MILITARY THOUGHT : SOME PROBLEMS IN DESTROYING TARGETS WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS, BY CHIEF MARSHAL OF ARTILLERY S. VARENTSOV

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029600250001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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LIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
4 JUN 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . MILITARY THOUGHT TOP SECRET): Destroying Tariets with N)clear Warheads"
by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov
. 1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Militar Thought" Voyennaya Iysl~
Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributeddwnutoithedlevelhof
Army Commander.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among.
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
?
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
CSDB-3/60,234
Exelodid ten ntoma8e
dowPCradlo; lid
deeluslflratloe
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Ti. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
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CSDB-3/65o,234
COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT . MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): Targets with-Nu-clear Warheads" b ms in
Chief Marshal of Artiller y
y S. Varentsov
DATE OF INFO: October 1961
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary
SOURCE : A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled
"Some Problems in Destroying Targets with Nuclear Warheads", by
Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov.
This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special
version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya
Thought). This journal is published irre Mysl (Military
TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 FourthlIssue w ntstol ied
on 20 October 1961.
press
Headquarters Comment: "Military Thought" is published by the
USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED,
SECRET, and TOP: SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly
and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly.
By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during
1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is
also issued irregularly.
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CSDB-3/650,234
Some Problems in Destroying Targets with Nuclear Warheads
by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov
As is known, the use of nuclear weapons is making
fundamental changes in the quality of fire and is increasin
immeasurably the force of fire strikes against the enemy. g
The effectiveness of the destructive
weapons can be judged by the fact thatoitrisfsufficient nuclear
to deliver only two or three nuclear strikes with a yield
of 300 kt each to destroy an infantry or armored division
located in the concentration area.
The destructive effect of a nuclear weapon is greatly
increased through the use of surface nuclear bursts, which
result in an additional destruction of enemy strong radioactive contamination of the terrain following
the drift of the cloud formed by the burst. Thus, with
a surface nuclear burst with a yield of 300 kt and with
a wind speed of 20 kph, the burst itself will destroy
unprotected personnel in an area of 30 km2. the radioactive contamination of the terrain,Bhowever, one
hour aftr the burst the unprotected
of 80 km will receive a dose of radiaperso in an area
tionnof1200 roentgens.
Thus, the total area of destruction increases from 30 to
110 km
The significant radioactive contamination of terrain
created by surface bursts and by a wind favorable to us
permits a paralysis of enemy maneuver over a large area.
But, if careful consideration is not given to the force
and direction of the wind, then one can contaminate one's
own troops or lower their maneuverability with one's own
nuclear strikes. This considerationf must be kept in mind
when planning surface nuclear strikes.
The use of missiles as delivery vehicles for nuclear
charges has increased immeasurably the depth of
of fire on the enemy. There cannot be a sing the effect
le enemy
sobjectrikestive which can remain inaccessible to our nuclear
strikes.
The great range of fire of missiles makes it possible
to resolve the problem of fire maneuverability in a new
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CSDB-3/650,234
and more successful way than formerly operation. It is now possible to maneuverefiredontansuffi=
ciently broad scale and, thereb
quickly influence the course and~ouquite ,and'
tcomeeof ecombatyoperations.
By using missile units and large units of front and army
subordination to carry it out, maneuver by fire is possible
along the entire offensive zone of a front and aft army.
Furthermore, missile large units and units may be used
successfully to carry out missile/nuclear strikes not onl
in their zone but also in the zones of adjacent armies. y
weapoAslathe abovemme
ntioned qualities of missile/nuclear
to be used for primary ons
destroying the enemy and, first of all, formissi
missions of
destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack, his air-
craft on his airfields, his missile and nuclear warhead
depots, his control points, his first echelon troops and
his operational reserves in concentration areas, and in
unloading and other areas, as well as his most important
objectives of the rear.
If a count is made of the number of objectives in
the offensive zone of a front, the destruction of which
can be assigned to nuclear weapons, it would reveal that
they greatly exceed the possible allotment of nuclear
warheads for the operation. Table 1 shows the most
typical objectives-of an enemy field army, of which objectives can be assigned to nuclear arms ruction
In order to insure success in an offensive operation
when only a limited amount of nuclear warheads is available,
it is necessary to exercise great care in selecting the
objectives to be destroyed by nuclear weapons. They must '
truly be the most important objectives, the destruction
of which will result in achieving fire superiority over
the enemy, a sharp change in the relative strength of
forces in our favor, the loss of control by and, as a result, the creation of most favorableeconditions
for operations by tank motorized infantry and
large units and units in completing the total rout ofbthee
enemy. The first to be destroyed are the enemy's means
of nuclear attack, his main groupin includi those
occupying defensive positions inthe9tacticalnzone, hisroops
most important operational reserves, and his large control
points.
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CSDB-3/650,234
The experience of command-staff exercises and of
exercises with troops shows that the staffs, planning
missile/nuclear strikes, often fail to take intonconsideration
the nature of targets and the fire capabilities of missile
units and large units. The yields of nuclear charges
needed for the destruction of specific targets are estimated
by eye (na.glazok), without taking into account the actual
characteristics of the missiles or the nature of the
targets. Estimates of the expected result from each missile/
nuclear strike and of the possible enemy losses suffered
from a massed strike are not made. All this produces a
wasteful expenditure of powerful means of destruction and,
as a result, considerably reduces the fire effect upon the
enemy.
When planning missile/nuclear strikes, the combined-
arms staffs and the staffs of missile troops and
artillery of a front or army and, in.an tuber of cases, of a
corps and division., besides selecting objectives for
destruction, designating a missile unit or large unit to
carry out each fire mission, and resolving many other
problems, also have to select the yield of a nuclear
charge needed for the destruction of each target and
estimate the expected result of fire against each target
by charges of a given yield.
The destruction of each of the targets shown in
Table 1 calls for a nuclear charge of a definite yield.
The latter depends on the nature and size of the target,
the accuracy in preparation of fire, the effect of the
nuclear charge at the target, and the assumed value of
the index of fire effectiveness.
Accuracy in preparation of fire is the result of
the total effect of technical dispersion of a given
type of missile and of errors in the preparation of
fire data. It is defined as a mean error determined
from tables of fire or with the help of tables prepared
in advance.
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Table 1
The Most Typical Objectives for Destruction by
Nunn aar W------
Name of
a bjective
Missile
means of
nuclear
attack
Batteries
f
Materiel
50-150
203.2mm (Personnel in 4-10
howit
zers trenches
and 280mm
guns
Infantry
and tank same as
companies ;above
of the first
echelon of
divisions
Battle:
groups
and tank
battalions
of the
second
echelon of
divisions
Element-of.
I Distance from
be "destroyed I in+kmyu =ur'u,
;Personnel in
trenches and
tanks
Infantry
divisions of Exposed
second personnel
echelon of
army corps
(AK) and
field army
(PA) in areas
of concentra-
tion
10-30
Area of Approximate
objectives number in
in sq km (field army
12-25
1' 300 3
35 (92) *
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CSDB-3/650, 234
Armored
divisi
ons same as
of second above
echelon of
AK and PA
in areas of
concentration
60-200
Tank battal-I
ions of same as 25-70
Reserve of above
the High
Command (RGK)
in areas of
concentration
Command posts
of infantry Vehicles 8-170
divisions in shelters
(PD), AK, PAJ
and army group
Field air-
fields of Aircraft 20-400
tactical
aviation (TVA)
and company
airfields of
army aviatio
Control and I=
warning cente}'s-Radar in 30-300
and control shelters
centers for
aviation in
the sector
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Name of
F7 nmo...a. _-a "_+ ?"_??'? -----_
objective
Army
ooiective to
be destroyed
01
forward edge,'object ivelnumberiinte
in km in sq km Izone
supply
depots,
nuclear
warhead
supply
points,
and special
weapons
depots of
the forward
area.
"Nike"and
"Hawk" SAM
batteries
Light type
1 of blind-
I ages
Materiel
30-250
10 and more
'72
*Shown in parentheses is number of launching mounts:
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RET G0V'I vita
CSDB-3,650, 234
The effect of a nucle
ar burstt th
ae target depends
on the yield of the nuclear charge, the type (air or surface), and the degree of target p
of burst
The radius of the zone of destruction servesrasetheon.
characteristic of the effect of a nuclear bwrSt.
Numerical characteristics of
probabity of fire effectiveness and areusedlto helpcalled
estimate the possible results of fire.
a nuclear strike against enemy means of aIn ng out
rcarryyat ack,
or against other small-sized targets, the result of the
firing can be either full destruction (annihilation) or
non-destruction of the target. Consequently, a
probability destruction of the target may be assumed, andisassumed, to be the index of fire effectiveness.
In firing on collective targets (infantry company,
battle group, command
large areas, the results of fire maycvarycinyeachpindividua
case. In some cases the target may be annihilated completely,
and in other cases only partially destroyed, in which event
its combat effectiveness may be lost completely, partially,
or not at all. And, finally, the target may not be destroyed
&.t. all. Because of this, fire effectiveness against
collective targets is estimated not on the basis of
probability of destruction of the target, but on the basis
of the size of its smallest part to be destroyed with a
prescribed probability. In planning fire for annihilation,
the size of the smallest part of the target must be such
that as a result of its destruction the entire target loses
its combat effectiveness.
Used as supplementary indices of fire effectiveness
against collective targets are the mathematical expectancy
of the relative value '(percentage) of the destroyed the target and the largest possible 3' part of
destroyed part of the target. Percentage of the
The location, nature, and size of the target are
usually determined as a result of reconnaissance, but
the distribution of individual elements within the target
area is usually not known. Therefore, in computing indices
of fire effectiveness, it is assumed that individual elements
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234
,
of the target are evenly distributed over its. entire area.
Consequently, instead of determining the size of the smallest
part of the target, the size of the smallest part of the
target area covered by the zone of burst of a nuclear
charge with a given probability is determined. It is
considered that the percentage of the target area covered
by a nuclear burst zone equals the per
destroyed part of the target's elementsentage of the
When selecting the yield of a nuclear charge for a
single missile launching, as well as when determining the
expenditure of missiles for the destruction of targets
if the yield of one available charge
es be insuffici
it is necessary to know the value of thevfireoeffectivenessent,
index. The values of indices cannot be established on
the basis of theoretical considerations alone. Their
selection is based on combat operational experience and
on various economic, production, and technical considerations.
The accumulation of combat experience and the consideration
of changes in enemy troopd morale, arms, tactics, and
technical equipment, and in production and economic capabilities,
bring about changes in fire effectiveness requirements.
At the present time, when selecting
charges, the probability of destruction oflenemyomeanslofr
nuclear attack and of other small-sized targets is assumed
to be 90 percent. This means that, when firing against
such targets with charges of a selected
yi of 100 they will be annihilatedwhileindthenothera10s
they will not be destroyed.
When selecting yields of nuclear charges for the
annihilation of collective targets, the minimum size of
target area which, when destroyed, constitutes the
destruction of the entire target, is 40
the probability of destruction of at least 40nt+ percent
r
e
of the target area is assumed to be equal to 90 percen
This means that, when firing charges of a selected erciel.
d
on collective targets, in 90 cases out of 100, 40 e t
or more of the target area will be annihilate, whpile the other 10 cases less then 40 percent of the target area
will be destroyed. In the future the minimum part of the
target area with 90 percent destruction
be called the reliably destroyed area probability will
ploshchad) and will be designated So. (nadezhno porazhayemaya
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A S CRFT
IRONBARK
_~cessary yield of nuclear
CSDB-3/ 650, 234
The physical basis for the rules of selecting the
necessary yield of a nuclear charge for the destruction
of small-sized targets is shown in Sketch 1, and of
collective targets in Sketch 2.
Sketch 1
Ground zero of burst wil.
not be beyond the ercR ` this
circle, with probability of
P r 90%
Symbo' ,-.
enter of t3- t. p i i
en +.:r , T+'uci;"?, burst
of one of destruction
:I is determined by the
the rdi u.a of the zone
('?.~n " 3