MILITARY THOUGHT: THE INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF A FRONT, BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY V. KURASOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400650001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 9, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Influence of Nuclear Wea ons on the Principles of the Offensive
Operations of a Front
by
General of the Army V. Kurasov
The rapid development of the socialist economy and of Soviet science
and technology testify more eloquently than any words that our nation is
successfully creating the material-technical foundation for Communism
and at the same time is increasing its defensive capability,
The Soviet Armed-Forces, while undergoing reduction in numbers,
are being equipped more and more with nuclear weapons and other
means of modern military technology. A new type of armed force has
been created- -missile troops of strategic designation. The equipping
of all types of armed forces with nuclear weapons in quantity that will
ensure their mass use in operations immeasurably increases their
combat capabilities. All this introduces radical changes in our views
on the nature of modern warfare and the methods of waging it.
History offers many examples of how the development of armament
and technology has given rise to great changes in views on warfare and
in military art, but the revolution in the field which is occurring at the
present time, mainly on account of the development of nuclear weapons
and the possibility of their mass use, cannot be compared with the
changes of the past. The radical modern changes in views on warfare
and in military art have the nature of a headlong gallop, a break with the
gradual development of military art, which signifies the elimination of
a number of old tenets and their replacement by new ones.
By their own combat capabilities, nuclear, and especially nuclear/
missile, weapons under conditions of their mass use are the principle
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means of armed combat, and have a decisive influence on the course of
operation of all types of armed forces. Moreover , these weapons have
altered the combat capabilities of even identical types of armed forces.
One cannot now, for example, imagine the nature of offensive opera-
tions of a front and the means of conducting them without an analysis
of the possible influence on them of strikes of nuclear weapons of
strategic designation,-and `various types of armed forces participating
in these operations. Thus, during and as a result of strikes by
nuclear weapons of strategic designation, as we can well imagine,
nuclear superiority over the enemy can be won, his economic power
can be undermined, and the destruction of the strategic groupings of
his ground troops, air forces, and navy can be attained.
It remains to be said that such nuclear strikes will as a rule be
inflicted on enemy objectives located in the strategic depth. There-
fore, despite the views stated in the article by Colonel-General A. I.
Gastilovich, 1 the destruction of enemy objectives in his tactical and
operational zones is the goal of the offensive troops of a front and
above all of their nuclear weapons, and not the target for nuclear
strikes of strategic designation. Of course, one cannot completely
exclude cases where such strikes of strategic designation may be
delivered against enemy objectives in his ope rational depth. However,
these cases will not be typical, owing to the fact that such use of
strategic nuclear weapons contradicts their designation and does not
completely exploit all of their combat capabilities.
Success of these powerful strategic nuclear strikes, especially
if they precede the beginning of an offensive operation of a front,
will undoubtedly ensure favorable conditions for the conduct of the
operation with a comparatively small expenditure of nuclear weapons
of the front. Under other conditions, when nuclear weapons of stra-
tegic designation are not employed in the area of the offensive of a
front, the successful attainment of the goal of the offensive will re-
quire the use of a greater-number of the nuclear weapons of the
front.
-Special Collection.of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 50X1-HUM
First Issue, 19607
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Not too long ago, during our command-staff exercises, the front,
having a. limited am__o nt of nuclear ammuni ion, was able =to deliver
nuclear strikes only against the most important, individual targets
and ob ectives _off t he: eriem ,`-wh fe~a substantial 'port on df -trier
targets and objectives continued to be destroyed by conventional
weapons. And if it is recalled that practically the onr 1 carrier of
nuclear weapons at that time was aircraft, which often did not reach
the target, then one can even more fully understand the insufficient
effectiveness of nuclear strikes of that period. In connection with the
limited use of nuclear weapons in offensive operations of a front, the
possibility of simultaneous destruction of enemy groupings and ob-
jectives in the entire depth of their operational formation was
.precluded during our exercises at that time. Therefore, the troop
offensive, as in the past, was carried out through the successive
overcoming of enemy resistance, during which the enemy had the
opportunity to maneuver his forces and weapons from the rear and
the flanks for the creation of strike groupings.
Thus, nuclear weapons under conditions of limited use still had
not introduced decisive changes in the structure, and; conduct of of-
fensive operations of the front.
Only now, with the mass employment of these weapons, in opera-
tions with the use of various delivery yehcles,__,mainly, Ynsiles, is C
it possible to deliver surpr se.,nuclear-, strikes against a significant
number of enemy objectives and achieve their rapid and complete
destruction. Without exaggerating, it can be assumed that with the
successful mass use of nuclear weapons in an offensive operation
of the -front, not less than 60 percent . of the entire opposing enemy
grouping will be destroyed with these weapons. This is why nuclear,
and especially nuclear/missile, weapons have now become decisive
in the destruction of the enemy and above all in the attainment of
nuclear superiority over him. The attainment of such superiority
will significantly quicken the destruction of enemy groupings, while
in the absence of this superiority the enemy will always have an
opportunity to disrupt our offensive through the mass use of his 50X1-HUM
nuclear weapons.
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Only now in connection with the development of nuclear, and
principally nuclear/missile, weapons, and also in connection with
the possibility of their mass use, are radical changes'in the structure
and conduct of offensive and other operations taking place.
Let us examine several more specific instances of the influence
of nuclear weapons on some of the principles of offensive operations
of the front in the initial period of a war.
The goals of an offensive operation of a front, as is generally-
known, determine its concept and scope. Such goals, as in the past,
are: the destruction of the basic enemy groupings, the swift develop-
ment of the offensive, the seizure of his territory and specific opera-
tional-strategic objectives. However, the essence and nature of
these goals have changed considerably. While, in the past the basis
of the enemy's grouping of troops consisted of his infantry and tank
large units, now nuclear weapons, as the principle and decisive
means of combat, have become the basis.
Studying the development of nuclear weapons of operational-
tactical designation in the armies of the probable enemy and above
all in the US Army, we come across a great number of types. of
nuclear weapons, of TNT equivalents and of delivery aircraft.
Quite recently, up to 10 types of aerial atomic bombs with 19 various
TNT equivalents (from 2 to 300 kilotons) could have been noted in
the US Army. Seventeen different types of delivery aircraft
supported the use of these bombs.
At the present".time the. arsenal of nuclear/missile weapons of
operational-tactical designation in the US Army consists of only five
types of guided missiles and free rockets: "Honest John", "Little
John "Lacrosse", "Corporal" ; and "Redstone" with nine different
TNT equivalents (from 1 to 3800 kilotons), and two types of cruise
missiles: "Matador" and "Regulus" with five TNT equivalents 50X1-HUM
(from 1 to 100 'kilotons).
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the probable-.enemy has at his
disposal artillery pieces with calibers of 203 and 208 Ysic - 2807 mm
with nuclear shells (from 1 to 45 kilotons).
As is evident from the aforementioned data, the most modern
and powerful nuclear/missile weapons in the armies of the prob&ble
enemy have not yet become his principle and decisive means of combat.
It looks more as if the enemy?s aviation still fulfills this role, in spite
of its increased vulnerability to antiaircraft missiles. This should
be kept in mind. However, this situation requires further, study.
As regards the possible number of enemy infantry and tank large
units in his troop grouping, able to resist the front, considerable
changes have also taken place here.. Comparatively recently, under
conditions of limited use of nuclear weapons, it was considered that in
a front offensivye area with a width of 300-400 kilometers, and basing
the average operational density of troops at 15 kilometers per division,.
the enemy, could have up to 20-27 infantry and tank divisions. Because
of the mass use of nuclear weapons, these divisions can now suc-
cessfully advance and conduct combat operations in areas with a
width of up to 30 kilometers, and such an enemy grouping will
undoubtedly be smaller. For example, in a front offensive area with
a width of 400 kilometers, it will have in all only 13 .to 15 infantry
~_and tank divisions. Such a quantitative reduction of groupings is a
direct consequence of the unusually increased.fire power and troop
maneuverability, and also of the requirement for their maximum
protection from destruction by nuclear weapons.
Together with this, the dispersal of enemy groupings in area has
grown even more. Now it is impossible to imagine compact groupings
with a continuous front of even one or two enemy divisions, to say
nothing of several of his armies, since such groupings would im-
mediately be subjected to nuclear strikes and destroyed.
Under modern conditions, not armies, but often individual enemy
divisions,not creating a continuous front, will conduct an engagement
in a particular area, while others of his divisions on the flanks and
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in the rear of this area execute a maneuver with the ainm of a swift
penetration ahead. Hence, the enemy grouping will, note only be
smaller with .regard to its force and composition, but also more
widely dispersed in area.
Finally, mention should be made of the great influence which
the mass use of enemy nuclear weapons has on the nature of his
troop operations, accelerating them significantly. The offensive
operations of the probable enemy during his training exercises
acquire a deeper and more dynamic nature. The enemy has re-
course less often to the solution of tasks by shifting to the defensive,
and,even the latter has begun to have a different, more aggressive,
and maneuverable nature.
Thus, the modern enemy grouping has become not only smaller
in relation to its force, and more widely dispersed in area, but
also more aggressive and maneuverable with regard to the methods
of -the execution of operational tasks.
Regarding the operational-strategic enemy objectives which
may be the goal of a front offensive operation, it should be emphasized
that under conditions of mass use of nuclear weapons, their destruction ,
seizure, and retention will no longer create difficulties as in the past
and will not require as large forces as were used for this during the
past war.
A true conception of the probable enemy, a careful study of his
strong and weak points, and also their skilful exploitation during the
preparation and conduct of an offensive operation, will ensure his
rapid and most complete destruction.
.The forces and weapons needed for the conduct of a front offen-.
s ive 'operation determine the success of the operation to a large
extent.. As is well known, the basis for the determination of such
forces and weapons was always the demand for the creation of the
appropriate superiority. over the enemy. The stronger and more
aggressive the enemy was, the more forces and weapons were 50X1-HUM
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required for his destruction, and consequently, the more significant
was their superiority over the enemy, and as long as superiority of
forces was not attained, the front offensive operation often did not
begin. This was true in the.past and, incidentally, quite recently
under, conditions of limited use of nuclear weapons.
Now that the possibility of the mass use of nuclear weapons has
become a reality, the relative strengthas-,a..-result.. of_ pov etfUl..nuelear
strikes of the offensive side can rapidly and sharply change in its
favor, even at the very beginning of the operation,
Since, as a result of such powerful nuclear strikes, the front
can destroy not less than 60 percent of all enemy forces and weapons-
at the beginning of the operation, then the general superiority of his
forces and weapons over the enemy can become significant, and on
the axis of the main strike, even great. However, this can occur
only if the offensive troops themselves- have not already suffered
enemy nuclear strikes. Therefore, under modern conditions, the
necessary superiority of forces and weapons over the enemy will
as a rule not be attained prior to the beginning of the offensive
operation, as it was previously through the concentration and deploy-
ment of these forces on appropriate axes, but at the beginning and in
the course of the offensive operation as a result of the infliction of
powerful nuclear strikes on the enemy.
Thus, under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, the
front offensive operation can be successfully conducted even with
equality in the relative stren&th::of Jorces._:a..nd :weapons.
The influence of nuclear weapons affects not only the quantity of
forces and weapons of the front and their relative strength;,.:: but:.atso
the combat composition of a front. The most important place in this
combat makeup is now occupied by nuclear weapons, and principally
by missile troops. An estimate of other forces and weapons included
in the combat composition of the front depends on a correct and
accurately grounded estimate of the necessary quantity of these 50X1-HUM
weapons.
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Fora an estimate of the nuclear weapons needed =for the entire
offensive operation of a front, it should be taken into account that
.for a..reliable .destruction of all selected targets and objectives, it
seems. to us .that we must allot from 4 to 6 nuclear weapons of
appropriate. TNT.equivalents, against every large unit and opera-
t ional-strategic objective of the enemy, or 1 or 2 nuclear weapons
of high yield (100-500 kilotons). Such an estimate will permit, even
if only approximately, the determination both of the overall number
of nuclear weapons needed for the operation and of their types and
level of yield. In its turn the estimate of the nuclear weapons of a
front depends on what tasks .will be carried out in behalf of the front
by nuclear weapons of strategic designation.
The strength and composition of the motorized rifle and tank
.troops of a front are determined in accordance with the combat
potentialities of the nuclear weapons of the front, the operational
density of the enemy grouping, and the tasks of these troops in the
operation.
In view of this, the front grouping cannot be permitted to have a
lower operational density of troops than the enemy. Let us suppose
that the front grouping of troops has an operational density of troops,
equal to 20 kilometers per division. Then a front offensive area
having; a width of 300 kilometers must have no fewer than 15 divisions
in its composition. Furthermore, additional forces and weapons
should be provided, to allow for possible losses of our troops in the
course of the offensive operation and for the appearance in. the area.
of the front offensive of fresh enemy troops or of enemy troops who
have escaped. destruction. In the case of limited use of nuclear
weapons, the estimate of the forces and weapons of a front must
include appropriate adjustments for an increase in the number of
motorized rifle and tank large units.
The tasks of` the motorized ...rifle-and-tank -troops in a front offensive
operation are also determined by these conditions. While, under con-
ditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, the basic task of these
troops is the completion of enemy destruction upon whom nuclear 50X1-HUM
strikes have been inflicted, in the case of, the limited-use of, these
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weapons the motorized rifle and tank troops of the front will fulfill
the basic task of destroying the enemy grouping.
The destruction and neutralization of the enemy in his tactical
and operational zones may require reinforcement of the front with
ar illery, which at the beginning of the offensive and especially in
the operational rear, -will 'unquestionably render great benefit,to the
offensive troops in overcoming the centers of enemy resistance
which have survived nuclear strikes.
Taking into consideration the increased role in an offensive
operation of a front of airborne troops who are capable of seizing
the most important areas m Amy's operational rear more
quickly than other troops, their forces in the effective strength for
combat of the front should be especially accurately determined,
starting with the tasks that can be assigned to them. Furthermore,
one should dkeep in mind that in a modern offensive operation of a
front, which is conducted against a considerably greater depth,
airborne landings on a tactical and operational scale may have a
.place in the. combat makeup of the front.
Large units and units of engineer troop reinforcement may enter
into the combat composition of the front when the front's own (shtatnyy)
engineer resources are not able to support a maneuver of troops or the
rapid rate of their advance, especially during a crossing in force
of water barriers or during operations in zones of radioactive. con-
tamination.
The strength and composition of the aviation of a front are also
determined in accordance with the tasks which will be assigned to it.
Such missions in a front offensive operation may be: the conduct of
reconnaissance, the destruction of mobile and small-sized objectives,
in the tactical and operational zones, and the support of the attacking
troops of the front during the course of the operation.
It is particularly important in the combat composition of the 50X1-HUM
front to have units of antiaircraft-missile troops, fighter aviation
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and antiaircraft artillery in sufficient number to provide reliable air
cover for the launching areas of. missile large units and units, for
airfields with delivery aircraft for nuclear weapons, for command
posts, for basic troop groupings, especially in the areas of their
concentration, and for the most important installations in the rear
area of the front.
The selection of the axis of the main strike is the most important
(fundamental offensive operation, which in essence determines the
concept and methods of conducting the operation. However, some
authors of articles' (Comrades Baskakov and Zavyalov), in their
review of the principles of our military art, have expressed the view
that under modern conditions the established opinions about the axis
of the main strike are obsolbte and may lead to the creation of con-
centrated strike groupings of troops, which would offer a highly
profitable target for enemy nuclear strikes, and thus do injury to
our military art. In connection with this, they propose either to
abolish this most important principle of military art or to replace
it with the principle of concentrating the basic efforts on the destruc-
tion of the nuclear weapons and the main troop grouping of the enemy
or with the definition of the principle tasks of the operation, to the
fulfillment of which the basic efforts of the weapons 'of nuclear attack
and of the troops must be directed. 1 But are not such conclusions
and proposals too hasty,, and will they not inflict damage on our
military art?
It has long been known that one cannot be strong everywhere in
an offensive. Any such tendency has always led to the dispersal of
forces and weapons, to strikes against the enemy with widespread
fingers.
If this was fallacious before, then under present conditions of
the mass use of nuclear weapons, 'such strikes are even more in-
admissable, since they may lead not only to the dispersal of the
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iSpecial Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 50X1-HUM
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troops but above all to the dispersal of nuclear weapons in various
directions often of secondary importance. Of tIYe7=several axes
along which the troops of a front are advancing,*one always will be
decisive, i. eo the axis of the main strike, which usually involves
the entire depth of the front offensive operation. Therefore, not
only are strategic and operational-tactical factors to be considered,
but also the possible influence of political, economic, and physical-
geographical conditions on the course of the offensive operation.
The axis of the main strike determines the concept of the offensive
operation, the tasks of the front troops, and above all of nuclear
weapons, and also the methods of fulfilling these tasks.
As for the proposed principle of concentrating the basic efforts
on the destruction of the nuclear weapons and themaingrouping of
the enemy thlose are nothing less than the most im, portanttasks of
t h e - offensive troops, but they can be accomplished o n l y wlienie
areas of the location of the nuclear weapons and of the troop group-
ings of the enemy have been precisely determined. However,:
these tasks still cannot determine the concept of the front offensive
operation and the methods of conducting it, since far from all''the
areas of location of the nuclear weapons and groupings of the enemy
will be known to us prior to the beginning of the operation.
The same thing can also be stated regarding the main tasks of
the operation, which have been proposed to replace the concept of
the axis of the main strike since these tasks can likewise be as-
signed to the troops only after the establishment of the coordinates
of the appropriate enemy targets and objectives. Thus, neither the
principle of concentrating the basic, efforts on the destruction of the
nuclear weapons and the main grouping of the enemy, nor the main
tasks of the operation, can abolish or replace the axis of the main
strike.
One can likewise hardly agree with the view that the selection
of the axis of the main. strike leads to the creation of concentrated
assault groupings of troops, which would offer a highly advanta-
geous target for mass nuclear strikes. Is it not a. fact that the 50X1-HUM
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azs of the main strike is not a line but a zoned f terrain within the
borders of which the troops advance? Why thUh cannot this offensive
zone, with its width, ensure the necessary dispersal of troop group-
ings and the most effective use of their firing, striking, and
maneuvering capabilities?
Such a, dispersal of troops is now necessary as one of the most
important conditions for ensuring the success of the offensive, and
not only on the axis of the main strike but also on other axes.. At
the present time concentrated strike groupings of offensive troops
will not be created on these axes. Very likely, on the axis of the
main strike, as distinguished from other axes, a more powerful
troop grouping will attack, but in a wide zone, thus ensuring the
necessary dispersal and maneuver, while on the other axes of the
advance the troops will be of less strength and not in such wide zones.
Prior to the mass use of nuclear weapons, the main strike was
asi'ru'le launched on the axis most likely to ensure the successful
breakthrough of the enemy defense and the destruction of his basic
grouping. Therefore the axis of the main strike almost always ran
through weak-sectors of the enemy's defense and took the attacking
troops to the flank. and rear of his strong, grouping. It should be
recalled that this was conditioned by the complexity of the destruction
and neutralization of the enemy's defense system in its strong sectors
and by the difficulty-of penetrating this defense.
But now, under conditions where the mass use of nuclear weapons
favors the rapid and most nearly complete destruction of an enemy of
any strength, it is advisable to launch the main strike on the axis
which will ensure the rapid advance of the troops and the seizure of
the operational-strategic objectives of the enemy.
In accordance with the goal of the front offensive operation, in
addition to. the axis of the main strike, the axes of other strikes are
also determined. It should be emphasized that at the present time
the destruction of the enemy and the success of the troop advance on the.
axr'is of the main. strike depend on the success of these other strikes to
a.greater' degree than was true in the past. As soon as there occurs
any confusion or even worse, any failure,' in the advance of the troops
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on the other axes, then the flanks of the troops attacking on the axis
of the main strike are immediately exposed, the possibility of their
isolation is increased, and favorable conditions 4-i :created for the
enemy to destroy this grouping of the attacking troops.
Therefore the troops attacking on the other axes must have a
sufficiently high penetrating ability and capabilities for maneuver,
thus ensuring their swift advance. In other words, these troops
must have at their disposal nuclear weapons and the appropriate
reserves to the extent necessary.
The determination of the immediate and subsequent tasks of the
front was always the most important part of the concept of the offensive
operation and of the commander's decision. The distribution of front
troop efforts for the fulfillment of successively resolved tasks.takes
place as a result of the fact that with one, even with the most powerful,,
strike, it has been impossible to destroy the entire enemy grouping
;and to attain1he final goal of the front offensive operation. But
perhaps now, under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapon s
and the increased combat capabilities of the armed forces, the
final goal of the front offensive operation can be attained with the
delivery of one powerful strike against the enemy grouping.. However,
an analysis of the combat capabilities of the enemy and of our modern
armed forces does not allow us to give a positive reply to this
question.
Even now, not one, but several strikes against the enemy group-
ing, and also, considerable effort and great stress on the part of
the attacking troops, are required for the attainment of the final
goal of the front offensive operation. In other words, even under
modern conditions, the goal of the front offensive operation can be
attained only as a result of the fulfillment of the immediate and
subsequent tasks of the front. But now these tasks, principally
under the influence of nuclear weapons, have increased in depth and
have been abbreviated in the time needed for their fulfillment.
Furthermore, 'with the availability of long-range missiles and of
delivery aircraft for nuclear weapons, the fulfillment of a subsequent
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front.task can be begun at.the same time as the destruction of the
enemy and his tactical and closest operational depth, e. , during
the time that the front troops are fulfilling their immediate task.
Proceeding from the above,.the immediate task o f the front.in '-.--??
a modern. offensive operation must be understood to be the rapid and
decisive destruction of the enemy grouping, and above all of his
nuclear weapons, the swift advance of the troops, and the seizure
of important objectives or areas to a depth of 300. to 400 kilometers,
i. e. , to the depth of approximately the entire front offensive opera-
tion in the last war. Taking account of the increased rate of advance
of troops, the modern front can fulfill this task during 3 to 4 calendar
days.
The subsequent task of the front will be to complete the destruction
of the strategic enemy reserves by means of a swift advance of the
troopq and to capture the objectives and areas whose seizure will
accomplish the final goal of the front offensive operation.
As is evident, the greatest importance is attached to the fulfill-
ment of the immediate. task of the front, in the course of which the
destruction of the enemy's basic-,forces takes place and in essence
the fate of the front offensive operation is decided. Therefore, the
largest portion of all the forces of the front, and above all nuclear
weapons, must be employed for the fulfillment of precisely this task.
However, under the conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons
by the enemy, and in connection with the increased role. of his stra-
tegic reserves, the importance of the subsequent mission of the
front has been increased, for the fulfillment of which the .front will
often, have to be reinforced with the appropriate quantity of nuclear
ammunition and with fresh large units of troops.
The methods of. conducting an offensive operation of a. front
under the influence of the mass?:use of nuclear weapons has also
undergone significant changes.
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Soviet ;'military art has always striven to find a method of conducting
offensive operations which would lead to the quickest,"and most com
plete destruction of the enemy and to the attainment of the final goal
of the operation. In the search for such methods, Soviet military-
scientific thought, as is generally known, even in 1935 worked out
the theory of combat in depth, which consisted in essence of simul-
taneous attack against the enemy to the entire depth of his combat
formation. However, the firing, striking, and maneuvering capa-
bilities of the troops of that time could not ensure the practical
implementation of this theory. Nor was this problem resolved in
World War II operations. Only now, in connection with the rapid
growth of firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of the armed
forces have conditions appeared for the practical solution of the
problem of the simultaneous destruction of the enemy to . the ;entire
depth of his, operational formation.
It is a fact that modern nuclear, and especially nuclear/missile,
weapons can be successfully employed for the delivery of sudden,
.long-range, and crushing strikes against the enemy to the entire
depth of his operational.. formation, and even against his strategic
reserves.
. The development of,airborne forces and military-transport
aviation, now as never before,, ensures the dropping and combat
operations of front troops not only in the immediate but also in the
deep rear area of the enemy on the most important axes and n the
decisive areas.
The increased mobility of ground troops, ensuring their advance
at a speed of 100 kilometers and more, permits them to gain the
enemy's operational-strategic rear quickly.
More than was true in the past, modern. aviation ensures effective
support and.cover for troop combat *operations, to the entire depth of
their offensive.
. Thus, the increased firing, striking, and maneuvering capa-
bilities. of modern. armed forces fully ensure the conduct of a front
offensive operation in-grsaterdepth and completely resolve the 50X1-HUM
problem of simultaneous destruction of the enemy grouping to the
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entire depth of its operational formation, Any other"method of con-
ducting a modern offensive operation which results iii the consecutive,
methodical advance of troops, is a step backward. It fails to exploit
all the firing, striking,. and maneuvering; capabilities of modern troops,
and permits the enemy to maneuver with ease in his operational rear
and to create groupings for the launching of strikes against the attack-
ing troops. The simultaneous destruction of the enemy can be ac-
complished through the annihilation and prolonged neutralization of
his groupings and objectives on the axis of the main strike and on other
axes, in the tactical and operational zones, at least to the depth of
the immediate task of the front. The main role in the simultaneous
destruction of the enemy grouping in the entire depth of its formation
is carried out by the missile troops both of the front and of strategic
designation.
Missile troops, in coordination with aviation, employing nuclear
and chemical ammunition, destroy and neutralize enemy nuclear
weapons at bases, depots, launching sites, and airfields, as well
as his troop groupings and control coasters. The'missile troops, as
a rule, deliver the most powerful nuclear strike at the beginning of
the offensive. In the course of an offensive operation, the missile
troops deliver nuclear strikes against newly discovered enemy targets
and objectives opposing the attacking troops.
. Chemical weapons are also employed, mainly against objectives
which were not subjected to nuclear strikes, in order to ensure the
most complete destruction of the enemy and to preclude the possi-
bility of his counteraction and maneuver.
However, the transformation of nuclear strikes into the final
destruction of the enemy, together with the seizure of his territory,
requires the immediate carrying out of airborne landings and the
swift advance of motorized rifle and tank troops in coordination
with aviation.
Airborne forces quickly occupy the most important areas on the
axis of the main and of other strikes of the attacking groupings in
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coordination with the missile troops and front aviation; they complete
the destruction of the enemy.in these areas and prevent the approach
of his fresh large units from the rear and from unattacked sectors,
thus ensuring the swift advance of the troops into the operational
depth of the enemy. With this goal, tactical airborne landings can
be employed by armies at a depth of 100 to 200 kilometers from
the enemy'- line of defense, while operational airborne forces: of a
front can `conduct combat operations at a depth of 200 to 400 kilometers
and more. The basic conditions which ensure. the success of airborne
forces operations are the suddenness and rapidity of the landings,
and also the aggressiveness and resoluteness of the pperations
during the execution of the combat'tasks. However, fbr the reinforce-
ment-of operational airborne forces it will sometimes be necessary
to increase their forces through the transfer by air of motorized
rifle units and large units.
The motorized rifle and tank troops of a front, in coordination
with missile troops, aviation, and airborne forces, by skilfull
maneuvering and by not becoming engaged in protracted fighting
with the enemy, can quickly overrun his tactical and operational zones,
swiftly reach the area of the combat operations of the tactical and
operational airborne forces, accomplish the immediate task of the front,
and continw s.ly develop the offensivesto the accomplishment of the
goal of the front operation. Artillery, and above all rocket artillery,
destroys and neutralizes the enemy's nuclear installations, his
weapons, and his personnel. In the course of the offensive, the
artillery destroys and neutralizes newly discovered targets, ob-
jectives, and revived centers of enemy resistance.
The speed of the troop advance, especially on the axis of the
main strike, must.15e:'not Jess than 100 kilometers per calendar
-day.
Aviation, in coordination with the missile., airborne, and ground
troops of the front, destroys and neutralizes enemy nuclear weapons
and troops, against whom missile strikes and artillery fire may not
be sufficiently effective. It also supports and covers the attacking
,troops, destroying newly discovered (mainly mobile and small-sized)
objectives and also enemy air targets.
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It is obvious that such a method of conducting an offensive operation
of a front in which all the combat capabilities of the- attacking troops
are used.to the maximum, significantly hastens the destruction of the
enemy and the attainment of the goal; of the operation. However, it
should be emphasized that this method of conducting an offensive can
be successfully carried out only with the mass use of nuclear weapons,
and even then only when the enemy troop groupings and objectives
marked for destruction, are well reconnoitered and their coordinates
precisely determined. Therefore, the method of the simultaneous
destruction of the enemy to the entire depth of his operational forma-
tion can be used most often at the beginning of an offensive operation.
Under other conditions, when the enemy groupings and objectives are
insufficiently reconnoitered, and when the launching of a simultaneous
strike against them to their entire depth does not appear possible, the
front offensive will be conducted by means of the successive destruction
of enemy groupings and objectives in accordance with their discovery
and the precise determination of their coordinates. Such a method of
conducting an offensive naturally cannot ensure the most complete
utilization of all the firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of
the attacking troops and it permits the enemy to maneuver in his depth
with the aim of delaying and disrupting our offensive. Most commonly,
the goal of the offensive front operation will be attained as a result of
a combination of the methods of simultaneous and successive destruction
of the enemy, with the first of these methods having the decisive role.
It should be emphasized that these methods of conducting an of-
fensive front operation may be successfully employed for the imple-
mentation of any concept of the operation.
The grouping of troops in the offensive operations of the front
consists not only of their operational makeup but also must provide
for various procedures of the large units and units--marching,
approach march, and combat. At present one cannot conceive of
a front grouping solely in terms of the formation of the individual
armies of which it is composed, without those formations of large units
and units which, properly speaking, accomplish the operation.
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A troop grouping of a front and of armies, depending upon their
tasks, can be varied, but must always and to the greatest extent pos-
sible, ensure the successful execution of these tasks. While the
immediate task of the front is carried out through the launching of
a. simultaneous strike against the enemy in the entire depth of his
operational formation, the front troops must strive to execute this
task in one grouping. As a rule, in such a grouping the front troops
will be formed into one echelon, following which the necessary
reserves must be provided. It is impossible that in the course of
the execution of the immediate task of the front, the situation will
require changes in the grouping of the troops, but in this there
should be no large-scale regroupings of troops.
The rapid and complete destruction of the enemy to the entire depth
of the immediate task of a front must ensure to the grouping of troops
a continuous and swift advance right up to the execution of the subse-
q uent task.
When the immediate task of a front is to be carried out through
the delivery of successive strikes against the enemy, and his complete
destruction requires more prolonged and intensive combat, the most
advisable grouping of a front may be formation into two echelons.
In this case the second echelon of the front is usually committed
to battle at the beginning of the execution of the subsequent task of
the front.
The most important place in the modern grouping of a front is
held by missile troops anddelivery aircraft for nuclear weapons.
Therefore the creation of a front grouping must begin with the
determination of the siting areas for missile large units and units,
and also for the airfields of delivery aircraft, and only after this
can the assembly and departure areas of other front troops be laid
out. Nothing must reveal the siting areas of missile troops or the
airfields of nuclear delivery aircraft.
The departure areas of airborne troops must be occupied
immediately before the beginning of airborne operations. 50X1-HUM
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As regards tank and motorized rifle large units, in the interest
of achieving concealment of the offensive, they can pass through their
departure areas without stopping, or else occupy them for the minimum
time necessary for the deployment of artillery in firing positions, the
inspection of equipment, and the refueling of tanks and vehicles.
The security of a front troop grouping from enemy nuclear strikes,
as is generally known, is largely ensured by its dispersal. However,
even in. a dispersed state, troops must not be located for a prolonged
time in the same areas. In this connection, now to a greater degree
than previously, emergency areas, firing positions, and airfields
must be provided, and also the arrangements for the concealed move-
ment of the troops must be more carefully worked out. At the same
time, the importance of counterintelligence in the areas of troop
disposition, especially of missile troops, and on the routes of their
movement has increased.
But skill consists not only of the creation of the most advanta-
geous grouping of troops in a departure position, even though this is
very important, but also of maintaining its advantages during the
course of the entire offensive, taking into consideration that an
enemy employing nuclear weapons can at any moment suddenly intro-
duce large, unfavorable changes in the front troop grouping if
appropriate measures are not taken by our side. The continuous
maintenance of a favorable grouping of the attacking troops can be
achieved through the timely delivery of sudden and crushing nuclear
strikes against the enemy, thus exerting great influence on the course
of the offensive, and also through the skilful maneuvering of the
attacking troops. But such means of maintaining an advantageous
situation and the superiority of our grouping will provide the neces-
sary effect only if the command and staff of the front,in their
planning and direction of the offensive operation, prudently determine
the most favorable grouping of troops not only in the departure posi-
tion but also during the crucial moments of the offensive, and also
toward the end of the first and each of the subsequent days of operation.
Let us examine the problem of the influence of nuclear weapons on
the scope and nature of the offensive operations of a- front. 50X1-HUM
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The, width of a front offensive zone. It is known tha -.under conditions
of the mass use of nuclear weapons, the number of large-units of ground
troops in the composition of a front is reduced and their operational
density considerably diminishes. In connection with this, the width of
the front offensive zone now will ordinarily be determined by the
established operational density of the troops, which in its turn will
depend on the amount of nuclear ammunition alloted to the front.
Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this density
will scarcely be higher than 20 kilometers per division. With such an
operational density of the troops of a front, an offensive zone 300 km
wide, e. g., may have 15 division, besides the necessary reserves.
But if there are 20 divisions in the composition of a front, then for the
same operational density of troops the width of the zone of its offensive
will be 400 kilometers.
Thus, depending on the quantity of nuclear weapons alloted for
the operation, the number of divisions in the composition of a front
and the established operational density of troops, the width of a front
offensive zone may now vary within the limits of 300 to 600 kilometers.
A further increase in the width of a front offensive zone may cause
considerable complications in the control of the troops. In determining,
the width of a front offensive zone, the relative strength of forces and
weapons should not be forgotten and, even more, the enemy should not
be permitted an overall superiority of them. Together with this, it
is necessary to take into consideration that in the development of an
offensive the front zone will widen, and toward the end of the operation
its width may have grown approximately one and one-half times.
The depth of a front offensive operation is usually determined
by the goal of the operation and by those installations and areas which
are to be taken. Under the conditions of the mass use of nuclear
weapons, including those of strategic designation, an offensive
operation of a front in the initial period of a war can be carried out
to a depth 'up to 800.: kilometers and more, since at this depth the
enemy's groupings and his most important installations can be
destroyed as a result of nuclear strikes. Under conditions where
a front does not have at its disposal the capability of delivering mass
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nuclear strikes at such a distance, the depth of its offensive operations,,
will, of course, be less.
The rates of advance of the troops can be varied and they depend
upon the extent of destruction of the enemy and also on the preparation
of the attacking troops for rapid negotiation of natural and artificial
obstacles and obstructions in the terrain. Under conditions of the
mass use of nuclear weapons and the increased mobility of troops,
their advance at a rate of 100 kilometers and more in a calendar day
is quite possible. However, in order to realize such rates of advance
of the troops, it is necessary to inflict such destruction on the enemy
that he would be deprived of the capability of offering serious resistance
to the attacking troops or of creating radioactive contamination of the
terrain in the zones of the offensive. Under other conditions, chiefly
with a lesser degree of enemy destruction, the rates of advance of the
front troops naturally cannot be as high.
The duration of offensive operations of a front at the highest
indices of their scope may reach 8 to 10 calendar days. With lower
indices of scope of the offensive operations of a front, their duration
will be considerably greater.
Thus, under the influence of the mass use of nuclear weapons and
the increased mobility of troops, not only have the indices of the scope
of the offensive operations of a front changed, but also their nature.
Now the troop advance, as a rule, will be carried out in wide zones,
on separate and disconnected axes, by the method of simultaneous
and successive destruction of the enemy. The advance of the troops
will develop at high rates in order to penetrate swiftly and rapidly
into the operational-strategic rear,of the enemy. However, on account
of the perfectly natural tendency of the enemy, by extensive use of
nuclear weapons, to accomplish his tasks also by means of an advance,
the most frequent type of combat operation of troops in modern of-
fensive operations will be the meeting battle and meeting -engagement.
The high degree of maneuver in a modern offensive operation
almost completely precludes the penetration of the enemy's defenses
in its past meaning, since his defenses will not have the continuous
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fronts and the high density which they formerly had.
While,up to now, this article has discussed the overall influence
of nuclear weapons on the principles of offensive operations of a
front, we would now like to emphasize its special characteristics,
the radioactive contamination of the terrain. It should always be
taken into consideration that troop personnel operating on terrain
contaminated by radioactive substances can be disabled as a result
of radiation sickness.
It is known that this casualty factor is most insidious, since it
does not have any apparent external symptoms and can be detected
only with dosimetric instruments. The greatbst radioactive contami=
nation of the terrain endangers troop operations, and occurs with
nuclear, surface bursts. Radioactive contamination of the terrain
in areas of nuclear air bursts and in the path of movement of a radio-
active cloud is considerably less and is less dangerous to troop
operations.
It also should be kept in mind that the fallout of radioactive dust,
and consequently, the level of radiation on the contaminated terrain,
will vary. As regards the duration of radioactive contamination, if
at ground zero it is lethal for a considerable period of time, the
levels of radiation in the path of the cloud gradually diminish and
cease to be lethal.
It.is obvious that as a rule nuclear surface bursts will be employed
against troops and installations located in the operational depth under
favorable operational and meteorological conditions. Wherever
these conditions are favorable for the attacking troops of a front,
they naturally preclude the possibility of enemy nuclear surface
bursts and, conversely, wherever the front troops, because of
operational and meteorological conditions, cannot employ nuclear
surface bursts, they will be advantageous for the enemy. Hence, it
can be assumed that during the course of an operation up to -25 percent
of all nuclear warheads of both sides can be employed with surface
bursts. 50X1-HUM
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Let us suppose that in the zone of the immediate task of a front,
equal to 120, 000 square kilometers, both sides, for the fulfillment
of their combat tasks, use up to 200 different nuclear warheads, or
half the total supply allotted to the operation, of which 25 percent,
or 50 nuclear warheads, involve surface bursts. If, for example,
25 nuclear warheads have a yield of 10 kilotons and each of the
remaining 25 of 100 kilotons, then in the general area of radioactive-
contaminated terrain, equal'to approximately 60, 000 square kilo-
meters, almost 9, 000 square kilometers of terrain will be con-
taminated with dangerous levels of radiation from 50 roentgens and
higher. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that with the
mass use of nuclear 'warheads overlapping of the zones of radioactive-
contaminated terrain and the creation of dangerous levels of radiation
.will inevitably occur, where the single bursts would not have been
dangerous.
Even from this estimate the great significance of the casualty
factor which arises as a result of the radioactive contamination of
the terrain, and its influence on the course of the operation, are
evident. However, it should be taken into consideration that the
data of this estimate are more likely too low- than too `high;-.'since in
reality in the zone of the immediate task of a front both sides can
employ more nuclear warheads with surface bursts and with a more
powerful charge. Furthermore, in the present estimate no account
has been taken of the fact that the zones of radioactive contamination
can be especially designed to follow water and other natural boundaries,
and to cross the axis of the troop offensive with the task of delaying
the enemy or stopping his offensive. It should be kept in mind that the
zones of radioactive contamination are not distributed- uniformly
throughout the whole of the zone of the front offensive, but as a rule
will be created on the axis of the main and other strikes and will
reach the greatest extent and the most dangerous levels of radiation
there. In short, radioactive contamination of terrain has become
a most important factor of operational-strategic significance.
Without constant prognosis of the radiation situation, continuous
study of it and reconnaissance of the probable zones and strips of
radioactive contamination, and also without the prudent adoption of
measures for the immediate withdrawal of troops from these zone,50X1-HUM
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and strips or for their rapid crossing, the success of offensive opera-
tions cannot be guaranteed. With this aim, a chart of the radiation
situation must be kept constantly in all staffs, especially in the opera-
tional staffs. The commanders of troops and the commanding officers
of large units and units are obliged to know the radiation situation at
all times and to take account of it in their decisions, orders, and
operations.
Neglect of these requirements in a combat situation, or insuf-
ficient attention to them, may lead to unnecessary mass troop loss
and to a deceleration of the rates of their advance.
The withdrawal of troops from the zones of radioactive contamina-
tion prior to the beginning of the operation may take place along the
shortest axes on the initiative of the commanding officers of large units
immediately after the detection of contamination, but crossing through
such zones and strips during the course of an offensive operation, as
a rule, will be carried out only on the decision of the commander of
the front troops or with his sanction in order not to upset the jian of
the operation.
The methods of crossing through these zones are determined by
the axes, the dimension, and levels of radiation. If these zones do
not completely intersect the axis of the troop advance and are not too
extensive, then the most advisable method of crossing through them
may be a detour not requiring a great deal of time.
When the zones and strips of radioactive contamination intersect
the axes of the troop advance, and bypassing them does not appear
possible, crossing through such zones and strips must be carried
out by forcing them along routes with the lowest levels of radiation.
Under conditions where high levels of radiation exist on all probable
routes across the zone of contamination, it is advisable that the
forward movement of troops be postponed until some abatement of
these levels, but with the impossiblity of doing this, they immediately
f orce the zone with tanks.. Crossing through zones of radioactive 50X1 -HUM
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contamination...must be carried .out at-increased speeds, with.increased
..distances between.. vehicles, subunits and units and with the best use of
means of individual protection.
In ..isolated cases,-, .depending...on...the...situation, continuous' zones
.,of -radioactive contamination can-.be crossed by small units of troops
in helicopters.
Furthermore,. one cannot-but. consider. the. necessity for complete
....medical processing, of".the personnel of units and large units, and
also..,the.. decontamination,,of._their. armament, equipment, and trans -
port immediately after ..the...troop crossing .of...zones and strips of
radioactive,....c.onth,mination. Even .with the thorough preparation of
troops, ..medical processing. ..and..decontamination.will require consi-
...derable -time, but,. as_.is known, an offensive.penetration, especially
under....modern conditions, cannot tolerate any interruption. There-
fore, ....the .problem ..of the continuity of the offensive under modern
.-.conditions acquires especially_important.significance. Its solution
depends,..mainly,_on.the.-ability-of ..the troops to cross. the. zones and
strips of radioactive contamination rapidly and without. great losses.
Furthermore, for a more complete solution of this problem, it is
necessary to envisage the. swift maneuver of reserves from the.: rear
t o bypass the zones and strips of radioactive contamination and sub-
sequently to emerge on the axis of the main and other strikes, fre-
quently in conjunction with the dropping of forward units on these
axes.
The views stated in this article are an attempt to examine briefly
the influence which is exerted by the mass use of nuclear weapons
(having due regard for other qualitative changes of troops) on some
of the principles of modern offensive operations of a front.
In a short article, naturally, not all the principles of offensive
operations could be examined. Therefore, such important questions
as the influence of nuclear weapons on the support of front troops and
on coordination, control, etc. , were not touched on in this artfr?th
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should also be taken into consideration th
t f
a
urther development
of nuclear weapons will without doubt reinforce the firing, striking,
and maneuvering capabilities of troops, and consequently, will bring
about appropriate changes in the principles of modern offensive operations
of a front.
A correct understanding of the influence of nuclear weapons on
the principles of modern offensive operations of a front is undoubtedly
necessary for the successful practical work of generals., and officers
regarding the preparation and conduct of these operations.
In the development of military-scientific thought in this and other
directions of the growth of the military art, and also in the realm of
the structure of the armed forces, we must not only remember but also
persistently carry out, the orders of the Minister of Defense of the
USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy to the effect
that "at the present time, when our Armed Forces are at a critical
stage of development, further thorough working out of military
doctrine, of the theory of the military art, and of other questions
of a military nature has acquired special significance. We must
clearly realize that without marked improvement in military-
theoretical work, practical errors in the building up of the Armed
Forces are possible. "1
The All-Army- Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Or aniza-
tions, Military Publishing House, 1960, page 20.
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