MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME PROBLEMS IN THE PREPARATION OF THE REAR AREA FOR SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF A WAR, BY COLONEL-GENERAL F. MALYKHIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400400001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Some Problems in the Preparation of ,the Rear Area---f or Support of
the Armed Forces in the In .tia~ ?Perio4S&f-~a war
by Colonel=General F. Mlykhin
Fundamental changes in. the , nature of a future war require a basically
new approach to the resolution of.,a series of high],ji important problems
in the mterielmtechnical et:of armed c"
ombat.
We. have in mind,.first of all, the problems of rear area support
of all types of. Armed Forces when. missile troops have the leading role
in the theaters of military operations and, simultaneously, the ful-
filment of missions for the protection, of the zone of the interior and
the groupings of the Armed Forces in the depth; from enemy strikes with
weapons of mass. destruction. In`brief, we are discussing the necessity
of developing special theoretical, postulates concerning the utilization
of those tremendous forces and means which will be made available by
the State for the comprehensive rear:'area..support of the Armed Forces
at the beginning of a war.
In none of the previous wars was this problem so keen and urgent.
Even during the period of the: Second World War the attention of
military leaders with respect 'to the rear area support of the Armed
Forces was directed mainly a.t the delivery of allotted materiel-technical
supplies to the fronts and to their proper utilization in the theaters
of military operations. Moreover 'the,delivery of a significant part
of the supplies to the. consumers,_.i to the distribution stations
of the' front, was carried out " by elements of the national economy.
-Those supplies which were delivered to the central supply elements,
could be delivered to'the fronts in a planned manner by using the
regularly operating transportation network of the country. The
disruption of delivery-plans by the enemy took place primarily in the
rear areas of the front and-in zones' directly adjacent to them.
Completely different. conditions for rear area support of the
Armed Forces will prevail in modern warfare,.
In delineating the conditions of: work in the rear area of the
Armed Forces, it is necessary to bear the following factors in mind
above'al:
the necessity.of simultaneous support of operations of fronts
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in different theaters of military operations and-of those groupings
of the Armed Forces which are carrying out combat missions in the
deep rear;
YM
- the provision of reliable transportation networks for the
rear area and for the. front, and between theaters of military
operations, for supplying fronts with everything necessary and for
carrying out strategic and large operational regroupings;
- the difficulties of ensuring protection of the rear area of
the Armed Forces from the: means of mess destruction over the entire
territory of the country.
In modern conditions the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, as
never before, depends upon the timely preparation and stability of
rear area support. For this reason the theoretical development and
serious scientific investigation of problems of the rear area support
of the Armed Forces at.its present stage must be viewed as the most
important tasks.
The modern rear services of the Armed Forces represent a huge
organism which must be arranged in such a way as to support continuously,
with minimum losses, the combat activity of fronts, the Antiaircraft
Defense Troops of the Country, and reserves of the General Headquarters
of the Supreme High Command in precise conformity with their missions
and the situation.
By the rear services of the Armed Forces, in our opinion, one
should understand both the forces and equipment included organizationally
in the complement of the Armed Forces and those attached by the State
to the Jurisdiction of a military command for overall materiel, technical,
and medical support and for the servicing of missile and ground troops,
troops of antiaircraft defense the country, and the air forces and
the navy.
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Depending upon the nature of the missions being fulfilled, conditions
of work I or 2 words missin 7 and the organizational order, the forces
.and means of the rear area of the Armed Forces fare divided into the
followinil elements: troop, operational, and central.
_ The troop element is composed of rear services units and subunits,
f2- or 3 words:missin/ieteriel-technical supplies and property 2 or 3
words missinil of supporting the combat activity of large units /and
unit.
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The o erational element of the rear is composed =organizationally
of special organs of control of rear services large Units, units, and
installations of fronts, armies, fleets (flotillas and PVO districts.
It is designated for organization and implementation of measures for
materiel, technical, and medical support of troops, preparation,
restoration, and utilization of transportation routes, and other work
in support of the combat activity of troops.
The central element of the rear services includes a large number
of various large units, units,..and installations, bases, depots, arsenals,
repair plants, and other production enterprises of the Ministry of
Defense designated for the rear services support of all the Armed Forces
of the country (their various types), and at the same time constituting
the reserve of the Supreme High Command and commanders-in-chief of
the types of Armed Forces.
The central organs of the rear services of the Armed Forces utilize
the transportation network of the national economy in accordance with
the full needs of the Armed Forces, and also the forces and means of
State reserves and the mobilization potential of industry prepared
during peacetime and assigned to their jurisdiction by special govern-
ment decrees.
or 3 words missinilin the preparation of the rear services of
the Armed Forces for warfare is extremely large. In this article we
shall endeavour to set forth our point of view only on the most important
problems, having, in our opinion, primary significance for fulfilling
practical missions of preparation of the rear services for the support.
of the Armed Forces in the initial period of a war.
In these problems we refer first of all to the changing role of
stocks of materiel, determination of their size and principles of their
echelonment, the preparation of communication routes, and means of
transport, and problems of developing new forms of control of the rear
services of the Armed Forces.
With the growth in size of arses, adoption of new, more sophisti-
cated means of armed combat, increase in offensive tempos, and the
intensity of defensive engagements, the materiel requirements of the
troops';increase correspondingly. During the First World War the Russian
Army expended about one million tons of ammuition and a total of several
tens of thousands of tons of fuel. During the period of the Second
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World War the total expenditure of ammunition by the Soviet Armed
Forces comprised about 8 million tons,6nd(.1f ifel -more to 13 million
tons.
The materiel expenditures of the Armed Forces in a future war
apparently will increase even more. The high level of technical out-
fitting of the Armed Forces has caused a significant increase in the
estimated units of supply expressed in weight. Thus, the weight of
a unit of fire of a modern front (without aviation) currently amounts
to 18.5 thousand tons, and fuel servicing exceeds 22 thousand tons.
Calculations indicate that for 8 to 10 calendar days of an offensive
operation, developing speeds of 80 to 100 km in a calendar day, and
for the period of its preparation, the troops of a front may expend
upwards of 240 thousand tons of fuel and about 120 thousand tons of
various ammunition. To this should be added the probability of
increased combat losses from weapons of mass destruction. It follows
that the quantitative growth of. materiel expenditures conforms to an
objective law'.
Along with the quantitative changes in modern conditions, as a
result of equipping the Armed Forces with new types of arms, great
qualttit changes in materiel requirements have taken place.
A future war will be a nuclear/missile war, in which the decisive
type of Armed Forces will be missile troops of strategic designation,
and the basis of the firepower of each of the types of Armed Forces
will be their missile weapons. In connection with this, the supply
of troops with missiles, missile fuel, and other special materiel for
missile troops acquires primary significance. The need, however, for
conventional types of ammunition, especially for tube artillery and
aircraft bombs, is decreasing significantly at the present time.
Speaking of the decrease of the needs of the troops for these types
of ammunition, we are basing it on the fact that fire preparation and
the support of operations during broad use of nuclear/missile weapons
will undergo great changes. An offensive will be carried out at
great speeds with broad utilization of nuclear weapons. Nuclear/
missile weapons will also form the basis of defensive fire.
No less serious qualitative changes have also taken place in
the fuel requirements of the Armed Forces. The proportion of aviation
fuel in the total expenditure of fuel has significantly decreased,
with a simultaneous colossal growth in the fuel requirement of ground
equipment. The supply of troops with missile fuel has acquired the
greatest significance.
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Serious qualitative changes in the requirements of the Armed
Forces also arise from their increased technical outfitting.
In a future war, much very complex equipment will be used. For
this reason one of the main missions of the rear services is the un-
interrupted supply of the Armed Forces with technical equipment for
the use, repair,and servicing of nuclear, missile,and radioelectronic
equipment, tanks, motor vehicles, and other, materiel.
While, during the Second World War, this equipment comprised
altogether only 8 to 10 percent of the weight of expended ammunition,
fuel, and rations, its present proportion has grown to 20 to 25 percent.
The preceding statements permit the conclusion that under modern
conditions the basic types of materiel supplies for support of the
Armed Forces may be considered to be: missiles and assorted nuclear
ammunition, missile fuel, artillery ammunition, fuel for ground
equipment and aircraft, technical equipment, and rations.
The uninterrupted support of troops with these types of materiel
supplies as the first priority in modern conditions is one of the
chief factors in their high combat readiness, and depends upon the
status of the supplies and accumulated stocks in case of a war.
In our time the significance of materiel supplies has grown
immeasurably.
The role and size of stocks depends first of all on the volume
of materiel expenditures, the urgency with which needs may arise, and
the capacity of the transportation system to guarantee uninterrupted
delivery of freight from the place of production to the consumers.
Under modern conditions, with increased requirements for materiel
supplies and the great vulnerability of the routes of communication
and transportation, guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow of goods will
be extremely difficult, and in certain instances altogether impossible.
Namely for this reason, stocks of materiel supplies created-in advance
in all elements of the Armed Forces will, as never before, be essential
for guaranteeing the constant combat readiness of troops. This is
especially important for guaranteeing the strategic deployment of the
Armed Forces and conduct of operations during the initial period of
a war, when industry will only be converting to military production,
the transportation network will be occupied mainly with movements
for the concentration of troops, and in a number of areas may be
disrupted by the first massive nuclear/missile strikes of the enemy.
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Arguments are now in process concerning the.-size and order of
echelonment of stocks created in peacetime. Certbin comrades advise
maximum reduction of stocks with the aim of supposedly easing the
burden of troops further. We are against such an approach to the
resolution of this important problem.
The correct determination of the essential scale of materiel
stocks accumulated in advance has been a subject of special concern
to governments, general staffs, and the rear services elements of
their armed forces throughout the course of the entire history of
warfare.
In our opinion, during the development of plans for the rear
services support of the Armed Forces in the initial period of a
modern war, careful consideration should be given such factors as:
- the strategic goals facing the armed forces along strategic
axes (theaters of military operations);
- the total volume of materiel requirements fl- or 2 words missin7
of the Armed Forces;
- the probable period of conversion of current production to
military needs;
- the degree of preparation of the transportation system of the
country.-.for uninterrupted work in carrying out planned movements of
troops and bringing up of materiel supplies under conditions of the
initial nuclear/missile strikes;
- the economic potentialities of the country ~f the combined
countries), and the state of combat equipment development (the
possibility of rapid; obsolescence of accumulated ammunition,
technical, and other supplies).
On the basis of the experience of the last war, and after
consideration of the postwar changes of the factors indicated above,
we assume that, in preparation for war, it is essential to create
stocks of materiel in advance directly within the troops, with the
armies and fronts planned for deployment, and under the jurisdiction
of the central organ of the rear services of the Armed Forces. We
consider the following to be the optimum sizes of these stocks applicable
to the western axis:
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- general stocks of deployed fronts (mobile - troop, army, and
front) calculated on the monthly requirement of the troops;
supplies of the central organ of the rear services, calculated
on the three-month requirements of all the Armed Forces of the country,
taking mobilization buildup into account.
When determining the size of the stocks, which are eligible for
prior creation and regular maintenance within the troops, in army and
district depots (depots of groups of troops), we proceed from the fact
that in the first 20 to 25 calendar days after the initiation of war,
the main types of transport will be converted primarily to operational
movements of troops for supporting strategic concentration and
deployment of future fronts.' On overland communication routes a
large number of barriers and centers of persistent contamination will
be formed. A portion of the peacetime stocks will be subject to
contamination or will be annihilated by the initial nuclear strikes
of the enemy. For this reason the delivery of materiel' supplies
during the course of the first and even partly during the second
offensive operation of the front will be extremely difficult. In
volume it apparently will not exceed 25 to 30 percent of the monthly
requirements of the troops, which might cover only the combat losses
and form some reserve for supporting the combat effectiveness of troops
until the moment of establishment of a system of uninterrupted supply
of the operating army for the delivery of everything necessary from
the depots and bases of the center.
In the determination of the size of stocks, which it is feasible
to accumulate in advance and maintain at central bases, taking into
account all the above-listed factors, we took as a base the time
necessary for the buildup of the mobilization potential and for the
conversion of industry to war production.
As is known,three months were required during the last world
war for the conversion of industry to the military needs of our country,
during the course of which bases for production of combat equipment
and various military materiel were created in interior areas. Already
1. The period of the most intensive operational: movements on railroads
of the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War lasted for: about
a month. During this time the volume of supply movements was very low.
During the first 10 days of mobilization.. it made up altogether only 10
percent of the total volume of military railway movements.
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in October-November 1941, our Armed Forces began to receive regularly
everything necessary for combat and life from current production. It
is this very: period that we are.taking into-account, proposing minimum
quantities of supplies at the center for supporting the Armed Forces
at the beginning of a future war.
.We may hear objections; that the last war was started with extremely
disadvantageous conditions of enemy superiority; the organization of
military production in the summer of 1941 was combined with the evacuation
of a large number of enterprises to the east; in addition to this, our
supply organs did not have sufficient practical experience in the ful-
filment of these complex missions, etc.
Al]. this, undoubtedly, should be considered. However, it is
impossible to overlook the new' difficulties connected with the enemy
capability of carrying out nuclear/missile strikes against:i.important
economic centers over the entire territory of the country. For this
reason we take into consideration the potential possibility of annihilation,
or'heavy destruction, of a number of enterprises and bases and, consequently,
also ;a substantial decrease in mobilization potential and State reserves
in the first days of a war.
Under modern conditions, with the great vulnerability of the lines
of communication, the correct determination of the echelonment of
stocks of materiel supplies will have exceptionally important significance.
The accepted order of echelonment and location of stocks has.:direct
influence on the creation of conditions of autonomy and independence,
of troop operations and on the viability of the system of rear area
support during widespread utilization of weapons of mass destruction.
We consider that for a deploying front, as regards a western axis,
stocks should be echeloned in the following order:
- with the troops (in regimental and divisional depots) - mobile
stocks on motor vehicles in amounts required by the troops for three
or four calendar days of medium intensity combat;
in army depots - similarly mobile stocks for two calendar days;
in front depots (of military districts, groups of troops) for
20-25 calendar day!:; requirements of the grouping being supported.
A modern division is a highly mobile, fully mechanized large unit,
capable of engaging-in combat under complex conditions, along an
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independent axis, as a landing force, etc. For this-reason it is very
important to create definite conditions of autonomy for the division,
.opportunities to conduct combat while cut off from bases of supply,
with broken communicationolines,and in other instances of complex
combat situations. In the interests of easing the burden of the
division, during the last years its rear services have been significantly
decreased and stocks of materiel supplies have been substantially
lowered. Further decrease of stocks in the division, in our opinion,
is already impossible. As long as the basic means of transport
continues to be land transportation,. based on highly vulrierable routes
of communication, the lowering of the mobile stocks below the level
of three to four calendar day requirements of the division will
inevitably harm the combat effectiveness of the troops. This pertains
especially to fuel, without which modern,fully mechanized troops may
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become immobile targets
It is known that the expenditure of fuel during a calendar day
when the speed of the offensive is 80 to 100 km may amount to: diesel
fuel for heavy tanks, 1.3 fuelings, and for medium tanks, 0.7 fuelings;
aviation gasoline for armored carriers, 0.7 fuelings, motor vehicle`
gasoline for combat and transport vehicles, 0.45 fuelings. If with
such expenditure the divisional supply of diesel fuel drops to two
fuelings, and aviation and Other gasoline to 1.25 fuelings, then in
case of disruption of transport, the troops will not be able to
continue'',the fulfilment of their combat missions, after one and a
half to two calendar days.
For this reason we categorically object to those who, viewing
the idea of easing the burden of the troops as a goal in itself,
recommend lowering the fuel stocks in a division to. one and a half
to two calender day requirements.
We consider that the very minimum mobile stocks of fuel in a
division must be: motor vehicle gasoline - 1.4 fuelings, diesel fuel -
2.5 fuelings.l
The combined-arms and tank armies, under modern conditions, form
the basis of both operational internal and operational interfrontal
maneuver. For this reason, it is extremely essential to have at the,,
1. All fuel calculations were carried out on the basis that motor
vehicles have a cruising range of 500 km, and for tanks, taking into
consideration the fuel in all fuel tanks making up the'fuel system of
tanks.
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disposal pf the army commander at least minima--l-reserves of materiel
supplies for operational influence on sharp and:unexpected changes in
the situation. Such a reserve is proposed by us fora:.combined-arms
army on the scale of troop requirements for twci calendar days, and
for a tank army - for one calendar day.
In connection with such a lowering of stocks with the troops and
at mobile army bases, as well as in connection with the significant
decrease of other forces and materiel of these elements of the rear
services, there has appeared a necessity to alter the echelonment of
stocks of a front. In the interests of bringing these stocks nearer
to the troops supported, we consider that up to 60 percent of them
should be maintained in forward bases of the front, which, with great
strain on the communication lines, can move their sections forward.
The remaining 40 percent of the stocks of ;the front may be kept in
rear area bases of the front for the regular replenishing of forward
bases, for deliveries by air transport to armies, and for the direct
support of-troops carrying out missions in the depth of the rear
area.
Such a system of stocks echelonment in the zone of operations
of the front, in our opinion, more readily satisfies the requirements
of uninterrupted support of troops under the complex conditions of
modern operations.
Certain comrades consider that in order to avoid unnecessary
transshipment, bases should not be formed in the deep rear area of
a front. Thus, for example, it is proposed to have one front
missile-technical base with two sections, which must deploy in an
area along a 200 to 250 km front and 100 to 150 km in depth. Such
a scheme, seemingly very simple at first glance, may become, in
actual conditions, very complex, and will not guarantee the ful-
filment of assigned missions. It does not satisfy the requirements
of maximum dispersion, stability of supply during the sudden appearance
,of barriers on lines of communication, and hinders support of missile
large units deployed in the depth of the rear area.
In view of the great vulnerability of rear area lines of
communication, remoteness of theaters. of military operations, and
the long-range ability of modern means of attack, the problem of
correct echelonment of stocks of the central organ of the rear
services of the Armed Forces has arisen sharply at the present time.
The investigation of this problem leads to the conclusion that
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in our time the stocks of the center should be--maintained in two
echelons: in the border zone and in the zone==of inferior. By the
border zone, we mean the groups of our troops located on the territory
of countries of the Peoples' Democracies, the territory of Warsaw' Pact
countries contiguous with our borders, and, for. military districts,
the border areas of the USSR.
The moving out of bases of the center on the Western axis beyond
our borders, with the moving of stocks nearer to troops supported,
will permit us in initial operations to avoid dependence bn?.vulnbkable
railroad meeting points of Soviet and European gauges.
During the echelonment of stocks in border areas, their distribution
along the axes of probable troop operations must also be provided for,
taking into consideration requirements of groupings of the Armed Forces
for materiel stocks along a particular axis.
Altogether in the bases of the center in the border zone, there
should be 50 to 60 percent of the total volume of stocks of the center,
which are accumulated ahead of time. It is advisable to create the
remaining portion (50 to 4+0 percent) in the zone of interior, located
in scattered places sheltered from nuclear/missile strikes of the
enemy. These stocks will be utilized to support the full mobilization
of the Armed Forces, troop operations of the antiaircraft defense of
the country, missile troops of strategic designation, and other
groupings fulfilling combat missions in the zone of interior.
During the distribution of stocks created ahead of time, special
attention should be given to`their preservation-.during enemy attack
with weapons of mass destruction. The preservation of troop and army
stocks is assured chiefly by the mobility of bases and depots. Insofar
as the stocks of the front and bases of the center are concerned, in
the interests of great security, they should be located at an appropriate
distance from probable targets of nuclear strikes, in sheltered places
and carefully concealed. Unfortunately, at the present time this vital
principal is a long way from being observed everywhere.
It appears to us, that we should not be carried away with the
creation of large bases, the sheltering and concealment of which would
require huge resources. It is considerably more advantageous to create
smaller bases, to spread them over a larger territory, and place them
at a distance from possible targets of enemy nuclear/missile strikes.
The stocks of materiel supplies of the center need not be located
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only in bases under the jurisdiction of the-..military command. A
portion of thse stocks may also be located_n bases of State materiel
reserves, but which are earmarked even in'peacetime for support of
troops in the initial period of a war. The :military command must
take part in the determination of the size=and points for locating
these stocks. The stocks of the center must be constantly kept
prepared for movement, and ramps and approach routes must be prepared
in advance on the various fronts for all types of transport.
Under modern conditions large shipments of materiel supplies,
from the central bases and depots, can be accomplished by air trans-
port, so it is very important to have a prepared network of airfields
in the area of these bases, approaches to them, transportation for
bringing up freight to the airfields, and also a labor force with
loading-unloading equipment.
Such preparation has special significance for missile bases,
dumps of missile fuels, and special articles (izdeliye), belonging to
the armament of missile troops. The most advantageous way to move
materiel supplies of this type will be over great distances from the
deep rear directly to the points of their utilization.
Thus, the most important problem of supporting troops in the
initial period of a war and during the strategic deployment of the
Armed Forces is the accumulation of the required stocks of materiel
supplies ahead of time, their proper location and echelonment, and
their reliable protection from enemy strikes. The timely and purpose-
ful resolution of this problem will form the most important materiel
basis for armed conflict in the initial period of a future war. This
will also reflect, to a significant degree, upon the successes of our
Armed Forces during the subsequent course of the war.
The conditions for conduct of armed combat in a future war bring
up a series of new, highly important problems in the realm of prepa-
ration of communication lines and means of transport.
In the interests of assuring the required viability of the rail
and motor vehicle roads which form the basis of the transportation
system in internal areas and in the prefrontal zone, it is essential,
still in peacetime, to carry out a number of important measures.
Among these measures are the following, above all:
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- the development of a network of roads on the required strategic
and operational axes;
- the construction of deep and local bypassesof large junctions,
administrative-political,and industrial-economic .centers;
the preparation of alternate crossings over water obstacles;
- the preparation of modern types of transport.
In the postwar period our country has significantly broadened
the program of construction of lines of communication.
A large measure of capital investment is directed toward the
fulfilment of these missions. With the goal of looking after the
interests of the Armed Forces, the appropriate elements of the Ministry
of Defense must 'very vigorously place before the planning elements of
the national economy. the missions for ensuring dependable communication
lines for the vitally important strategic axes which run through
economically less-developed areas of the territory of the country.
These very important measures must be given foremost attention by
State planning organs, as well as by organs of the Ministry of Defense.
We consider one of the most important problems in the preparation
of the rear services of the Armed Forces for war to be the long-range
development of a network of communication lines in precise conformity
with strategic plans being developed for the conduct of armed combat.
Under conditions of a modern nuclear/missile war, when the
stability of the operation of networks of communication lines in
internal areas of the country becomes the most important factor in
the maneuvering of armed forces and in ensuring the fulfilment of
strategic missions by them, views on the preparation of communication
routes for operation in wartime change radically. At present the
mission of constructing deep and local (depending upon the importance
of the target) bypasses of centers of communication .routes, large
stations, transshipping,and other narrow points and sectors, as well
as bypasses of large administrative and industrial centers, should
be pushed to the fore. Only by having such bypasses prepared ahead
of time is it possible to count on assuring uninterrupted operation
of transport by rapid transfer of the flow of trains and.,motor vehicle
march columns to alternate routes or to adjacent axes.
It is no less important to carry out preparatory measures ahead
of time, ensuring uninterrupted military movements across large water
50X1-HUM
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barriers. In our opinion, the resolution of this problem may be
achieved by implementation of a complex of various. measures. Of these,
we must first of all mention the construction of main alternate bridges,
the cutting and filling of roadbeds, and also in certain instances, the,
laying.of load-bearing surfaces on the approaches to points where
temporary alternate crossings are being erected. To shorten the periods
for reestablishment of traffic in cases of destruction of bridges by
the enemy, it is essential, already at the present time, to develop
broadly the procurement and accumulation of stocks of materials for
erecting floating rail and motor vehicle bridges and ferry crossings.
In addition, it is essential to have such materials directly under
the control of the Ministry of Defense for concentration along the
most important operational axes, as well as under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Transport Construction for maintenance of rear area
roads where barriers are most likely to occur. In the fulfilment of
this mission, a significant reserve for the decrease of capital
investment may be the adaptation of floating river equipment for the
erection of temporary floating rail and motor vehicle bridges and
ferry crossings. In terms of capacity of the river tug fleet and
freight-carrying capacity of the towed fleet in river basins, the
Soviet Union at the present time occupies first place in Europe and
second in the world. This fleet is growing rapidly. During the
period from 1951 to 1958 alone, the freight-carrying capacity of the
self-propelled and towed river fleets increased by more than 3.5
million tons.
. In the makeup of the river fleet there is a large number of
barge -) gt terv,,.; with a freight-carrying capacity of 300-2000 tons,
open double-bottomed metal barges with freight-carrying capacities
of 1800-3000 tons, and other cargo vessels, entirely suitable for
rapid erection of floating bridges of any length. For the rational
utilization of this reserve and appropriate preparation of velffiell,
it appears essential to develop their fixed tonnage for series
production and to achieve the introduction of certain design changes,
especially in the superstructure.
Closely related to the resolution of the problems listed is the
need to organize vigorous protection of major transport installations
from the means of enemy attack (allotment of antiaircraft defense means).
It is extremely essential at the initiation of military operations to.
screen basic installations (large centers on main lines of strategic
designation, rail meeting points of Soviet and West European gauges; large
bridges) reliably with antimissile and antiaircraft weapons. 'It appears
to us that this problem must be worked out beforehand by the joint
efforts of elements of PVO Troops of the Country and the rear services
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of the Armed Forces.
In the resolution of problems concerning the stability of the
system of the rear services support of the Armed Forces and the
strategic maneuvering of troops under modern conditions, the continuity
of the transportation process has very important significance. At
the present time a portion of our Armed Forces along the western axis
are located beyond the territorial limits of the USSR. For. this
reason we must closely tie in the execution of all missions connected
with the preparation of networks of communication lines and means of
transport on our territory with analogous measures carried out on the
networks of communication lines ofjr~dg cent6countries. This pertains
especially to the readiness of rail an motor vehicle roads, as well
as to sea transport in maritime theaters of military operations.
Modern warfare creates such difficulties in the organization of
troop transport that the fulfilment of these missions can be achieved
only under conditions of combined utilization of all types of transport.
Even in the last war, depending,.on,:.conditions, various types of
transportation were utilized. Under modern conditions the necessity
of our intensive and cooperative operation of the various types of
transport has increased even more. For this reason the preparation
of communication routes and means of transport for operation in war-
time should be carried out at once, proceeding precisely from the
problem of their combined utilization.
Let us examine in somewhat more detail the possibilities of
utilizing measures for the preparation of each of the types of transport.
Rail Transport. The utilization of railroads in a future war
will depend on the conditions of the theater of military operations,
the density of networks and other factors mentioned above. If we take
the Western Theater of Military Operations, then within its limits,
on the territory of countries of the Socialist Camp, the density of
railroad networks is 9.2 km per 100 square km, and in capitalist
countries it reaches 10.7 km. Such a density of railroads in this
theater of military operations, even under conditions of the use of
nuclear missile weapons, permits hope of the possibility of carrying
out a significant volume of military railroad shipments within the
confines of the rear areas of fronts deploying there and in the
prefrontal zone. Railroad transport in the internal areas of our
country will play a basic role in the total volume of shipments when
it is prepared beforehand.
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An extremely complicated mission for the rear services of the
Armed Forces will be ensuring continuity of the transportation process
from the centers of production (bases) to consumers. In the ful-
filment of this mission, we must emphasize, above all, such measures
as ensuring dependable operation at the meeting points of railroads
of Soviet and West European gauges, and the organization of trans-
loading operations at points where barriers have resulted from
enemy strikes (in the destruction of bridge crossings over large
water lines and railroad tunnel sectors).
For ensuring uninterrupted supply of our Armed Forces operating
in the period of the Second World War on the territory of European
countries, along our Western borders-were organized ten transloading
areas, and a large number of transloading stations were set up.
Such a fundamental system of transloading areas may also be
adopted in a future war, but it must be organized with consideration
of the new conditions of nuclear/missile war. Each transloading area
at the meeting points of railroads of Soviet and West European gauges
is a huge military installation and a huge installation of the
national economy. It must include several stations with sectors of
deep extensions of railroad lines of various gauges, a branching net-
work of motor vehicle roads and pipelines, a communications system,
a large quantity of loading-unloading equipment, and specially
prepared places for changing the trucks of the rolling stock, as
well as transloading bases with depots and means for transporting
freight. The degree of prior preparation of transloading areas
for operations under conditions of a nuclear/missile war will render
a decisive influence on the feasibility of maintaining uninterrupted
delivery of materiel supplies from the zone of interior to the
distributing stations of the fronts. ,
Sometimes proposals are introduced to reject transloading areas
and to resort, at the initiation of a war, to the altering of gauges
of West European lines to Soviet gauges. In the period of the Second
World War it was not uncommon to resort to such a measure. Thus,
in the zones of operation of the Belorussian and the First Ukrainian
fronts, to the line of the Vistula River, most of the railroad lines
were altered; later the following main lines were fully altered:
Kaunas-Insterburg-Koenigsberg-Marienburg; Bialystok-Tluszcz-0strolenks-
Deutsch-Eylau; Brest-Warsaw-Poznan-Berlin-Lvov-Prtemyzl-Krakow-Katowice-
Breslau. Experience showed that to rely-upon the alteration of basic
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main lines is not advisable. This must be resorted to only in exceptional
cases, in individual secondary sectors. The alteration of basic main
lines may lead to broad gauge lines' cutting the entire network of
railroads,of European countries into isolated areas, and this will
drastically limit the utilization of local transport in rear areas of
the fronts and in the prefrontal zone. Along with this there will be
insufficient native rolling stock and locomotives in the event of
a sharp increase in the length of the network, and it will be
impossible to utilize West European gauge rolling stock. Besides,
the smaller dimensions of the auxiliary structures on West European
gauge railroad lines would make it more difficult to utilize our
rolling stock, especially in the organization of two-way traffic on
two-way bridges and tunnels. In connection with this we consider it
more advantageous to concentrate on ensuring the stable operation of
a diversified network of transloading areas at meeting points of
railroads of. different gauges.
A new and extremely complex problem in ensuring the continuity
of transport networks between the front and the rear will be the
organization of the surmounting of obstructed places along railroad
lines, especially in the internal areas of the country. The most
rational form for organizing this operation appears to be the creation
of temporary transloading areas (vremennyy peregruzochnyy rayon -? VPR).
In the composition of the VPR it is essential to have various special
railroad formations, as well as motor vehicle, road, pipeline, loading-
unloading, and other equipment. The basic mission of the temporary
transloading areas must be the ensuring of continuity in the flow of
freight without a substantial decrease in-the tempo of shipments
during the surmounting of obstructed places until through railroad
traffic is restored.
We consider that such organizations should be provided for in the
mobilization plans of railroads for operations on railroads of internal
areas of the country. To support transloading at water barriers, as
well as at tunnel sectors of railroads on the territory of Western
countries (outside the borders of"operating fronts), it is essential
to have rather strong reserves of this equipment which could be moved
up to an area where needed in a short period of time.
It is expedient to have mobile formations of temporary transload-
ing areas in the reserve of the rear services of the Armed Forces for
aiding fronts to surmount obstructed places.
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The volume of reconstruction work on railroads in a future war
will significantly exceed the work carried out during the period of
the Second World War.
Taking this into account, it is essential to begin serious work
on preparation for the restoration of internal railroads and those
in the prefrontal zone. In the complex of preparatory work, primary
significance is attached to the creation and training of special
formations, the prior creation of stocks of repair-reconstruction
materials, and others. All these problems in internal areas of the
country will be resolved by elements of the transport ministries.
However, it is essential for us to submit our requirements now and
participate in the measures which are being carried out.
More intensive conversion to diesel-electric traction takes on
special significance for railroad rolling stock, will increase
significantly the transport capacity of railroads, and will facilitate
reconstruction operations. A significant increase must be obtained in
the proportion in the car park of large-capacity flatcars and tank cars
for the transport of petroleum products. It is extremely essential
to create, in the near future, a sufficient park of special cars and
flatcars for .the transport of missiles and missile equipment, and also
tank cars for the transport of the components of liquid missile fuel.
The problem of creating a sufficient park of trucks and steam locomotives
of West European gauge which may be utilized for movement from trans-
loading areas along railroads of West European gauge in the first days
of a war, acquires great significance.
Water transport in maritime theaters of military operations and
when there are internal water routes along the axes of combat operations,
and in the zone of interior, will carry out a significant volume of
troop transport, especially the transport of supplies.
For the: preparation of water transport, the problems of organiza-
tion of transloading areas and outfitting them with equipment capable
of carrying out rapid transloading of armaments and all types of
supplies from an unequipped shore to vessels anchored in the road-
stead and vice versa, should be decided beforehand. It is necessary
to carry. out scientific-research and experimental design work for the
creation of special equipment of sea-going river vessels for the
transport of modern types of weapons and ammunition and the development
of transloading equipment on board the vessels.
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i I I 'J%J,\I-I Is_I
For the maintenance of water communication-_rotates in a state of
constant usability, it will be necessary to create:. special formations.
In our opinion, it is expedient to have at of the vessels
in the composition of the naval fleets and flotillas adapted so that
they are capable of operating at sea and on large river waterways.
This will make it possible, in many instances, to avoid the rather
difficult operations of carrying out transloading work in roadsteads.
Motor vehicle roads and motor vehicle transport deliveries
played a large role in carrying out transport of troops and supplies
within a front already during the past war. There were also frequent
instances when motor vehicle transport was utilized for delivery of
materiel supplies to the fronts in accordance with the plans of the
centreJ.elements of the rear area, and for urgent transport of
personnel replacements. Thus, in 1942't&;e vehicle park of the Reserve
of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) transported up to 1.3 million
tons of various freight to the fronts, and altogether for 10 months
of 1943 - about 1.4 million tons of freight and 130 thousand personnel.
replacements.
In connection with the large volume of motor vehicle shipments
of the center in the 1941 to 1943 period, the following special
military motor vehicle roads of the center were prepared and serviced:
Gorkiy-to-Moscow, Moscow-to-Leningrad, Moscow-to-Volokolamsk,
Moscow-to-Mozhaysk, Moscow-to-Yukhnov, and others. During the final
stage of the war the Moscow-to-Warsaw-to-Berlin highway was in operation.
In modern conditions it is most probable that there will be,
not periodic, but constant use of::Imotor vehicle transport along the
entire extent of the basic axis ftom the zone of interior to the
operating fronts. Motor vehicle transport will t-ot('bnly have to
supplement or duplicate railroad transport, but during a certain period
will fully replace it along individual axes.
In modern conditions large motor vehicle highways will be utilized
not only for delivery of materiel supplies, but chiefly for the move-
ment of troops in motor vehicles and by mechanized traction, reserves,
and all types of replacements. For this reason the role of motor
vehicle roads is now growing and qualitatively changing.
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In connection with this the problem of development of a network
of hard-surfaced motor vehicle roads arises sharply. In addition,
it is. necessary to strive to improve correspondingly the transportability
and passability of motor vehicle roads on our territory and on the
territory of countries of the Socialist Camp allied with us. In an
adverse situation the holding up of motor vehicle transport in narrow
places and delay in the flow of freight will be unavoidable.
The intensive transport traffic, and enemy actions against
important installations of basic motor vehicle communication routes
demands the carrying out of serious measures for their maintenance in
usable condition and their reconstruction. We suppose, that during
the first days of the war the basic motor vehicle highways of the
center must be serviced by special road-reconstruction and maintenance
formations, which must be capable of carrying out work of technical
concealment, reconstruction, and maintenance of the rear area motor
vehicle roads.
. In the interests of ensuring a high degree of readiness of the
road service for operations in the initial period of a war, it appears
expedient to carryout large-scale preparatory work in peacetime, taking
into consideration the utilization of all forces and means of the
military establishment as well as civilian organizations.
A special role in the preparation of military motor vehicle
roads will be played by such measures as prior buildup of stocks
of construction-repair materials, the procurement and concentration,
in necessary'"locations, of spare structural components for reconstruction
of auxiliary structures, the preparation and proper setting-up in
peacetime of civilian road organizations equipped with machinery, the
development of bypasses of the most vulnerable places, etc.
The motor vehicle park of our country has grown significantly
during the postwar period, and is more than 80 percent modernized
by the receipt of more highly perfected motor vehicles. For
equipping the Soviet Army, especially the motor vehicle transport
large units and units of central subordination, there will appear,
in ever increasing quantities, larger freight-capacity motor vehicles
.with large trailers, semitrailers with independent transmissions,
and motor vehicle trains. The introduction of this equipment will
permit a sharp increase in the freight capacity of transport units
and large units and will significantly decrease loading-unloading
operations. From this it follows that it is essential for us to
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50X1-HUM
submit, in a timely manner, the military requirements for newly
designed models of motor vehicle equipment]order that during
mobilization the motor vehicle park of the.-1~ational economy might,
with great effectiveness)be.utilized in aI elements of the rear
services of the Armed Forces in wartime.
A task which cannot be postponed is the development within
the system of the Ministry of Defense of essential types of motor
vehicles, semitrailers, and motor vehicle trains for transport of all
types of missiles, missile fuels, and other special freight for
supporting missile troops. Here we are speaking of special motor
vehicle transport suitable for operations in the central element of
transport.
Pipeline transport is an economical, high-capacity method of
fuel;, transport that has low vulnerability. These positive qualities
of pipeline transport are extremely important for the creation of a
stable system of supporting modern mechanized Armed Forces in war-
time. In the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Camp
friendly to us, the network of pipelines is increasing from year to
year. At the present time a large program for the development of
permanent pipelines is being planned. The Seven-Year Plan for
developing the national economy of the USSR provides for the
construction of new petroleum and petroleum product pipelines, which
will ensure an almost three-fold increase in the length of the main
pipelines. Together with this, the construction of the petroleum
pipeline from the Trans-Volga region through Bryansk, with branches
to the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which has been started,
will have special significance not only for the national economy but
also for supplying the. Armed Forces in the European theaters of
military operations with fuel.
In modern conditions it appears extremely essential to force
the construction of pipelines within the framework of. the
for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA), to achieve the uniting of the basic
main lines and local petroleum pipelines into a single network of the countries
of:,the..Peoples'.-Democracies. The stability of the support of the Armed
Forces in theaters of military operations may substantially facilitate
the creation of a system of field main pipelines as an extension-of
permanent lines. For this reason we consider that the development
in every possible way of the production of field pipeline. equipment
with a pipe diamOter of 150 mm has good prospects. Systems of such
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pipelines; with a 24-hour delivery capacity of each line of 2,000-
2,400 tons, must guarantee the delivery of basic types of fuel, with-
out overloading, to a depth of 600 km and more fromthe terminals
of permanent pipelines or from operating sectors o railroads.
Air transport, even in the last war, in various instances,
played an important role in the transport of troops and their
materiel support. It is sufficient to indicate that the forces of
the Civil Air Fleet and Long Range Aviation, based upon incomplete
data for the period of the war, transported over 300 thousand tons
of freight and more than 1.5 million personnel.
Air transport during the period of the Second World War was
utilized primarily centrally in the capacity of a resource of the
Supreme High Command. However, even during that period there were
instances of temporary assignment of certain units of transport
aviation to the fronts. Thus, out of the 228 transport aircraft
in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations during the summer
of 1945, 189 were detached for the servicing of the Transbaykal
Front. During the time of preparation and conduct of the operation
by this front, about 16..5 thousand soldiers and officers, up to
2.8 thousand tons of fuel, and 2 thousand tons of miscellaneous
freight were moved by air transport.
In view of the exceptional prospects for the use of air
transport under-future war conditions, an important modern problem
is the long-range increase in freight capacity of the transport
aviation pool and ensuring the capability of aircraft to operate
from small dirt airfields. It is expedient, even now, to determine
the basic axes for utilization of military transport aviation
according to the plans of the central elements of the rear services.
In order to ensure these shipments it is essential to have powerful
central military transport aviation for transfer of troops and to
determine beforehand the quantity of this aviation needed by the
rear services at the beginning of a war. This will permit timely
planning of the utilization of transport aviation of the center, the
preparation at the necessary points of materiel stocks, materiel
support, airfields, and other means ensuring the uninterrupted
operation of transport aviation.
In line with this it is essential for elements of the rear
services of the Armed Forces to unfold more broadly the work of
resolving problems of airfield-engineering, materiel-technical,
and special support of military transport aviation itself.
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The enumeration of problems in the preparation of the lines of
communication and transport is not by any means limited to those
indicated above. However, even those listed,show with sufficient
conviction,the necessity of adopting decisive measures for further
development of transport.
The investigation of the problems of the organization of rear
services support of the Armed Forces in a future war acquires entirely
new significance. at the present time.
First of all these questions arise.
Who in the Armed Forces must exercise control of all the means
allotted by the State for the rear services support of missile troops,
the ground troops, the air forces, and the navy?
What organs are needed in the system of the Armed Forces for
the correct distribution and organization of rational utilization
of the means of materiel support in the interests of the overall
armed conflict?
socialist republics, specifically, of the entire apparatus of
centralization in the direction of all forces and resources of the
of command of all detachments of the Red Army and the strictest
In our opinion, the only correct resolution, of these questions
lies in the centralization of the entire matter of the rear area
support of the Armed Forces. There are sufficient grounds for such a
conclusion both from the scientific-theoretical viewpoint and from
the experience gained from past wars.
In May 1919, at the height of the Civil War, V.I. Lenin wrote
in The Draft Directive to the Central Committee on Military Unity:
" -- the necessary condition for the success of this war is the unity
material factor of the war --" (Underlined by us - F.M.) (Collected
Works, Volume 29, page 373).
military su as well as railway trans ort as the most im ortant
The fulfilment of this demand of the leader of the revolution
and founder of the Soviet Army permitted the utilization of the available
extremely limited materiel resources of the country in the interests of
protection of the young socialist republic during the period of the
Civil War with maximum expediency and effectiveness.
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During the period of the Second World War.,'the General Head-
quarters of the Supreme High Command was in c1 rge of all resources
which the State Committee for Defense allotted for the conduct of
armed conflict, carrying o u t its functions f the rear area support
of the Armed Forces through a single central element of the rear
services of the Ministry of Defense.
It follows that there is every basis to consider the strict
centralization of the entire matter of rear area support of the
Armed Forces as an`,objective necessity. Being guided by such a
conclusion, it is appropriate to object to the authors who fight
for the creation of a territorial system of materiel (2 or 3 words
missin7 support in place of the existing elements of the rear
services, organized along the principle of channels of military
command.
The completeness and efficacy of satisfying the materiel
requirements of the Armed Forces in a future war will depend to a
significant degree, as indicated above, on the prior accumulation
of mobilization stocks, State materiel reserves, and the creation
of mobilization capacities of industry corresponding with the
proposed groupings of troops and the directions of the armed conflict
which evolve. The correct fulfilment of these most important missions,
connected with the plans for the development of the national economy
of the country, is only in the power of central elements. It will be
a drastic mistake if we permit decentralization in this matter among
various elements having a limited sphere of activity, according to
zones. The division of these missions according to types of Armed
Forces is likewise intolerable.
Ensuring the stability of the network of communication lines,
for use in wartime by various types of transport, in our country
as well as in the countries of the Socialist Camp allied with us,
may be achieved only under conditions of unified centralized planning
and management. The fulfilment of this mission is tied in with
large capital expenditures carried out in accordance with the
general plan for the development of the national economy of our
country and the Warsaw Pact. For this reason the impossibility of
handing over these functions to any elements responsible only for
one axis or one area of possible local operations of an operational
or even of a strategic grouping of the Armed Forces, is completely
apparent.
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. We recommend, for the fulfilment of all tasks _of organization
and control of the ?rea, the materiel and medical,,support of fronts
and other groupings of the Armed Forces, and the# ianagement of all
types of transport, that there be a special elent. in the form of
.an.or n of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces in
the General, Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, The Chief
of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces will be able to direct
purposefully all the forces and means of rear services support in
accordance with future strategic plans only under the condition;.
that-he be included in the Gener it Headquarters complement.
The Staff of. the Rear Services of the Armed Forces, the central
supply, the supporting and transport elements, being under unified
management.of the.Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces,
must, in their work, closely cooperate with the General Staff and be
guided by its directives.. The central elements of the rear services
of the Armed Forces.must be assigned the missions of organizing rear
area support of operating fronts, the troops of PVO of the Country,
missile large units of strategic designation and the utilization of
production capabilities in the territory occupied by the troops,
under the jurisdiction of the Supreme High Command. These elements
will likewise carry out the functions of direct management of large
units,.units, and installations of the central element of the rear
services of the Armed Forces deployed in the interior areas of the
country,.as well as in the prefrontal zone.
In the course of war there may be created high commands in
various theaters or axes of military operations in the interests of
achieving better coordination of operational efforts of operating
front formations.
We.consider that in the high command of a group of fronts, in
this instance.,. it will be expedient to have an operational group of
the Chief of.the Rear Services of the Armed Forces. Howgver, such a
group cannot be looked upon as an intermediate supply echelon. The
creation of additional supply levels always involves the enlargement
of the rear services operations; the introduction of intermediate trans-
loading-points.. in the end result, adversely affects the flexibility
of the system of rear area support.
In our opinion, it. is expedient to charge the operational group
of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces attached to
the high commands of groups of fronts with'rendering assistance to
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the fronts in the rear area support of troops, when the timely
information of the Headquarters of the Rear Services of the Armed
Forces, emanating from a concretely established situation, indicates
.a suddenly arising necessity to change the supply plans and carry
out an interfrontal maneuver. Herein we allow for temporary
subordination to the operational groups of the appropriate central
bases created beforehand in the prefrontal zone. The. operational
groups of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces in
specific theaters of military operations may be formed also for the
fulfilment of certain narrower missions (organization of use of
production.- capacities, putting right the operation of the
transportation network on occupied territory, etc.).
The activity of central organs of the rear services of the
Armed Forces in a future war has not as yet been sufficiently
explored, and it is essential to carry out appropriate work in
this sphere. However, we are absolutely convinced that':it ies>0tost
expedient during the organization of rear area support to take as
a basis a system which has proven itself: General Headquarters -
front - army - troops. This system meets the requirements of
centralization to the greatest degree, corresponds to the
structural organization of the Armed Forces, and is relatively
economical and efficient.
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