MILITARY THOUGHT: THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION IN MODERN WARFARE, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL OF TECHNICAL TROOPS I. KOVALEV, COLONEL-GENERAL OF TECHNICAL TROOPS P. BAKAREV, AND COLONEL K. PAVLOVICH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400570001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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JV/\ 1 -1 IUM
The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare
by .
Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I. Kovalev,
Colonel-General-of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, and
Colonel K. Pavlovich
The appearance of nuclear/missile weapons has caused
basic-changes in the means and methods of conducting armed
combat.'
On the basis of the well-known tenet of Engels that
"tactics and strategy depend, first of all, on the level
of production and means of communication attained at a
given'moment" (F._,Engels, Anti,-DuehringState .political
Publishing House, 1952, page 1is necessary to
examine; in the light of new conditions;.one'of the problems
of utmost importance to our country, namely, the problem of
transportation in'modern warfare, the strategic role aif
which,.has grown immeasurably.
V.I. Lenin indicated that-without well-prepared and
organized. transportation, and without railroads, modern
warfare is an empty phrase.
These tenets of Marxist-Leninist teaching retain their
full strength and meaning. Modern warfare will demand.. the
maximum effort of the. economic, military, and psychological
forces. of the country. From.its very,f irst moments "the
efforts,,ofall types of transportation must be concentrated.
on supporting combat operations of the missile troops,
PVO troops', and the first strategic echelon of our.Armed
Forces. At the. same time tremendous efforts must be
directed at ensuring shipments for mobilization of the
armed forces and their' strategic concentration.
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50X1-HUM
In connection with this, it is impossible~to agree
with the opinion of Colonel.-General.A`.:'-Gastilovich which
was expressed in his article.l He apparently maintains
that allegedly mobilization and. strategic deployment of
a multimillion-man army is impossible and unnecessary
under present conditions because nothing from the interior
of the country will reach the front in time, and may not
even reach=it at all. In his:opinion, the outcome of
war will be decided by missile troops and border district
armies, in such strength and with such armament as they
had when war fell upon them.
The views of Colonel-General Comrade Gastilovich are
apparently based on the assertion that allegedly under
modern conditions only "blitzkrieg" war is possible.
We cannot agree with this viewpoint. The country
and its armed forces should not be prepared only for a
"blitzkrieg" war. The risk is too great, too great and
tragic are the possible consequences in the event that
the war assumes a protracted character. Indeed, the fate
of the Socialist Camp will be.placed on the scales of war.
Prolonged war-must not be rejected at the'very outset. On
the contrary, it is:for just such a war that the country
and, its armed forces must be prepared, allowing, at-the
same time, for the possibility of a "blitzkrieg", and
preparation for the latter must be provided for and carried
out, but within the framework of preparation for a protracted
war. 50X1-HUM
The tasks connected with preparation of transportation
for war are distinguished by their tremendous labor-consum-
ing character and demand great resources and attention. To
organize these'properly there must be'a clear and concise
conception of the nature of modern warfare. If we agree with
the viewpoint of Colonel-General Comrade Gastilovich, and
rule out. the possibility of anything but a;"blitzkrieg"
which would be decided by the forces of only border district
armies, and plan the development of the war economy, and
specifically transportation, accordingly, then we may lose
precious time made available by the period of peacetime
development, and at'a moment of severe trial find ourselves
ill-prepared for a protracted ware
1. Special-Collectionof Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought", First Issue, 1960.
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Our opinions are based on the fact that nuclear/missile
weapons will not eliminate massed armies-but, on the
contrary, will cause their inevitable increase, because
losses in_personnel will increase and large numbers of
reserves will be required to replace them. Besides, no
amount of missiles can ensure,the.occupation and retention
of enemy territory; troops are needed for this, and a great
.many troops.
The decisiveness of the aims and the tremendous
spatial scope of modern warfare make it necessary to transit
considerable expanses. Armed combat carried on simultaneously
in several isolated theaters of military operations will
call for strategic and operational maneuvering of forces
and weapons, as well as the bringing up of large quantities
of.supplies to troops in action during the course of the
ware These shipments, for the most part, will be carried
out not only on the territory of the USSR, but also on. that
of the. adjacent allied countries, as well as on enemy
territory.
Organizing shipments between countries is complicated
by the varying widths of railway gauge, differences in
means of transportation, and. by the. absence of a unified
controlling organ which has appropriate authority for
carrying out and coordinating military shipments between
countries, conducted on land, sea, and air.
In addition to military shipments, consideration must
be given to the large volume of shipments within each
country to satisfy the requirements of the military economy
and civilian population of the countries taking part in a
war o .
Recently, with the spread of opinion regarding the
possibility of a "blitzkrieg", and the simplifications
permitted in conducting command-staff. exercises, many
generals and officers have formed an incorrect idea
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regarding the place and role of various .t~ipes of transporta-
tion in war. The role of railroads is greatly belittled
because of, their supposedly great vulnerability to strikes
of all types of weapons and the complexity of reconstructing
them. These ideas are quite. erroneous. Their.authors
fail to take into consideration the fact that railway
transportation remains the basic and decisive type of
transportation in the zone of interior and one of its
basic types within the limits of the front.
The experience of many wars shows that with a well-
organized reconstruction service, railroads possess a high
degree of.viability, and any damage to them is quickly
eliminated, This pertains, to the conditions of nuclear/
missile war as well, during which it is possible to maintain
relatively prompt reconstruction of damaged sections of
railroad lines by the assignment of appropriate manpower
and the extensive mechanization of work.
In relation to this question, the statements of two
Nvprominent?` American generals are of considerable interest.
The former commander of the 8th U.S. Army in Korea,
Van Fleet, writes in his memoirs: "We knew that the basic
mass of military supplies was delivered to the enemy by
rail. We knew' the loca,t`3on of all railway lines. We
had superiority at sea and in the air...We did everything
possible day after day, and still could not stop the
traffic of the Red trains. We attacked with dive bombers
and from low altitudes, shelled with artillery fire from
heavy sea and landbased guns, attacked with rocket weapons
and machine guns, and organized sabotage. We were witnesses
of new proof of the dependability and flexibility of railroads
in wartime."
l.
Chief,Engineer of the U.S. Army General Hall, in
mentioning that in case of war railways will pass from the
category of a, necessary means of transportation to one of
vital importance, stresses the fact that even under the
impact of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, railway installations were the most stable.
1.. James Van Fleet, Railway Transport and the Winners
of Wars. Washington, 1956.
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All this attests to the high viability-of railroads and,
consequently, also to..,the fact that with appropriate
preparation and organization of a reconstruction service,
they will.be one of the major strategic means of support
.for armed combat even in modern warfare.
For proper clarification of the role of the individual
types of transportation in the economy of the country,.now
and in the near future, let us list some figures which
characterize their relative proportion in relation to the
overall freight turnover of our country.
Types of Transportation
1940 [ 1958
1965
in perce
nt
Rail -------------
85.1
'81.17
71.33
Sea -------------
4.9
6.6
10.5
River . -------------
7.4
5.3
5.1
..Pipeline -------------
'0-.79
2.1
6.8
Motor Vehicle -------------
.1.8
4.8
6.2
Air ------------- _..:.
0.01
0.03
0.07
It is apparent from these figures that rail transport
still accounts for more than 80 percent of all freight and
passenger shipments, and if we count only that which covers
distances, of. over 1,000 km, then the proportion of rail
shipments will rise to 90 to 95-percent. This should
always be kept in mind in working out various! theoretical
conceptions and in developing long-term plans for shipments,
so that they are based on the actual capabilities of the
transportation means.
It is also necessary. to take into consideration the
fact that the railway type of transportation is the cheapest,
and, after all, questions.of economy have important
significance not only in peacetime but in wartime as well.
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The cost of shipping one kilometer-ton ofd freight by rail
is about 3 kopeeks, as compared to 58 to 70 kopeeks by
motor vehicle, and more than 3 rubles by air transport.
For a long time to come.railway transport will have
a decisive role in serving the transportation needs of
the country, in. peacetime as well as wartime, especially
in long distance shipping of freight.
During the period of the Second World War, 1941 to
1945,the proportion for the various types of transporta-
tion.in the.total volume of military shipments (excluding
medical shipments).were:l
Average
Types of Transportation
Shipping
Proportion
Distance (km)
(in percent)
Railway
700
70.5
Water (sea and river)
700
9.5
Motor-Vehicle
100
19;8
Air
700
0.2
In modern offensive operations, when the operational
rear is of considerable depth, regardless of the development
of other means of delivery, rail transport will carry up to
50 percent of all front shipments. Neither transport
aviation, field pipelines, nor motor vehicle transport can
replace railways in the near future.
We are for the comprehensive utilization of all types
of transportation because no single type can independently
fulfil all the needs of the national economy and the armed
forces. Consequently, the task consists of working out the
principles of comprehensive utilization of all types of
transportation on the basis of a thorough analysis of
the nature of modern warfare and taking into consideration
the actual potentialities of the theaters of military
operations. In accordance with this, we must . bring. about
their development and essential construction. 50X1-HUM
page miss ng
1. Military Communications in Light of the Further Development
o ar--y Art. Military Publishing House /date and
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The viability of the transportation'.netwbrk depends
to a large extent on the degree of its preparation in
peacetime.
One, of the most important measures is the development
of a network of railroads and highways, construction of
airfields, pipelines, river and seaports, and also of
bypasses of major junctions of communications lines,
tunnels, large bridges, etc. The accomplishment of these
tasks will take a prolonged period of time and large capital
investments, and in this connection, they must be closely
coordinated with the economic needs of the country. It is
necessary to combine correctly the economic and defense
interests of the country, which in our opinion, is not
always done in practice in questions of the development
of the transportation network.
For instance, the Seven-Year Plan calls for laying
90,000 km of rails on railroad lines. Of this amount,
only'9,000 km are allotted for new railway construction,
and the rest will be used for the, reconstruction of existing
lines and replacement of old.rails. It must be stated, that
in the course of the past several years the rate of railway
expansion' has fallen behind the growth .rate of the volume
of industrial output. For the past l0.years the volume of
industrial output. has grown yearly by 10 to 12 percent, but
the expansion of rail lines has been only 1 percent, and
highways even less than that. The density of the network
of rail lines and mobile highways even in the western
theater of military operations, the most favorable in
this respect, is illustrated by the following figures:
Rail lines T Automobile highways
(in km per 100,sq km of territory)
In the Soviet Union 2.7
In other countries
of the. Socialist Camp 9.2'
In the capitalist
countries 10.7
10.5'
42.0
75.0
50X1-HUM
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It is necessary to note that in compiling these figures
on the USSR,'only those territories. having the most highly
developed networks of railways and automobile highways
were considered.
Having a total network of main railway lines. stretching
for 123,000 km, we haul 60 percent more freight than the
entire railway network of the USA, which stretches for
340,000 km (first-class roads only). Thus, the density
of freight traffic carried by railways in the USSR is
4.5 times that of the USA. During the current Seven-Year
Plan the average freight traffic density will be increased
by another 50 percent approximately. Thus, despite the
development of other means of transportation, the operating
'pace of the railways, of the USSR in the coming years will
not decrease,but on the contrary, will increase considerably.
Meanwhile, it is now planned to utilize basic capital
investment not for the development of new rail lines,.but
for the reconstruction of existing lines.
From the military viewpoint, 1Aa number of important
areas it would . e more correct. to, solve the pro em of en-
surng the shipment of the increasing fl6-w_of__freUg_ht by
building new railway lines, because a denser .ne wor a so
as"a g er,. egree o viability.
Converting the basic railway main lines to electric
traction will not raise the viability of the transportation
network, because the work of the railways will depend
entirely on the uninterrupted performance of the powerful
electric power plants, which in themselves will be an
important target for enemy strikes. In these circumstances
it is necessary to establish alternate sources of power
?.(zakoltsevat) in our power system as soon as possible.
.Diesel-electric traction is more independent,. and con-
sequently more viable, provided that stocks..of diesel fuel
are established for a prolonged period of time because
.fuel.suitable for diesel.,'locomotive use is produced in
only one or two places in,the_country. It must also be noted
that our main, line locomotives cannot be used abroad because
of their clearance and load characteristics and the design
of the running gear, which is not adaptable to West
European gauge.
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One of the measures for increasing the viability of
the transportation network which is being carried out in
peacetime is the construction of bypasses of major rail-
way junctions and establishment of stocks of reconstruction
materials and structures.
In our opinion, a number of errors are committed
in this matter. Bypasses of junctions take,a long time
to build, and are expected to be used only in wartime.
Thus, large capital investments are immobilized. For
example, the bypass. of the Smolensk railway junction,,
which has been under construction for 10 years, and whose
estimated cost is 52 million rubles, does not completely
perform the task of increasing the viability of this
railway. It is necessary to construct wide bypasses of
junctions, taking into account the possibility of using
them in peacetime for transporting local freight, thus"
allowing for fast recovery of the expenditures which have
been made.
Little attention has been given to the problems of the
construction and development of rail spurs to river and
seaports, moorages for support of combined rail-water
shipments, and also to the construction of railway spurs
to airports.
Not everything is going well in establishing stocks
of materiel, structures and equipment for the reconstruction
of bridges, tunnels, ports, airfields and other installations
in the transportation network. For instance, the Ministry
of Transportation is stockpiling pre-assembled, transportable
(tselnoperevozimyy) spans weighing up to 68 tons to reconstruct
bridges, and.,they can be transported only by rail and
installed by special railway cantilever cranes.
Under modern conditions, when the enemy will attempt
to cut our railway network into individual isolated
sections, in a majority of cases it will not be possible
to transport these spans and cranes by rail to the bridges
under reconstruction.
In our opinion it would be proper to stockpile pre-
fabricated bridge structures, and cranes to install them,
so that in case of need they could be shipped by motor
vehicle transport.
50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
It is advisable also to establish stocks of materials
and structures for reconstructing highway bridges and
river ports.
At present the need has arisen for closer coordination
of activities among the member countries of the Warsaw
Pact. Many problems have accumulated which require
coordinated solutions and collaboration. Specifically
awaiting a solution are problems of great importance such
as:
-establishing a park of special rolling stock which
would allow for automatic transfer (while in motion) from
the Soviet gauge of 1524 mm to the West European gauge
of 1435 mm and back again without changing trucks;
-setting up extensions of rail lines with Soviet gauge
deep into the territory of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia
and Rumania and of West European gauge deep into our
territory;
-establishing common bases for reconstruction materials
and structures and consolidating them;
-reinforcing railway and highway bridges to meet the
load specifications of our rolling stock and units of
independently driven equipment.
All these problems have a direct bearing on ensuring
the viability and the uninterrupted performance of the
transportation network during a period of war.
To solve them we must first of all enlist the services
of the already existing Organization for the Cooperation of.
Railroads of the Socialist Countries (Organizatsiya
Sotrudnichestva Zheleznykh Dorog-OSZhD) but include in it
appropriate military specialists.
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In addition to engineer-construction measures, the
viability of communications lines, is ensured by the
presence of reconstruction organizations, capable of
moving quickly to work installations and having at their
disposal the necessary equipment cadres of specialists
trained in working under conditions of radioactive
contamination of the terrain.
Within the boundaries of the zone of the front, the
viability and reconstruction of communications lines will
be ensured by railway, engineer, and road units which are
trained to perform this work in peacetime.
Reconstruction of the rear area networks is entrusted
to the organizations in charge of their operation and
which do not have the technical equipment or the trained
cadres for performing this work.
The exception is the Ministry of Transportation, which
has reconstruction trains and bases of reconstruction
materials. In addition, for reconstruction of major
installations it is provided that construction organizations
of the Ministry of Transport Construction will be called
upon. However, even these organizations are not trained
in the reconstruction of installations destroyed by nuclear
weapons.
In case of large-scale destruction of major railway
installations whose reconstruction will require a great deal
of time, the organization of temporary transshipment areas
(vremennyy peregruzochnyy rayon - VPR) should be provided
for in order to transit obstructed areas by using other
forms of transport, primarily motor vehicle.. For servicing
the VPR, special mobile formations should be organized for
wartime and equipped with loading-unloading machinery and
motor vehicle transport.
It would be incorrect to assume that such special
formations will be able to perform independently the task
of transshipping freight in obstructed areas. Even rough
estimates indicate that for setting up a VPR on such a
main line as that between Moscow and Minsk, when the railway
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junction at Vyazma has been destroyed, and through which
pass 76 pairs of trains daily, the transshipment area
stretches for 250 to 300 km, and for it to service trans-
shipment of supply trains alone we shall need no less .
than 10,000 motor vehicles and more than 15,000 men for
the loading-unloading operations.
In circumstances when the enemy inflicts large-scale
destruction, it will be very difficult to effect necessary
national economic and military shipments without,. strict
centralization of the comprehensive utilization-of.all
forms of transport.
is
At the present time in our country, all forms of
transportation are controlled by various ministries and
departments. Some of them are subordinate to central,
and some to republic and local organs of authority.
Because of this, it is very complicated,even in peacetime,
to organize and conduct combined shipments with the
participation of 2 to 3 types of transport.
In time of war, such bureaucratic disunity in
transportation means is intolerable because it can lead
to serious consequences for the armed forces, as well as
for the economy of the country, and these consequences
would be difficult to correct.
.All forms of transportation which are at the disposal
of the country can be systematically and expediently
utilized only if the control of their exploitation emanates
from a single center, closely connected to the Supreme-High
Command.
In our opinion, it is extremely essential to unite the
management of all types of transport in one organ, for
instance, in a specially established transportation committee.
At the same time, decentralization of control must be ensured
by establishing 8 to 10 directing?bodies territorially
and administratively linked with industrial-economic
areas and military districts. Such a system will ensure
the viability of the controlling organs and will permit a
more effective solution of the problem of combined
utilization of all types of transportation in peace and
wartime.
50X1-HUM
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At the same time it is necessary to==complete the
unification within the Ministry of Transport Construction
of all construction organizations which.conduct construction
of rail lines and highways, pipelines, airfields, and
sea and river ports, after preparing them organizationally
and technically for wartime accomplishment of the most
complex work in reconstructing communications lines in
the zone of interior.
However, the forces of the construction organizations
of the Ministry of Transport Construction alone will be far
from sufficient to reach this goal. Appropriate preparation
is needed so that reconstruction work .and the establishment
of VPR's are also assigned to local territorial organizations
and the populace.
In wartime, reconstruction of communications lines in
the zone of interior must become a common task of all the
people and be organized by the State. People and equip-
ment must be assigned in advance to all the most important
installations ( rail centers, ports, large.bridges, etc.)
and, in case of need, must go immediately to the installation
and put themselves at the disposal of the chief in charge
of organizing the reconstruction work.
Under peacetime conditions, it is expedient to conduct
a series of measures in accordance with the policy of the
Ministry of Defense and the civilian ministries to ensure
more effective utilization of the means of transport in the
initial period of a war.
In the present situation, to outfit one fully mobilized
motorized-rifle division, various types of equipment must
be brought from 29 to 32 separate depots to the activation
point from distances of 500 to 2500 km. In order to decrease
this volume of shipments at a time when the railways are
working under the most strain, complete depots should be
set up at the mobilization points, from which all the
requisite military equipment and materiel. could be obtained
at once.
The problem of supplier and consumer routing of trains
must be solved in order to reduce to a minimum the layover
time of military goods at points where trains are reconstituted.
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It is time to take practical action in creating special
freight containers, pallets(poddon).sand other means for
shipping military goods which will-;:.ensure mechanization of
loading-unloading work and will sharply reduce the layover
time of trains in transshipment areas.
To decrease the time needed for full mobilization
and shipment of troops of the first strategic echelon,
the traveling speed of trains should be increased to
1000 km per 24-hour period (i.e. doubled) and the weight
of a military train increased to at least 1500 tons
(gross weight) instead of the 1200 tons used presently.
The present level of technical equipment of railway transport
fully allows implementation of these measures.
According to modern views, it is planned to reconstruct,
in a frontal zone, 2 or 3 frontal railway routes and 1 or
2 lateral ones. To carry out these tasks, the composition
of the front includes 5 or 6 railway brigades, reinforced
with bridge regiments, battalions of railway pontoon bridges,
special formations, and, when necessary, tunnel battalions.
The rate of reconstruction of railways will depend to
a considerable extent on the extent and nature of their
destruction and on the number of railway units assigned to
the reconstruction of one or another railway route.
It is known that in previous wars each of the opposing
sides tried to effect complete destruction of railways
during a retreat. Roadbeds, tracks, all bridges and pipes,
communication lines, railway water supply installations,
and service and technical buildings were all blown up.
Practically speaking, such complete destruction was possible
only in a tactical zone of defense to a depth of 20 to 40 km
from the main line of resistance, and then only under
conditions of a slow retreat. In an operational zone 100 to
200 km in depth, railways suffered a slight to average
amount of destruction.
In the currently effective regulations and instructions
of our probable enemies, there is provision by way of
"delaying operations" for massive obstructions along
communications routes. In the field manual of the 50X1-HUM
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US Army, Obstruction and Destruction, it is planned to
use nuclear weapons to create obstructions--..-- Considerable
work has been done in West Germany in prearing structures
for destruction. According to available data,mine devices
have been installed in more than 300 installations (bridges,
tunnels, dams, reservoirs).
The experience of the last war showed that the faster
the rate of offensives of troops, the less time the enemy
has to set up obstructions. Under modern conditions, with
the fast rate of offensive and the dense railway network
in the western theater of military operations, it is to be
expected that the enemy will be in a position to destroy
railways only by individual focal points, striving to
split and break up the entire network into isolated
sections. Moreover, first to be destroyed will be all
large bridges and tunnels. The extent of destruction to
railways in this case will not be as great as in the case
of complete destruction, but the nature of destruction and
conditions of reconstruction will be more complex than in
the last war.
Under the conditions of highly mobile modern warfare,
when offensive operations are conducted in great depth and
the destruction of railways, is accomplished at certain
points, railway units will have to work along a wide front,
separated from each other, as a rule, in small subunits,
often in a "deep envelopment" of railway sectors still
occupied by the enemy, or in "corridors" made by our troops.
Taking into account the possible tempos of offensive
operations, railway troops must reconstruct the basic
front railway main lines at a pace of no less than 45 to
50 km per 24-hour period and strive to raise this to 55
to 60 km per day. In the last war the railway reconstruction
rate in one front operation was 5 to 8 km on one route
(in individual cases up to 20 to 25 km).
In order not to be separated from.the advancing troops
by more than a distance of a day's ride by motor vehicle
transport, railway troops must reconstruct any destroyed
point or any installation in.3 to 3.5 days. If its 50X1-HUM
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reconstruction requires more time (for instance, building
a bypass of a railway junction or bridge, reconstruction
.of tunnels, etc), then, it will be necessary to overcome
the obstructed area by establishing a VPR.and by. wide
use of other types of transport.
The task of increasing the rate of reconstruction of
railways to 55 to 60 km per day, and more, demands a
fundamental change in the technical equipment of railway
.troops, the creation of new types of reconstruction means
based on wide use of automation, telemechanics, and he
overall mechanization of reconstruction processes.
Railway troops must be mobile. Their technical
equipment and reconstruction equipment must be capable of
being transported not only by rail and motor vehicle
transport,.but also by airplanes and helicopters. Only by
this approach can the task of increasing the pace of rail-
way reconstruction to the required level be performed. In
addition we must not lose sight either of certain problems
of an organizational nature.
As is known, the composition of the troops of the
Soviet Army which are deployed beyond the western national
borders of the USSR does not include railway units. In
case of war, railway units will take at least 5 to 6 days
to arrive at the. front and start work, while during this
time the advancing troops will move forward considerably.
Consequently, in the very first days of a war, a significant
separation may develop between operating railways and the
advancing troops.
All bases for reconstruction materials and structures
are also located on the territory of the USSR, at a
distance.of more than 2000 to 3000 km from the line of
deployment of troops of the first line. Even if there
are sufficient stocks of these materials, it is impossible
to deliver them quickly to reconstruction sites.
Such a situation cannot be considered normal. In order
to reconstruct railways in the wake of the advancing troops,
railway units and materiel bases must be located as close
as possible to departure lines. -
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There is no clarity in the problems of organizing
the operation of reconstructed sectors and their technical
concealment. Many independently operating organizations
have appeared in front railway sectors. Reconstruction
of railways is conducted by railway brigades and special
reconstruction formations subordinate to the chief of
railway troops of the front (NZhVF), and operation of
the reconstructed railway sectors is ensured by operating.
railway regiments and operating special. formations,
subordinate to the chief of the military-operating director-
ate of the front (each. VEU). The organization of
military shipments is conducted by the chief of military
transport of the front (nachalnik VOSO),. They all have
equal rights and, with the exception of the chief of
VOSO, are directly subordinate to the commander of the
front. The NZhVF and VEU for special service are also
subordinate to the Ministry of Transportation of the
USSR.
When our troops are operating on the territory of
allies, it must be taken into account that there are also
local governmental organs of railway administration-with
whom the work must be coordinated.
As was pointed out earlier, under modern conditions
we must strive for the comprehensive utilization of all
types of transportation located within the limits of the
front' rail,`',water, motor vehicle, air, and pipeline. Yet,
all these types of transportation are subordinate to
different arms of troops and services.
The need has arisen to examine the problem of setting
up within the composition of the front a single military
transport service (directorate), endowed with the necessary
powers for organizing centralized utilization of all types
of transportation subordinate to the front and appropriate
authority to coordinate problems of military shipments
with appropriate ministries and departments. The complement
of this directorate must include experienced specialists
and representatives of all types of transportation who are
capable of establishing and efficiently directing a
powerful transport service.
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At the beginning of the Second World War an attempt
was made to assign the responsibility for reconstruction
and operation of front railways to a "representative of
the NKPS (Narodnyy Komissariat Putey Soobshcheniya -
Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation), who was attached
to the Military Council of a front. The experience. of
many wars has shown that front railways must be controlled
by the military, especially beyond the limits of our
national boundaries. In time of war, neither railwaymen
nor local agencies of authority will recognize anyone
else's authority, and no one else will have adequate
legal rights.
At the present time the planning of shipments and
coordination of the tasks of all types of transportation
are the responsibility of the third department of the
headquarters of the rear services of a front. This
department will be unable to resolve a single practical
problem, and will be a superfluous echelon of command, tying
up the operations of all transportation agencies. This
conclusion is corroborated by the experience of many
practical exercises.
To ensure comprehensive utilization of all types of
transportation, it will be necessary to make up mutually
coordinated schedules and plans (possibly using electronic
computing machines), a unified dispatcher control for
shipments, good and accurately operating communications,
etc. All this requires highly qualified specialists who
have experience in working in transportation agencies.
To coordinate the preparation of the entire transportation
network for operation in wartime, and also to resolve
problems of its utilization in the interests of-operating
troops, it is necessary to set up, within the scope of the.
member-countries of the Warsaw Pact, an appropriate
transportation agency which must be closely connected with
the OSZhD.
it is also expedient to distribute properly the stocks
of reconstruction materiel, and to unify reconstruction
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.1 QUA]-huM
equipment and reconstruction units so that they will
meet modern requirements. Comprehensive utilization of.,
all types of transportation must also be organized in
accordance with a unified plan, regardless of the
nation to which they belong.
It is perfectly obvious that appropriate preparation
of means of transportation for work under conditions of
war must be carried out in.advance. Every delay in this
matter is very dangerous :because the scope ,,of the work
is so great that it will be impossible to make up lost'
time in the course of a war.
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