MILITARY THOUGHT: UTILIZATION OF THE MISSILE TROOPS OF A FRONT (ARMY) IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION, BY COLONEL-GENERAL P. KOSHEVOY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400720001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Utilization of the Missile Troo.0s of a Front (AM)
in an Offensive Deration
by
Colonel-General P. Koshevoy
In modern warfare, along with the decisive role of nuclear/missile
weapons, extremely important tasks are entrusted to the ground troops.
In close cooperation with other types of armed forces, especially
with the missile troops of strategic designation, they are called upon
"to perform one of the most important tasks of armed combat which is
the annihilation of the enemy?s troops on the ground and the occupation
of his territory. Successful accomplishment of this task is considerably
facilitated by the presence of the most modern means of combat within
the composition of the ground troops: missile large units and units
of operational-tactical designation and highly maneuverable motorized
rifle and tank troops, also equipped with missiles.
After the ground troops were provided with missile large units and
units, their fire power increased immeasurably. Fire, which now :
consists basically of nuclear strikes,, has acquired new qualities:
there has been a sharp increase in its power and effectiveness. While
the role of fire formerly consisted of supporting tank and infantry
operations directly on the field of battle, today missile large
units and units of the ground troops are capable of destroying major
installations and groupings of troops in the entire depth of the
operational formation of the enemy.
Dice to the high effectiveness of the nuclear/missile weapon, a
front can now fulfil.its tasks in an offensive operation with a
greatly reduced number of forces and conventional fire means.
. At present, the front is usually made up of 4 to 5 armies,
including one tank and one air army, one or two front missile brigades,
as well as large units and units of special troops. Altogether, in
this case, there will be 17 to 22 divisions, about 4 thousand pieces
(orudiye) and mortars, and up to 600 airplanes within the composition
of a front.
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In comparison with the closing period of World War II, there
has been a considerable decrease in personnel and pieces in a front,
but on the other hand, missile troops have emerged in the form of
front and army missile brigades, as well as the missile battalions
of motorized rifle and tank divisions.
A front of the above-mentioned complement contains 58-to 80
launching mounts, including 6 to 12 front, 18 to 24 army and
34 to 44 organic.(voyskovoy), and also one or two regiments of front
cruise missiles.
By means of these weapons nuclear strikes can be delivered
against enemy objectives to a depth of 500 to 600 km. Thus, under
conditions when nuclear/missile weapons have become the principal
means of destroying the enemy, the problems of the use of these
weapons are the basis of the decision of the front (army) troop
commander in an offensive operation. The operation as a whole cannot
be planned without ensuring, in all respects, the most effective
utilization of the missile troops.
The newest means of armed combat and the radical changes in the
methods of combat operations to which they have given rise, demand
from commanders and staffs of all levels exceptionally accurate
and mobile work with a minimum expenditure of time in all command
and staff echelons. In view of this, we consider that the
established practice of the commander working out a decision on the
basis of the information reports of various officials is completely
unacceptable under the new conditions.
The commander of the troops of a front (army) must be quite
familiar with the condition and capabilities of the missile troops,
because only then can he make a well-founded decision for using missiles,
without spending time listening to information reports.
It seems to us that in the period d ps ration for an operation,
it is best for the commander of the troops of a front (army) to
make his decision in the presence of the chief of staff, the chief
of the missile troops and artillery., the commander of the air army,
and the chiefs of the operational and intelligence directorates.
Each of the above-mentioned persons must, if necessary, give a brief
and clear description of the enemy objectives, the readiness and
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capabilities of the missile large units and units, the availability
of nuclear/missile warheads, and answer other questions of interest
to the commander.
In his decision, the commander determines the procedure for the
use of the nuclear warheads issued to the front (army), establishes
. enemy objectives or groupings of troops, the number of warheads,
the yield, and the time of strike, and also indicates the ground zero
.(center) of the nuclear strikes which are intended to destroy the
most important enemy objectives.
The staff of the front, together with the chief of the missile
troops and artillery and the commander of the air army, organizes the
execution of the decision of the troop commander- they organize the
reconnaissance and preliminary reconnaissance of enemy objectives,'
plan the fire tasks, determine siting areas, and carry out the re-
grouping of missile large units and units. After this the staff of
the missile troops and artillery, the staff of the air army, and other
interested directorates and departments can plan in detail the
thorough, support of the missile troops. This procedure of work was
applied in special exercises conducted in the district (okrug) and, in
our opinion, corresponds fully to the new requirements pertaining to
the control of troops.
The initial.data,on which the decision to use missile troops is
based, consist of intelligence information on the enemy targets and
objectives destined'for destruction by nuclear weapons, the condition
of our missile troops,.and the availability of nuclear warheads.
Without this information, it is impossible to plan the use of the missile
troops.
In the Western Theater of.Military Operations, in a front's zone
of offensive, the enemy may operate with a group of armies consisting
of 2 or 3 field armies (up to 6 army corps, 18 to 20 infantry and
armored divisions), reinforced by units of guided missiles and free
rockets, cruise missiles, and tactical aviation. Within the
composition of this grouping there will presumably be about 140 to 150
objectives which must be destroyed by nuclear weapons of varying
yield.
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It:must be taken into account that in preparing and carrying out
an offensive operation, we will not always have sufficient information
available on the position of-the objectives and, because many of them
are highly mobile, intelligence information may rapidly become
obsolete. At the start of nuclear preparation, we will be able to have
more-or-less correct information on only 50 percent of the objectives
against-which it is necessary to plan and deliver nuclear strikes.
The remainder will be destroyed by massed and individual nuclear
strikes, as they appear.
By using all the front, army and a greater part of the organic
missile launchers, as well as the front cruise missiles, it is possible
to deliver 50 to 70 nuclear strikes simultaneously during the nuclear
preparation and in the beginning of the nuclear support. This obviously
is not adequate for the simultaneous destruction of all enemy objectives.
It will be necessary to destroy part of them by missiles of strategic
designation or by front and.army missiles in the course of follow-up
strikes.
There may be instances when the front will have sufficient
ballistic and cruise missiles available for delivering a simultaneous
strike against all detected enemy objectives. But more often, the
number of detected 'objectives requiring destruction by nuclear weapons
will exceed the number of available missile launchers and warheads.
Therefore, naturally it'is necessary to deliver strikes first against
those objectives whose destruction will lead to an abrupt weakening
of the basic enemy grouping, disorganize the control of his troops,
and, on the whole, change the correlation of forces to our advantage.
It should, be borne in mind that, in the preparation for an
operation, more time will be spent in working out the decision and
planning for the. use of missile troops than in the performance of
these tasks during the course of combat operations. During the period
of preparation and planning of the operation, we can have at our
disposal more complete data about the enemy objectives, more time for
carrying out preliminary reconnaissance of the objectives and for
transmitting the tasks to those who will perform them.
In the course of the operation, however, the decision for
delivering nuclear/missile strikes must be made without any delay
and be transmitted quickly to the missile brigades, battalions, and
batteries. This is possible only when there is mechanization and
automation.of the data receiving process and of the control of
troops as a whole.
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Experience gained from the special exercise conducted in the
district with missile large units indicates that it will take about
3 hours to clarify the plan for the utilization of nuclear/missile
weapons and to transmit'it.from the front to the launch batteries.
At the headquarters of the'miosile troops and artillery this work was
performed in one and one half-hours; transmitting the tasks from the
front headquarters to the missile brigades consumed 40 to 50 minutes,
and the work performed at the level of the missile brigade and launch
battery also consumed 40 to 50 minutes.
It is completely obvious that the time expended on all the above-
mentioned operations must be sharply decreased.
We maintain that-in the staff of the missile troops and artillery
of a front, all the work connected with clarifying the tasks should
consume a maximum of 30 minutes and at the level of the missile
brigade and launch battery,.30 to 40 minutes, of which 15 to 20 'will be
used for technical preparation of the launching assembly for the
launch. As various guidance devices and technical communications
means are perfected, this period of time will be increasingly shortened.
During the course of an operation, as well as during its
preparation, it is best that the decision for delivering a massed
nuclear/missile strike be made by the commander of troops of the
front (army) in the presence of the chief of staff, the chief of the
missile troops and artillery, the commander of the air army, the
commander of the operational directorate, and the chief of intelligence
of the front. After a brief exchange of opinions and after clarifying
the conditions of, the situation and the capabilities of the missile
troops, the troop commander must determine the ground zero of the
nuclear strikes on a map for the missile-troops and aviation and set
the time for their delivery and the yield of the warheads to be used.
The chief of missile troops and artillery of the front and the commander
of the air army, on the basis of the commander's decision, ensure the
preparation of the appropriate commands and their transmission to those
who will carry them out.
Of course, the choice of the method for working out a decision
depends largely on the personal characteristics of the individual
military commander. However,.we are convinced that the suggested
method in which.the commander of troops of the front, proceeding
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from an analysis of the situation which has taken shape, personally
and immediately makes the decision for the delivery of a. nuclear/
missile strike, requires the least expenditure of time.
In the exercise conducted in the district, after the commander
had announced his decision, the staff of the missile troops and
artillery of the front spent about two hours in obtaining the
coordinates of the targets, distributing the missions among the units,
and in_relaying the commands and preparing the batteries for launching.
This included 45 to 63 minutes for work within the staff .of the missile
troops and artillery of the front, 4 to 12 minutes for relaying the
commands from brigade to battery, 17 to 23 minutes for preparing the
duty batteries for launching, and 45 to 53 minutes for preparing the
batteries in waiting positions.
It is perfectly, obvious that such squandering of time cannot be
tolerated, especially since the lion'.s'share of it is wasted in the
staffs and in the transmission of commands by technical communications
means.
We believe that under the conditions of highly dynamic combat
operations, the time expended, from the moment of beginning to work
out the decision at the 'front to the moment of firing at the launch
batteries, must not exceed.one hour. This result can be achieved if
no more than 25 minutes are used by the staff of the missile troops
of the front in preparing all the commands and transmitting them to
the front brigades and staffs of the missile troops of the armies,
10 to 12 minutes are usedto.transmit the commands at the level of
the missile.brigade and launch battery, and no more than 23 to 25
minutes are used.for the work of the launch batteries.
Why do we contend that no more than one hour should be expended
,for carrying out the tasks enumerated above?
If the decision for delivering a massed nuclear/missile strike
against an enemy grouping which is advancing for a counterstrike
is made by the commander of troops three'hours in advance of the strike,
during the period when the enemy troops are still marching to the line
of deployment, then there is no guarantee that the intentions of the
enemy will be discovered and that his line of deployment will be
determined correctly. It is quite possible that during this period of
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time, the direction of movement of the enemy grouping will be changed
and it will not be on the line supposed by us. As a result, the
nuclear/missile. strike will be delivered against a vacant area.
However, if there is a reserve of time available., it is essential
,that it be used in the most effective way possible for the preparation
of the strike: to determine the most probable areas of concentration
or congested movement of the enemy troops, especially his nuclear
weapons,and to prepare the necessary data for conducting fire with
conventional and nuclear charges.
If, however,,- on the basis of accurate intelligence information,
the commander makes his decision one hour before delivery of the
strike, by this time the enemy columns will be located somewhere within
15 to 20 km from the line of deployment. In this case, any significant
change in the direction of their movement is unlikely and the
probability of destroying the enemy groupings will therefore be
sharply increased.
A nuclear/missile strike can be delivered immediately upon
determining an'enemy advance for a counterstrike. But even in this
case, the destruction of the columns will be guaranteed only. if no
more. than one hour elapses from the time of their detection to the
launching of the missiles. This is explained by the fact that during
the movement, for example, of an infantry or an armored division along
three lines of march, the length of each'column reaches 50 to 60 km
and the rate of speed 20 to 25 km per hour. If we determine the .
coordinates of the heads of the columns an hour before the strike and
subsequently deliver a strike against them, the columns will be
destroyed.
The best time for delivering a messed strike is at the moment of
the enemy's deployment for a counterstrike. In this case, the`
personnel and combat equipment are outside their concealment and are
disposed in relatively compact combat formations. As deployed, enemy
infantry or armored division occupies up to 20 km along the front,
8 to 10 km in depth (150 to 200 sq. km.), and has the greater part of
its forces in the first echelon with a view to delivering a powerful
initial strike.
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If 4 or 5 nuclear strikes are delivered against the first and
1 or 2 strikes against the second echelon of the division, with a
total yield of 300 thousand tons or more, the bulk of the personnel
and combat equipment will be put out of action.
Massed strikes against troops advancing for a counterstrike or
for other operations must, in our opinion, be preceded by strikes of
nuclear and conventional weapons in areas of various defiles and
other sectors of terrain that are difficult to traverse, in order
to brake the movement and-produce congestion of enemy troops.
Thus, delivery of massed nuclear/missile.strikes in the course
of combat requires quick and decisive actions, principally from
those who make the decision for a counterstrike and organize its
execution and also smooth-functioning staff work, reliable intelligence,
stability of the technical means of communications, and timely
transmission of commands to those who will carry them out.
Proper organization of the, control point of the chief. of the
missile troops plays an important role in the control of missile
troops.
In conducting exercises with missile troops, we have avoided
locating the control points in tents scattered at considerable
distances from each other. The mobile control point of the front has
been located in special buses, built on the chassis of MAZ-501 vehicles.
All the motor vehicles of. the troop commander, chief of staff of the
front, chief of. the missile troops and artillery of the front, and
the chiefs of the operational and intelligence directorates were
interconnected by gangways. Officers of the staff of the missile
troops and artillery were located in three specially equipped ZIL-157
buses with trailers.
Convenient,. compact placement of the control point permitted a
decrease in the amount of telephone lines for internal communications
and the wide use of selector loudspeaker communications which ensured
individual as well as collective receipt of information regarding the
situation, simultaneous assignment of tasks to the officers who are
to fulfil them, etc.
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Selector communications were established with all the directing
officers (napravlenets) of the armies and missile large units of the
front, with the planning group, the intelligence department and with
the operations group of the chief of the missile armament department
located at the command post (komandnyy punkt--KP), of the front. In
the course of the exercise, telegraph apparatus, equipped with a
secure communications device (zasekrechivayushchaya apparatura--ZAS),
were.deployed in direct proximity to the directing officers' buses.
It was established at the exercises that it is possible to shorten
considerably the time needed for transmitting orders to the troops and
receiving information from the troops, if all the directing officers
were located in one specially equipped bus in which were concentrated
the receiving and transmitting ZAS and signal-code device: (signalno-
kodovaya'ustanovka--SKU) apparatus and the direct telephone channels
for radio relay and radio communications. In the exercise, direct
telephone channels for radio relay communications were organized and
signal-code communications (SKU) devices were used for communications
with the missile brigades and the chiefs of.missile'troops of the
armies.
On the whole, experience from the exercises indicated that radio
and radio.relay means of communications utilizing ZAS and SKU ensure
stable and flexible control of the fire and maneuver of the missile
troops. Wire, communications, including high frequency (vysokaya
chastota--V(,b.) were found to be unsuitable during combat operations
of'a highly mobile nature.
Nevertheless, the use of the above-mentioned methods of organizing
communications only partially'solves the problem of ensuring dependable
control of the missile troops. We are of the opinion that in order
to achieve a.radical improvement in communications, the chief of the
missile troops of a front must have his organic means of communication,
which would ensure the establishment of radio communications with the
missile troops up. to and including missile battalions not within a
radio network, but only on point-to-point nets. In addition, the
control point of the.chief of the missile troops of a front (army)
must be equipped in such a way as to ensure the transmission of orders
with a minimum expenditure of time. It is also necessary to perfect
control devices and the preparation of officers' working areas, to
work out the sequence of issuing commands, etc. All this will
undoubtedly shorten the time expended in the transmission of commands.
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In a modern offensive operation it is vitally important to
organize correctly and maintain continually coordination of the missile
large units and units of operational-tactical designation with cruise
missiles and aviation.
In order to coordinate the delivery of nuclear strikes by missile
large units and aviation. it is necessary to determine for them the
objectives to be destroyed and to establish the order and the time of
delivery of the strikes. These questions must be resolved more
thoroughly and concretely during the conduct of fire preparation and
also fire support for an offensive during execution of the immediate
task of the front.
Due to the fact that cruise missiles and aviation are capable of
destroying the enemy in considerable depth, zonal distribution of
objectives for destruction among the missile troops and aviation is
not advisable since one zone may contain objectives which it is more
advantageous to destroy by missiles than by aviation and vice-versa.
The allocation of objectives within zones should be so calculated
as to reduce the effect of nuclear bursts on the flight of the cruise
missiles, and for this reason it is advisable to assign to them
independent. objectives, which are separated by some distance from
objectives of ballistic missile strikes. In case of a need for a
massed nuclear strike by ballistic and cruise missiles against
objectives in the same area, the latter should deliver strikes
1 or 2 minutes before or 10?to 15.minutes after the ballistic missiles.
It is also important that. there be no nuclear bursts along the flight
paths of the cruise missiles, otherwise the missile may turn itself
or depart from its course. The launching times of all types of
missiles should be designated on the basis of a coordinated time of
strike and of the individual flight time of each of them.
The unexpectedness of a massed nuclear strike in an offensive
operation is one of the most important conditions of the effective use
of nuclear weapons by the missile troops and aviation. It can be
achieved, if the flight of delivery aircraft over friendly territory
is carried out simultaneously with the delivery of nuclear strikes
by missile large units or shortly thereafter, and must be done with
changes in altitude which will make it more difficult for the enemy's
radar stations to detect the delivery aircraft in their approach to
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the objectives to be destroyed. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary
;o sae ifice the advantages of a simultaneous strike, especially since,
in order to ensure a breakthrough by the aircraft to the objectives,
it is necessary to create corridors in the enemy's PVO system for
them beforehand.
In organizing coordinated action between missile large units (units)
and aviation, it is necessary to establish restricted zones for the
flight. of aircraft over the combat formations of the missile large
units (units), and over regions to be subjected to nuclear strikes by
other ' means .
The utilization of nuclear/missile weapons depends largely on
timely engineer 'support of the combat operations of the missile troops.
Missile troops'must reach the area of combat operations without
hindrance, at high speeds and, as a rule, at night, and shift rapidly
to new siting areas during the course of an-offensive. For this
reason, it is necessary to transport missiles, over long distances
to the missile troops, which requires special transportation conditions.
Experience from exercises has indicated that in order to transport
missiles to the armies and front missile brigades, it is imperative
to designate a special route in the rear area of the front, which
must have engineer preparation, well-organized traffic and control
services, and appropriate forces for the'protection of transports with
missiles. This route should be maintained by the forces and means
of the front.
Similarly, each army should designate one route for the transport
of organic missiles from the army missile-depot battalion (raketno-
parkovyy divizion.) to the army brigades and battalions. Army routes
should be maintained by the forces and means of the army.
In a special experimental exercise, we established that by using
helicopters and photography it.is possible, in the course of an
offensive, to raise the speed of engineer reconnaissance of supply
routes to'approximately 70 km per hour, compared to the 12 to 15 km
per hour maximum by_'motor vehicles.
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As yet unresolved are such important problems in the engineer
support of the combat operations of the missile troops as the
preparation of siting areas and areas of concentration of missile
large units and units with regard to ensuring their anti-nuclear
protection-and camouflage. Taking into consideration the high speeds
of a troop offensive . (for their own security), it is known that
missile large units and units must not remain in one spot for more`
than 24 hours. Therefore, their engineer support must be so organized
that all personnel and combat equipment can be satisfactorily
concealed within 4 to 5 hours. On the basis of this requirement,
it seems to us that it is also necessary to proceed in providing the
missile. brigades with engineer equipment.
Camouflage of missile troops, in our opinion, should be up to
the front. Therefore,' it' is intolerable that front camouflage
battalions have nothing for camouflaging missile troops. They should
at least be equipped with dummy launching mounts.
A few words regarding the organizational structure of missile
brigades. Experience indicates that in order to increase the fire
power as well as to.ensure the viability and the constant readiness
of missile large units to conduct fire, missile brigades should be
composed of three battalions . The shifting of brigades of this
composition in the course of an operation should be so organized that
two battalions are in constant readines's to conduct fire, and the
third, meanwhile, is moving to the new position. This ensures
continuity of the fire accompanying the troops in the course of an
offensive.
The general conclusions which we have set forth, based on the
special exercise, represent only an initial attempt to investigate
the use of missile troops. and their control in the course of an
offensive operation of a front (army). The joint creative efforts of
the generals and officers of our Armed Forces are required in order
to complete the study of these important problems.
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