STRATEGIC MISSILE BULLETIN: THE PREPARATION FOR COMBAT OPERATION OF A REGIMENT ARMED WITH R-12 MISSILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400690001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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bUAl -HUM
The Preparation for Combat Operations
of a
Regiment Armed with R-12 Missiles
(Based on experience gained in exercises)
emu- -
According to the concept of the higher command,a
regiment equipped to launch R-12 missiles is used mainly
for the performance of strategic tasks. These tasks are
performed through the participation of the regiment in
missile operations (in massed nuclear/missile strikes),
carried out at the start of or during a war. The basic
targets for destruction by the regiment may be:
-strategic missile launch sites;
-sites for the production, assembly and storage of
nuclear weapons and of means for delivering them to
the target;
-large airfields, air force and naval bases;
-centers of political administration and of military
industry;
-large communications centers;
-large factories and power centers;
-arsenals and depots with strategic stocks of
armaments, military equipment or strategic raw materials;
-strategic reserves and other targets of strategic
significance in the deep rear of the enemy.
In individual cases the missile regiment may be used
to destroy the most important targets. of operational
significance.
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The preparation of a regiment for combat operations
embraces a variety of measures which~are carried out by
commanders, staffs and services at a~i levels, and also
by the subunits of the regiment. Basic among these
measures are:
-the determination and allocation of combat tasks;
-the selection and preparation of siting areas and
of the road network;
-the transport and stockpiling of missiles, nose
cones and missile fuel components;
-the movement of subunits into the siting area
and their deployment in combat formation;
-the organization of communications and control;
-combat, geodetic, meteorological, engineer and
medical support;
c_-
Go -the organization of-coordination with the technical
repair base (remontno-tekhnicheskaya baza - RTB) support-
ing the combat operations of the.regiment; o v v 4'
-the advance planning of nuclear/missile strikes
against enemy targets;
-the systematic carrying out of exercises with the
subunits, aimed at increasing the smooth functioning,
clarity and speed of their operation in the fulfilment
of f ire missions;
-organization of the carrying out of combat duty
and advance preparation of the procedure and sequence
for the receipt of signals (orders) on transition to
the appropriate stage of readiness or on the preparation
of missiles for launching, and also of the order for
reporting on the fulfilment of the signals and commands
to the commander of the large unit.
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The sequence of accomplishment of the measures
mentioned above depends on the specific conditions of the
military and political situation, on the establishment
(ukomplektovaniye) and level of training bf the subunits,
and also on the significance of the combat tasks entrust-
ed to the regiment.
The preparation of the regiment for the performance
of tasks in an operation during the initial period of a
war must be carried out in advance, in accordance with
the plan of the higher command. With the aim of delivering
the first nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy
immediately and of reducing to the minimum the time
necessary to deploy the regiment in combat formation, the
primary siting area is equipped in advance with launching
mounts, with storage facilities for missiles, nose cones,
and missile fuel, with shelters for personnel, for command
posts and combat equipment, and with other stationary
structures and hard surface roads. The command post of
a regiment is prepared in the siting area of one of the
battalions.
Besides the primary siting area,one or two alternate
areas are prepared for the regiment, equipped with field-
type engineer structures.
The high combat readiness of a missile regiment, and
the availability of prepared siting areas, is best ensured
by allocating combat tasks to it in advance and by precise
performance of combat duty.
Subunits with a high level of special tactical train-
ing, with combat equipment in excellent condition, with
appropriate materiel and technical support and with a
prepared siting area will be allowed to go on combat duty.
To perform combat duty is to carry out a combat task.
Permission for subunits to go on combat duty is granted
by a commission of the Commander-in-Chief of Missile
Troops.
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RTB duty officer, a communications duty officer,.radio-
telegraph operators, telegraph operators, communications -
'-center telephone operators and radiorelay technicians.
A complete combat crew is assigned to the command pos-
each day, when the regiment is announced as being at
readiness Nos. 3, 2, or 1, or at the order of the higher
command. The number of officers, NCO's and soldiers
allotted to the combat crew of a command post is determined
by an order to the regiment or by the Regulation on
Combat Duty.
A regiment is put on combat duty on the basis of a
combat order from the Main Staff of the Missile Troops
(Glavnyy shtab raketnykh voysk). In allocating tasks
for combat duty the following are';indicated to the
regiment:
combat crew at a regiment command post usually includes a
regimental duty officer (otvetstvennyy dezhurnyy), an
for specially detailed combat crews ,at the command_po sts
regiment and-RTB on combat duty, and for the operational
control of ~t h easing (podyem) and assembly of- -subunits
during a combat alert, round-the-clock duty is-organized
-the purpose of the duty and the degree of combat
readiness;
-the number and composition of the subunits put
on combat duty;
-the fire missions, the number and degree of readiness
of missiles and nose cones intended for the first and
for subsequent launchings (at readiness Nos. 2 or 1);
-the sequence of organization and the operation of
communications with the Main Staff of the Missile Troops,
with the staff of the large unit (formation), with the
district headquarters and with subordinate subunits;
-the regimental stocks of missiles, nose cones,
missile fuel, and other materiel supplies and the
periods for their stockpiling;
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-signals and the procedure for reporting the carry-
ing out of signals (commands, orders);
-readiness periods.
Fire missions for the destruction of objectives (targets),
the coordinates of aiming points, the expenditure of missiles
for each objective, the order or the sequence of the
destruction of targets are determined by the Main Staff. of
the Missile Troops.
Depending on the situation, and on the nature and
importance of the tasks being performed, the personnel and
combat equipment of a regiment and of an RTB may be found
itn, various degxees_af c.ombat_readiness (Nos. 1, 2, 3 or 4).
The following are related to th ave r ous degreesof comba
readiness:
-the specific technical condition of missiles and nose
cones, and of ground and fueling equipment; the areas
appointed for their disposition and storage.
-the specific disposition of the personnel carrying
out combat duty;
-a' .specific system of communications and of the control
of regiments and RTB;
-the accumulated stocks-.nf missiles, nose cones, missile
fuel and of other supplies of materiel.
On the basis of the particular situation and of
the
decision of the higher command, the preparation of
a
regiment for launching missiles may be carried out
by
means of a successive transition from one degree
of
combat
readiness to another or all at once, regardless
of
the
degree of readiness of the regiment subunits at
the
time
the alert was announced.
Readiness Nos. 1, 2 and 3, as they have been established
for the regiment, ensure the launching ;of the first missiles'
t -,
in J to 2J hours, and in 6 to 20 hours'from readiness No. 4.
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Preparation and execution of the first missile launchings
in i to 2j hours are ensured by;: the timely performance of
a number of measures in technical preparation for the
launchings and also by having personnel on constant combat
duty at the launch and technical sites. The number of
personnel assigned to combat duty is determined by the
total volume of high priority tasks involved in preparing
the missiles for launching, in organizing their immediate
storage and in the carrying-out of other measures to
ensure attainment of the combat readiness specified for
the regiment.
Thus, for example, to ensure combat readiness No. 4,
the personnel of a regiment and RTB may be situated in the
primary siting area (completely or, partially) or in their.
permanent location. All regimental personnel are occupied
in conformity with the plan for combat and, political training.,
Subunits remaining at the disposition site. are at constant
readiness to move to the primary siting area. When
readiness No. 3, 2 or 1 is announced the missile regiment
and RTB are moved to the siting area at full strength.
In the regiment's primary siting area the requisite
stocks of missiles, component parts, nose cones, ground
equipment, missile fuel and of the other materiel supplies
needed to ensure the specified degree of readiness, and
the successful conduct of combat operations are set up in
good time. The size of the stocks established in the
regiment is determined by a decision of the Commander-in-
Chief of Missile Troops. -,
In the primary siting area the necessary astronomical
and geodetic work and calculations are carried out in
good time, a system of communications and control is
organized, the combat training of personnel is carried
out, and special tactical exercises for the subunits and
the training of the regiment and RTB are carried out.
The operations of the regimental subunits on combat
duty must be determined by instructions worked out for
each subunit, taking into consideration the specific
conditions of their disposition.
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The occupation by the regiment and RTB-of the primary
siting area, the transition from one degreeJof combat
readiness to another,, and combat operations, will start,
as a rule, when a combat alert signal, prearranged by
the Main Staff of the Missile Troops, is received from
the central command post of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Missile Troops.
For this purpose direct communications are organized
between the Commander-in-Chief and each missile regiment.
The'existence of such communications should ensure the
minimum expenditure of time in assigning combatmissions
and in calling for the first nuclear/missile strikes,
because it is the regiment itself which is able to
ensure the constant combat readiness of those who will
directly carry out the fire missions - the launching
subunits - and to accomplish independently the fire
missions assigned to it. The allocation of tasks to the
regiment's subunits must be carried out by short signals
and by commands sent from the command post.
The actions of regiment and RTB subunits in an alert
must therefore be planned carefully and in good time.
The plan of action for a regimental subunit in an alert,
with its deployment into combat formation, is evolved
with this goal; in the plan are given the target, the
combat alert signals, the order for the reception of
signals and for their transmission to the subunits, the
order for assembling and moving the subunits to the siting
area, the movement routes, the attack positions, the
control posts, the sequence for deploying the regiment
in combat formation 4hd for bringing it to the degree of
combat readiness which has been determined, the ord 00
for the move of the_ RTB to the 't~ ehn cal 20 he
questions of controls and communications, the trans ort
schedule for missiles and fuel components from the supply
station, the schedule for issuing and receiving missiles,
nose cones, missile fuel and other materiel and technical_-_..
supplies,.and also measures for support in combat. tln work-
ing out the plan it is necessary to consider conditions for
the disposition and security of the regiment, the probable
nature of enemy actions,'the time of year, the time of day
and other conditions.
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Systematic training must be conducted with all-personnel,
with the goal of carefully working'out the'duties and
the sequence of actions in an alert. An account of the
personnel for action in an alert is made in each subunit
daily,taking into consideration fatigue details, and
administrative and other work. The actions of personnel,
from the announcement of the al t and after assembly at
their work positions, must be worked on to the stage at
which they are automatic,,and the expenditure of time
in moving to and assuming work positions, in deploying
ground equipment and in preparing it for operation,'and
in preparing and launching missiles, must be reduced to a
minimum.
The Deployment of Regimental.Subunits and of the
Technical-Repair Base in an Alert at Readiness No. 3
As has already been indicated, given the availabilities
of siting areas prepared in good time, and the stockpiling
in them of missile weapons, of nose cones 'and of means for
ensuring their use, the combat actions of missile units
(subunits) will begin with immediate deployment in combat
formation at the alert., with transition to a greater degree
of readiness or with the preparation of missiles for
launching from any degree of readiness. Everything will
depend on the particular situation, on the support, pre-
paredness and degree of the regiment-'s'combat readiness
and on the decision of the higher command.
if the,' regiments subunits are located in the primary
siting area while at readiness No. 4 it is then necessary
to do the following for transition to readiness No. 3.:
-to transmit the alert signal to all personnel of
the regiment and to assemble them at their work positions
(notifying and assembling personnel in an alert should
be done in 5 to 10 minutes);
-to deploy the ground equipment, in 1 to li hours;
M
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-to carry out the transition of the missiles from
readiness No. 4 to readiness No. 3, the nose cones'from
SG-4 (condition of readiness - sostoyaniye gotovnosti)
to SG-5, to transport the nose cones to the launching
areas andito mate them with the missiles (not more than
9-10 hours should be used to fulfil these operations) ;
-to fill the fueling trucks and tank trucks with
missile fuel components simultaneously with the preparation
of the missiles and nose cones.
Thus, if the regimental subunits are located in the
primary siting area, the regiment's transition from
readiness No. 4 to readiness No. 3 can be carried out
in 10i to 11 hours.
However, various initial conditions may conform with
combat readiness No. 4, causing a different sequence and
duration for the fulfilment by the regiment of the basic
measures for transition to'readiness No. 3.
The combat situation may make it necessary to bring the
missile regiment to readiness No. 3, when the construction of
storage facilities and structures in the primary siting
area is not yet completed. In this case, the regimental
subunits will, as a rule, be located in the permanent
disposition area, and the regimental stocks of missiles,
nose cones and missile fuel may be stored at the closest
depots. In order to bring the regiment to readiness No. 3.in
these conditions it is necessary:
-to notify the personnel of the alert;
-to move the missile battalions, the servicing and
supporting subunits of the regiment and the RTB into the
assembly areas and to organize and carry out the march
of these subunits to the primary siting area;
-to deploy the regiment and RTB subunits in combat
formation and to prepare them for the receipt and checking
of missiles and nose cones, and also for the receipt of
missile fuel;
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-to direct the transport and fueling subunits of
the battalion to missile and nose'cone unloading
points and to the Directorate of the Fuel Supply Dumps
of the Ministry of Defense (Upravleniye snabzheniya
goryuchim Ministerstva oborony - USG MO);
-to receive the missiles, nose cones and missile
.fuel from the depots and to deliver them to the siting
'.'area;
-to check the missiles and nose cones and to bring
them to readiness No. 3.
The total time needed to bring the regiment to
readiness No. 3 under these conditions will consist of
the time necessary:
-for notification of and assembly for the alert
(up to 1 hour);
-for the execution of a march of up to 100 km by the
transport and fueling subunits of the battalion, for
the loading of the first group (partiya) of missiles on
ground carriers (gruntovaya telezhka) (up, to 10 hours),
the transport of nose cones and of missile fuel must be
carried out simultaneously with the transport of missiles;
-for the technical preparation of the missiles and
nose cones after transport (up to 6 hours).
Simultaneously, the missile battalions march for
20-50 km to the siting area and deploy the ground equip-
ment in the siting area (up to 5 hours).
Up to 17 hours is required to bring a regiment to
readiness No. 3 under these circumstances; missile
battalions will be ready to receive missiles 6 hours
after an alert is announced.
In order to ensure readiness No. 4, the'subunits of
a regiment may also be located in the primary siting area
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or at the permanent disposition area when the-regimental
stocks of missiles and nose cones are set =directly
in the siting area and the missile fuel components are
stored at the closest USG MO dumps (at a distance of up
to 100 km). Under these conditions, the time necessary
to bring the regiment to readiness No. 3 will be determined
by the time necessary for the transport and fueling'sub-
units of the battalion to march to the USG MO dumps, to'
receive the missile fuel components and to transport them
to the siting area. Depending on the distance to the
USG MO dump, on the condition of the roads, the weather,
and sometimes on other conditions, the time will total
10 to 15 hours and'sometimes more.
The deployment of a regiment in combat formation and
the transition to readiness No. 3 may be carried out under
conditions in which personnel are located simultaneously in
the primary siting area and at the area of permanent
disposition. In consequence, the initial conditions which
may precede the bringing of the regiment to readiness No. 3
may be very varied. Therefore, the time necessary to reach
readiness No. 3 depends on the particular situation and
may vary between 6 and 20 hours.
The principles mentioned above are essentially
confirmed by the results of the exercises which have been
carried out. In general, the initial situation of subunits,
before the start of the exercise, conformed to,the version
which was originally stated.
The regimental headquarters took 10 minutes to transmit
the "Alert" signal to the subunits, the battalion head-
quarters -.about 1 minute. However, this signal was trans-
mitted to the technical position only after 34 minutes
because of the lack of direct communications between this
position and the command post of the battalion.
The assembly of subunit personnel at their places of work
was accomplished in 8 to 20 minutes.
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The deployment of ground equipment by,the launching
batteries was not carried out in uniform periods'of time
(from 1 hour 33 minutes to 2 hours and 197mfnutes) ; this
is explained by the different levels of pl:eparedness of the
subunit personnel and mainly by the different conditions
for the deployment of the launch batteries.
One of the reasons for the differences in preparedness
between the subunits was that the evaluation of their work
is made not for each operation on the technological schedule,
but as a whole, using the total time needed to bring a,
battery to a particular readiness, which is, of course,,
wrong. As the basis for an evaluation of all work in
bringing a subunit to a certain degree of readiness,,it is
essential to evaluate not only the total time needed but
also that taken for each technological operation.
.The whole of the preparatory work was completed by
the launch batteries in 21 to 3 hours and the calculations
for the independent chec i__g._o f the technical;.-batterywere _~
completed in 51 hours.'IThe total time for bringing the
missile regiment to readiness No. 3 was more-t?han-that allowed
/, C _t4.,~.?.?.: \'?" because durin
+t,i c a the RTB was work inL'--...__
g
below its potential level, having spent 13 hours in preparing
to and assembly: df the subunits of the..xeg an TB~.~~
for the alert was intolerably slow. The organization!' of---.
the assembly of personnel in an aler must be thoroughly
perfected, using not more than 30 seconds for the notifica-
tion of the subunits of the regiment located in the primary
siting area and 5 to 7 minutes for this assembly. The
notif ication should be carried out by technical means,
using selective loudspeaker communications, sound and light
signal devices (electric bells, signal lights, etc.), the
installation of which must be carried out in all places
where the personnel are disposed.'., The technical means
of notification should be activated instantly by the pushing
of a button. A similar system of signals must be set up
by the forces and means of units and subunits.
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Exercises have shown thata" missile regimentT.needs
12 to 13 hours for transition. to readiness No-:_-3: from the
previously mentioned initial position. However the-time
necessary to convert the missile regiment to','readiness
No. 3 can be almost halved if the productivity of the
RTB's assembly brigades bringing nose cones to SG-5?corresponds
to the productivity of the missile battalions of the regiment
in the technical preparation of missiles for launching.
Preparation of Data for Missile Launchings
When a regiment is on combat duty,initial data for the
launching of missiles are prepared beforehand for all
targets; scheduled for destruction by the regiment, and
the documents required by the launching regulations are
formulated. The preparation beforehand of data for launchings
against each target includes:
-calculation of the sphericalazimuth and of the range
of,the launchings;
-filling out data preparation form No. 1;
-the compilation of the launching card, of aiming
cards and of the initial geodetic data.
The preparation of initial data for the launching of
missiles at the start of combat operations consists of
carrying out calculations for the second phase,' which
are performed directly before the fueling of the missile.
In this process, the following are determined:
-the feasibility of firing on the planned targets,
given the specific gravities of the oxidizer and fuel;
-the time setting for the accelerometer (vremya
zaryadki integratora) in accordance with the main and
preliminary commands for engine shutdown;
-fuel loadings of the missiles by weight and volume.
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.In the exercise,'-,she preparation of data for the
second phase was carried out by the data-preparation
section (otdeleniye podgotovki dannykllj -- OPD) of the
battalion, augmented by data-personnelt(vychislitel) from
a battalion which was not taking part in the exercise.
It is necessary to strengthen the OPD of the battalion with
,reserve data-personnel from among the senior geodesists of
the geodetic support platoon whose training must be
organized and carried out beforehand under the direction of
the chief of the OPD of the regiment. In their degree of
training, the senior geodesists approximate very closely to
the data-personnel of the data preparation sections and, are
capable of mastering this specialty (which is related to
their own) in a short period of time.'
Since the geodetic preparation of the siting areas of
a regiment is carried out in advance, and since the senior
geodesists of the geodetic support platoon are free of work
in their specialty by the time combat operations begin, it
is possible to use them as data-personnel. In this process
it is advisable to set up a non-organic OPD for the-regiment
with the 6 to 8 reserve data personnel and to entrust them
with the performance of the following main tasks:
-checking the accuracy of the calculations made by the
OPD of the battalions;
-making first :phase calculations in the preparation of
data for launchings against targets that were not on the
plan, in cases when the battalion OPJYs are busy with the
preparation of second phase data for launchings against
planned targets;
-reinforcing the battalion OPD (when necessary):;
Exercises have shown that in preparing subunits for
the launching of missiles directly from readiness No. 2,
the battalion OPD carrying out the computation of second
phase data in accordance with the instructions of the Temporary
Firing Tables (Vremennaya Tablitsa Strelby.-), delays the
launching of the missiles for 12 to 17 minutes, because the
loading with fuel components begins seven to nine minutes
after the signal to launch the missile is given, and .
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calculation of the volume of the fuel components takes 20
to 25 minutes. This fault can'be eliminated by advance
completion of Form No. 2 on the series of~ possible
temperature values (znacheniye temperatur) of the fuel
and,,,the oxidizer. The availability at the battalion of
a,t'able, calculated in advance, showing the possible,
temperature values of--the missile fuel components has been
shown by the experience of exercises to permit a reduction
in the time needed to calculate their volume by 12 to 17
minutes, and to allow the advance issue of data for the
loading of missiles with fuel and oxidizer.
In addition, the exercises disclosed:
-the advisability of advance calculation, by the data
preparation sections of the battalions, of the angle for
the preliminary aiming of the missile (the angle between
the basic direction and the line connecting the center
of the pad of the launching mount with the point where the
guidance theodolite (teodolit navodki) is standing, which
ensures the timely computation of the first phase of the
initial data for the launchings;
-the. possibility, in principle, of increasing the launch
sector of a launch site by 490 (19? to the left of the basic
direction and 300 to the right) without relocating the ground
equipment assemblies, but changing the point where the
guidance theodolite stands. However, the launch sector for
each launch site depends on the particular features of its
equipment and may have widely differing dimensions. The
possibility of increasing these dimensions must therefore
be determined for each launch site individually';`
-the need to strengthen the data-preparation section of
the regiment with non-organic, reserve data-personnel,
because its organic composition does not permit the
organization of control over the work of the OPDs of the
battalions;
-the need to supply each member of the working data-
personnel with a separate copy of the launching tables;
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-the need to establish time norms for=the transmission
of initial data for launchings to all=the subunits, from
the battalion data-preparation section,-to the launch
batteries;
-the possibility that calculation by the battalion
data-preparation section of the initial data for all
launching mounts for launchings against an unscheduled
(neplanovoy) target will take 3 hours and 30 minutes,
which greatly exceE3ds the time taken for the technical
preparation of missiles for launching from readiness Nos. 3,
2 and 1. To eliminate this fault it is necessary to use
accelerated methods for the calculation of initial data,
for example, the method developed by the Artillery
Academy i/n F.E. Dzerzhinskiy.
It is also necessary to develop widespread rationalizing
and inventive work in units, in scientific-research
institutes and in the military higher education institutions,
designed to evolve more accurate and more rapid methods for
the calculation of initial data. Use should be made of
all opportunities for a more rational distribution of
functional duties in the OPD, for the use of available cal-
culating equipment, for the improvement of existing methods
of computing data and for the development of new ones, and
also for the wider introduction of electronic computers.
The Transition of a Regiment to Readiness Nos. 2
or 1 and the Preparation of Missiles for
Launching in the Primary Siting XrFea
After transition to readiness No. 3, the missile regiment
may remain at this state of readiness for some time, or, upon
a`signal from the central command post, it may pass to a
higher degree of readiness, or may prepare missiles directly p
for launching.
On reception of the signal to pass from readiness No. 3
to readiness No. 2, the missiles and nose cones are
transported to the launching platforms from prelaunch storage
(predstartovoye khranilishche), are mounted on the launch
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pads, and are brought to readiness-0o. 2. Missiles and
nose cones, which were checked at'the technical position,
are handed over to prelaunch storage, are mated (sostykovyvat),
and are brought to readiness No. 3. The necessary fueling
capacity (zapravochnaya emkost), filled with missile fuel
components, is delivered to the launching platforms and
readied for the fueling of the missiles. Missiles are aimed
at first volley targets, the accelerometers are set for
the flight time. Duty combat crews must be located at
their places of work at this time.'
The launching of missiles from readiness No. 2 must
be carried out not more than an hour after the regimental
commander receives the command to launch.
From readiness No. 2 the subunits of the regiment may
prepare the missiles directly for launching or bring them
to readiness No. 1.
On receipt of the signal for transition from readiness
No. 2 to readiness No. 1 the following steps are carried
out:
-the fueling of missiles with fuel and oxidizer;
-a check of the aiming of the first volley at the
target;
-the transport of missile fuel components by the,
regiment's surface transport resources, which are free after
fueling the missiles.
Duty combat crews must be permanently located at.their
places of work.
The launching of missiles from readiness No. 1 must be
accomplished. not more than 30 minutes after the moment when
the regimental commander receives the signal to launch.
The actions of regimental subunits in the exercise, after
deploying at readiness No. 3, consisted of subsequent
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transitions from one readiness to another, of preparation
for launching and of the simulated launching of missiles
from the primary launching positions at readiness Nos.
3, 2 and 1, and also of the preparation of missiles at
the technical position.
The total time for converting missiles to different
stages of readiness and for their preparation for launching,
according to the results of the work of four launching
batteries in one of the exercises, is shown in Table 1.
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Description of Technical Operations
Tran,sittto-'f of the regiment to
readiness No. 3, from the moment
the alert. was given. (according
to the report of the last battery)
Conversion of missiles from
readiness No.'3 to readiness No. 2.
Conversion of missiles from
readiness No. 2 to readiness No. 1.
Preparation of missiles for :; ;:.
launching from readiness No. 1.
Conversion of missiles from
readiness No. 4 to readiness No. 3.
Preparation of missiles for
launching from readiness No. 3.
Conversion of missiles from
readiness No. 4 to readiness No. 2.
Preparation of missiles for
launching.from readiness No. 2.
Conversion of missiles from
readiness No. 4 to readiness No. 1.
Preparation of missiles at the
technical position.
Average Time for
Completion of Operation
15 hours 01 minute
2 hours 50 minutes
48 minutes
30 minutes
2 hours 20 minutes
3 hours 14 minutes
3 hours 10 minutes
50 minutes
3 hours 40 minutes
4 hours 38 minutes
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The operations of subunits at a given stage of the
exercise, in fulf illing the tasks allocated by the Main
Staff of the Missile Troops, showed that the times taken
for checking at the technical position - for the preparation
of missiles for launching, and for transition from one
stage of readiness to another,-were basically shorter than
the times established as, normal (the transition from
readiness No. 3 to readiness No. 2 by 1 hour and 20 minutes,
the transition from readiness No. 2 to readiness No. 1
by 22 minutes, etc.). The time taken to perform certain
technological operations at launching and technical
positions was reduced to a minimum, thanks to the
combination of separate operations.
The experience of exercises has shown that the existing
time norms for the carrying out of a series of technological
operations are in need of review. It is advisable, for
example, to carry out the self-contained (avtonomnyy) tests
of the system for regulating apparent speed (kazhushchayasya
skorost) in conjunction with the checking of the system
for normal and lateral stabilization, which reduces the
length of time taken to prepare a missile for launching by
10 to 15 minutes; to allot 15 minutes instead of 5 for the
uncovering of the missile; 15 minutes instead of 20 for
testing insulation resistance and the integrity of the
circuits, 20 minutes instead of 30 for the assembly of the
independent testing circuit, 30 minutes instead of 25 for
final operations on the engine assembly.
In addition, it is advisable to include in the
technical schedule as a separate, independent operation the
adjustment of the gyroscope-stabilized platform (giroplata),,
allotting 5 minutes for its fulfilment. The adjustment of
the gyroscope-stabilized platform must be carried out after
the instruments have been installed on board the missile.
It is also advisable to install storm lashing (shtormovoye
krepleniye) on the missile before its erection.
The Movement of a Regiment to an Alternate Siting Area
The advance preparation of the primary siting area of
a'regiment creates favorable conditions for the complete
engineer preparation of elements of the combat formation,
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which significantly raises their viability. In addition,
the prolonged presence of a regiment in one sitoi~gi area
greatly increases the probabilfy of discovery
elements of combat formation
delivernnuclear/missile strikes
it possible for the
combat operations.
at the beginning
The . problem of increasing the viability of the combat
formations of missile troops must therefore be resolved
by skilfully combining the concealment of preparations
for combat operations with the engineer preparation and
the concealment of combat formations, withatioadomaneuvers,
with the deception of the enemy out of false regroupings,
siting areas, with the carrying
transfers, etc. When the actual threat of an enemy nuclear
attack arises it is essential to take measures to move the
regiment from the primary siting area and to relocate it in
which
an alternate siting area
tasks.
an opportunity for the
The need to change the siting also
relocate the regiment in an
arise:
-in the event that it is impossible to fulfil combat
tasks, for example, because of enemy fire;
-on the reception of new and unscheduled fire missions,
which cannot be fuif fled from a particular siting area;
becauseremain
-when it is impsaib~olonged personnel
of high
particular area for p
radioactive contamination;
-in the event that several launchings have been carried
out from the primary launch sites, which increases the
likelihood of their being located by intersection by the
enemy, and in other cases.
Thus, the need to transfer the regiment during combat
operations, from the primary se siting area aThisn
area (or to another) may
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can be performed successfully only with a high degree of
march training, and also when there is a high factor of
technical preparedness in,the motor pool of the subunits,
of the regiment and of the r RTB . Theref ore., marchntraining
must be kept in the center of attention by
staffs and must occupy one of the important places in the
system of unit and subunit combat training.
During the'exercises a situation was created in
which the regimental
he regiment an change the
areaAg
area and to move giment
The launch batteries took 2 hours and 18 minutes tohe
andetheeAsfor the march, t
pack s their equipment
sembly brigade of
technical battery
the RTB 1 hour and 16 minutes.
A march of about 15 km was carried out by the subunits
of the regiment and the RTB along one route,.takisg anthour,
L
trans-
and 20 minutes. Iimultaneously,,the battery fueling,
porting and fueling sections were directed
detoetheofieldoddump
of the USG MO to collect missile f
10 hours to collect the missile fuel components and to carry
out a march totaling 99 km.
Upon arrival at the alternate siting area the subunits
of the regiment and RTB began to set up the equipment. The
launch batteries took 3 hours for. this, the technical
battery 1 hour and 32 minutes, and the RTB 2 hiurshaand
20 minutes. For the march and for setting up n
alternate siting area a total of 5 hours and 23 minutes
was used. The advance movement of some~of the vehicles
and personnel of the technical battery and of the RTB
facilitated quick deployment by ensuring the erectioneof
tents and the carrying out of some preparatory meas
before the arrival of the subunits.
The launching of from
was carried out in 2 hours
12 minutes.
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The experience of exercises has shown that the -
organization and carrying out of a march by:--a .regiment
equipped with medium range missiles. involves-considerable
difficulties. The great weight of the convoys (poyezd),,
which runs into tens of tons, the large dimensions of the
missiles, of the means for their transport and of thedemands
means for transporting fuel make exceptionally great
on the roads. The success of a march will depend to a
considerable degree on the availability of wide hard-surface
roads, of bridges with high .load-bearing'capacity, on
the configuration of the terrain, and on the training of
personnel and other conditions.
The maneuverability of missile units may be increased
by reducing
of the means for their transport.
One possible way to resolve this problem would be to
build solid fuel missiles. The solid fuel strategic
missiles which-are already in existence (uzhelaunching
sushchestvuyushchaya)have considerably lower
weight and dimensions in comparison with missiles of the
same class which have liquid rocket engines. However, on
the march, solid fuel missiles are considerably heavier than
liquid missiles which have-not been fueled, and thus they
have no perceptible advantages in maneuverability.
It is also possible rtos the path of
railroadsetting
orup
mobile launching platfom
on the mobile means of the maritime (river) fleet. The
advance preparation of several siting areas (areas for
parking (mesto stoyanki) or deployment in combat formation)
for such subunits, the systematic changing within short
periods of siting areas separated by considerable distances,
would ensure the concealment of their deployment and of their
preparation for combat operations, and would create conditions
increasing their viability.
However, mobile launching platforms also have a series
of serious faults, basic among which are:
V L--
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-their confinement to railroads and waterways, which
simplifies their detection by enemy intelligence;
-their location away from cover, which increases
their vulnerability;
-the sharp diminution of the possibilities of
maneuver during coebadt if the
be
waterways should
-the insufficient accuracy of launchings from mobile
river E(maritime) launching platforms.
The Control of Regimental Subunits During an Exercise
The control of the subunits of a regiment includes
all the activity of commanders and staffs in the direction
of the training, organization and conduct of the combat
operations of the subunits, and envisages:
-the maintenance of a high level of political morale
among personnel and of the constant combat readiness of
the subunits;
-the timely allocation of combat tasks;
-the firm and unbroken direction of the combat
activities of the subunits;
-the organization of unbroken coordination;
-comprehensive support for the combat operations of the
subunits;
-constant control over the execution of combat orders,
instructions and commands and over the technical condition
of armament and combat equipment.
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The control must ensure e he
combat operations, the prise and the. high of dive
ness of nuclear/missile strikes, the possibility trans
ferring nuclear/missile strikes from certain areas to others,
and the simultaneous and high-grade performance of measures
for the protection of subunits from enemy means of mass
destruction.
The control must be unbroken, firm and flexible.
ed in
The control.of regimental subunits
combatzreadiness
advance with the aim of ensuring
and the speedy delivery of nuclear/missile strikes against
the enemy It consists of the formulation of basic combat
documents, the allocation of .specific tasks to subunniitworking
are organizati acommanderstand of communications centers
areas for b Battt y
and nets, the organization of radio nets and of directional
t
radio nets (radionapravleniye), the comprehensive
uppordiness
of subunits and their maintenance at the appropriate
for combat operations, and the unbroken direction of their
combat operations.
Having received the combat order to move the
regiment's subunits to hPesimentalrcommanderrexplainsathea
tion of combat duty, the g
task and makes a decision which shows:
-combat duty tasks and the degree of combat readiness;
-the number and composition of the subunits put on
combat duty;
-the distribution of launch and technical sites, the
procedure and time for their occupation;
-the arrangement and time strengthn(komplektuyush-
stores for building up to prescribed
cheye imushchestvo), missile fuel components and other
materiel supplies;
-the arrangement for the receipt odata
of the missiles and for the preparation
guidance system;'
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-the arrangement for the organization of coordination
between the launching subunits andhthe RTB assembly
brigades;
-the supply station (unloading points), the location
of the USG MO depot, the routes and the procedure for
the transport of materiel means to the siting areas;
-the location of the regimental command post and the
arrangement for the organization of communications;
-the signals and the arrangement for reporting the
carrying out of signals (commands);
-the readiness periods.
In addition, in his decision, the regimental commander
provides measures for combat, geodetic, meteorological,
engineer and materiel and technical support.
The regimental commander passes his decision on to
those who are to implement it in the form of a combat order
and of combat instructions. On the basis of the
commander's decision, the headquarters staff of the regiment,
together with the special armaments service (sluzhba
spetsialnogo vooruzheniya),with the deputy regimental
commanders of the rear services and of the technical unit,
carries out the comprehensive of
the combat operations
measures for carrying out the plans.
Having deployed the subunits in combat formation and
at the combat readiness specified, the commander and the
staff of the regiment organize:
-the concealment of all measures for the preparation
of subunits for combat operations;.
-a check on the maintenance of othee specified combat
readiness and on the performance duty
-all types of combat support;
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-support with materiel and everyday necessities
(materialno-bytovoy);
-study and training with the subunits, striving to
achieve the minimum expenditure of time on their
preparation for the execution of fire missions;
-more precise definition (revision) of the planning
documents, when necessary.
On receipt of the signal to go from readiness No. 4
to readiness No. 3 (2 or 1) the regimenntaltcommanderimust
immediately announce a combat alert,
he has received to the large unit commander and organize:
-a check on the carrying oition signals
and on the plan for the trans
specified combat readiness;
-the preparation of personnel and of ground equipment
for the execution of fire mission,
-a check of the missiles and nose cones and on their
delivery to the launch sites;
-the transport of missiles, nose cones and missile fuel
to the siting area;
-the strengthening of the security of the siting area
and of the routes for the transport of materiel means;
-the reliable control of subunits and of the unbroken
operation of communications;
-the timely preparation of missiles for launching
(aiming at the target, fueling, etc.).
With the beginning of combat operations the control
will be effected by the transmission of short signals,
specifying the previously determined sequence o$eworkdiness
for the subunits on transition to the app p r
or to the direct preparation of missiles for launching.
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More precise definition or the partial revision of
combat tasks must be carried out by short. enciphered
issue oforalccombat,
combat orders over isrtimeh~ibYlthemeans
and when there orders and instructions.
in
The experience of exercises has shown that,
l
order to ensure the independable
corabatcontrol
operationsmandaduring
subunits at the beginning of
their course, it is necessary to compile the following
combat documents and to have them at the regimental
headquarters (at the command post):
1. The plan of action for the subunits of the
regiment in an alert,
formation
earlier).
2. The plan of action for the subunits of the
The
regiment when moving to an alternate siting area.
plan must be worked out on the basis of intelligence data
and must provide signals for leaving the positions occupied
and for beginning the move to the alternate siting area;
the arrangement for packing up the cable network and
the ground equipment and for the quitting of their positions
e
by the subunits; a calculation of the march and deployment
procedure by which it is to be carried out; t
of the subunits in the alternate siting area and their
preparation to carry out combat tasks; the organitationhof
combat, materiel and technical and medical suppn
march and at the alternate siting area.
3. The launching table (compiled during the special
period (osobyy period)).: The table shows: the number of
the targets and the total expenditure of missiles for each
target, the coordinates of the aiming points, the
expenditure of thestlof burst, missiletlaunching
equivalent and type
time for each launch battery.
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4. The work map of the commander (staff) of the
regiment, on which the following are entered: arthe combat
formation of the regiment in the primary nate
siting areas; the combat formation. of the PVO means
covering the regiment; the basicsdifor rectionnforotheelaunch
alternate siting area;
of missiles by the battalions; the boundaries of the area
of possible destruction of targets; the unloading stations.
In addition, the following are entered on the map: the
forms of the tables for the control of signals and of
;Missile launchings, the layout of the plan for the transport,
preparation and issue of cones ofbmaterielhforobmildi~Ag
of the plan for the issue . The up to prescribe strenhare and
f filled compone
duringnthe specialrms
of the tables and plans
period.
5. The plan (schedule) for the preparation of missiles
for launching, which is compiled on the basis-of the task
g the missiles
and of the technolog~eelofcreadinessroxrdi~ectly for
to the specified deg
launching . The plan (schedule) ~must
missiles show:
for s e abeg hnningr
and end of the work of preparing the order
for transition to a higher stage of readiness;
for performing the basic jos
of a missile; the availabi
missile battalion, with an indication of their degree of
readiness.
6. The plan for the issue of missiles, of materiel for
building up to prescribed strength and of missile fuel.
The plan is compiled by the special servthe cespec ial
together with the staff of the regiment,
period. The plan provides: the points and theetime oo f
arrival of the transport bringing missiles, mel or
building up to prescribed strength, and missile fuel
components, the time of issue and the amount of materiel
advance,lptriel
operationregiment
his
forbattalion.
issued sseach
entireWhen
with missiles
type of plan is not made up.
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7. The plan for transport, preparation and issue
of nose cones to bat ntogetherpwithithe~staff~of the
the staff of the regiment
RTB,during the special period. The contents of the plan
provide: the time when the transport means of the RTB
are to be sent to the unloading point; denomination and
~uantit of the the time
of* the time
loading of nose cones
at which the nose cones are to arrive at the RTB and the
duration of their preparation; time theirtarrival
the nose cones from
at the appropriate launch sites.
subunits
ovisi
to
8. A memorandum on the pr
components.
a
one
special armaments, missiles, nose supplies
The memorandum shows the places where materiel sare stored. In peacetime the memorandum is kept in a
sealed package.
9. Diagrams of the radio and wire communications. in accor
with The diagrams are workeh outhe regimentdhaseunder commandnands
of communications whit
with the numbers of forces and estimate ofntheeforces.
The legend for each diagram
and means in operation and in reserve.
The tables are
10. Tables of-callsigns and radio data.
made up in accordance with the data received and with the
instructions of the staff of the large unit.
11. A prearranged message code (peregovornaya tablitsa)
and a signal table. The prearranged message of othehe
missile regiment is confirmed by
large unit and the ighaltatable by bles the ofather.
The word content of preparation and
subordinate subunits during pre-combat during the course of combat operations.
12. Instructions for the responsible duty officer
and for the duty shift of the regimental command post. invent
worked aout by the
in The instructions are
aretconfirmed
in accordance with the
by the regimental commander. Mentioned in them are:
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the name of the responsible duty off icer;.the composition
of the duty shift of the command post; the duties: -of
the personnel of the duty shift; the arrangemen
the storage and use of combat documents; the pr
for action when a signal to bring the regiment to a
higher degx?ee?readiness
tasks?istreceivede it for the
performance of combat
13. A log of all orders received and issued. Commands
and orders received over technical means welf lcommunication
are entered and recorded in the log, as
given by the commander and staff of the regiment. The
log is kept personally by the chief of staff of the
regiment or by a staff officer nominated by him.
14. Combat orders on the organization of direct
security, on self-defense and combat with airborne forces,
on antiaircraft defense, on protection against weapons of
mass destruction and on Manual.
combat orders are defined
At the command post of the missile regiment an
electrified display board (table) should be installed to
of directorate
show the commands
the operations
As the experience of exercises has shown, by the
formulation and presence in the regiment of the documents
enumerated, the commander and staff are assured that the
necessary materiel supplies are accumulated according to
plan , that the regimental subunits will movetin anting
organized fashion and will deploy rapidly
that they will be brought to the appropriate level
area,
of combat readiness and that missile launchings will be
prepared in good time and carried out.
However, the suggested list of combat documents made
up by the staff of the missile regiment may undergo
significant changes with the introduction of automated
and mechanized equipment into the system of troop control.
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The control of the regiment in-one of the exercises
was carried out from the central.-command post byfthemmands
Commander-in-Chief of Missile Tro;Ps , by means
egiment
diof the visionrcommand
(signals) transmitted hcenteraof thepost
through the communications
post. The signals were transmitted over permanent wire
communications with the help of a secrecy device (ZAS)
and were duplicated over high frequency communications.
The control of the subunits of the regiment and RTB reg was carried out from thei~ingaareaoof onetof theibattalions.
located in the primary
This location of the command post allowed the commander of
the regiment to carry out the direction of the subunits
not only by technical means of
the
personal contact with
of the transportation and fueling battalion and with the
chief of the RTB.
Ten minutes elapsed between the moment when the regiment
received the signal, directing that the subsequent
operations of the regiment were to be determined by
documents prepared in advance, and the announcement of the
alert to the batteries; of these 2 minutes were spent on
the transmission of commands to the battery commanders,
8 minutes on the exchange of passwords and on study and
explanation of the order. The order to go over to
readiness No. 3 was sent to the battalion commander by the
regimental commander by coded telegram (kodogramma) 18
minutes after the regiment received the alert signal.
The explanation of their tasks to the commanders of the
subunits located in the immediate proximity of
theimental
regimental command post was carried out by the
commander as they arrived at the command post (within
18 to 25 minutes).
The commander of a missile battalion put before the
commanders of batteries orally the tasks of going over to
readiness No. 3. The commanders of batteries arrived at
the command post of the battalion to receive their tasks
However,
immediately after the alert had been declared.
postcommanders
the summoning of
of d the regiment combat
(battalion)
command subunit
position on t to
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to assign or explain their tasks at the beginning of
combat operations cannot be considered as`,a rule. Under
these conditions, all tasks must be conveyed to the
subunits beforehand. Thus, the combat operations of subunits
must begin with the receipt of short signals (commands)
transmitted by technical means of communication.
The commands for transition to readiness.. N. 2, and
then to readiness No. 1, and for the carrying out
missile launchings were transmitted in 2 to 5 minutes
The regimental
.to those who were to carry them out.
commander transmitted the commands over the telephone
(by code or in open text) to each subunit in turn,
while the commander of a battalion transmitted them (in
rmissionulyarno),spending
open text) in a circular rmanner
much less time over
From the beginning of the exercise the regimental
commander, instead of transmitting signals for transition
to readiness Nos. 3, 2, and 1, sent coded telegrams to
the missile battalions, which took up to 3 minutes to
decode. Such a method of
must be regarded as
subunits during the period of the preparation of missiles
for launching or during their transition from one readiness
to another must be exercised by means of short, i
transmittable signals, whose significance must have been
memorized by appropriate persons.
During the course of combat operations the commanders
of the regiment and of the missile battalion controlled
the subunits only from their command posts by
However, it is impossible to exclude the possibility, and
sometimes, the zneed,for personal control
regiment (battalion)
of the subunits by the commander
at any stage of combat operations.
During the periods of preparation for a march and dnyy moving the subunits to thtelephone t ifromitheocommand post
control was exercised by
of the regiment and by personal contact between the
regimental commander, RTB, commander thmarche
and the chief of the R ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400690001-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400690001-0
personal contact and with the help of the tk i is con
communications
service (sluzhba regulirova Y ) in adiante and
the alternate dependably sandnwithoutwinterruption.
win
orkked ed
w
The experience the showed
question of controlling regimental subunits
is poorly worked out. The problem consists of finding
and of working out practleYn the most
marcheRpFirsttofeallds
for the control of subunits
it is necessary to devise a method for the control of a
marching column with signals, for which it would be'
ground lights
p carriers (using
advisable to instal vehicles l and signal
prime movers, motor
the forces and means the
using these signal lights
distances, w with
driver's cab. During a march over greateadir cations
th
the regiment and RTB at full strength, o r will also be organized to exercise dependableicontrol over
the column. In order to ensure secrecy, of the regimental
transmission of signals by
tebeipermitted.
commander and of the chiefs of the columns must
The remaining radio sets of subunits
signals.
It is also necessary to bear in mind that radio will
represent the basic means of communication during combat
operations. Maintenance f radio of gtrainingiofcradiont
readiness for work, a high level
operators, the improvement of their level of isesperforandmance
(klassnost), systematic radio training exerc, the
perfection of radio netwr~oncern?ofdtheccommandersiarimust
therefore be the constant
staffs of units and subunits.
The dependability and stabilitveof otcontrol dependsrsonnel
the
to a considerable degree on
and on the equipment of command poss and
unthe its the
lntcertain of
of commanders and the work-
ing ing areas of battery commanders at theellaunrhing plath
are equipped in a primitive fashion, bent
telephones, loudspeaker apparatus and other equip
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400690001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400690001-0
_ --
50X1-HUM
and do not provide normal conditions the;efrk, ororeliable
protection for combat doc
atmospheric precipitation.
In view of the low level of training and and n s the un-
systematic conditioning of personnel, of control
result of the lack of adaptability if and means subunits
to work in gas masks, the control of reg
in conditions when the siting with greatodifficulty and
radioactivity was carried out was often disrupted.
In order ntion aofeunitcontrol
(subunit) rationalizers
conditions, the he attention
must be concentrated on the perfection of technical means
of control, especially when personnel areopratingainas
gas masks, the development of light, portable
for battery commanders, providing convenient aaccommodation
and the interconnection (kommutatsiya) of
communication, concealment
by day o or night and d from atmospheric precipitation.
b
at many
erfection with
The experience f are need of furtherhp
questions of control
.the aim of increasing its dependability and stability and
of ensuring the delivery of the first nuclear/missile
strikes against the enemy in the shortest possible time.
For this it is first f taall ken essential to make
reductions in the time
particularly, in the encodof co mandsrtosthose who are to
carry them out and of reports about in the
fulfilment of tasks by the subunits. The signal table
used in this exercise, drawn up by the staff of the regiment,
turned out to be cumbersome, resembled a prearranged message
code (peregovornaya tablitsa) and was inconvenient tofuse.
As a result, the coding and especiallyjthe
,
short commands and instructions
andatooallocatee Also,
the time taken to issue
out eionsxoverecutantsthe,
which are to be carried
must be reduced by means technical means of communication All th hensurllth fastest
transmission at a given moment.
certain reduction in the time taken for the transmission of
tasks.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400690001-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400690001-0
However, only broad automation of the processes
for controlling missile units dandbstabilitylofrcon'trol
the best degree of dependability
and will make it possible to deliver nuclear/missile strikes
against the enemy in the shortest. period of time.
In conclusion, it is necessary to note.that the
exercises which were conducted by confirming the basic
principles of the instructions and directions for the
employment in combat of units armed with R-12 missiles,
of the
provided valuable eofaexistingemanualslanditechn logical
individual
schedules.
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400690001-0