MILITARY THOUGHT : THE PROBLEM OF COMBAT WITH THE NUCLEAR MEANS OF THE ENEMY AND ITS SOLUTION, BY CHIEF MARSHAL OF ARTILLERY S. VARENTSOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029600220001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Problem of Combat with the Nuclear Means
of the Enemy and Its Solution
by
Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov
Under today's conditions the strength of belligerents
must be assessed primarily in the light of their capabilities
and of their capacity for the employment of nuclear weapons.
In a modern operation the side which can win fire supremacy
over the enemy, primarily in nuclear weapons, will win.
The conduct of any operation, especially in the initial
period of a war, is inconceivable without reliable destruc-
tion of the nuclear means of the enemy.
The experience of exercises and of operational games
over the past two years shows that many generals and senior
officers still have an inadequate understanding of the com-
plexity of the problem of combat with the nuclear means of
the enemy and of the whole set of problems which must be
solved in order to reduce his ability to use these weapons
against our troops.
As is generally known, our probable enemy has a con-
siderable quantity of means of nuclear attack, such as
guided missiles and free rockets and atomic artillery and
aircraft which use nuclear ammunition. In the offensive
zone of a front there can be approximately the following
number of missile and artillery batteries, using nuclear
ammunition alone:
-batteries of 203 mm howitzer and 280 mm cannon,
batteries and battalions of "Honest John" and
battalions of "Little John" free'rockets (NURS)
and "Lacross-e" -- up to 170;
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-mounts for "Redstone" guided missiles (URS),
battalions of "Corporal" or "Sergeant" guided mis-
siles, detachments of "Matador" or "Mace" cruise-
missiles -- up to 20.
It is fully understandable that nuclear weapons must
be destroyed in the shortest possible periods, calculated
in minutes, after they have been detected in order to prevent
the enemy from delivering nuclear strikes. First of all, in
every case, the missile and artillery batteries using nuclear
ammunition, located at launch and firing sites, must be des-
troyed. In this process; primary attention should be given
to the destruction of batteries of long-range missiles such
as the "Redstone", "Corporal", "Sergeant" and "Pershing".
The range of these batteries permits the enemy to deliver
nuclear strikes against-our missile units and against the
disposition areas of combined-arms large units and command
posts and airfields.
Reconnaissance must be aimed first of all at providing
mensuration data (izmeritelnyye dannyy-e) on the enemy's missile
batteries, armed with "Redstone", "Corporal", "Sergeant" and
"Pershing" missiles. At the same time, the disposition of
the nuclear means of divisions deployed on the immediate
border during the initial period of a war or in direct
contact with our troops during the war must be reconnoitered.
As is generally known, our probable enemy imposes great
tasks on his aviation in the delivery of nuclear strikes
against our troops. To be specific, aviation may receive
60 to 70 percent of the total of the nuclear weapons allocated
for an operation. Consequently, the destruction of aircraft
on the airfields where they are based, is one of the most
important tasks in the combat with the nuclear means of the
enemy.
In the zone of a front there may be up to 40 or 50
airfields for the enemy's tactical aviation. Since these
will normally be reliably protected by a whole system of
antiair defense, the delivery of strikes against them will
be entrusted to the missile troops in the first instance.
50X1-HUM
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Not only the missile troops of a front but also those of the
High Command (Glavnoye Komandovaniye) will operate against
the airfields in the initial period of a war. To destroy
the aircraft of the enemy which use nuclear ammunition is,
figuratively, to tear the nuclear sword from his hands.
Together with the missile batteries and aviation, the
most important targets in the combat with the enemy's
nuclear means are the assembly. bases and depots for them.,
The main mass of nuclear ammunition, and, during initial
combat operations, up to 50 percent of the nuclear ammunition
which it is planned to use in the operation, may be located at
these points in the initial period of a war. The destruction
of the assembly bases and depots for nuclear ammunition is
also one of the most important tasks, not only of a front,
but also of the missile troops of the High Command. The
destruction of the assembly bases and depots for nuclear
ammunition in a theater of military operations radically
weakens the enemy in his use of nuclear weapons against
our troops. If the destruction of these targets is skilfully
organized, the enemy will be compelled not only to revise
(redistribute) but also materially to restrict his expendi-
ture of nuclear,weapons.
In order to be sure of weakening t he enemy in his use
of nuclear weapons against our troops, it is necessary to
devote most serious attention to the destruction of such
targets as command posts, control centers for reconnaissance
and artillery fire-directing aircraft and the enemy's radio-
technical means.
At command posts all the questions connected with the
combat use of nuclear weapons are worked out. Specifically,
the reconnaissance of targets is organized; plans are made
for the delivery of nuclear strikes, and for the direction of
missile units and aviation up to the issue of the necessary
commands for the delivery of nuclear strikes. Destruction
of the enemy's command posts therefore makes it possible to
resolve the main problem - the-substantial weakening of the
enemy in his organization of the use of nuclear weapons.
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In resolving the questions of combat with the enemy's
nuclear means, the destruction of his command posts must
be undertaken boldly and decisively, not only in the zone
of a front, but also throughout the whole theater of military
operations. It is desirable for the strikes against command
posts to take place during a massed strike, simultaneously
with strikes against the nuclear targets and the more impor-
tant groupings of the enemy.
The enemy's reconnaissance and artillery fire-directing
aircraft are the means which allow him to expose the grouping
of our troops, including the disposition areas of missile
units and subunits, and to obtain mensuration data on these
objectives in order to deliver nuclear strikes against them.
If we deprive the enemy of his reconnaissance and artillery
fire-directing aircraft, we will by so doing ensure the ful-
filment of the basic task of weakening the enemy in the
effective employment of nuclear weapons, since without air-
craft it will be extremely difficult for him to obtain the
necessary mensuration data on our objectives. Having been
deprived of reconnaissance and artillery fire-directing air-
craft, the enemy will be unable to make use of a considerable
number of his nuclear means with sufficient effectiveness.
This applies particularly to repeat (povtornyy) strikes,
before which combat reconnaissance (dorazvedka) must, without
fail, be conducted. Not having the capability to organize
combat reconnaissance, the enemy will deliver many strikes
inaccurately and against empty areas.
Enemy reconnaissance and artillery fire-directing air-
craft must be destroyed, primarily, by our nuclear strikes
against the airfields where they are based and the surviving
aircraft during the period of their combat activity, by the
means of the antiair defense.
The timely destruction of the main radio electronic
intelligence centers of the enemy is also of considerable
importance. The work of these centers can be made more dif-
ficult to some extent by the setting-up of various types of
interference.
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In this way, in order to weaken the enemy fundamentally
in his employment of nuclear weapons and in order to achieve
supremacy with them, reconnaissance must be purposefully
organized and mensuration data must be obtained on such
enemy objectives as:
-the launch sites of missile batteries;
-the firing positions of artillery batteries which
use nuclear ammunition;
-the base airfields of bomber and fighter-bomber
aircraft;
-the assembly bases and depots for nuclear ammunition.
In addition to these basic objectives, it is also
necessary to obtain mensuration data on the command posts
of groups of armies, field armies, army corps and divisions;
on aviation control centers; on base airfields for recon-
naissance and artillery fire-direction aircraft and on the
main centers of radio electronic intelligence.
In the initial period of a war the task of destroying
the enemy's nuclear means must be performed by the first
massed strike, before the ground forces of the front go
over to the offensive, often against previously recon-
noitered objectives; under these conditions prior recon-
naissance of the main nuclear objectives may take place
only with the permission of the commander of the troops
of the front, depending on the number of aircraft which
are determined to be available to fly over the border in
the course of 24 hours.
In the course of a war, the task of destroying nuclear
means should be completely performed by a massed strike at
the beginning of an offensive operation by a front and
then, as they are exposed and as mensuration data, 'are
received, by single, or if necessary, by grouped nuclear
strikes. During the "pauses" between operations (if
these occur) enemy nuclear objectives must be destroyed
as they are exposed, by single, or if necessary, by grouped
nuclear strikes. 50X1-HUM
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One of the most important tasks in the period of prepara-
tion for an offensive operation is not to allow the enemy to
carry out a nuclear strike on the main grouping of the troops
of a front, in order to break up our offensive. If it be-
comes positively known that the enemy is preparing and will
try to deliver such a strike, it will be necessary to fore-
stall it and, with a massed nuclear strike of our own, to
destroy as great a number as possible of the above-men-
tioned objectives. In order to perform this task, in-accor-
dance with their deployment, missile units must immediately
prepare for strikes against nuclear and then against other
objectives on which the enemy's capability to organize the
use of nuclear weapons depends.
In defense, in order to break up an enemy offensive,
it is also necessary to plan a massed nuclear strike directed
primarily against the nuclear means, command posts and main
groupings of the enemy's troops. Such a massed strike, suc-
cessfully executed and supplemented by new strikes against
the enemy troops (if this is necessary), will allow a transi-
tion from the defensive to the offensive.
From what has been said, it is evident that in organizing
combat with the nuclear means of the enemy, we cannot be
restricted to reconnaissance and to the destruction of
subunits which are immediately capable of using nuclear
weapons. The task of the struggle for nuclear supremacy is
considerably greater. It must include combat with the whole
complex of forces and means, which the enemy makes use of
in employing nuclear weapons.
To perform, this task it is necessary to establish an
orderly and all-embracing system, in which will be included
all the forces and means necessary for reconnaissance and
destruction, a well-organized rear area and, lastly, precise
control.
Let us first examine the means of destruction which
can be used to weaken the enemy, in the nuclear sense.
These are, above all others, nuclear missile weapons, which
have great range coverage (diapazon dalnosti) and vast 50X1-HUM
destructive capability.
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The principal tasks in combating the nuclear means
of the enemy will be accomplished by missile large units
and units of the ground forces - missile large units and
operational-tactical units and independent (otdelnyy)
battalions of tactical missiles.
At present missile large units and tactical opera-
tional missile units are organizationally presented as
army and front missile brigades and as independent missile
battalions attached to fronts for reinforcement. In
addition, for combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons, the
battalions of tactical missiles of the motorized rifle and
tank divisions, can be used in an army. Thus, a front has
missile weapons capable of combating the enemy's nuclear
means, disposed within the limits of both the tactical and
the operational depth.
In case of need, missile large units and units of the
missile troops of the High Command may also be called in
to combat the enemy's nuclear means on behalf of a front.
They will be used for the destruction of the main enemy
nuclear objectives, which are unattainable for the missile
troops of the front or for the front's aviation. To such
objectives belong the assembly bases and depots, the
launch sites of long-range ballistic missiles, communications
centers, airfields, ports, loading and unloading stations
and the sites of cruise missiles which have great range of
action.
The characteristics of means of combat, besides the
range of fire, are the time needed to prepare for the
delivery of a strike after receipt of the command, the
accuracy of fire and the yield of the nuclear warhead.
The time taken to prepare the missile for launching has
particular significance in the destruction of the enemy's
nuclear weapons at their sites. After a target has been
detected at a site, it is necessary to destroy it as
quickly as possible, in order to forestall. the enemy in
the delivery of a strike. Here we must bear in mind that
the enemy's nuclear means will be at their sites for a very
limited time before delivery of the strike. Thus, for
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example, a battery of "Honest John" or "Lacrosse" requires
not more than 30 minutes to occupy a position and to
prepare to open fire, a battery of "Sergeant", up to one
hour. It is true that, when detected, these weapons may 50X1-HUM
be at varying degrees of readiness to deliver a strike;
and if we take their readiness as 50 percent, we will
have an average of 15 minutes to destroy tactical missiles
and atomic artillery and 30 minutes to destroy operational
tactical missiles.
In defining the time for the delivery of strikes
against the enemy's nuclear weapons one must also consider
the reliability with which they can be destroyed. This
must be not less than 90 percent. In order that this
reliability can be ensured, the above-mentioned period will
shorten still further; for tactical weapons from 2 to 9
minutes and for operational-tactical weapons, from 10 to
25 minutes. During this period, the reconnaissance data
must be received and processed, a decision must be taken
and relayed to the firing subunits and the latter must be
prepared for the delivery of a strike or for opening fire.
As the experience of exercises has shown, a large
proportion of this period is spent in the receipt and pro-
cessing of reconnaissance data, since they pass through
many departments, and also in the making of a decision and
in relaying it to subunits. Thus, for example, on a series
of exercises, up to 40 to 50 minutes were spent in the
making of a decision and in allocating a strike mission
against the enemy's nuclear means.
The periods taken to prepare subunits for the delivery
of a strike or for opening fire are at present shortened
to the utmost and are limited only by the technical capa-
bilities of the firing means. At the present time duty
(dezhurnyy) missile subunits of army and front missile
brigades can be ready to launch a missile within 15 to
20 minutes of the receipt of the coordinates of a target,
and subunits of tactical missiles within 8 to 10 minutes.
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The accuracy of fire of the missiles must be suffi-
ciently high, or alternately must be compensated for by
greater yield in the nuclear charges.
According to all the indications which have been
examined, the existing types of missiles of the ground
troops are fully suitable for combat with the enemy's
nuclear means. In the table which is shown below, the
characteristics of enemy objectives are given, and the
approximate yield of the nuclear charges, which can be
used in operational-tactical and tactical missiles-is
indicated.
From analysis of the table it is clear that the
missile units of the ground troops can successfully combat
all the troop obje?ctives of the enemy which are connected
with the employment of nuclear weapons. In accordance
with the yield of the nuclear warhead used to destroy one
objective or another, the problem of destroying either
both materiel and personnel or only the personnel and some
of the equipment can be resolved.
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u
Battery of 203m
howitzers on site
1
4to8
Battery of 280mm cannon on sitei
2to4
8 to 10
Battery of "Foneat John",
1
4 to 12
Battalion of "Honest John"
free rockets ("IAcrosse"
guided missiles) on 1-nnch4te
1 to 5
4 to to
Battalion of "Honest John"
("lacrosse"), in concentration
area
8 to 9
Battalion of "Corporal",
9 to 12
guided missiles, in
concentration area
Individual "Corporal" mount
on site
Individual "Redstone" guided
missile mount, on site
"Redstone" artillery tech-
nical and engineer companies
Detachment of "Mitador",
("Mace") cruise missiles on
launching platform
Preparatory zone for a group
of cruise missiles
Tactical aviation airfield
Airfield for artillery-fire-
direction std rec onIai ::arce air raft
Command post of o group of
armies, field army
Command post of an army corps
(eK - armeyskiy krrpus)
Aviation control and guidance
center
Center for control of aviation
it, a sector
Element of the c 0
target which is u nw ~,
to he destroyed x e
5
Personnel in up to 10
Personnel. in up to 10
trenches
Unprotected
personnel
Materiel
upto2
up to 15
Unprotected ( 5 to 10
personnel }
up to 25
up to ?_0
Unprotected up to 25
personnel up to 20
30 to 60
65 to 90
70 to 100
Unprotected per- ,
sonnel and equilnent'
120 to 150
120 to 150
Unprotected
personnel ,
4 to 8
130 to 160
Materiel
`
t
36
150 to 400
Aircraft
30 to 150
25 to 55
30 to 150
25 to 55
8 to 25
7 to 10
R-30
R-30
R-30
R-170
R-300
R-170
B-300
R-170
R-300
R-170
R-300
R-170
R-300
R-170
R-300
up to 25 R-170
up to 20 R-300
up to 50 R-170
up to 25 R-300
`t
up to 15 R-300
8 to 15
1 to 5
R-170
1 tot
R-300
Radio stations
50 to 100
R-170
and shelters
5o to 60
R-300
3to4
15 to 50
Radio stations 1
14 to 60
R-170
10 to 20
R-300
1 to 2
10 to 20
Armored ervnsport
5 to 10
R-30
i
15 to 60
R-170
2
30 to 50
15 to 60
R- 17)
10 to 20
R-300
15 to (:J
R-1f0
10 to 20
R-300
Nuclear aneuni- 1300 and mates R-170
tion in shel- 1280 to 600 R-300
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The proper selection of the element of a target which
is to be destroyed is of very great significance. For
example, the combat formation of a group of "Redstone"
guided missiles consists of the firing positions of the launch
batteries and of the disposition areas of the fire control
point, of headquarters, engineer and technical artillery
companies, at distances of 4 to 13 km from one another. The
launching mounts on the launch sites and the engineer and
technical artillery companies can serve as independent objec-
tives for destruction. At the different periods of their
combat operations one of these objectives will assume the
greatest importance and if reconnaissance provides the neces-
sary data, the point of aim for the strike must be set there.
Otherwise, we will be compelled to deliver a strike against
all the objectives which have been exposed.
A group of "Matador", ("Mace") cruise-missiles are
disposed in two areas, preparatory and launching, separated
by a distance of 6 to 7 km. As a whole, a group of cruise?
missiles constitutes four separate objectives for destruction.
A tactical aviation airfield (one squadron on the air-
field) may occupy an area of 30 to 50 km2. However, the
aircraft on their hardstands, the fuel and munition depots,
or the control points, disposed over considerably smaller
areas, may be selected for destruction.
Supply points and depots for special types of weapons,
depending on their significance, (points in corps rear areas,
army depots, depots in the forward area or base depots in the
administrative zone) may have between 5 to 6 and 12 to 18
separate storage places, disposed in separate groups (of 2
to 3 storage places) at distances of 6 to 7 km from one
another. For the destruction of a whole point or depot,
as many nuclear warheads as there are separate groups of
storage places exposed by reconnaissance will be needed.
In delivering nuclear strikes against objectives it is
necessary to select the type and height of the nuclear burst
properly. Air bursts will be those most frequently produced*,
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aithough or the destruction of a series of objectives, es-
pecially of those which are deeply disposed, ground bursts
may be more effective, providing greater destruction of try
enemy by the generation of high levels of radioactive con-50X1-HUM
tamination of the area.
For the destruction of the enemy's nuclear means in
operational and tactical depth, operational-tactical and
tactical missiles with chemical filler ( v khimicheskom
snaryazhenii) may be used; but in this case, as in the case
of nuclear ground bursts, the possible direction of the wind
in the target area must be considered. To destroy 75 to 80
percent of the personnel of a battalion (battery) of "Honest
John" -rockets, of 203 mm howitzers or of 280 mm cannon,
firing at a minimum distance, two, and at a maximum distance,
three of four tactical missiles with chemical fillers will
be required.
Artillery is sufficiently effective for combat with
the enemy's tactical nuclear means, especially long-range
gun artillery. The ability of artillery to open highly
accurate fire quickly permits it to be considered at present
as one of the important means of combat with the 203 mm
howitzers, 280 mm cannon, "Honest John", and "Lacrosse"
missiles on their firing positions and also as a means for
the destruction of their observation and command posts and
radar station sites.
The main quantity of the enemy's nuclear means, as is
generally known, is located within the limits of the tac-
tical depth, at a distance of 5 to 30 km, from the forward
edge (perednyy kray). As a result, the main burden of
combat with them falls upon the missile battalions and divi-
sional artillery and also upon the army missile units.
The enemy's tactical means for nuclear attack, located
at positions within the range of tube artillery, may be destroyed
by the fire of the latter. The expenditure of shells will
depend on the dimensions of the target, the range of fire,
the method of determining coordinates, and the method of
preparing data for firing. With the greatest accuracy of
fire preparation, an "Honest John" or Lacrosse" battery ca50X1-HUM
be destroyed by a battalion within 5 to 15 minutes, with an
expenditure of 150 to 400 missiles.
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The effectiveness of destruction is increased if
chemical warheads are used. In such a case the expenditure
of shells can be less. However, for this it is necessary
that the fire against the enemy is carried out unexpectedly
and that he is not able to take advantage of antichemical
installations or of other means of defense. 50X1-HUM
In destroying the nuclear means of the enemy, tube
artillery must bring fire to bear not only on the firing or
launch sites but also on the fire control points of these
subunits. For example, the fire of tube artillery against
the radar guidance station of a battalion of "Lacrosse"
disposed at a distance of 1 to 2 km from the forward edge
can knock the battalion out of action for a prolonged
period. Thus, tube artillery must take its position in
the overall system of combat with the nuclear means of
the enemy. In our opinion, it is necessary to have more
long-range gunrr artillery in an army.
One must keep in mind that, at present, only missile
units and artillery are capable of destroying the enemy's
missile mounts and artillery weapons in timely fashion at
their launch sites or firing positions before they deliver
strikes against our troops, that is, in the course of
several minutes.
Besides this, it is clear that the existing periods
for the preparation of the weapons of nuclear attack of the
enemy will not remain the same for any length of time; they
have a constant tendency to become shorter, in accordance
with the assimilation of missile equipment and with the
introduction into the latter of electronic instruments for
the checkout and preparation of missiles for launching.
Therefore, bearing in mind that a considerable number
of the enemy's nuclear weapons will be located on launch
sites or firing positions during the course of an operation,
we must have a system for combat with them which can ensure
their destruction within the very shortest periods.
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The methods for the organization of control and the
views on the employment of missiles and artillery for the
destruction of nuclear means, which exist at present, do
not correspond in any degree with present requirements.
For example, for the destruction of a "Corporal" guided 50X1-HUM
missile, detected on its site, we must open fire within
10 to 25 minutes from the moment of its detection; but on
some exercises up to 11 hours and more were required for
this. An analysis of the organization of similar strikes
in a series of exercises shows that a great portion of this
excessively long time is taken up with tIansmissionand analy-
sis of reconnaissance data, with preparation and with the
making of a decision in the staff of a front or an army.
The only proper path, along which we must go, is that
of a decisive examination of views on the organization of
the combat with nuclear means.
First of all, clearly, a definite minumum of nuclear
warheads must be specially designated from the total number
allotted for an ope ration for combat with the nuclear weapons
of the enemy. This fundamental decision is made by the com-
mander of the troops of a front (army) while nuclear warheads
are being distributed in accordance with the tasks of an
operation and by armies.
A decisive simplification of the whole structural
scheme for the control of nuclear/missile weapons in the
combat with the nuclear means of the enemy is also needed,
eliminating a series of levels, and, as a result, considerably
shortening the time for the preparation of the means of des-
truction for the delivery of strikes. It seems to us that
the responsibility for the employment of missile units and
artillery in combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons should
be entrusted entirely to the commander of missile troops
and artillery. This suggestion is also substantiated by
the experience of exercises.
Arising from the need for the rapid destruction of
enemy nuclear means which have been detected, we consider
that the commander of the missile troops and artillery must
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be given the right to make independent decisions on the
delivery of nuclear strikes against the nuclear means of 50X1-HUM
attack of the enemy, with the limit set by the commander
of the troops of a front (army) for the destruction of the
enemy's nuclear means.
Besides the means of destruction, the commander
of the missile troops and artillery of a front (army) and
the commander of the artillery of a division should have
the necessary reconnaissance means to obtain the coordinates
of targets and also to conduct combat reconnaissance of the
enemy's nuclear means and a check on the results of fire.
In accordance with this, clearly, it is necessary to make
definite changes in the organizational and organic structure
of missile and artillery units of artillery reconnaissance
units and of subunits at divisional army and front levels.
To conduct reconnaissance of the nuclear means of the
enemy, the commander of the artillery of a division must
have pilotless means of reconnaissance - not less than
two flights (zveno) of artillery-fire-direction helicopters
(vertolet':-korrektirovshchik) and also subunits for sound-
ranging (zvukovoy) and radar reconnaissance and subunits
for reconnaissance of the enemy's radar. In the future, a
division will also require light air-reconnaissance aircraft.
Divisional artillery must have not only howitzer artillery
but also the necessary quantity of long-range rgun,.,:, artil-
lery. Given such means of reconnaissance and destruction,
the division will be able to combat the enemy's tactical
nuclear means successfully.
With their own means, an army and a front will combat
the nuclear means of the enemy disposed in the operational
depth. To these belong "Corporal", "Sergeant" and "Redstone"
guided missile battalions, detachments of "Matador" and
"Mace" cruise missiles, depots and supply points for special
types of weapons, airfields and command posts. In case of
necessity front and army means will also supplement the
means of divisions.
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For the support of army missiles, in an army, besides
the ground means of reconnaissance, there should be means
for air reconnaissance, including aircraft, helicopters
and pilotless means. In a front, in addition to recon-
naissance and artillery-fire-direction aircraft, it is
necessary to have pilotless means of reconnaissance. 50X1-HUM
The need for specially trained air reconnaissance
subunits under (v rukakh .) the commander of the missile
troops and artillery of a front (army), with apparatus
for the determination of the coordinates of targets, is
confirmed by the experience of exercises. On one of these,
for example, 66 objectives were reconnoitered by the forces
of a front; but their coordinates, which only artillery-
fire-direction aircraft could provide, were determined for
only 16 objectives.
For a fundamental solution of the questions of combat
with the nuclear means of the enemy, it is necessary to
provide the commanders of missile troops and artillery of
a front and an army and also the divisional level with
reliable means for reconnaissance and destruction. We
should note, incidentally, that during World War II all
the necessary means for reconnaissance and destruction
were under the orders of the artillery commander and that,
thanks to this, counter-battery combat was of a continuous
nature.
As has been pointed out above, various forces and means,
from the complement of all arms of troops, will be brought in
to the combat with the nuclear means of the enemy. The
effective use of all these means is inconceivable without
well-organized, operational and efficiently functioning control
at all levels, beginning from the planning and ending with the
actual assignment of missions to the means of reconnaissance
and destruction, and also checking on their timely completion.
The responsibility for organizing combat with nuclear means
rests with the commander of the troops of a front (army), and
the commander of a division.
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 a rv i ui inn
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Control of the means of destruction in a front or in an
army is carried out in accordance with the plan of combat
against the enemy's nuclear weapons. This plan is worked out
under the direction of the chief of staff of the front (army)
by the operations and reconnaissance directorates (depart-
ments), together with the staffs of the missile troops and
artillery and of the air army. In the plan the following
questions should be reflected:
-the grouping of the enemy troops, especially of his
nuclear means;
-the limit of ammunition with nuclear, chemical and
conventional fillers planned for use in combat with
the enemy's nuclear means and their distribution by
tasks (days) of an operation and by armies;
-the limit of the flying resources of the aviation
and their distribution;
-the position of the reconnaissance units and sub-
units and of the means of destruction brought in
for combat with the enemy's nuclear means;
-tarsks of the combat with the enemy's nuclear means
which are entrusted to a front, to an army and to a
division;
-the distribution of these tasks between the different
means for reconnaissance and destruction;
-the arrangement for the movement of means during the
course of the operation;
-the tasks of the combined arms (especially tank)
large units and formations in the destruction of the
means of nuclear attack and in the disruption of the
basing of nuclear weapons along the axis of the main
strike;
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 cnYi _i-ii inn
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-the organization of control of the means which have
been brought in (the organization of communications,
signals, call signs,etc).
The plan may be represented graphically on a map or
written.
It is quite clear that combat with the enemy's nuclear
means must be waged continuously both in the preparatory
period of an operation, and while it is being conducted.
However, the most vigorous operations of the main mass of
means for reconnaissance and destruction, will clearly be
timed for certain moments of the operation, when the most
crucial tasks are being performed, such as the commitment
to battle of the second echelons, the repulse of counter-
attacks, the forcing of water obstacles etc.
The plan for radio counter-measures evolved by the
operations. directorate should be drawn up with regard to
the requirements for combat with the enemy's nuclear means.
Support for this combat must be planned and carried out in
the first instance.
The movement of the whole complex of means during the
course of an operation must be planned on such a basis as to
ensure the constant readiness of the latter to perform tasks
at any time of the day or night and under any circumstances.
The commander of the missile troops and artillery of a
front must be the principal organizer of the employment of
the missile troops of the front in combat with the enemy's
nuclear means. On the basis of the plan drawn up by the
staff of the front, he, with his staff, works -out, ' all
the questions connected with the organization of the combat
of the front's missile troops with the enemy's nuclear means,
reflecting them in an appropriate plan.
The role of the commander and staff of the missile troops
and artillery in the planning and organization of the opera-
tions of duty missile subunits, whose basic function is the
destruction of the enemy's nuclear means, is especially in50X1-HUM
portant. As is generally known, the duty missile batteries,
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which are on launch sites, in a state of readiness to
deliver a strike in relatively short periods, namely the
duty batteries under the command of the commander of
missile troops and artillery, are the means with whose
help the latter can most quickly deliver strikes against
objectives which have been exposed.
In planning the operations of the duty batteries, the
commander of the missile troops and artillery of a front
(army) determines their number, the units and subunits,
from which they should be detached, the number of nuclear
warheads, and the procedure for their preparation and supply
the organization of communications,etc.
The commander of the artillery of aldivision must plan,
in detail, the use of a battalion of tactical missiles and
tube artillery, bothc: for combat with the enemy's tactical
nuclear weapons, and for combat with his artillery as a whole.
At the present time, when an army operates in a wide zone
and its divisions carry on combat operations at a considerable
distance from one another, combat with tactical nuclear means
and artillery can most successfully be performed only in the
divisions. This is why a division must be provided with a
sufficient quantity of artillery, especially with long-range
artillery, and also with reconnaissance meeans, which were dis-
cussed above.
An army and a front3with the missile units, as we already
said, will carry on the combat with the enemy's nuclear means
which are disposed in the rear and will also supplement the
fire of battalions of tactical missiles and of divisional
artillery against tactical weapons. In conformity with this,
the functions of the commanders of the missile troops and
artillery of a front and of an army and of the commander of
the artillery of a division are determined. They, must re-
spond operationally exclusively to the incoming data on enemy
nuclear means which have been exposed, make decisions and
quickly give the necessary commands to open fire.
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The system for the control of the means of reconnaissance,
of the missile troops and artillery, under the commander of
missile troops and artillery must be similar to the control
systems set up in the anti-a.ir defense troops.
At the command posts of the commanders of missile troops
and artillery, reconnaissance data should be quickly plotted
on a fire control map or on an appropriate artillery board
and the command to open fire should be transmitted auto-
matically, spending only several seconds in all on this.
The command posts of commanders of missile troops and
artillery of missile brigades, battalions and batteries
should be equipped with electronic computers and with different
calculators and the means of communications between them must
provide dependable, fast and enciphered transmission of infor-
mation and commands. Unfortunately, for the moment there are no
such means.
In order to be ready to carry out the tasks of combat
with the enemy's nuclear means, already, today, the staffs of
the commanders of missile troops and artillery must be in a
position to set up two fire control groups, with a number of
well-prepared and trained officers. Control groups should
be supplied with well-equipped mobile command posts, provided
with all the necessary instruments, appliances, selective
communications and other means of light automation.
In order that the appropriate instructions and commands
for the destruction of objectives may pass without obstruction,
it is essential that a special channel of communications
should be allocated between staffs of a front, an army, and a
division, and also that measures necessary for the granting of
special priorities in the use of all lines of communications
should be envisaged, up to the automatic disconnection of any
subscribers and the clearing of a channel of communications
for the time of the transmission of a command. Channels of
communications must be dependably paralleled by different
means of communications assigned for the direction of the
fire of the missile troops of a front, an army, and a division.
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It is necessary to determine in detail the operating
procedure at all levels of the system for control of the
means of combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons, for the
maintenance of commands (instructions) for appropriate
documentation etc, and to improve this system daily, as is
done in the fire control of the missile troops and artillery.
At the present time an unceasing struggle is being
waged in the missile troops and artillery to shorten the
time for the preparation of nuclear strikes along the whole
chain - from the commander of the missile troops of a front
to the launch sites. Work on the shortening of time is
carried on in all branches (napravleniye), the implementation
of a series of technical decisions, the training of the per-
sonnel of staffs at all levels by systematic instruction,
an increase in efficiency within each staff, especially among army
generals and officers who are being brought directly to the
control of fire; the equipment of working areas and of the
personnel of control groups with different instruments and
appliances; the setting up of special control machines; the
introduction of selective communications; the use of accur-
ate, brief, laconic commands and instructions wirt,h the use
of codes which are simple to use but sufficiently reliable.
The work which has been done has already yielded positive
results. Thus, on one of the exercises, from the moment
when the task of delivering a nuclear strike was received
by the commander of the missile troops and artillery of a
front (army), to the launch of a missile, from 20 to 30 minutes
were used, which included the preparation of the missile fbr
firing.
However, at present, a shortening of time has been
achieved in only one portion of the whole system of control.
Unfortunately, 2 to 3 times as long was used for its other
portion -- from the moment of detection of the target by
reconnaissance to the making of a decision by the commander
of the troops of a front (army).
Consequently, it is necessary to turn our attention to
coordination of the whole system of control beginning from
the staff of a front (army) and ending with the immediate' :ex-
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ecutors. An assessment of the operation of this system
must be considered as an important element in the overall
assessment of the training of the staffs of fronts, armies
and divisions. It would be quite reasonable, in the near
future, to develop a special manual or instruction on the
operation of this system and a special complex of typical
missions to test the ability of staffs to carry out effec-
tive combat with the enemy's nuclear means.
Such, in the main, are the problems of the organization
of combat with nuclear means which, in our opinion, must be
resolved by the missile troops and artillery.
We also consider it necessary to dwell briefly on the
problems of other arms of troops in combat with nuclear
means, since the missile troops and artillery carry on this
combat in close coordination with them, in the first place
with aviation, and with the tank and airborne troops.
An important role in the combat with the enemy's nuclear
means. must be played by aircraft, whose advantage lies in
its ability to carry on the struggle with nuclear means which
are on the move most effectively. In the course of an oper-
ation, the enemy's nuclear means, like our missile units and
subunits, will be on the move for 30 to 50 percent of the
time, not only at night, but also in the daytime, when air-
craft can operate most successfully. Furthermore, it is
necessary to bear in mind, that during a period of movement
the enemy's nuclear means can be detected considerably more
quickly than they can in well-camouflaged siting areas or
build-up areas. In these periods, aviation must display its
maximum powers in the combat with the enemy's nuclear means.
The weaknesses of aviation are its dependence on
meteorological conditions and its vulnerability to the enemy's
antiair defenses. With proper organizational coordination
between missile troops and aviation, one can use the ad-
vantages of each of these means, taking account of and'mini-
mizing their shortcomings..
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 tinx1_NiiM
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The antiair defense troops of the ground troops
should also be used in the overall system of combat
with nuclear means. First of all, they can destroy
the aircraft of the enemy's reconnaissance aviation.
The main task of the antiair defense troops will be
the destruction of delivery aircraft for nuclear bombs
and cru .lsd.-missiles . The question of the development
of complexes which would be able to carry on the com-
bat with the enemy's missiles in their flight trajectory
already exists. These complexes are an important means
for combat with the en(emy's nuclear weapons.
Besides the missile troops, artillery, aviation.,
and antiair defense troops, other forces and means
which are under the orders of a front and an army,
-tank and airborne troops, diversionary-reconnaissance
groups and radio-technical means - should be drawn into
the combat with the enemy's nuclear means.
The experience of the Second World War shows that
during actions in the operational areas tank troops
frequently destroyed the enemy's artillery on the march or
in build-up areas, seized or destroyed munitions depots,
etc. In a modern war there will be considerably more op-
portunities for actions by tank troops in the enemy's
operational rear. In all cases, one of the missions of the
tank troops should be the destruction of the enemy's nuclear
means.
In the course of combat operations, tank troops may
carry on the fight with atomic artillery, guided missiles,
and free rockets at sites, in build-up areas and on the
march, destroying both personnel and materiel in the pro-
cess. Operating in the operational rear?tanks are also
capable of disrupting the support system of special types
of weapons, of destroying depots, command posts and others.
For combat with the enemy's nuclear means it is also
necessary to use airborne troops. Surely, in a modern
operation, together with the seizure of individual areas
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or bases of operations, a no less important task will 50X1-HUM
very likely be the seizure and destruction of the enemy
nuclear means, particularly of depots for special types
of armament, of subunits of "Redstone", "Sergeant" and
"Corporal" guided missiles, and others. In the planning
of an operation, the actions by airborne troops, assigned
to combat with the enemy's nuclear means, should be in-
tegrated with the operations of other means of destruction
and in the first instance, with the operations of the
missile troops',of aviation and of tanks.
The operations of diversionary-reconnaissance groups
can be of definite significance in the combat with the
enemy's nuclear means. These groups can operate with
particular success along the routes for the supply of
missiles and nuclear-charges from depots and assembly bases
to units and subunits. Operating from ambush or making
raids on the transports carrying missiles or nuclear
charges, diversionary-reconnaissance groups can inflict con-
siderable damage. An attack by diversionary-reconnaissance
groups on a position of the enemy's nuclear means, is also
entirely feasible. Here it is expedient to attack the most
vuLnterable elements of a combat formation, on which the com-
bat effectiveness of the whole unit or subunit is dependent.
For example, in a "Corporal" battery, it is sufficient to
knock the radar guidance. station out of action,and the bat-
tery will be unable to undertake the launching of a missile.
Finally, radio-technical means should be widely used in
the combat with the enemy's nuclear means. They can be em-
ployed for this purpose in two ways: for intelligence on the
enemy's radio-technical means and for the creation of inter-
ference in the operation of the enemy's radio and radar ap-
paratus. By the skilful use of radio-technical means, in
combination with other means for reconnaissance and des-
truction, one can achieve sufficiently effective results.
Only some of the questions of combat with the enemy's
nuclear means have been touched upon in the present article.
Since this struggle is a most important problem, its solution
calls for great efforts by all arms of troops and, in the first
instance, by the missile troops, aviation,and artillery. The
military academies, the scientific-research institutes, and the
troops must join in to-solve this problem. Only by their com-
mon efforts can it be resolved in the shortest periods of time.
50X1-HUM
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