MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLANNING OF A MODERN OFFENSIVE OPERATION, BY COLONEL-GENERAL YE. IVANOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400700001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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50X1-HUM
Some Factors Affecting the Planning of a Modern Offensive eration
by
Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov
The concept that the planning of a modern operation should be based
primarily on the capabilities of nuclear weapons and their most
effective utilization, which now appears to be the decisive factor
in achieving victory over the enemy, has become universally recognized.
However, it would be useful to examine some particular factors affecting
the planning of operations.
In this connection, the first point,on which we must dwell is the
clarification of the concept "the main strike and the number of strikes
in an operation.
In the past, the direction of the main strike for a breakthrough
of a solid positional defense, which was typical, was always selected
in support of the most effective use of the infantry, artillery, and
tanks which were concentrated for the delivery of a strike on the weak
spot on a selected axis, as a rule, in narrow zones, for subsequent
\ destruction of the basic enemy grouping. This axis had precise limits
in an operation and required compulsory superiority over the enemy in
forces and weapons. This,naturally, had its definite influence on
the content of the planning of the operation.
Under modern conditions, atomic weapons without the aid of other
weapons of combat can, in the shortest periods of time, destroy the
basic enemy troop groupings and deprive them of their combat effectiveness
and in this way ensure an advantageous correlation of forces for the
delivery of strikes and the development of an offensive.
Hence, when working out a solution and planning an operation,
V.primary attention must be given to the determination of the sequence
of the utilization of nuclea rile weapons, which would guarantee
maximum effectiveness of the latter in the destruction and neutralization
of enemy groupings in the entire depth of the tactical and operational
formation.
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With such a solution to the problem, very often on.-the axes and
through?the'areas where- nuclear weapons will be used Qkto 5 words
missing)"'-groupings of ground .troops or _in general to circumvent these
areas in-avoidance-of a ' sharp deceleration of the rat4?e~ of advance
as a result of the serious destruction of populated parts, of road
structures, and-of radiation contaminatjon'of the terrain.
It appears that the concept "main strike" under modern conditions
and eonnean operational scale is primarily a mass nuclear strike against
ms's nuclear weapons and his basic troop-groupings which is
followed by strikes with tanks and infantry on several axes, and no
\_longer against a solid positional defense, but against a defense
having primarily a, clustered nature (ochagovyy kharakter).
In resolving the problem of the quantity of strikes, the
mechanical transfer of the experience of the
conditions must be decisively ly rejected in a front ont and, d a aot modern
_army
because of the still extant conception of the inadvisability for a
front to deliver more than two strikes and of the impossibility for an
array to deliver a strike on more than one axis. Substantiation of
this leads to assertions which are far from the truth, namely. that with
a large number of strikes a front, and even more, an army,,will dissipate
its forces and will not be able to perform the assigned mission.
If concentration and utilization of a large mass of fire and of
considerable masses of troops were required to execute a breakthrough
in the past, now it can be carried out much more si
missile weapons are capable of breaking thr
ough an ~ ' enemy' hde ense
over large areas not only s defense
such breaches and even vacuums as to lead unotnonly t oathetweakening g of
the enemy but also to his complete loss of combat effectiveness on the
axes selected for the offensive. Thus, conditions have been created
in which the operations of ground troops are possible without
amalgamating them into some sort of a dense striking force.
N Consequently, if one speaks of strikes, keeping in mind the axes
of ground troop operations, there can be several of them, both of an
army and of a front. Their number will be determined by the
capabilities of the nuclear missile weapons, the advantages of utilizing
them, and also by the conditions supporting convenience in the
operations of large units of ground troops.
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The-delivery-of several strikes. by a front and an a. -:..
ragy, united
by a common concept and' directed toward the achievement of the
assigned goals of an operation, is"advantageous not only gom.the
point of view of the availability of, possibilities for ensuring these
strikes by nuclear/missile weapons but also because with this., favorable
conditions for achieving surprise-are created.
Dispersion of troops
.in several areas and over a large expanse together with the execution
of other measures for operational concealment hinders the enemy-in
the timely deteiination of the intentions of the attacker. This
will permit concealment from the enemy of not only the.actua l
employment of the troops in an operation but also. of the nature of
the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons.
The operations of front (army) troops on several isolated axes
N create more favorable conditions for the utilization of the most varied
forms of operational maneuver, permit a comparatively easy change in
the direction of operations, especially during the course of the
operation?s development, and a quick transfer of the efforts of the
troops into the depth. Furthermore, such conditions considerably
simplify the use of various arms of troops since excessive congestion
and shifting of their combat and precombat formations are eliminated,
they permit a more effective utilization of the terrain, assist in the
better organization of the work of the rear services and in particular,
permit a more rational utilization of the main railroad and vehicular
highway networks, and also of bridges and rivercrossings in support
of supply and evacuation.
It is perfectly obvious that ,troops dispersed along a front for
operations on various axes cannot be equivalent in composition or
equipment. The content and importance. of their missions will also
differ. But they will be;united by a single concept and the efforts
of the troops will be directed toward the achievement of the overall
goal of the operation. Moreover, now it is not important how many
groupings have been created in a front for an offensive, but rather
how the troops are organ zed for the most effective a loitation
at hi tempos, of the results of the use of nuclear missile weapons.
Therefore, dispersion of troops along a front does not at all mean
that their efforts are dissipated as a result.
The s tial sco a to os and the duration of an operation must
also be examined in a different manner from Znat which is still-Ile-
practice at the present time.
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First of all, the establishment of rigid and constant sizes In
relation to - the ,width' of -offensive zones loses its significance,
especially for ...operational formations. In reality, when,:_planning
,r an operation,,, a front (army) will be assigned zones, determined not on
the basis of some conBtant size, but rather on the basis'of such
factors as--the ccmposition-and-condition of the troops, the
availability-of nuclear/missile' weapons, the possibility of
organizing not - only- simultaneous neutralization of the enemy -by fire
in the entire depth and by a strike against the enemy from the front,
.but also the effect on him' of airborne troops and-motorized-rifle
.units'and large units transported by air, and also (and this is very
important:) by the. necessity to support an extensive maneuver of troops
in the course of an offensive both for the delivery of simultaneous
and successive strikes against the enemy.from the most advantageous
axes as well as for protection from his nuclear weapons.
From this, it. is obvious that the principle of planning an army
offensive operation is a zone 50 to 70 km wide with a breakthrough of
the enemy's defense on a front of 25 to 30 km is outmoded. If this
principle is examined carefully, it will be found to hide nothing
more than an indirect requirement for the necessity, even now, to
-concentrate a large number of men and equipment on a sufficiently
limited area (even if for only a brief span of time), i.e., as
previously, to accomplish the tasks of breaking through the enemy's
defense by an avalanche of troops. and not by the power of modern
fire and maneuver.
It appears to us that at the present time an army can, right from
the beginning of an offensive, couduet it successfully in its entire
zone or even in a significantly wider one than indicated above,
including an offensive against a prepared enemy defense.
%t. is all the more possible that the basic. thods of its
operations will be mutually coordinated, in space and time, maneuvering
operations of its individual large units, which come into direct
.contact with each other only in cases when the efforts of several large
units are required against some particular enemy grouping.
conditions, moreover, even the large units of an army Under
to operate as individual units in wide zones. Consequently., may often planning
1r an operation, the offensive zone of an army q' in Pnning
conduct of maneuvering operations both at the beginning uoof theto permit
operation and during its development and to provide a capability to
concentrate the strength of the strike by means of the reserves
dispersed in depth. Apparently, a zone of 100 to 150 km, in the
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absence of a solid front, will ensure such operations to the highest
degree to the troops of an army, particularly under conditions of
considerable radioactive contamination of the terrain;-:.which will better
assist the fulfilment of assigned missions, and will mdoubtedly lower
the possibility of their destruction by the enemy's nuclear/missile
weapons.
The necessity for maximum exploitation of the capabilities of
nuclear missile weapons for the speediest shifting of the efforts of
a front's (army's) troops into the depth of the enemy's defense
aimed at his final destruction and the seizure of the enemy's means
of using nuclear ammunition and his missile weapon bases,. engenders
\,a legitimate desire to sharply increase the rates of offensive, which
is now proposed to be 80 to 100 km per 2k-hour period.
In connection with such a presentation of the problem of
ti offensive tempos, we think that 80 to 100 km can be only an average
daily rate with the presence of completely favorable conditions of the
development of the operation.
Deily troop movement of 80 to 100 km can take place only with
the absence of any enemy activity and, obviously, this cannot be
counted on for the course of the entire operation; this is confirmed
by past combat experience and by the experience of all exercises.
High offensive tempos and inevitable losses will, naturally,
demand a high degree of strain on the troops and consequently the
timely relief of large units of the first echelon, who have borne
considerable losses and have lost their combat effectiveness as a
result of the enemy's nuclear strikes. This very factor must be
carefully appraised in order to correctly plan the conduct of
operations at high but realistic rates, determined in light of the
concretely developing situation. From this it appears that in each
specific case, depenq.ing on the goals of the operation and the
capabilities of the nuclear missile weapons at band, the indicated
rates can vacillate to one side or the other.
Further, to the extent that as a result of the use of nuclear/
missile weapons by both sides considerable areas of the terrain will
be transformed into solid radioactive fields and because of which the
engagement will break up into individual centers of combat over a
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wide expanse, it must be assumed that the planned movement of ground
troops will not take place as was done during the years 'of the past
war. For example, an operation can begin with the simultaneous use
of nuclear missile weapons and of ground troops over the entire
depth of the enemy's operational formation and will conclude as
soon as the surviving centers of resistance have been destroyed, and
the enemy's potential for undertaking any serious countermeasures to
regain its lost position or to reestablish equality, in forces on a
given axis has been paralyzed.
With this method of conducting an operation, the degree of
fulfilment of the assigned missions must be provided for. in the
plan of operation not by the number of kilometers covered by ground
troops but by the possibility of seizing as much of the enemy's
N depth as possible through active combat operations including airborne
landings, in order to paralyze his freedom over significant expanses
and to bring to naught his efforts to continue resistance. Under
such conditions, the most important thing is to calculate correctly
the time necessary for a particular front or army grouping to
conclude the destruction of the enemy in individual areas of
resistance.
Of considerable importance in planning an offensive operation
N is its depth, which also cannot'be of constant magnitude and which
depends on the goals of the operation, the scale of use of nuclear/
missile weapons, and the distance from the enemy's key operational-
strategic objectives, which the front (army) must seize. In the
category of these objectives which have a decisive influence in the
determination of the depth of the operation and consequently the
depth and content of the front's (army's) missions, the enemy's
political-administrative and economic centers, important supply
junctions, and the disposition areas of the enemy's bases of nuclear
missile weapons should be included.
The factors which in the past influenced the planning of the
rates, the depth, and the duration of operations, such, for example,
as the need for a front (army) to use force against the enemy
successively depending on the means of destruction on hand for this
goal, the depth of its operational formation, the possibility of a lag
in airfield basing of aviation, of artillery, and a number of other
things, which, if they must be considered at the present time cannot
be determining because the capabilities of nuclear/missile weapons are
actually limitless and, therefore, conditions for significantly
~. speedier destruction of enemy groupings and the seizure of his
territories are created.
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I bUX1-NUM
At the present time, as is known, it is customary to plan
offensive operations by missions, in which all intermediate missions.
composing the substance of the immediate and subsequent missions
of a front are included.
Thus, in planning for the execution of a front's immediate
mission, the subsequent execution of the following intermediate
missions is usually envisaged: the breakthrough of the tactical
depth of the enemy's defense and the destruction of his nearest
reserves, the seizure of the army zone and of the intermediate
zones, the encirclement and destruction of the enemy by the forces
of the front or, in coordination with adjacent units, the forcing of
water obstacles, etc.
This type of mission assignment is connected in principle with
methodical operations of the troops with their relatively steady
movement on a solid front, from one line to another.
Moreover, modern conditions, operations of the troops of a
front will be completely different and will not resemble the operations
of the period of the past war, since both an offensive and defensive
will be conducted on different principles.
The shifting of troops to an offensive will be effected, as a rule,
from areas removed from the line where both sides are in direct contact;
broad maneuver must be incorporated in the methods of troop operation,
based on a combination of swift movement in columns with operations in
..precombat and combat formations along separate axes with subsequent
conduct of individual engagements and battles in individual areas on
a large expanse. Moreover, on some axes groupings of troops will
advance swiftly, on others they will conduct meeting battles and
engagements, temporarily withdraw, circumvent vast zones of
radioactive contamination, changing the direction of advance or wait
for a time.
Deep mutual breaking in by troops will become a normal phenomenon.
Loss of direct contact of advancing and defending troops will take place
frequently. An airborne landing may at times be the only possible way
for the speedy fulfilment of the goals of the operation because
(2 to 4 words missing) mass'nucleaar/missile strikes, whole expanses
may become inaccessible for operations from the front of troops for an
extended period of time.
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50X1-HUM
Armies of a front will advance, exposing themselves to enemy
nuclear strikes, encountering the fierce opposition of his individual
mobile groupings in separate areas, with which it will be necessary to
wage heavy battles and engagements, and then to swiftly advance
at rates close to those of marches, in order to seize the more
deeply deployed.objectives or to destroy the enemy groupings which are
covering them.
As a result of the nature of combat operations by troops of a
front, the rates of advance of the armies operating in the first
echelon, and of the divisions which are part of the complement of
the armies will be most uneven. Therefore, under conditions when
the enemy's defense has lost its clearly expressed positional nature,
when the mobility of the troops has significantly increased, and combat
operations in the absence of solid fronts have become exceptionally
maneuverable, by which both sides, in the course of executing combat
operations will strive to deliver powerful deep strikes in order to
break through into the depth of the territory along separate axes to
seize the most important areas and objectives. The seizure of
certain lines will not be a necessary condition for the complete
defeat of the troops of the enemy whose groupings will also be
maneuvering on the battlefield.
?i The assignment of missions by lines binds the maneuver capabilities
not only of tank but also of combined-arms armies and paralyzes the
commanders' initiative in their choice of the method of operations and
the direction of a strike when deciding on missions for the destruction
of the enemy.
One should also keep in mind that the basic fire strike force are
nuclear/missile weapons on whose destructive power the success of the
operation depends in the final analysis, but these weapons, as is known,
are not permanently located in some limited area. They are dispersed
in the depth and along the front, practically throughout the entire
zone of the defender.
With movement of our troops, the bases of the enemy's nuclear/
missile weapons will be changing all the time, therefore, the arrival
of troops of the front (army) at some given line still does not
ensure the mission of routing the enemy.
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On the basis of the above, we come to the conclusion that the
content and character of their assignment., to the troops must be
changed and brought into accord with the new methods of combat
operations of troops.
The missions of a front (army) must be assigned so that
their content does not bind the commander to the seizure and holding of
certain lines on a solid front, but so as to have their fulfilment
lead to the achievement of a perfectly definite operational or
operational-strategic result.
In this, the main attention of the commander and staff should
be aimed, above all, at the destruction (neutralization) of the
enemy's nuclear/missile weapons, on the destruction of his basic
groupings and the seizure of individual areas having important
significance for the further development of the operation.
For example, the most immediate mission of a front in the
'v initial period of a war can be the destruction (neutralization) of
the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons along the entire depth of his
operational formation, the route of the first operational echelon of
the opposing grouping by gaining the main routes of approach of the
major enemy reserves, and prevention of their inflow and unification
for a strike against the troops of the front.
A subsequent mission of a front can consist of the destruction
of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons that have remained intact
or have newly appeared, the destruction of deep reserves, the seizure
of the primary areas of his missile bases, political-administrative or
economic centers, and also the disruption of mobilization measures
in a particular area of the country.
However, in these questions also, we must decisively reject our
accepted practice of strict centralization and detailing of missions.
The experience of war shows that the degree of detailing in assigning
missions to troops depended, in every case, on the scale and the
designated purpose of formation and large units, on-the specific
conditions of the situation and the nature of the combat activity
of the troops. In this, great independence in operations was
permitted at the operational level and to a lesser extent at the
tactical. During the war, there was also a very clear expression of
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the tendency toward strict centralization of control in the
preparation for an operation and combat and a relatively smaller degree
of centralization in the process of their conduct. At all levels,
centralization of control by the. senior commanders also took place
with regard to the utilization of fire and strike means.
However, in the course of the past war it had already become
evident that strict centralization of control is applicablein those
forms of combat operations where the troops lack a capability for
an extensive maneuver, for example, during a breakthrough of a
prepared positional defense and also in instances when the. qualities
of the troops are not adequate for maneuvering. But as soon as
conditions were created for an extensive maneuver of forces and
weapons, the necessity immediately arose to switch from strict
centralization to granting subordinates more initiative and independence
in accordance with the specific situation within the framework of
the general operational concept.
Under the conditions of highly dynamic combat operations and
abrupt changes in the situation, it would hardly be correct to
centralize the control of troops right up to the point of indicating
to large units and units the methods for fulfiling their combat
missions, as sometimes happened during the past war. The increased
combat capabilities of troops, the nature of a modern battle and
\ operation now urgently require granting subordinates greater
V independence and the opportunity to manifest initiative in operations
in all instances.
Of course, the degree of centralization of control, even under
new conditions will depend on the specific situation which has taken
V shape, the nature of the combat operations, and the preparedness of
command cadres and staffs at all levels of the military organism.
Under certain situational conditions, the senior commander, in
addition to assigning missions to subordinate troops and allocating
to them the means of reinforcement, can define the method by which
the assigned missions are to be fulfilled, under others, he can
apportion to subordinate troops the necessary means for reinforcement
and indicate combat missions without predetermination of the methods
of fulfilling them and the sequence of the use of forces and weapons,
granting this right to the subordinate commanders.
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However, the general trend in the development:~:_:characteristic of
v troop control under modern conditions, must lead to__subordinate
commanders and staffs using greater freedom and iii a endence than was
the case, for example, in World War II.
The circumstance, that a tendency has been clearly noted to
V change the combat composition of the operational formations of the
front and armies, in the direction of a quantitative reduction also has
very great significance for the planning of an operation.
In the past, the basic criterion determining the troop
composition of a front and an army for the successful execution of a
major offensive operation, as is known, was the necessity to create
'on the main axis, one and a half, double or sometimes even triple
superiority over the enemy in forces and weapons. Therefore, it was
completely natural to have the desire to achieve such superiority by
means of a maximum increase in the combat composition of formation for
the execution of not only the initial, most difficult missions of an
operation,, but also those in the course of its development. In this
,way, the strength of front and army formations was determined by the
ti number of large units, and also by the capability of the weapons of
4 destruction, chiefly of artillery and aviation to whose level of
development the methods of combat operations corresponded. These
methods, although they were basically maneuvering and fast moving,
were developed in complex situational conditions, and always required
for their initiation and development, the availability of compact
groupings of troops and fire,'coordination and close lateral contact
between them and their separate elements. This is why army and front
formations included in their composition a large number of combined-
arms large units, not counting the units and large units of arms of
troops and special troops. It is known, that the combat composition
\iof a front reached 35 to 40 large units and of an army up to 12 or more
large units.
It.is perfectly obvious that in view of the existence of
nuclear/missile weapons and their limited capabilities, front and army.
formations can no longer have their former composition in motorized
rifle and tank divisions. Under modern conditions, the criterion of
the ability of a front and an army to execute its assigned missions
V is determined by their capabilities to deliver crushing strikes with
nuclear weapons and other fire weapons.
50X1-HUM
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I 50X1-HUM
Considering the'- above conditions in tot_e,l the"
composition of a front for the West European theater c Gmilitary
operations can be defined as 15 to'20 motorized rifleand tank
large units, 4 to 6 missile large units and a number of special units.
With the indicated number of large units in a'front, the
l operational density will be from 25 to 35 km for a division (when
conducting an operation in a zone of up to.500 km), i.e., 2.5 to 3.5
times larger than was accepted in accordance with the experiences of
the past war.
In view of this possible composition of a front, the problem
v arises as to the number of armies in a front and the number of
divisions in an army. We consider that. it is inadvisable for a front
to have, as formerly, less than three or more than five armies.
Concerning an army, its composition should also include no more than
5.divisions plus a missile large unit and special units. This
composition, in comparison with 7 divisions, is sufficiently capable
of strikes and is more flexible-from the point of view of control,-
does not lead to unnecessary supersaturation of the operational
formation with forces and weapons and, consequently, to a possible
increase in losses from enemy nuclear strikes. Hence, the need for
army corps finally passes away to the degree than an army and a corps
cease to be in any way substantially different from one another in
their composition. With such limited composition of the armies,
army corps could be used in a front in their stead but this step is
hardly advisable if only for the reason that in every respect, the
control of an army is in its capabilities, undoubtedly a more
dependable and secure operational organ for control of troops under
modern conditions, when great military erudition is required from a
command element on this scale.
Planning the-use.:of nuclear/missile weapons in an operation is
the most important and definitive part of the planning of the entire
operation. In attributing great significance. to this principle, it
is impossible, in our view, not to turn attention to a'sometimes not
thoroughly correct understanding of the role of the missile troops of
a front. In concrete terms, we,are speaking of certain opinions
according to which the initiation of an offensive by front troops should
be preceded by a missile operation conducted by these troops, i.e., in
other words, an attempt is being made to mechanically extend the
principles for conducting missile operations in a strategic plan to the
front also.
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With such an approach to this problem, the factis..overlooked that
N missile large units and units are the main fire and s?ti'ike force of the
ground troops and are intended not only for combat with enemy nuclear
weapons which, as is known, constitutes one of the basic tasks of any
missile operation, but for the support of troop combat operations as
a whole. For this reason, they cannot, in principle, be planned
separately from the utilization of motorized rifle and tank troops,
aviation, tube artillery, and other combat weapons of the armies and
front as awhole. It is, therefore, all the more important to
emphasize the fact that-the relative weight of conventional weapons of
destruction has sharply decreased at this time.
The missile troops of a front are varied in their combat
characteristics and are found at various troop levels. It follows
from this, that every type of missile has its definite operational-
.tactical designation and every echelon of command to which they are
subordinate assigns them tasks in the required detail.
Thus, we believe, that striving to conduct missile operations at
the level of the front, with the means organizationally included in the
composition of the various combined arms elements of the front, has no
basis.
Nevertheless, measures for the timely and qualitative planning of
the use of nuclear/missile weapons in an operation are complex, many-
sided, and therefore require a very correct approach to the delimitation
of functions between the commander and staff of the front on the one
hand, and the commander and the staff of the missile troops and the air
force (WS) of the front on the other.
However, it must be said that in problems of control of missile
large units and units in a front and in an army, various extreme points
of view are expressed at times. Some believe that the entire control,
including the issuance of commands, must be executed by the commander
of troops of the front (army) through the staff of the front (army)
which is directly connected with the missile large units and units,
others believe it-to be advisable to transfer almost all questions of
control to the commander of missile troops and artillery of the front
(army), leaving to the commander of troops of the front (army) the
obligation, in essence, to review and approve the proposals of the
commander of missile troops and artillery of the front (army).
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These extreme points of view are clearly not acceptaTle and it
therefore appears more correct that only the commander o4 troops of i
the front with his staff be able to take it upon himself to decide
the basic fundamental problems in the utilization of nuclear weapons.
It is his prerogative alone to determine the targets for nuclear
weapons, the time and sequence of the utilization by the missile
troops and aviation, the expenditure of nuclear warheads. in an
operation, and distribution of them among the armies and missile
large units (units) of front subordination.
Of very great significance is the planning of combat with the
enemy's weapons of nuclear attack by all possible means (not only with
nuclear weapons, as is sometimes done), as well as the organization of
control of the means of using nuclear weapons in light of the concrete
conditions.' of the impending operation. In this, the front and army
must very carefully work out the problems of ensuring massed fire
of several missile large units and units of various subordination for
the execution of the most important tasks in the course of the operation.
The staff of the front conducts the operational planning for the
use of nuclear weapons, organizes and ensures control of the means of
using them through the commanders and staffs.of the missile troops and
the WS.
Specifically, the staff of the front (army) must organize k
reconnaissance of all kinds in support of the utilization of nuclear
weapons, organize the collection and analysis of intelligence data,
organize communications for control of the means of utilizing
nuclear weapons, organize engineer support for the deployment and
maneuver of the missile troops, and also organize security and defense
of the missile troops and organs of the missile rear services in areas
of disposition and during transfers.
At the same time, direct control of the missile large units and
units of the front (army) and especially of their fire, must naturally
be the prerogative of the commander of the missile troops and artillery.
On the basis of all these considerations, the following sequence
of work can be recommended.
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decisions to the troops, and the combined-arms staff and the staffs of
arms of troops are freed of the necessity to request and prepare necessary
memoranda and considerations for the preparation of nuclear strikes.
The problems of utilizing nuclear/missile weapons must be the basis IV
of the plan of the-operation. It must reflect: the objectives to be
destroyed, the time and sequence of the delivery of strikes, the
expenditure of nuclear warheads with an indication of their yields, the
types and heights of bursts and also the coordinates of their ground
zeros for each objective, safe distance for troops and the time periods
of their readiness, and also a tentative calculation of the use of
nuclear warheads in the course of the entire operation. Only after
deciding all these problems do the operations of the remaining
forces and weapons of the front, the combined-arms formations -and large
units, the conventional field artillery, the aviation, and other arms
of troops and special troops, become reflected in the plan of the
operation.
missions to those who will execute them and the entire work of
fulfilling them is organized by the commanders of the missile troops
and of the air army personally and through their staffs.
Such a work sequence speeds the planning and transmission of
each objective, the safe distance of our troops from the ground zeros
(centers) of the nuclear bursts, evaluates the expected results of
the nuclear strikes and the possible resultant radiation situation,
determines the large units (units) of missile troops and aviation
to be used to deliver strikes and other matters resulting from the
specific situation.
After confirmation of the problems which have been 'worked out by
the commander of troops of the front (army), the transmission of fire
The commander of troops of the front (army) determines"- the enemy
grouping to be destroyed by nuclear warheads and the mast.impbrtant
objectives to be destroyed, the expenditure of nuclear warheads for
the missile troops and aviation, the types of nuclear bursts, the
..order and the time of delivering the nuclear strikes.
The operational directorate of the staff of the front (army),
together with the staffs of the artillery and the air army
(the representative of the supporting aviation) works out the
specific problems of nuclear preparation and nuclear support of the
offensive, distributes the objectives for destruction between the
missile troops and aviation, determines the yield of the nuclear
charge the type and the height of the burst for the destruction 'of
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It is completely obvious, that there is no need whatsoever to
draw up a special plan for the use of nuclear/missile-weapons as
an attachment to the' general plan for an operation. All questions
of the organization and conduct of an offensive.operation are covered
b a single plan of the operation. This is a direct result of the
leading role of nuclear missile weapons in accomplishing the goals
and missions of an operation.
Weakening the nuclear strength of an opposing grouping of the
enemy and depriving him of his capability to use nuclear weapons is one
of the most important tasks, whose correct solution ensures the success
of the offensive operation as a whole. It is completely obvious, that
planning the fulfilment of the tasks of.achieving and maintaining
nuclear superiority over the enemy must be carried out within the
framework of the nuclear preparation and support of the offensive of
the troops of the front.
In this connection, the following should be mentioned. At the
present time, we employ such concepts as "fire preparation for an
offensive", "nuclear preparation for an offensive", while at the same
time such concepts as "artillery and aviation preparation for an
offensive" continue to exist. A correct clarification of these
concepts, it seems to us, is of a fundamental significance in
planning the utilization of missile troops and nuclear/missile weapons.
But are all these concepts valid and do not some contradictions exist
in this problem?
It seems to us that they all have a quite definite content. Fire
preparation for an offensive is a somewhat general collective concept
and includes fire strikes by nuclear/missile weapons, as well as by
aviation and artillery. Therefore, a direct result of this is that
component parts of the fire preparation for an offensive are nuclear,
artillery, and aviation preparation.
Fire preparation must be examined and planned as a comparatively
brief, powerful, massed, and sudden strike by nuclear/missile weapons,
aviation and artillery against the most important objectives of the
operational formation of the enemy's troops to a depth required by the
specific conditions of the situation.
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One of the most essential problems in planning nuclear
preparation and fire preparation as a whole for an offensive is
the ability to accomplish it in the most limited periods of time
and at the same time to ensure the delivery of a powerful fire
strike against the most important objectives of the enemy.
The mass utilization of nuclear weapons in short periods of time
is the only way. to achieve decisive destruction of the fire power of d
an opposing enemy grouping, destruction of his main nuclear/missile
and aviation means, and also disruption of the control of troops and
the disorganization of work of the rear services.
As to nuclear support of an offensive, depending upon the
expected nature of the combat operations of the troops, it can be
planned to include the delivery of individual, group, and mass
nuclear strikes. These strikes must ensure the fire support for
the advancing troops in the most vital and intensive (3 to 5 words
missing) for the use of nuclear weapons during the days of the
operation, obviously, are possible only tentatively during the period
when the troops are fulfilling their immediate tasks. Detailed
planning of nuclear support against targets and objectives to be
destroyed, can apparently be executed only for 1 or 2 days of the
combat operations.
Briefly summarizing the thoughts expressed above concerning the
influence of new factors on the planning of a modern offensive operation,
it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that little remains of
former concepts, including those drawn from the experience of
World War II. The time has come for a much more discriminating
approach to the use of this experience under new conditions which would
sweep aside everything which to any degree hinders the further
evolution of our views, which should not lag behind the development
of the modern weapons of armed combat.
Taking advantage of the opportunity presented to share thoughts
on the pages of this Collection, the publication of which must be
warmly greeted, I should like to touch very briefly on an abnormal
situation which has been created in connection with the working out
of the operational instructions necessary for the Armed Forces.
The fact is that, such instructions, as is known, have not yet
appeared since the conclusion of World War II, if we disregard the
II I I
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several published drafts which were not approved even though they were
widely used in their time during the training of`,higher staffs. Such
a situation does not help to bring about unity of views and does not
provide guidance for long-range elaboration of theories in particular
directions.
It is not possible to agree with the point of view which gives
preference to so called works which are not intended to give
strictly defined recommendations and, consequently, are not to be
cate gorized as either regulations or instructions.
A situation such as this evokes serious concern and in the study
particularly of sectors of applied military theory,. it leads to the
necessity for orienting oneself primarily to analyses-of the major
measures of operational training, carried out by the types of Armed
Forces and the General Staff which, as is known, most clearly
elucidate the specifics of a given measure. In addition, the lack
of official instructions also gives rise to the situation that the
level of preparation and knowledge of generals and officers always
depends upon the personal views of superior commanders on any
particular question. And since these commanders come and go, it is'
perfectly obvious what consequences this has.
In passing, it should be noted that in the work published by the
General Staff called "Bases of Modern Operations", it is difficult to
grasp anything different in the nature of the exposition of problems
.from what was accepted as the content of previously proposed
instructions. There are fewer practical recommendations, but it
is questionable whether this is really good. And does this better
support the training of young cadres who are moving up and have no
combat experience in commanding formations and in serving in
higher staffs?
It seems that it would be far more correct to decide in favor of
working out those instructions necessary for training the command
personnel of the Armed Forces in the conduct of front and army
operations, and as a matter of fact, those and others as well. At
present, it is intended that the instructions for conducting army
operations will be worked out separately from and parallel to the
work "Bases of Modern Operations" without any coordination between
them, one in the General Staff and the other in the Main Staff of
the Ground Troops.
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The working out of operational instructions must be organized
so that it does not become a substitute for the working out of
theoretical works in development of and on the basis of these
instructions. Therefore, it seems to us, this practice in working
out regulations should be judged as an extraordinary inflation of
their scope by means of superfluous detail and repetition. That
this is very widespread with us can be easily confirmed by looking
at previously worked out drafts of similar instructions and even
of other works.
Mca eover, it is very important to clarify published instructions
in a timely manner. Under present conditions, which are unprecedented
in rates of development and perfection of combat equipment, one can
never be completely sure that the problems have been finally worked
out. Obviously, many of them will, to one degree or another but at
different times have to be clarified to the extent of the study and
revelation of new factors. It is asked, how can this be best done?
To republish the instructions yearly makes no sense but nevertheless,
every year changes concerning one problem or another become solidified
and they must reach the proper people in a timely manner. Failure to
do this will result in the fact that many outdated situations in the
above-mentioned work of the General Staff will continue to exist
along with other recommendations that have been elaborated later. /
In order to correct this situation, yearly directives should be
issued on operational training, not only stating shortcomings and
assigning general tasks for this training, but primarily clarifying
those problems and recommendations in previously published instructions
which require changes and supplements. In this instance, the
significance and authority of these directives will increase
immeasurably. As for the republication of instructions, this should
be done after a few years, depending on the necessity.
Experience in working out instructions and regulations shows
that it is clearly inadvisable to conduct parallel elaboration of them,
since this gives rise to the necessity for numerous and frequently
fruitless coordination, hampers to a great degree the selection of
author groups, and dissipates efforts. It is perfectly obvious that
this work could be fulfilled in a significantly more productive and
qualitative manner and even in a shorter time of there was a
prearranged plan for working out operational instructions and issuing
them before the field regulations, and not vice-versa, as is still
the case today.
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