MILITARY THOUGHT: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICS, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL V. BASKAKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400360001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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New Developments in Operational Art and Tactics
by
Lieutenant General V. Baskakov
In recent times the assertion has been growing continually more
definite and more persistent, and is now deeply rooted, that the
fundamental tenets of strategy, of operational art, of tactics, and
of the structure of the armed forces, based on the experience of
the last war, cannot ensure victory under modern conditions, and
need radical revision. The reason for this is the wealth of
material that-has been accumulated by testing nuclear weapons -
the basic and.decisive _means of routing the enemy in a future war -
and also the experience of command-staff exercises, games, and
drills with troops and from..military-scientific research on the
organization and conduct of an operation and of a battle. All this
permits a practical review of the tenets that existed previously,
and working out and basing new positions in military art in
accordance with modern conditions.
In this respect, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolr___ ov~~--'
article /footnote missing7, in which a serious and profound analysis
is given of the nature of a future war, taking into account the em-
ployment of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, has
especially -important significance, many tenets of the past are
;decisively reconsidered, and concrete problems in working out
the strategy of the next war are advanced.
It is essential to recognize that although atomic weapons have
already been studied.for many years, we often still continue to employ
former tenets in theoretical. operational studies and to apply them to
.modern conditions. If one compares the concepts of certain opera-
tional studies and exercises, and the decisions made according to them
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for a .front.. and.an.,army, with the concepts ,and..decisions for an
-operation adopted by. commanders of troops of fronts ' andarmies
.in the last war, . it .is not.:-difficult to be convinced that these concepts
and .decisions ..often coincide almost completely in .their aims, forms
of operational maneuver, and methods and means of : defeating the
enemy, and are very similar to one another. There is some difference
only in the tempos of offensive, An the width of zones, and in the fact
that now the Absence of a continuous front is permitted.
So, on the one hand, we acknowledge quite definitely the de-
cisive role of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruc-
tion in the organization and conduct of an operation aimed at the
complete defeat of the enemy; on the other hand, we continue to
organize and plan an operation according to the methods of the last
war. This obvious contradiction in the theory of operational art may,
without exaggeration, be called a crisis. A correct evaluation of the
role of nuclear weapons enables this contradiction to be resolved
through discovering new forms and methods of armed combat and
operations, and of the conduct of battle under modern conditions.
In connection with the radical alteration already recognized in
the role of the types of armed forces and arms of troops in bringing
about the complete defeat of the enemy, let us consider the aims,
nature, and essence of a modern operation, the principles of using
nuclear weapons, and other, in our view extremely important,
problems.
Thus, before the appearance of nuclear weapons the main role
in defeating the enemy belonged to ground troops, and as their
basic operational-tactical form of organization - to divisions. In
the last war, the infantry and armored divisions of ground troops
were the striking force for defeating the enemy in an offensive and
the basis of combat stability in defense. The destruction of divisions
generally meant the complete defeat of the enemy, so the purpose of
each operation was the encirclement and destruction of his main
groupings of ground troops.
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. After the defeat of the divisions, nei"r the aviation nor,. even
less, the artillery of the enemy, could have a decisive influence on the
operations of the troops.
. In connection with what has been stated, the well-known appre-
ciation of the decisive significance of divisions of ground troops,
advanced by I. V. Stalin, as one of the main constant factors
deciding the.fate of a war, was absolutely correct only for the last
war. That is, "the quantity and quality of divisions" of ground
troops at that time basically determined the military power of the
opposing sides.
Under modern conditions, nuclear/missile weapons are the
main means of destroying atomic weapons, ground troops, and
other forces and weapons of the enemy. Therefore, one of the
main aims of an operation in a future war must be, as the first
priority, to deprive the enemy of nuclear weapons, the destruction
of nuclear warheads and the means of delivering them to the target,
but not the destruction of his divisions. This aim may also be at-
tained by employing nuclear weapons alones
Today, to defeat the enemy completely means wresting nuclear
weapons from his hands, depriving him of nuclear power, or de-
cisively undermining, the possibility of restoring it. An enemy,
having lost his nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether or not
he has a sufficient number of divisions of ground troops, will already
be unable to organize his defense, much less organize decisive of-
fensive operations, and will be forced to capitulate before the threat
of total destruction.
The proposition. set out here.is so important and basic that it
can radically change not only the aims and tasks, but also the nature,
of operations, and requires a quite different solution to all other
problems of the organization and conduct of operations and of battle
in. the future.. While operations were conducted previously by the
forces of two or three, or even of one, front, now they will have a
much wider scope and most likely will be conducted simultaneously
on several strategic axes or theaters of military operations with all
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the forces. and weapons at the disposal of the opposing sides. Opera-
tions will be carried. on until all enemy forces on_=a given continent have
been totally defeated, Therefore, the scale of aii;.operation will have
nothing.in common with the scale of operations in the last war. The
depth of operations will not be limited to four, five, or six hundred
kilometers, but will increase to at least twice this amount.
On a number of axes, where by employing nuclear weapons great
destruction and devastation will be achieved, the tempo of advance of
ground troops will be determined by the movement capability of the
troops and will approximate the length of a day?s march. However,
it is extremely necessary to take into account constantly that for
ensuring movement in these areas, measures will need to be taken
for surmounting vast zones with high levels of radioactive contamina-
tion.of terrain and with great destruction. On other axes, where the
scale of employing nuclear weapons will be less, the tempo of advance
may be correspondingly somewhat lower. -
The essence of operations will amount to the following: organi-
zing and delivering nuclear strikes by the forces of missile troops
and aviation for carrying out strategic, operational, or tactical
tasks; the employment of chemical and bacteriological weapons;
moving divisions, corps, and armies of ground troops forward on
selected axes into enemy territory, with the purpose of exploiting
the results of nuclear strikes, completing the defeat of the remain-
ing enemy forces not destroyed by nuclear weapons, and the final
disruption of his attempts to continue the delivery of nuclear strikes;
and organizing the protection of friendly troops from strikes of enemy
nuclear weapons.
In connection with the above, the basic content of planning and
preparation for operations will amount to organizing the employment
of nuclear weapons. It is-pertinent to define the general principles
and to consider the concrete forms of organization of the operational
employment of nuclear weapons.
The basic princi a of employing nuclear weapons, in our view,
must follow from the fact that they cane toand um st not be used any
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longer as a means of supporting the operations of.divisions of ground
troops. Nuclear weapons must be considered and:used as an independent
and decisive means of de eating the enemy.
Up to the present time, in theoretical studies and command-staff
exercises, nuclear weapons have been planned and employed just as a
means of support. For example, in the exercise in the autumn of
1959, the "East" employed 82 percent of its atomic warheads in direct
support of the conduct of combat.by...divisions. of...ground troops, and
only 1.8 percent for. the .destruction of means of nuclear attack and
for hitting other enemy objectives. Can such employment of nuclear
weapons really be considered advantageous? Does it answer the
problem of depriving the enemy of the capability for employing
nuclear weapons? Of course not. More than that, such employment
is harmful, as essentially it means squandering the most powerful
weapons of the present time on targets of secondary importance and
permits the enemy to preserve the means of nuclear attack.
It is not for supporting a partial advance of this . or that division
and neutralizing ;an ordinary strongpoint that these weapons must be
used, but for defeating the main forces of the enemy, and first and
foremost the means of nuclear attack, Very much will depend on how
far this basic proposition is perceived and understood. According to
our profound conviction, this is the guarantee of success in opera-
tions o
Nuclear weapons must be used purposefully and en masse. This
means that, first of all, for the total annihilation of enemy nuclear
means,, and then, of the main grouping of his ground troops, aviation,
and naval forces, an absolute majority of the nuclear warheads must
be employed.
It is hardly necessary to prove that with nuclear weapons it is
possible not only to annihilate individual objectives and targets but
also to carry out tactical, operational, and even strategic tasks.
With nuclear weapons it is possible to rout entire formations
/obyedineniye7 and the main forces of the operational groupings of
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enemy.ground troops, including their own nuclear Weapons and
airfields.. which are. located' over. a considerable area and. ingreat depth.
Nuclear weapons must be employed suddenly, effectively, and econom-
..icallp91. e. , so ..that each. burst should inflict -maximum losses on
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ffi~ enemy. -and so ..that all .the. destructive properties of the--burst itself
and- radioactive contamination of the terrain are used in the most
advantageous manner.
Based on the general principles of employing nuclear weapons,
with the object of obtaing a common understanding of the methods
of. their operational use and a simplification of planning methods, it
would be advisable in our view to establish a. separation of nuclear
strikes into concentrated and individual nuclear strikes, in this, the
former, depending on the importance of the tasks and goals they
carry out, should be subdivided into strategic, operational, and
tactical nuclear strikes.
A strategic concentrated nuclear strike is a series of most
powerful nuc ear bursts, directed at carrying out strategic tasks
such as. the neutralization of ballistic missile bases, the annihila-
tion and destruction- of the main economic and political centers of
the enemy, the crushing of his atomic industry, military bases, and
other objectives.
An operational concentrated nuclear strike must be a series of
nuclear bursts, delivered simultaneously or in succession by several
salvoes with the purpose of carrying out operational tasks. These
.tasks may be: the disruption of the enemy?s concentrated nuclear
strike and the annihilation of his means of delivery, assembly bases,
and reserves of nuclear warheads in the immediate zone of the front;
the rout of a strike grouping of the ground troops, the destruction of
aircraft and naval forces of the enemy; the destruction of second
echelons or large operational reserves of a group of armies of the
enemy and, as first priority, the annihilation of their nuclear weapons;
the disruption. of control and the work, of the rear, the destruction of
communication lines, ports, enemy bases and so on. . Depending on
.the situation, an operational concentrated nuclear strike may coincide
in timing with a strategic nuclear strike, which will be a characteristic
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feature of operations in the initial period of war.
A tactical concentrated nuclear strike may be delivered with the
purpose of routing immediate reserves, neutralizing the tactical
depth of defense and the enemy nuclear weapons located in it,
destroying airborne forces landed in our rear area, and also car-
rying out other tasks of a tactical nature.
An individual nuclear strike consisting of single or of group
nuclear bursts is intended for the annihilation, neutralization, or
destruction of individual enemy targets or objectives from day to
day during the course of an operation, as the need arises.
A concentrated nuclear strike must be planned as an independent
and most important stage of an operation, and its organization and
execution are very complex and responsible matters. Such strikes,
depending on the situation, may be differentiated according to the
purpose of their delivery, yield, and duration, and may have the
most varied plans or schemes. Military operations will start, as
a rule, with concentrated strikes. It is convenient to call the one
with which an operation starts the initial strike. Strikes will also
be carried out during the course of a war up to its final conclusion.
In connection with the considerable special features in the organiza-
tion and execution of concentrated strikes, it is advisable to divide
them into preemptive and counter strikes.
Such a division of nuclear strikes, in our view, is convenient
for solving problems connected with the operational use of nuclear
weapons. The concept of a "missile operation", on the other hand,
it seems to us, fails to express fully the operational aims of this
measure. The concept of a "strategic nuclear strike" would define
its content considerably better. The fact is that the missile is only
a means of delivering nuclear _ weapons to a target. In a number of
instances, apart from missiles, the carrier of an atomic charge.
may be aircraft. In any case, the heart of the matter is not in the
missile or the aircraft but in the charge itself and the burst emanating
from it.
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The next problem that has arisen in the operational art, in our
opinion, lies in a categorical rejection of the basic principle of the
operational art of the past - the principle of determining the main
strike and selection of its axis, and the concentration on that axis
of the main part of the forces and weapons of the front and the army.
In. the last war, when complete defeat of the enemy lay in the
destruction of divisions of his ground troops and was carried out
in the main by the combat of our divisions, it was impossible to
achieve success, either in the offensive or on defense, without
selecting the axis of the main strike and concentrating the main
forces on it. This had special importance when breaking through
the enemy's defense, when opposite one defending division the
efforts of two, and sometimes even three, divisions were concen-
trated, and manifold superiority in artillery, tanks, and aircraft
was built up. Such a concentration of forces on the axis of the main
strike, together with the extremely weak overall maneuverability of
troops at that time, naturally ensured a breakthrough of the enemy's
defense in the selected sector, and made it inconceivable, as a rule,
for the enemy to hold zones and lines on other axes.
In this way, the. principle of concentrating the principal efforts
on the axis of the main strike, selected so that this axis should
lead to the enemy's most vulnerable point, and the provision on
this axis of double or triple superiority over the enemy in forces
and weapons, was the basic principle of operational art in the past,
and corresponded to the level of development of armament and
combat equipment and ensured the successful execution of operations.
But can this principle remain basic in modern operational art?
Does it conform to the nature of an operation and of battle being
conducted under conditions of the massed employment of nuclear
weapons? In our view it cannot, for two main reasons.
Firstly, nuclear weapons will play the main role in defeating
enemy troops. Even to talk of concentrating the main efforts of
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quantity of nuclear bursts on an axis, even on the main one, is not only
incorrect but simply absurd. With this. method of delivering strikes,
a considerable number of enemy troops, his corps, and divisions
located beyond the boundaries of the selected axis will remain unaf-
fected, and in the area of the burst there will not be a target deserving
attention.
As an example one may cite the decision taken by the commander
of the 18th Army of the "West" in the war 9. me conducted in February
1959 in the Mil itar_y Academy i/n M. V. Frunze. According to the
situation on the morning of 20 July diagram 7 of the critique
materials of the game), the main forces of the 3rd Tank Army of
the "East", composed of two tank and one heavy tank divisions, were
in, one limited area, a fourth division, operating on a broad front,
covered the left flank of the Army, and the right flank of the Army
was covered by an airborne division. In this situation it seemed
quite clear that a large portion of the nuclear warheads should be
brought down on the main grouping of the tank army with the purpose
of routing it. In practice, however, the very opposite occurred. By
decision of the commander of the 18th Army, all 11 warheads were
employed against the divisions on the flanks of the 3rd Tank Army,
and not one strike was delivered against the main grouping of its
forces. As a result of this, the main forces of the tank army, not
having come under the enemy. nuclear strike, continued to develop
their offensive without hindrance and carried out their assigned
task.
if not the main, role here.
This, to say the least, strange decision, was taken, obviously,
because we still underestimate the role of nuclear weapons and
their capabilities, while, at the same time, we overestimate the
role of divisions of ground troops in a modern operation. In this
decision there was very clearly reflected the tendency to employ
nuclear weapons simply as a means of supporting an offensive by
ground troops, and the main hopes were evidently put on the results
of their operations. Adherence to the principle of concentrating the
main efforts on strikes on selected axes, which, in the example given,
the ground troops of the "West" were preparing, played a considerable,
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Secondly, to concentrate the main part of the divisions of a front,
army, or even a corps and the means of their reinforcement, on no mat-
ter what axis, including the main one means taking a risk, and not
only taking a risk, but simply from the start giving the opportunity for
these troops to be defeated, as the enemy will certainly endeavor to take
advantage of such an opportunity for the effective employment of his
nuclear weapons against the grouping most threatening to him.
The example cited by us is undoubtedly a minor one, but it has
been taken because it clearly reflected the failure of the principle of
concentrating efforts on axes to conform with the means of conducting
modern operations and battle, and the recognized harmfulness of
employing this principle in the training of our cadres for a future war.
Therefore, modern operational art, in our opinion, can no longer
employ as a basis the principle of the main strike, selection of its
axis and concentration on it of the main efforts of the troops, as this
principle no longer conforms either with the level of development of
the armed forces or with modern military theory.
Undoubtedly, the principle of concentrating the principal effort
on the main axis resulted from a most important tenet of dialectical
materialism - the doctrine of the main element- and was, as it were,
its interpretation in the theory of operational art. Therefore, it
cannot simply be rejected, but mast be replaced by a new principle,
which, in our view, must become the principle of concentrating the
main efforts for destroying the nuclear means and main grouping of
troop& of the enemy. This principle takes into full account the
present level of development of the means of armed combat. It not
only permits, but even compels the use of the main mass of nuclear
weapons for the annihilation of enemy nuclear weapons and the route
of the strongest main grouping of his ground troops, naval forces,
and aviation. The divisions of the ground troops have every oppor-
tunity of bringing up their units from various axes to the area where
the main forces of the enemy are;,. and of committing them to battle
in those sectors where it seems appropriate in a particular case,
in order to achieve success and not to expose friendly forces to a
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Recently, we have frequently been considering the problem of
where to deliver the main strike - on a strong or a weak point of the
enemy defense. This problem, absurd in itself from the.p_oint of view
of conducting operations in the age of nuclear weapons, in. %view of
keeping the outdated principle of concentrating the principal efforts
on the main axis, has now led to an impasse. Indeed, if one is to
deliver a strike on the strongest point of the enemy defense, then
it.is possible to employ nuclear weapons successfully, but the ground
troops are placed in an unfavorable position. But if one delivers
a strike on the weak point of the enemy defense, then conversely,
the divisions of the ground troops can select(-favorable flank, and
generally more successful, axes, but nuclear weapons will have to
be employed on targets and objectives of minor importance. What
is better then, what should one sacrifice - the advantages of using
nuclear weapons or the convenience of operations of ground troops?
In our view, neither one nor the other can be acceptable. One
ought not to sacrifice either the advantages of employing atomic
weapons or the convenience of the operations of divisions of ground
troops. The only thing one should really sacrifice is the principle
of selecting the axis of the main strike and concentrating on it the
main efforts of fronts, armies, and even divisions. The necessity
has arisen for introducing clarity into this question, lest our com-
manders and staffs be completely disoriented.
The problem of removing the sharp distinction between the con-
cept of operational defense and operational offensive deserves con-
sideration.
Previously, when divisions of ground troops were the main
combat force. of the two sides, defense and offensive were funda-
mentally different methods of operations, in each of which definite
independent tasks were carried out. Defense ensured holding large
fronts and territories with comparatively insignificant forces, and
made it possible to free the necessary forces for an offensive. The
offensive, as the main type of combat operations, was the principal
means of decisively defeating the enemy and of seizing the initiative.
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Under conditions of the massed employment of nuclear weapons,
obviously.the purely classical type of defensive and offensive opera-
.tion will disappear. The success of an offensive operation, for example,
will depend not only on the correct organization of the..offensive itself
but on how skilfully are decided the problems of cover and protection
of friendly troops and means of mass destruction from destruction by
enemy nuclear weapons.. Elements of defense, such as security of the
flanks and points at which flanks meet, consolidation of occupied lines
during the course of an offensive operation were already being practised
in the last war, and began to penetrate into the offensive particularly
vigorously in the postwar period. The system of modern antiaircraft
defense appeared and is being improved all the time.
It is quite clear that it is now impossible to plan an offensive
operation without providing at the same time for measures for the
defense and reliable protection of the main forces and weapons of
the offensive troops from enemy nuclear weapons up to the beginning
of the offensive, and consolidation of lines and repelling counterstrikes
during the course of it. These measures must become one of the main
component parts of the general operational plan of offensive.
It is also the same on defense. Its object will consist in the con-
cealment of the main forces of nuclear weapons, ground troops, naval
forces, and aviation, and providing for their protection from enemy
nuclear weapons. Stability of defense under modern conditions is
based on the massed employment of nuclear weapons with the decisive
purpose of defeating the main grouping of enemy troops and the means
of enemy nuclear attack. Without this, the -defense is powerless and can-
not carry out its tasks. But at the game time, insofar as nuclear wea-
pons will be employed, and the destruction of the attacking strike
force achieved, it is senseless not to make use of these results and
to continue to go on sitting on occupied lines. It is natural, under these
conditions, to go over y. o the-offensive, even with very limited forces
of ground troops, immediately after nuclear strikes have taken place.
Operational defense, which counts on the maximum use of nuclear
weapons, cannot now be considered without going over to the offensive
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All this points to the fact that nuclear weapons:-are eliminating
the distinction between operational offensive and operational defense.
T ere will no longer be clearly defined breakthrough- sectors, of-
fensive zones for operational formations, and defense with a developed
system of solid positions and zones on a front of considerable width.
The difference between the conduct of an offensive and the defense,
in our opinion, will persist only in tactics.. Divisions and regiments
will, as before, receive tasks for the offensive and the defense and
carry. them out, taking into account the special features of operations
when nuclear weapons are being employed.
A feature of no small importance in modern operations will also
be that the rear areas of fronts and the rear of the country as a whole,
with its economic and political centers and manpower resources,
will be subjected from the very beginning of the war to the most
powerful effects of enemy nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological
weapons, which will seriously complicate the process of mobilizing
troops and conveying them to the front, and also material support
for operations. It follows from this that border military districts
will have to initiate military operations with those forces and
weapons which they had at the beginning of the war and which they
can save from enemy action.
..As far as internal military districts are concerned, their role
and the nature of their activities are being abruptly changed in com-
parison with the last war; under these conditions they will be forced
to take part immediately in active combat to frustrate enemy strikes
and eliminate their consequences. Forthis purpose, they must have
all necessary means at their disposal; in particular there must be
concentrated in. their hands all the means of antiaircraft defense
'(PVO), local antiaircraft defense (MPVO), etc.. Dispersal of these
.means in various organizations can only make the situation worse.
We feel that a special,ttype of operation must be developed -
operations of an internal 'military district. For training generals,
officers, and staffs of internal military districts in the conduct of
such operations, appropriate command-staff exercises and games
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must4lso: be carried out., in which the problems of-.troop operations
must be worked out under conditions of an enemy attack employing
nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons on- the_ ! territory of
the district. .
-The nextproblem.in.operational art, in our view, consists in
the employment and the nature of operations of the ground troops
themselves. As we have already ascertained, their role will amount
to the most advantageous and effective exploration of the results of
employment of nuclear weapons, and will be completely in line with
the -general concept of routing the opposing enemy forces. The tasks
of large units of ground troops and the means of reinforcing them
will now result from the aims of completing the rout of an enemy
being subjected to nuclear strikes, advancing into and capturing
enemy-held territory, conclusively depriving him of his capability
to employ nuclear weapons, and maintaining the stability of the opera-
tional situation of friendly troops. - At the same time, the achieve-
ment of the necessary surprise and effectiveness of the nuclear
strikes being delivered and the endeavor to exploit the results of
them to the maximum with ground troops and aviation must be made
fundamental in organizing coordinated action.
At the same time, the massed employment of nuclear weapons
cannot fail to result in changes in the operational structure of troops
and a revision of the role of echelons and the methods of increasing
efforts for routing the main forces of the enemy.
In the last war, an absolute majority of the troops of armies
and fronts was in their first echelons. Can this position be main-
tained now? No,. it cannot. Nuclear weapons make it possible to
neutralize effectively the troops of the enemy's first echelon in
certain sectors, and in a short time, to break through the defense in
.these sectors, with a powerful first echelon which is smaller
numerically. Therefore the tendency is growing immeasurably
''of Aeploying operational echelons of ground troops deeper, to have
more forces and weapons in the depth, and to reinforce second
echelons and reserves considerably in order to be able to increase
the efforts of the first operational echelon. 50X1-HUM
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In our view, the method of intensifying efforts. in an operation.on
those- axes where .the. most favorable or the. most.:difficult situation
has arisen-, .must also be fundamentally changed. The intensification
of efforts-must-now be carried out by small, groups of troops not larger
than a division. In this connection, second echelons of armies must
consist of tank.and motorized-rifle divisions, and the second echelons
of fronts - of corps and divisions. It is not advisable now to create
second echelons of fronts in the form of a combined arms or tank army,
as it is simply impossible to commit to battle a whole army (and still
more a reserve front) without incurring serious losses, which the
enemy is now able to inflict by employing nuclear weapons.
Let us take as an illustration an example from the same war game
carried out in the Academy i/n M. V. Frunze. By the time that the
"West" knew about the concentration and movement of the 3rd Tank
Army of the. "East", the "West's" 18th Army alone had 40 nuclear
warheads with a total yield of up to 1000 kt, and no less than 15
warheads could be used rapidly on the "East's" 3rd Tank Army.
In, addition, the group of "West" armies also had a large number of
nuclear warheads at that time, of which only 23 warheads were used
for delivering strikes on the area of the hills of the "Thueringen
Forest", with the aim of creating there zones of high radioactive
contamination. If all these warheads had been used with a definite
purpose on the troops of the "East's" 3rd Tank Army, especially
when it had not moved up to the "Thueringen Forest" hills, then this
army would undoubtedly have been completely routed and could not
have been committed to battle. The exercise could have been concluded
at this point.
depth.
In defense, divisions' of the first operational echelon which are
in direct contact with the enemy, will as a rule be better recon-
noitered by the enemy. Therefore commanding officers of and
commanders of armies will undoubtedly also endeavor to conceal
from the enemy their main forces operating in the first echelons,
having at every slightest available opportunity concentrated their
efforts on positions deployed in depth, on the strength of which even
the first operational echelon will be considerably more dispersed in
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In our opinion, evaluating the power of. atomic-weapons and their
possible operational use,.. it.--must be. considered that second echelons
and reserves of armies and of a front must now consist of more than
50 percent of all their component forces and weapons. In connection
with this, the overall .density of troops in first echelons will also
be many times less than it was in the last war.
In order to evaluate better the effect of employing nuclear weapons
and other means of mass destruction on the nature of operations and
combat, let us.consider several basic problems of the organization
and conduct of a defensive and an offensive operation.
In-principle.,.-defense, in our opinion, must be constructed in
the following manner: divisions of the first operational echelon
cover, the main axes. and.ensure observation on the remaining axes.
'Reconnaissance subunits are in direct contact with the enemy, then
come the troops detailed for combat in the security zone, further the
units defending the forward position, and, finally, the main line of
resistance.
The question arises, is such cover adequate or should one not
also, under, modern conditions, organize such a multi-zone echelon-
.in-depth defense as there was in the past? Could the enemy, even
without nuclear weapons, unexpectedly turn to the offensive with
aground troops, break this sparse cover and successfully develop an
offensive in depth?
In our view, such a structure of cover is adequate. If the
enemy really tries to deliver a strike without having neutralized
the nuclear weapons of the defense, i. e. , without having thoroughly
organized the operation, then he will receive a counter-nuclear
strike of such strength that it will not only paralyze any offensive
of his, but may bring about the total loss of troops assigned for it.
On the other hand, will the reliability of the cover be increased
much if a "normal" defense is organized, as it was in the last war,
with an average density of 10 to 15 kms per division? Are there
really no weapons now, capable of neutralizing any sector in this
defense that is essential for a breakthrough at any place and at any
time? 50X1-HUM
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The.success of covering operations of troops will now depend not
on how.many divisions of ground troops are .defending-=the main zone of
defense, or whether there is such a zone at all, but to what extent the
attacker will succeed in neutralizing the nuclear weapons of the enemy.
If this task is not carried out by the attacker, then comparatively small
forces, reinforced by the maneuver of tactical and operational reserves,
are quite adequate, by the massed use of nuclear weapons, to frustrate
the development of an offensive by enemy ground troops into the depth
of the defense.
Such an organization of cover, in our view, will now be typical
in all cases preceding the beginning of active combat operations.
Such cover will replace the operational defense of the past.
Let us turn to the problems of the offensive. The organizational
beginning of an offensive operation of a front is a General Headquarters
(Stavka) .directive. in which the tasks, composition of forces and weapons,
and the time of carrying out the operation are defined. In contrast
with the past, there. is now no need to define in the General Headquarters
directive the axis of the main and other strikes, or to stipulate the
amount of forces to be allotted to these axes. At the same time, the
necessity of indicating the following arises: which nuclear strikes will
be delivered by the means of General Headquarters on the axis of opera-
tions of the front, when and how the long-range enemy nuclear means
which are beyond the range of the means of the front will be neutralized,
and whether the means of the front will be called upon to carry out the
indicated strategic tasks.
In our view, the content of the, decision of the commander of troops
of the front (army) for carrying out an operation must be changed
materially. A resolution of the following problems must be included
in`it: - determining the maximum required number of nuclear warheads
and the selection of their most advantageous yield, determining the
points of concentration and time periods for :readying nuclear warheads
for use; - establishing methods for neutralizing and destroying nuclear
means and also for routing the main groupings of ground and naval
.forces and aviation of the enemy; determining the number of opera-
tional and tactical concentrated nuclear strikes, their tasks. comno-
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sition of .forces, and time of delivery; a. detailed working out of the
initial concentrated nuclear strike; -. determining. the.lines of the
immediate and subsequent tasks arising out of the planned nuclear
strikes; - making. the decision to use. ground troops (and naval forces
on a maritime axis) and aviation for completing the rout of the enemy,
and the time of .their move to the lines of the immediate and follow-up
tasks; - determining the tasks of the airborne forces and troops
designated to be dropped in the rear of the enemy from the air;
- establishing methods of cover from enemy strikes for friendly
troops and weapons, above all nuclear weapons; - allocating tasks
to operational formations and large units.
As is evident from the list given here, the basic content of a
decision for a modern offensive operation must include determining
the problems in employing nuclear weapons, and of these one of the
main and most complex is the organization of the initial operational
nuclear strike, the main purpose of which is to destroy the nuclear
means and neturalize the main grouping of ground'forces and aviation
of the enemy.
The destruction of enemy nuclear means is the most important
and, at the same time, the most difficult of the tasks. The fact is
that with the means of reconnaissance available at the present time
it is difficult to discover the location of enemy nuclear weapons.
Attempts to develop a, special device which would permit determining
at a considerable distance the location of depots of nuclear warheads,
assembly workshops, positions of missiles, and delivery aircraft,
have not yet, according to data in journals, given favorable results.
'-Ho wever, this does not mean that with the available o e o /one line
missing? In our view a thorough analysis of all intelligence data
received from all sources can ensure the discovery of the location
of the main part of the enemy?s nuclear means. But this study must
be very carefully and thoughtfully organized. For such a study and
analysis of reconnaissance data, it.is essential right now to have
special groups for evaluating targets in the staffs of fronts and armies.
In addition, it is necessary to continue persistently to search for new
methods of getting intelligence on enemy nuclear ineanso In this9 the
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main. direction must be taken not toward p.ilotsd reconnaissance aircraft,
but to the use of pilotless aircraft-missiles (samolet-raketa) for this
purpose, and also in the creation of a device which transmits an image
during flight, determining the coordinates of objectives, precisely
expediting the. development of film and photographs. -greatly, etc., i. e. ,
wholly answering the requirements given for reconnaissance of the
enemy's nuclear weapons.
Nuclear..means and missiles must be located only in well-prepared
areas before the beginning of an offensive. Commanding officers of
all levels -must remember that if it is possible to weaken the conse-
quences of the effect of the shockwave by means of dispersion of
troops, it is possible to save the troops from penetrating radiation
only by giving them cover in shelters and blindages. All movements
must be carried out in the shortest possible time, at high speed, and
with a considerable dispersion of troops.
The beginning of an offensive must be timed to the execution of the
initial operational nuclear strike. Divisions of the first echelon must
begin their move forward from shelters and areas which are com-
pletely prepared from the engineering standpoint under the cover of
the initial nuclear strike or after the delivery of such a strike by the
enemy. The attacker must strive to.,guess the enemy's intention to
-carry out a--concentrated nuclear strike, and to frustrate or weaken
it as much as possible.
During the course of an operation the reinforcement of appropriate
sectors of the front must now be carried out by employing nuclear
weapons and maneuver by trajectory (manevr trayektoriyami) and to
a lesser degree by transferring the reserve of the front or the re-
serves of neighboring armies, to complement one or another army.
An offensive by divisions of ground troops will be carried out along
the whole zone of the front on individual axes in accordance with the
requirements of the Field Service Regulations. The axes of opera-
tions of a division must be selected so that they ensure an adequate
dispersal of forces and of the movement of units toward correspond-
ing enemy groupings of troops, and should also lead into the operational
depth of his defense. 50X1-HUM
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In conclusion, it.is desirable to emphasize once again the idea
that. the success of an offensive operation will, in the final analysis,
depend on whether the attacker is -able to neutralize substantially
.the enemy's nuclear weapons. If_.he is unable to ensure this, the
offensive will be. frustrated no matter what measures he may under-
take. That is why it is now...impossible to conduct operations with
the forces of a single front, as..neighboring enemy armies or groups
of armies can ensure a concentration of nuclear strikes that will
stop any offensive by maneuvering means of delivering nuclear
weapons. For these same reasons, offensive operations of a group
of fronts must be secured by the conduct by General Headquarters
of a strategic nuclear strike or a missile operation with the object
of neutralizing the enemy's strategic nuclear weapons means.
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