where
the enemy will use his main weapons in his nuclear offensive.
Under modern conditions it is necessary to examine
afresh the regrouping of an army, in connection with its
subsequent commitment to battle. In the past, the sequence
and procedure for regrouping had little dependence on the
nature of the operational task- which the army had to
accomplish within the complement of a front. In the majority
of cases, after its movement an army spent a prolonged time
in the build-up area, where it also prepared to conduct
the operation.
At the present time, the high speeds of development
of operations, the desire to increase its efforts as
ggickly as possible and to achieve surprise, the mass
destruction of communications, and also the threat of the
destruction of a concentrated army by enemy nuclear/missile
strikes, make it inadvisable for the army to remain in a
build-up area for a long time, except in certain cases
when it is necessary to create a new grouping of troops,
for example,in preparing a counteroffensive along a given
axis.
The experience of exercises shows that a tendency
to transform the regrouping and the commitment to battle
of an army:from two independent and relatively unrelated
acts into a single process, connected by a general plan,
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and by the continuity of operations, is already appearing.
There is every reason to suppose that, as the speed of
regroupings and of the operations of ground troops increases,
this law will manifest itself even more strongly. This
results from the fact that the organization and procedure
for regrouping prove to depend increasingly on the nature
of the operational task which the army will have to accomplish
within the complement of a front. However, for the proper
organization of troop movement, there is more and more-
need for timely determination and knowledge of this task.
It is sometimes said that in the strained and dynamic
situation of the initial period of a war, it will be
impossible to determine in advance the nature of the task
which an army will accomplish after regrouping within
the complement of a front. Of course, sudden and abrupt
changes in the situation during this time are quite
possible. On this basis, however, it is impossible to
gainsay the advisability of planning the first army
operations and army regroupings from the depth of the
country before the war starts.
It should be borne in mind that under modern conditions,
in contrast to the last war, the number of armies within'
the complement of a front may be somewhat smaller. In
connection with this, there is the increasing possibility
of determining the tasks of each army in good time.
Moreover, in the majority of cases the development of an
offensive by the troops of a front will be carried out,
we suppose, by the reinforcement of the armies of the
first echelon with individual large units from the front's
reserve. The commitment of a whole army to battle must
be considered a rare phenomenon, and the general nature
of the task of such an army can be determined in advance.
For example, in one of the exercises, the need to
commit an army to battle arose from the fact that a new,
important operational axis had appeared in the depth of
"enemy" territory. In another instance, an army was 50X1-HUM
committed to battle after troops of the first echelon
of the front had traversed a narrow defile between two
water barriers. In both instances, the operational tasks
of the armies being committed in the impending army
operations were determined in advance.
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Sometimes it will be possible to orient an army in
the most probable variants of its use in general terms
only, but even this will assist in the purposeful organization
of troop movement.
Depending on the length of the period of threat
(ugrozhayemyy period), the periods of mobilization, the
complement and assignment of the army, and the distance
and speed of the regrouping, an army can arrive in the
complement of the front at various stages of its first or
subsequent operations, and, if the period of threat is of
sufficient duration, before the beginning of military
operations and at the beginning of the war it will be in
the first echelon, or will comprise the second echelon of
the front.
An army which is constantly deployed at a distance
of no more than 1,000 to 1,500 km from the line of the
front, and which succeeds in completing its mobilization
before the beginning of military operations or which is
in a state of constant readiness, will be able to join the
complement of the front (if it is not moved by air)
approximately as the fulfilment of the subsequent task of
the first front operation. is beginning, i.e., on the
fifth to seventh day of the war.
It is most probable that mobilization will begin only
on the eve,and sometimes at the beginning, of the war. In
this case, an army which is moving forward while regrouping
at a distance exceeding 1,000 to 1,500 km will be able to
participate only in the second and subsequent operations
of a front. Guaranteeing the participation of this army
in the first front operation is a very complicated task,
which can be accomplished only by moving the troops by
air.
We,now have such military transport aircraft as the
AN-8, AN-12, IL-18, TV-104, and the MI-6 helicopter, which
are able to transport by air the personnel and organic
means of a motorized rifle division of modern organization
(without tanks).
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Calculations show that 4 to 5 divisions of military
transport aviation can transport an entire motorized
rifle division in two trips over a distance of 2,000 km
in two days. From this, one can see that basically, modern
military transport means already meet requirements for the
movement of troops over large distances. When this aviation
is equipped with AN-22 aircraft, it will be able to transport
motorized rifle and tank divisions and missile and other
units in full complement by air.
However, this does not exclude the need for the
further improvement of military transport aviation. For
example, we must have aircraft able to carry loads of 30
to 50 tons, with a maximum speed of about 800 kph, and
with a flight range of 5,000 to 8,000 kms, which can take
off and land on dirt airfields of limited size. There is
also a great future for autocraft (turbolet), combining
the characteristics of a helicopter and an automobile and
able to move on the ground as well as in the air.
An important problem is that of decreasing the time
between regrouping and committing an army to combat. As
has already been noted, the simultaneous commitment of all
or of a large part of the forces of an army which is moving
up will now be a very rare phenomenon. There is now no
sense in keeping all the troops of an army in definite
areas until they have been fully concentrated. Firstly,
such a grouping would be a good target for enemy nuclear
strikes and could cause great losses; secondly, the
presence of an army in the build-up area for several days
will result in its separation from the troops operating
over a considerable area ahead, and this will not ensure
the timely stepping-up of the efforts of the first echelon
of the front.
As has been shown by the experience of exercises,
the one or two divisions which are in contact with the
enemy will usually be again subordinated to an army being
committed to battle after regrouping, and at first, only
a part of the complement of arriving troops may be committed
to battle -- a missile brigade and three, two, or even
one division with the necessary means for reinforcement.
As a rule, these divisions will be: committed to battle on
separate axes and at a different depth as they approach 50X1-HUM
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SFCPFT
and deploy for combat.
Therefore, under the conditions which have been examined,
the readiness of an army for commitment to battle must be
determined not by the completion of the concentration of
all its forces, but by the time of the arrival in the new
areas of its large units which have been assigned for
operations in the first echelon of the army. On exercises
this made it possible for us to reduce the time between the
beginning of regrouping and the commitment of an army
to battle by almost three days.
In connection with the conceptions which have been
expressed, the procedure for assigning the task of regroup-
ing to an army is also changing. For example, in the
majority of instances the designation of a build-up area
is losing its meaning because in practice there will be
no such build-up; the large units of the first echelon
of the army will enter battle abruptly, while the remainder,
trying not to lag behind the troops operating ahead, will
also continue the movement, in readiness to develop the
offensive.
It seems. to us that, under the conditions which have
been examined, instead of indicating an area and a time
for the conclusion of the build-up of an army, it would
be preferable to specify the area and time at which
commitment to battle should be begun and ended and also
the forces by which this commitment should be carried
out and supported.
Also, in allotting tasks to the army's large units,
there is no need to specify build-up areas. Bearing in
mind that these large units will enter combat abruptly,
and frequently not simultaneously, they should be given
only the limits of deployment (commitment).
Allocation of tasks in this way corresponds more
fully to the modern understanding of commitment to battle
and to its coordination with regrouping, allows maximum
use of the limited capabilities of existing means of
communication" for the forward movement of large units in
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the most advisable sequence, and reduces the time needed
to move and create the necessary grouping of forces and
weapons.
Preparation for moving an army from the depth of the
country begins even before war starts. In this process,
its assignment and complement are determined, together
with the zone of its movement, the times for mobilizing
and regrouping, the requisite transport and support means,
and the procedure for their use. At the same time, measures
are taken to maintain the constant high state of mobilization
and march readiness of the troops. In accordance with the
assignment of the army and with possible changes in the
state of the lines of communication and transportation,
several "variants of the regrouping plan are worked out.
Under the conditions of nuclear/missile warfare,
however, the significance of this prewar planning should
not be exaggerated. The experience of exercises shows that
the very first enemy nuclear/missile strikes can so sub-
stantially alter the periods for mobilizing troops, the
state of the lines of communication, and their traffic
capacity, that only basic elements of the prewar plan
will retain their significance. Therefore, the greater
part of the work on the organization of the forward'
ittovemeft'Will be done not ahead of time but immediately
before the very beginning of regrouping, in extremely
compressed periods of time, often under enemy action,
while the consequences of his strikes are being eliminated,
and simultaneously with the conduct of mobilization measures.
So that the army commander and staff will be able to
accomplish their tasks successfully under these complicated
conditions, we must first of all ensure the rapid collection
of information on the situation. For this, specifically,
a single system must be worked out for notifying troops
about the radiation situation, using all the means of
reconnaissance, subunits and units of the chemical troops,
local organs of civil defense, and the network of the
hydro-meteorological service. We must also resolve the
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problems of organizing engineer reconnaissance and of the
regular notification of troops o the state of the highway
network. With this purpose, we should periodically publish
appropriate information bulletins and also implement current
information, even immediately after the first enemy strikes.
The direct organization of regrouping begins with the
receipt of the appropriate directive. If this directive
arrives at the army staff during the period of threat, it
may contain only the briefest instructions on which variant
of the regrouping plan to use for guidance. Sometimes
such a directive can be replaced by a `verbal order or even
by a simple signal. Under these conditions, the army
commander and headquarters should ensure that the regrouping
plan which was worked out earlier is put into practice.
It is another matter if the war begins suddenly or
if the period of threat is so short that the army has not
succeeded in beginning its regrouping before the beginning
of military operations. Under these conditions, abrupt
changes in the regrouping plan are possible, and in several
instances in the taskof the army as well, and this demands
a directive containing new and specific instructions, which
take these changes into account.
We think that a directive on regrouping should include
the following: the task and complement of the army; the
zone and time for beginning and ending the regrouping; the
probable targets, the area and orientation time for
committing the army to battle, and the means by which this
commitment should be carried out; the transportation means
assigned to the army for the regrouping; the procedure
by which the means of the senior level support the -forward-
.movementand the commitment of the army; and the latest
information on the state of the lines of communication in
the zone of the forward- movement. ,
In determining the regrouping zone for an army, one
should proceed on the basis of the particular conditions
of the situation. It is still a widely held view that
the regrouping zone is a zone of terrain within the bounds
of which the troops carry out their own -forward movement.
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Railroads on which troops are transported and airfields
and docks for loading and unloading in the regrouping
zone are therefore frequently not included.
We consider that such an approach is already out-
of-date. Rail, water, and air transportation can be
disrupted at any time by enemy action and the troops
will be forced to continue the movement under their
own power. To carry out the loading and unloading of
a large unit, armies must have priority in the use of
roads leading to the corresponding stations (airfields,
wharves, and ports). By a regrouping zone, therefore,
is meant that-'area _withtn_theT bounds of which the whole
complex of measures for the.-.loading, shifting, and
unloading of troops is being carried out or is planned
to be carried out, regardless of the means for their
movement.
As far as the required width for a regrouping zone
is concerned, this can vary considerably, depending on
the specific conditions. It seems to us that one should
not set any kind of norms here.
For example, in the Western Theater of Military
Operations, as calculations show, an army should be
assigned a zone of movement with a width of about
250 to 300 kms. In less developed theaters, when
serious obstacles exist on the roads on which the forward
movement will occur, the width of a regrouping zone is
considerably greater. Thus, in one of the games, an
army crossed a mountain ridge in a zone with a width of
about 1,000 kms; in another instance the sudden formation
of a broad flooded zone made it necessary to cut the
width of the zone of movement to about 500 kms.
Each time,a regrouping zone must be determined in
such a way that it includes all the lines of communication
and the stations (airfields and ports) for loading and
unloading which are needed under given conditions for
timely movement of the forces and means of the army
assigned primarily for operations in its first echelon.
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After receiving the directive, the commander and
headquarters of the army will, as a rule, have a limited
amount of time which, in a number of instances, is
reckoned in hours, to organize the regrouping. Under
these conditions, the success of operations will depend
largely on the correct sequence of the work.
Let us examine the method of work chosen by an army
commander at one of the command-staff exercises.
The commander began his work correctly by determining
first of all, on the basis of the nature of the task
which had been set, the complement of the army's first
echelon, which it was desirable to have for the commitment',
of the army to battle. It was precisely here that the
correlation between the regrouping and the forthcoming
task of the army was expressed, particularly since a
directive from a higher headquarters on the regrouping
will hardly give exhaustive instructions on this problem.
There was a case in a command military game in which the
task of an army was insufficiently considered in making
the decision on regrouping. The army was to be committed
to battle in the complex conditions of a mountainous region,
where the use of large tank masses was hampered. In spite
of this, in organizing the movement forward,the army commander
decided to include a tank division in the complement of
the first echelon. The result of this error was that the
army arrived in the complement of the front in a grouping
which did not correspond with the conditions of its
commitment. The tank division had to be replaced quickly
by a motorized rifle division from the complement of the
front's reserve, and this resulted in, loss of time and
made it difficult to fulfil the task set.
It should be borne in mind that the complement of
an army's first echelon (the number and type of divisions
which it contains) may be quite varied. However, experience
shows that, in all instances, the first elements to enter
the area of commitment must be the missile brigade, the
army antiairr_units, the forces and means of the command-
ant's service, several combined-arms large units with
the necessary means of reinforcement, the forces and
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means of army intelligence , and the minimum necessary 50X1-HUM
organs of the rear.
At one command-staff exercise the situation developed
in such a way that, after suffering defeat in a border
battle, the "enemy", using the remains of the armies of
the first echelon, went over to delaying operations and
simultaneously, from the depth, began a movement forward
by a strong grouping which was assigned to deliver a
powerful counterstrike. An army was sent to combat this
grouping.
An appreciation of the situation led to the conclusion
that the hostile grouping would enter the battle earlier
than the army. This made it necessary to create a strong
first echelon containing three of the four divisions of
the army, including one tank division.
One further example. At an exercise conducted in
the North Caucasus Military District in 1959, from the
beginning of the war an army moved forward to organize
the defense-of the sea coast, in anticipation of a landing
by a large hostile force. The road conditions were very
difficult. In this situation the army commander decided
to use the whole network of lines of communication for
the very rapid, top Priority transfer of two motorized
rifle divisions and missile units, which made it possible
to gain time and to create a defense on the most dangerous
sectors of the coast before the landing of the "enemy"
force.
The capacity and nature of the operational axis on
which an army will have to operate after being committed
to battle, and other factors, can also influence the
complement of the army's first echelon.
After having determined the complement of the first
echelon, the army commander planned the times for its
arrival in the commitment area, the volume of transport,
the methods of moving troops, and the means necessary
for this, Army headquarters prepared a chart on which
was shown the traffic capacity of the lines of communication
in the regrouping zone.
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bum-HUM
The capability of the lines of communication to move
troops must be calculated, taking into consideration
the existence of almost impassable sectors, i.e., areas
of terrain where the traffic capacity of the roads is
least. To these belong the various types of defile,
ridges and rivers crossing the zone of the forward
movement. As has already been stated, the enemy can
create "nuclear obstruction barriers".
At the exercise which was conducted, the army's
zone of forward movement was crossed by a river and by
a flooded area created by the "enemy". The river was
200 km from the permanent disposition area, and the
flooded area was 900 km away. The roads in the flooded
area had the lowest traffic capacity.
Thus, the zone of the army'sforward movement
consisted of three parts. In the first part of the zone
-- up to the river -- the traffic capacity of the roads
was highest. The time for transportation from the river
to the flooded area was determined by the traffic capacity
of the river (the existence of river crossings), and from
the flooded area to the area where the army was to be
committed to battle it was determined by the traffic
capacity of the roads in the flooded sector.
Clearly, the total traffic capacity of the roads
in the regrouping zone could not exceed the traffic
capacity of the least passable barrier line.
First of all, therefore the army commander planned
and organized the crossing of the flooded area by the
troops. Bearing in mind the volume-'for transportation
of the first echelon and the traffic capacity of the
roads in the flooded area, which proved to be insufficient,
the army commander decided to move one lightened motorized
rifle division to the commitment area by air, using the
resources of the military transport aviation which had
been assigned to the army. Thanks to this, the amount
of motor transport moving under its own power was re-
duced by approximately 1,500 vehicles each day. In
addition, it was decided to build one more river crossing
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50X1-HUM
in the flooded area, with army means, with a traffic
capacity of up to 1,300 vehicles each calendar day.
These measures turned out to be sufficient to ensure the
timely crossing of the flooded area by the army's first
echelon, even when several functioning river crossings
were put out of action.
In order to build a river crossing before the arrival
of the troops of the first echelon, the engineer units
of the army began to embark in railroad echelons early,
before completion of the organization of the regrouping.
After this, the army commander established the most
advisable sequence for the arrival of the forces and weapons
of the first echelon in the commitment area, their grouping,
and the disposition areas of individual large units and
units.
It was decided to carry out the movement of the forces
and means of the first echelon to the commitment area in
the following order: the forces and means of the army
intelligence ; the lightened motorized rifle division
which had been moved by air and which was used before
commitment to battle to clear the area of remaining
enemy groups and to ensure the safe deployment of the
missile units; road-engineer and position engineer units
and subunits brought in for the commandant's service;
weapons of the army antiair defense; the missile brigade;the
intelligence fo 'ces:andmeans of the first echelon divisions; anti--
aircraft missile units and missile battalions of these
divisions; antitank artillery units; the remaining forces
and means for reinforcement of the large units of the
first echelon; and the minimum necessary rear organs.
Such a sequence met the interests of the forthcoming
commitment of the army to battle to the greatest extent.
In accordance with this, the necessary time and order
for the troops of the first echelon to cross the flooded
area were determined, as well as the" arrangement of their
movement from this line to the commitment area. Here the
troops could move only under their own power because the
railroad bridges had been destroyed, and the short distance
between the flooded area and the commitment area made it
pointless to restore the railroad transport after the 50X1-HUM
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forced unloading. The routes for movement of the large
units of the army's first echelon under their own power
and the time for their arrival at their final destinations
were therefore planned.
After this, the army commander planned and organized
the crossing by the troops of the river which cut through
the regrouping zone; the river crossings and the order,
methods, and times for the troops to cross the river
were determined, and then the order in which they were
to move to the line of the flooded area , In this
sector, the troops were transported by railroad and moved
under their own power. The following were transported
by railroad: combat engineer units assigned to build
crossings on the line of the flooded area; a missile
brigade and a missile maintenance*battalion*;the heavy
materiel of two motorized rifle divisions and of one
tank division; and some other forces and means.
On the basis of the established procedure for cross-
ing a flooded area, primary and alternate areas for the
unloading of the materiel following by railroad were
assigned. These areas were planned close to the routes
along which the divisions were moving under their own
power, so that the heavy equipment could take its place
as quickly as possible in the marching columns.
Loading stations were assigned to some units in
the army's permanent disposition area and to others
after they had crossed the river, to which they had
been brought by motor transport. The reason for this
was that not more than 26 echelons could be allowed to
cross the river in a 24-hour period or, in the sector
between the river to the flooded area, up to 32 echelons
in a 24-hour period.
After the procedure for the troops to cross the
river had been determined, it also became possible to
plan the procedure for their forward'movement from
disposition areas to the river.
It was in this way that the regrouping of the troops
of the first echelon was organized. The work of organizing
*parkovyy divizion
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the regrouping of the remaining forces of the army was
conducted in-a similar manner.
Thus, in contrast to the past, when a regrouping
was usually planned for the whole depth of a movement
at once, in this exercise it was planned in phases.
Under modern conditions, when the process of regrouping
requires intensive participation by the forces and
weapons of an army to overcome several successive barmier
lines, but when the conditions of the forward movement
will differ for each phase, we consider that such a
planning procedure is the most advisable.
The army commander and headquarters were not
limited to a single variant in organizing the regrouping.
Bearing in mind the possibility that the outlined plan
of movement might be disrupted by enemy nuclear/missile
and aircraft strikes, they prepared one more variant
for operations in case all the forces and weapons of the
army moved under their own power. A procedure was also
worked out for shifting from one method of forward
m ovemerit to another.
When they were being moved by rail, the complement
of the echelons was constituted in such a way that the
subunits being transported had complete march and
combat independence. Keeping in mind the possibility
of a forced cessation of air transport, alternate areas
for the landing of aircraft were assigned, and a
procedure for the resumption of movement under heirown
power of the troops who had been transported by air.
Large units moving under their own power were assigned
routes (zones) of movement. One zone able to contain
a division was left as a reserve zone.
The course of the regrouping, which occurred under
constant "enemy" pressure, showed the advisability of
these measures.
As far as the speed and procedure for the movement
of troops under their own power are concerned, the
experience of exercises has led us to the following
conclusions.
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We must use all measures to ensure that troops are
moved with the maximum speed.
No matter how high the demands may be for speed in
regrouping, however, its conduct must not result in the
exhaustion of personnel or in putting combat equipment
out of action on a mass scale.
The length of a day's movement must not exceed 12
to 13 hours. In the middle of the movement there should
be a halt lasting up to 3 hours. With such a schedule
of movement, the extent of a day's movement across
average broken terrain may reach 350 km and more.
In the final phases of the march, the length of a
movement may be decreased because of the need to move
mainly at night and to conserve forces immediately before
committing them to battle.
The problems of support for a regrouping acquire
great significance under all conditions. Let us examine
some of them.
We consider that the present practice of constantly
accompanying troops moving forward with support means is
not in accordance with the concentrated nature of destruction
along lines of communication or with the increased capabilit-
ies of units and large urnts'toovercome obstacles independently,
and it does not favor the purposeful use of support forces
and means.
Support means, especially those under the authority
of senior levels, must be concentrated at a barrier line
before the approach of the troops and must support the
passage of troops across obstacles which have appeared,
and they must then move rapidly forward to the next line
in readiness to perform the same support measures. The
best roads must be allocated for the movement of support
forces and weapons in good time, and in some cases it may
be useful to make use of all or a part of the aviation
transport resources which have been assigned to the army. 50X1-HUM
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The protection of troops against enemy nuclear attack
while they are regrouping is achieved by their maximum
dispersion, by rapidly overcoming obstacles, and also by
reliable antiair defense, since aviation is still at present
the basic weapon for destroying moving targets.
At formation and loading sites, divisions must be
assigned several concentration areas, each with an area
of up to 600 km2. The mutual location of these areas
must make it impossible for them to be simultaneously
destroyed by a weapon with a yield of one megaton. There
must also be strict observance of the diagram for loading
and for an efficient commandant's service. Troops must
also be dispersed in the unloading areas,
In the movement of troops under their own power,
their dispersal is achieved by using the maximum number
of routes and by decreasing the length of columns in such
a way that each short column, following independently,
will not be a worthwhile target, and can at the same time
be dispersed quickly to the depth at a signal of the
danger of an enemy nuclear or air attack.
The method by which troops can overcome obstacles
during the progress of a regrouping is determined by the
nature of the latter, by the time needed to overcome them,
and by the requirements for the maintenance of the troops'
combat effectiveness.
As a rule, sectors of the terrain with high levels
of radiation should be bypassed. When this is impossible,
they should be crossed by a rapid forward movement along
the axes with the lowest level of contamination. In
some instances, it will be advisable to wait for a
decrease in dangerous levels of radiation.
In crossing zones with high levels of radiation
and other obstacles which have appeared during a forward
movement, it may be advisable to use aircraft, particularly
heavy helicopters, to set up temporary transfer areas.
That is how the problem was resolved at one command game
which was conducted. The situation developed in such a 50X1-HUM
way that while one of the divisions was crossing a
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mountain pass, the "enemy" delivered a ground nuclear
strike. The movement of the division stopped. Then, in
a short period of time,a temporary transfer area was
organized and two regiments of Mt-6s were allocated, which
carried the personnel and motor transport of two motorized
rifle regiments over the obstacle which had appeared.
The experience of exercises shows that it is necessary
to consider not only the contaminated sectors of the terrain,
bite also the general radioactive background in the zone
of the troops' movement. Here it should be borne in mind
that vast areas may be subject to high radioactive con-
tamination. According to preliminary calculations, in
crossing such areas the doses of radiation received by
the overwhelming majority of the personnel may approach
the maximum permissible. To prevent a decrease in the
combat effectiveness of troops under these conditions,
the time they spend in contaminated areas must be reduced
by increasing their speed of movement every possible way
and by decreasing the length of the rest period, and at
the stops they are forced to make, they should carry
out partial sanitary processing and decontamination.
An enemy nuclear attack during a regrouping may
result in stopping the movement of a certain-unit or
large unit or even in knocking it out of action completely.
The elimination of the consequences of these strikes will
be done primarily by the means of the troops which have
suffered the attack and of local military organs, and
in the vicinity of barrier lines, by the rescue means
(spasatelnoye sredstvo) of the special treatment posts
of the army which were deployed there earlier.
The antiair defense of an army which is moving
forward will be provided mainly by the antiair defense
troops of the country, and in a front zone by the forces
and means of the front's antiair defense and by the
organic antiair defense weapons of the army and of the
divisions.
The mass nature of regroupings being carried out
over a vast. area and at great distances, and the character-
istics of modern means of antiair defense make it inexpedient
50X1-HUM
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to cover each column individually. The main forces of
fighter aviation and of the antiair missile units must
be directed at covering troops in build-up areas and
areas of loading, reloading, and unloading and when
they cross the areas which are most dangerous for them.
From the very beginning of a regrouping, an army's anti-
aircraft missile regiment may be transferred by rail to
the area where the army is committed to battle or brought
in to cover the main grouping of troops while they are
crossing the main barrier lines. According to the
experience of exercises, this regiment is able to cover
river crossings (roads) in a zone of up to 80 to 90 km.
The warning of troops of an army about the air
enemy during a regrouping will be carried out from the
main posts of the formations of the antiair defense
troops of the country. The large units and units being
moved forward must be provided in advance with appropriate
radio operating data to receive this warning.
Skilful and timely maneuver by road, bridge-building,
repair- and-restoration, and evacuation units takes on
special significance during a regrouping. In all circum-
stances, efforts of these must be concentrated on ensuring
the passage of troops across those barrier areas where
the movement of the large units of the first echelon is
being most held up at a given moment.
The organization of troop control during a regrouping
must ensure the almost simultaneous accomplishment of
three basic tasks: direction of the completion of
mobilization and elimination of the consequences of the
enemy nuclear attack in the areas of permanent troop
disposition; control of the movement of large units and
units; and the organization of their commitment to battle.
Since these tasks must be accomplished in areas located
at a great distance from each other, there arises a
need for the creation of three control points (which we
shall provisionally call the Command Post, Alternate
Command Post, and the Rear Control Point).
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Each post must be capable of the independent resolution
of operational, rear, and technical problems. It is
therefore necessary for representatives of all the depart-
ments and services of an army to be in the complement of
those performing functions at the control points. This
problem is resolved in advance, even before the war begins.
points
during
a
ways.
At one
of
control
points
was
forward
movement,
echelon
was carried
out from the Command Post, which followed an independent
route, and that of the troops of the second echelon from
the Alternate Command Post. During this time, the generals
and officers of the Rear Control Point performed the work
of completing the mobilization of rear units and establish-
ments and also of organizing the turning in of .materiel
which the troops would not need in a combat situation.
There will also be special features in the control
of troops when an army is committed to battle. It must
be supposed that an army commander will receive the
front's directive to commit the army to battle at a time
when troops of the first echelon are at a distance of
.300 km and more from the commitment area. We think that
by this time the whole complement of the Command Post
headed by the army commander should already be in the
commitment area. This will make it possible to evaluate
the situation better, to make a decision, to plan the
operation in a short period of time, and to inform the
troops about the tasks in good time.
As regards the movement of control
regrouping, this can be done in various
the exercises, the sequence for moving
as follows. With the beginning of the
the control of the troops of the first
The Alternate Command Post must take on the direction
of the forward movement of the troops of the first echelon
during this time, and the control of the troops of the
second echelon may temporarily be entrusted to the Rear
Control Point.
To control the troops during the crossing of the
main barrier lines, the control points should be deployed
near these lines, and operational groups or responsible
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generals and officers from the complement of the
command and staff of the army should be sent to the principal
routes.
The experience of exercises has shown that existing
means of army communications do not ensure reliable troop
control during a regrouping from the depth of the country.
At the same time, a part of the civil centers and lines
of communication, may also be put out of action. The
situation will also be complicated by the need to observe
radio silence.
In order to ensure troop control under these conditionp,
it is necessary to assign a considerable amount of forces
and means for communications to an army by a special
order of the General Staff or of the front (border district).
In a number of cases the use of the railroad communications
network may prove effective. All means for permanent long-
distance communicationstust also be fully used.
The process of regrouping will necessitate frequent
changes in the methods, routes, and zones of troop move-
ment to avoid the obstacles which appear, To carry out
these changes successfully, constant reconnaissance of
the terrain and road network in the zone of the forward
movement and on the flanks, constant knowledge of the
situation, and systematic clarr ification of tasks to
the troops will be necessary.
The timely clarification of the procedure and times
of arrival of large units in the area where an army is
committed to battle has special significance. Here there
will have to be exceptional flexibility at all level's of
control, a very well organized commandant's service, and
efficient communications)so that the complex changes of
troop formation that sometimes become necessary can be
carried out without loss of time,
When necessary, we shall have to replace a unit which
has been put out of action with forces from the second
echelon, so that the arrival in the commitment area will
take place at the proper time and in the intended grouping. 50X1-HUM
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The experience of the command games and exercises
which have been held has led us to the conclusion that
firm and unbroken troop control during a regrouping is
possible only if the whole complement of an army's control
has developed practical skills for the independent and
rapid resolution of complex problems in a constantly
changing situation, given the large spatial scope of
operations.
The interests of a constant heightening of the read-
iness of our operational control organscall for continual
and persistent study of all sides of the regrouping of an
army over great distances under the difficult conditions
of the initial period of a war.
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