MILITARY NEWS: THE PROTECTION OF TROOPS AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BY MAJOR-GENERAL OF TECHNICAL TROOPS, A.ISAYUK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 3, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
The Protection of Troops Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
by
? jor-General of Technical Troops, A. Isayuk
Nuclear and chemical weapons inflict casualties on personnel
and damage on combat equipment and armament over areas covering tens
and hundreds of square kilometers. A surface burst of a warhead
having a yield of 30 thousand tons, given a wind with an average speed
of 50 km an hour, can contaminate an area of 900 or."more square kilometers
with,a radiation level of over 5 roentgens per hour, and 250 to 300
square kilometers with a radiation level of 100. roentgens per hour
and more.
Considering such an enormous casualty effect of the weapons of
mass destruction, it is now essential to train troops to disperse
rapidly, to maneuver, to use skilfully the protective characteristics
of the terrain, and to cross rapidly large areas contaminated by
radioactive and toxic substances.
Maneuver and dispersion are the integral conditions in the
combat activities of large units and units. It is impossible to
preserve the combat effectiveness of troops without them. Maneuver
and dispersion must be carried out no matter how distant the troops
are from the enemy. Nevertheless, maneuver and dispersal must not
have an adverse effect on the carrying out of the main task by the
troops.
In selecting the areas for the disposition and concentration of
troops, it is essential to take into consideration the features of
the terrain that give protection from the destructive factors of
atomic and chemical weapons. Ravines, hills, ditches, caves,, quarries,,
underground excavations, vegetation cover (woods, bushes), and
meteorological conditions all change the radius and areas of
destruction by the shock wave, limit the spread of light radiation,
reduce penetrating radiation, affect the spread and the volume of
the radioactive fall-out, and also reduce the effectiveness of chemical
weapons and bacteriological agents.
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
 r PV%J4 HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
The effect of all the destructive factors of a nuclear burst on
personnel is considerably reduced when they are dispersed in ravines,
on reverse slopes of heights, and in ditches. The effective.casualty
radius of the shock wave is reduced by approximately two times under
these conditions. Thick woods reduce the effective casualty radius
from light radiation, on 'the average, by 5 to 6 times, and that of
penetrating radiation by 15 to 20 percent. By an accurate
consideration of all the positive features of broken terrain and
meteorological conditions and by their skilful use, destruction in
personnel and combat equipment is reduced, on the average, by about
half.
Unfortunately, not enough. attention is paid to the accurate
consideration of the protective features of the terrain. The
evaluation and reconnaissance of terrain from this viewpoint is
seldom done, and the necessary measures to strengthen the existing
natural cover and to improve its protective features are not undertaken.
In March 1960 in an army exercise in the Transcaucasus Military
District `('ZakVO), the forward command point of the 7th`Army and later
its command point were located on absolutely open terrain despite
the existence in the exercise area of broken terrain and other
favorable conditions. Neglecting the protective features of the
terrain, the army command point was bunched so close together (on an
area of less than one square kilometer) that for its destruction
several high explosive bombs, not to,nntion nuclear warheads, would
be sufficient.
Dispersal and maneuver, the advisable formation of combat and
march formations, the skilful use of the protective features of the
terrain, in our opinion, are the basic measures for protecting troops
from the weapons of mass destruction.
In this connection, the question arises of what significance
will the preparation of the terrain in an engineer respect have.
Certainly,. the significance of engineer preparation of terrain under
modern conditions has increased even more. Even the simplest types
of engineer constriction reduce by several times the destructive factors
of nuclear and chemical weapons. Trenches and communication trenches,
for example protect troop personnel from the shock wave of a nuclear
warhead burst having a yield of 15 to 20 thousand tons at a distance
of up to 1 km from the center of the burst, and from a warhead having
a yield of 100 thousand tons. at a distance of up to 1.8 km.
50X1-HUM I
L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
The radiation doses from a surface burst for personnel seated in
trenches and communication trenches 12 m deep are reduced 3 to 5 times
(and.when lying down up to 30 times), and the radiation level is
reduced 15 to 20 times. Trenches and slit trenches covered over even
thinly give complete protection from light radiation and from droplet-
liquid toxic substances (otravlyayushcheye veshchestvo--OV), and
reduce the dose of penetrating radiation 50 times, while dugout shelters
with a top cover of 100 cm reduce:. penetrating radiation 200 to 400 times.
The most reliable shelters are the various types with thick top
cover. Depending on their types and function such shelters give .
complete protection from penetrating radiation, and at a distance of
400 m from the center of a nuclear burst give protection from the
shock wave.
The creation of engineer structures, however, and also the
preparation of the terrain with the modern state of means of
mechanization will require a lengthy period of time and a great
expenditure of forces and means. The command post; (IQ'), communication
centers,-and medical points alone of a division will require more than
50 shelters, well equipped in an antiatomic-:and antichemical respect.
The combat equipment, the vehicles, and the needs of the rear services
of a division and regiments will require the digging of about 2,000
trenches, dugouts:(uglubleniye) and pits for various purposes.
It is quite obvious that such a large number of structures can
only be created when troops remain in place for a lengthy period.
Under conditions of great mobility, high maneuverability, and fluidity
of combat operations, this is impossible with the modern means of
mechanization of engineer works and the insufficiency of light and
portable structures for the construction of engineer structures.
Often it will not even be necessary. Therefore, the protective
features of the terrain must be utilized to the full.
Of no less importance in the protection of troops from the
weapons of mass destruction is the elimination of the consequences
of an atomic and chemical attack by the enemy. Unfortunately,
experience of exercises shows that such basic measures as the
restoration of combat effectiveness of the troops, rescue and
medical-evacuation work, medical processing of personnel,
decontamination of combat equipment and weapons, and dosimetric
checks are not only not worked out in practice but frequently are
not even solved organizationally.
50X1-HUM
L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7 /
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
In one of the tactical exercises, theccommander of the 210th
Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 118th Motorized Rifle Division located
directly in the area of a "nuclear burst" with high levels of
radiation, took more than two hours to make an evaluation of the
situation created as a result of the "nuclear burst". The evaluation
of the radiation situation was made slowly. Control and communications
with subunits were lost and no practical steps to reestablish them
were taken. Emergency rescue work was not organized, and the medical
processing of personnel was carried out after lengthy delay. The
regimental medical post (polkovoy meditsinskiy punkt) was not prepared
for this work and the division_:medical battalion (mediko-sanitarnyy
batalon divizii), having arrived after a long delay, was not able to
render any actual assistance to the personnel who had becomeccasualties.
The. subunit commanders of this regiment who were in the zone of
destruction did not even try to take any measures to eliminate the
consequences of the'huclear burst". The individual antichemical
protection equipment was not fully utilized by the personnel.
The commander and the chief of staff of the division, knowing
the situation in which the 210th Motorized Rifle Regiment foundoitself,
did not exercise any decisive influence on the organization and
rendering of assistance to the affected subunits of the regiment. The
supply,; of materiel (clothing, medicines, foodstuffs, and means of
communications) was not organized.
The commanders of large units, units, and subunits which find
themselves in an area of nuclear burst (in the zone of fallout from
a radioactive cloud, in an arearcontaminated by toxic substances)
must quickly evaluate the situation and make a decision as regards
protection of their troops. First of all, communications with the
subordinate subunits must be established to find out what their
situation is and what their needs are, report the situation to the
senior commander (chief) and inform the neighboring units about this,
appoint new commanders in place of those who have become casualties,
and without waiting for assistance from above, start eliminating the
consequences of the employment of the nuclear (chemical) weapon with
their own forces and means.
In the first place, measures for the rescue of personnel are
carried out, extracting them from the debris and rubble of engineer
structures and the rendering of immediate medical aid on the spot.
50X1-HUM
- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7 J
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
First aid to the victims is rendered in the form of self-aid and
mutual,aid, and also by the medical personnel allocated for rescue work.
Casualties are immediately evacuated to collecting and triage points.
For the evacuation of personnel, medical,units and subunits should
be used first of all. If this should prove to be insufficient, then
other units and subunits may be utilized. The collecting and triage
points should be located outside the area of radioactive contamination,
near sources of water, and in places having good approaches for vehicles
and people on.foot. All personnel must be informed of the location
of these points.
In the case of mass destruction of personnel, army and front
independent medical battalions are sent to the area of the atomic
burst. They are given a part of the more complicated work of rescue
and treatment of-personnel. Units r subunits of chemical protection
are also sent to the area'of the atomic burst to establish special
processing points-(punkt spetsialnoy obrabotki--PuSO).
Combat equipment and weapons are salvaged from ruins, restored,
and evacuated by the combat effective personnel of the units and
subunits after the radiation situation has been clarified and the :s`.?i:`
radiation levels do not exceed the permissible irradiation doses.
To assist the troops in the evacuation of equipment and weapons from
the areas of atomic bursts, it is advisable to allot subunits from
other units, and primarily from repair-units.
Combat equipment, weapons, and other materiel which were in the
zone of total destruction and are badly damaged are left on the spot
and evacuated (if this is found necessary) on special directions by
.army and front forces and means.
Clearance and restoration of routes for maneuver, and bringing
up of supplies and evacuation are carried out by the units and
subunits of all arms of troops with their own forces and means. The
most difficult tasks--the making of passages through the.obstructions
and the repair of roads, bridges, and other tasks--are carried out by
engineer units and subunits reinforced with the necessary means of
mechanization.
50X1-HUMS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
50X1-HUM
Extinguishing fires in the areas of atomic bursts should be
undertaken only in exceptional cases where these areas are of tactical
or operational importance, and then only when the high level of
radiation in these areas has fallen. Small fires occurring at a
considerable distance from the ground zero of the atomic bursts should
be localized by the personnel of the subunits in the area or by
specially detailed subunits from units located near the area of the
fire.
In order not to expose troops,.combat equipment, and armament to
the danger of radioactive contamination and to maintain their combat
effectiveness, the radiation situation in an area of radioactive
contamination must be constantly known. To accelerate the
clarification of the radiation situation and the taking of a decision,
a simple method of calculation with tables (raschetno-graficheskiy
sposob) can be recommended to commanders and staffs.
The route of movement of a motorized rifle regiment crosses the
axis of the path of a radioactively contaminated cloud at a distance
of 12 km from the center of a 40 thousand ton nuclear burst.I The
length of the route along the path in ^ 18.5 km. ',The speed of the
average wind is 30 km an hour. The level of radiation on the axis
of the path, 5 hours after the burst, equals Pmax ^ 75 roentgens.
per hour. The speed of movement of the column while on the path of.
the cloud equals 25 kph. The movement is carried out on motor vehicles.
Under these conditions, we find that the dose of irradiation received
by the personnel is:
A Pmax xln 75 x 18.5 = 7 roentgens per hour
TVK x25x2
and if the move is carried outinarmored personnel carriers:
75 x 18.5 = 3.5 roentgens per hour.
x 25 x
A motorized rifle battalion moving in motor vehicles at 12 kph
must cross the path of a cloud from a surface atomic burst having a
yield of 30 thousand tons at a distance of 16 km from the center of
the burst. The speed of the average wind is 25 kph.
50X1-HUMI
L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
First of all, the level of radiation under the given conditions
is calculated, and then the dose of irradiation.
P v 5-0--x V e 50 x,30 x 25 a 36 roentgens per hour
R x t l6 x
A d 1.5 P a e 1.5 36 0: 6 r
KV t 2 x 12
Good aids in carrying out most diverse calculations are The
Short Reference Book of Combat Characteristics of Atomic Weapons and
Antiatomic Protection, the textbook Atomic Weapons and Operations of
Troops Under Conditions of its Employment, Tables for Evaluating,
Radioactive Contamination of errain during Employment of Atomic Bursts,
and dosimetric rules DL-Land DL-2.
In eliminating the consequences of the employment of weapons
of mass destruction the most aggressive and organizing role must belong
to the senior commanders and staffs. They must immediately send their
representatives into or toward the areas of nuclear bursts for direct
supervision of the work. Medical, chemical and engineer units and
subunits must be sent to the'areas of nuclear bursts, and, if necessary,
s
b
it
u
un
s and units of other:,. arms of troops. The composition of the
units and
b
it
su
un
s so detailed will be determined by. the, specific.
situation of each case and by the proposed scope of :work;;_.,
attempts are being made within the troops to create
temporary supernumerary teams for the elimination of the consequences
of a nuclear attack. In our opinion, improvised rescue groups and
teams do not fulfil their purpose either organizationally or in fact.
By their composition and technical equipment they are not able to
carry out the whole range of special tasks--evacuation of personnel
casualties, clearance of obstructions and of lines of supply,
reestablishment of communications and control, fire fighting, medical
?processing of personnel, decontamination and degassing of combat
equipment and materiel, etc.
Furthermore, these groups and teams may themselves be put out of
action by nuclear bursts even before they are used. The very
creation of such teams will to some extent weaken for a long time the
unit or subunit providing the personnel and the equipment.
~- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7
.Owing to the combat situation prevailing, temporarily created
teams may be at such a distance from their troops that it will be
difficult and also sometimes impossible for them to."reach the required
area to carry out the tasks of eliminating the consequences of an
atomic attack.
We consider that the most effective aid to the troops in eliminating
the consequences of a nuclear attack can and must be rendered by those
units and subunits which are in the vicinity of the area of the, burst
but outside the sphere of its effects.
The elimination of the consequences of the employment of weapons
of mass destruction consists first of all in rendering immediate id
to the casualties from toxic substances; in-the medical observation
of affected personnel; in discovering which units and subunits have
been exposed to the effects of bacterial agents; in carrying out
dosimetric checks and in organizing and carrying out medical processing
of personnel; the degassing and decontamination of combat equipment,
armament, clothing, equipment, and terrain, and also of purifying
water and neutralizing foodstuffs from toxic and radioactive substances
and bacterial agents.
50X1-HUM
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500070001-7