THE PATHS OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE TANK TROOPS OF THE SOVIET ARMY, BY MARSHAL OF ARMORED TROOPS P. ROTMISTROV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029200060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1 1-HUM
The Paths of Further Development of the
Tank Troops of the Soviet Army
by
Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov
There have been pronouncements of late on many questions con-
nected with the development of tank technology and the organization
of tank troops. One can hear the opinion that it is pointless to
have strong armor plating on tanks in view of the appearance of new,
highly effective antitank means (above all of guided antitank
missiles - snaryad), and also because of difficulties related to the
production and use of heavy, tracked combat vehicles.
In connection with the probable re-arming of tanks with guided
missiles (upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad) instead of tube
artillery armament, it is also said that it is necessary to re-
examine the design of tanks. In particular, proposals are advanced
that the production of heavy tanks and the development of prototypes
be stopped. In this case there will be only two types of tanks with
which our tank troops can be equipped: medium (the basic type) and
light (amphibious), instead of the three that now exist.
It is impossible not to admit that the pronouncements and
proposals cited touch upon fundamental questions of the further
development of armored technology, organizational structure, and of
the combat use of tank troops.
A proposal that is no less important, which is also widely
discussed and which has its supporters, is the elimination of tank
armies and divisions and conversion to mixed organization of an
army and a unified division.
We do not share the views of the "innovators", since they are
not scientifically founded and are not supported by the experience
of the last war. Inasmuch as there are no official decisions con-
cerning these questions as yet, we shall permit ourselves to express
our viewpoint.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1 1-HUM
Conditions that determine the directions of the further develop-
ment of tanks. A tank is a tracked combat vehicle of high cross-
country ability incorporating three basic combat qualities: firepower,
armor protection, and mobility. During the existence of the tank
these qualities have constantly been imppved as regards achievements
in the development of armament, armor protection, power transmission,
and running gear, as well as by changes in operational-tactical views
on the employment of tank troops.
The choice of the directions of development of the basic combat
qualities of our modern tanks was made on the basis of the experience
of the last war. During recent years further development has been
mainly concerned with increasing the accuracy of fire when in motion
(stabilizers), of broadening the scope of combat utilization (firing
at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the surmounting of
water obstacles by floating or by moving along the bottom of the water),
and of increasing the reliability of operation of separate assemblies
and of the vehicle as a whole.
The correct determination of basic combat characteristics
ensured the superiority of our tanks over the comparable types of
tanks of the capitalist countries during the last war and in the
postwar period.
At the present time the development of new types of weapons, and
above all of the means of mass destruction, makes it necessary to
determine the paths for the further improvement of the combat qualities
of tanks, which are applicable to the newly arising conditions of a
possible war.
The present period of tank development is characterized by the
fact that the decisive factor for further improvement is not so much
past combat experience, with all its value, but a scientific forecast
of the nature of a future war, the role of tank troops in it, and the
methods of their combat employment. In other words, the basic trends
in the development of armor technology should be determined now, above
all, by the presence of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and
by the development of tank technology and of the means of defense
against tanks.
Proceeding from a thorough analysis of the nature of' a future,
war, it must be considered that the decisive force
in the ground troops will be tank troops, in cooperation with
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 cnYi _i-ii inn
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
missile troops and aviation. The basic assignment of tanks in
modern combat operations will obviously be: combat with the tanks
of the enemy, destruction of missile launchers on the launch sites,
suppression and destruction of the various other firing means, the
means of control, reconnaissance, and supply, as well as the
personnel of the enemy, including those in armored carriers and in
shelters. Proceeding from this, it is essential to lay special stress
on the multi-purpose assignments of tanks and their armament not only
at the present stage, but also in the near future. From the conditions
of highly mobile troop operations and of great independence in the
employment of tank units (chast), sub-units (podrazdeleniye), and
individual tanks, dictated by the use of weapons of mass destruction
in a battle and an engagement, arises the need to include in the
armament of our troops tanks with high resistance to all the de-
structive (porazhayushchiy) factors of a nuclear explosion, with
great cruising range, and which are also powerfully armed and carrying
a significant supply of ammunition for various missions, above all
of shells (snaryad) effective against the tanks of the enemy.
The armor protection of tanks. As was mentioned before, one
hears nowadays the opinion that, owing to the appearance of new
antitank combat weapons, there is no longer a requirement for
tanks with thick armor. Among others, a proponent of this view-
point is Colonel-General A. I. Gastilovich, who writes literally
in his article ("The Theory of Military Art Requires Review",
Spetsialnyy sbornik statey zhurnala Voyennaya Mysl, First Issue,
1960.) that the ground troops as a whole should be made air-
transportable with lightly armored (oblegchennyy) tanks, as any
armor can be penetrated anyway.
In this article we do not have the opportunity to examine other
questions raised by General Gastilovich. At the same time, it is
impossible to bypass the question cited without drawing the attention
of the author to the fact that not only are light tanks incapable of
engaging independently in battles with tanks of the enemy (General
Gastilovich) it should be said, calls upon our tank divisions to
do this, on page 13 of the Special Collection), but they will also
suffer heavy losses from nuclear strikes by the enemy, and thus our
tanks and tank troops as a whole will only lose by these "innovations".
Consequently, it is impossible to reject, so rashly, reliable armor
protection of modern tanks. 50X1-HUM
The complexity of creating proper armor protection for tanks
under modern conditions, in relation to the development of powerful
means of destruction, is further conditioned by the fact that this
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
bUA1-HUM
protection must be over-all, i.e., that it is called upon to protect
personnel against destruction by various types of weapons that operate
on different principles.
Thus, the armor-piercing shell with high muzzle velocity which
is used against tanks presents one requirement to the armor material.
Nuclear weapons have introduced other requirements, namely, the
need to protect tanks against the shock wave of a nuclear explosion
and against penetrating radiation (gamma rays and neutron flux).
In this connection, it must be kept in mind that while steel armor
offers good protection against the shock wave of a nuclear explosion
(here we take into consideration the strength of the hull and turret)
and successfully resists gamma-radiation, which is connected with the
heavy specific gravity of steel, it affords slight resistance to the
flow of fast neutrons. In regard to radiation of light waves it should
be said that the existing armor of tanks eliminates this danger to
the crew.
Finally, the use of shaped-charge (kumulyativnyy) shells, as is
known, is based upon a different principle of destruction, which is
most effective against steel armor. We recall that the first attempts
to use shaped charges in combat occurred during the period of the
Spanish Civil War (1936). During World War II shaped-charge antitank
means were greatly improved (panzerfaust, bazooka, and others) and
were quite widely used.
In the postwar period the sphere of employment of shaped charges
as a means of combating tanks has widened even more; this is evidenced
by the further improvement of shaped-charge shells in conventional
tube artillery, the creation of recoilless weapons with shaped-charge
shells, and, finally, the appearance of guided missiles with shaped
charges.
The highly effective action of shaped charges against steel armor,
the widespread possibilities of their use, and also the appearance
during the last few years, in many countries, for example, France,
England, the USA, West Germany and Switzerland, of various models of
antitank guided missiles (PTURS) (See Table 1), have introduced the
problem of providing protection for tanks from destruction by ol--A
charges, which should be gone into in more detail. 50X1-HUM
Some foreign military experts think that the appearance of PTURS
with shaped charges opens a new era in combat with tanks and leads to
a fundamental change in the equipment (tekhnika) and tactics of
armored troops.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
50X1-HUM
TABLE 1
Various Tactical-Technical Data of Antitank Guided Missiles of
Foreign Countries:
France
USA
England
Switzer-
land
Characteri
ti
0 0
H-1 lr
U
H'o
l
O\ 0
I
s
cs
rn
o~
E,
ir
U `? o~
I
rI
\
v)
CJ~ rl
W
\
A H
1 rI
0
-
-
U
Guidance (T
e)
N ri
0
C,
'd
Q)
F4
H 0
10
0
0
Q) P N
,1J
,c]
a) rI
yp
3 0
Q) n d
Cd
Q)
!Z
w93 Q
0r8 Q)
O
System
O zj a)
+3
Fr
,
+~,
G o ti
+~ t, fr
o f. Q)
E; +3 s4
Qa3ox
o r-I
gti
0 H
ac?
r
0U
F
o -0 ?fq
15 o
E 3 c.
o
g
,
) Q)
-4
12 8
Caliber, mm
164
160
150
130
254
114
100
4)
Overall Length
to
of Missile, mm
860
1070
000
'1300
2100
rI 'D
838
870
n
Launch Weight, kg
15
28
17
18.6
110
.
18
11
~
(D W
Weight of Warhead,
U)) rl
0 to
kg*
4.2
5.8
4.8
4
---
? C
W
3.5
4
,
4-1
Velocity,
Cd Cd
meters/sec*
80
195
80
125
270
?
P
H
90
80
~
,
y
n
~
~
o
F,
Distance of Guided
to Cd
Flight, m
1600
3500
350
5000
4800
' ,,
1600
500
cd
Armor-piercing
r4
Ability, mm
400
400
450
---
400
F'
400
300
* Collection of Articles "Artillery Journal" (artilleriyskiy zhurnal),
No. 43/10 for 1959, pages 46,47.
Note: The date on missiles SS-10, SS-11, "Dart", "Vickers-891" and "Cobra-4"
are from the book, "Missile Weapons and Their Combat Use", Part I,
Voyenizdat 1960, page 186. Data on "Entac" and ."Lin" -- from the
collection of articles, "Artillery Journal", No. 43/10 1959, pages 46,
47. On Red Eye, from the collection of articles of the journal
"Tankist", No. 47, 1959, pages 36, 37.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
With all the diversity of known PTURS, they can be differenti-
ated basically by the type of rocket engine (solid - porokhovoy - or
liquid) and by the system of guidance (navedeniye) to the target.
Guidance (upravleniye) is by wire, radio, or by means of an infrared
homing head.
The firing of antitank guided missiles is done from ground
launching mounts (puskovaya ustanovka) installed on vehicles, armored
carriers, and other mobile means.
In comparison with other antitank means, these missiles have a
number of advantages. They are easy to handle and, being guided in
trajectory, display great accuracy in tests. Unlike conventional
antitank weapons, the operator does not have to determine distance
to the target and its rate of movement when firing a guided missile.
And finally, the main thing, which allowed some experts to speak of
the onset of a new era in combat against tanks,,is the great depth of
penetration of steel armor, equal to 400-450 mm or more for a normal
hit.
These positive qualities of antitank guided missiles prede-
termine their widespread use in battle. But one must not go to
extremes and draw hasty conclusions, which often happens when
technical achievements are evaluated from only one standpoint.
Our creation of antitank guided missiles, of which the tactical-
technical characteristics are on a level with foreign models,
apparently served as one of the main grounds for the pronouncements
on the inexpediency of using heavy armor on tanks, inasmuch as it is
allegedly practically impossible to install armor protection of tanks
that could withstand the modern means for their destruction.
The mistake in such reasoning lies in its one-sidedness, and
arises from an inadequate appraisal of many factors connected with
the conditions of employment of these means, and also from forgetting
the powerful combat characteristics of tanks.
The launching mounts of antitank guided missiles are basically
a means of defense; they cannot be used in a tank meeting engagement
and have absolutely no protection from the effects of nuclear
weapons, which seriously limits the possibilities for their combat
employment. Even in the defense these launching mounts are easily
destroyed by tactical nuclear weapons. Besides, they will be unable
to move over contaminated terrain right after a nuclear explosion,
while tanks will operate without delay, exploiting the success after
the use of a nuclear weapon against the enemy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
50X1-HUM
Data on the great firing accuracy of PTURS were obtained under
firing range conditions, in other words, without interference by the
enemy.
The receiving apparatus of an antitank guided missile is highly
sensitive to the signals of the operator. It is enough to force the
operator, who works under conditions of direct contact with the enemy,
to commit any unintentional movement of the binocular sight (visor)
at the instant the missile is being laid on, even to start at the
explosion of a hostile shell, and the PTURS will change its flight
course and miss the target.
PTURS mobile launching mounts on light transport equipment can
be suppressed effectively by modern means of mass destruction.
Besides this, the known models of antitank guided missiles have
the following substantial faults:
- during the intitial stage of flight, for a sizeable part
of the trajectory (up to 500 meters), they are still
unguided, i. e., they have a sizeable "dead" (mertvaya)
zone in which they present no danger to tanks; for the
same reason they are of little use for combat operations
under city conditions;
- when firing from launching mounts, located on the ground,
or on vehicles, they have a limited shift of fire;
- with instantaneous-action fuses, if the missiles meet even
the slightest resistance in their trajectory (bushes, fences,
etc) they may explode before reaching the target;
- they have a low velocity, so that it takes 15-30 seconds
for them to travel 2-3 km; during this time the enemy can
destroy the operator or his guidance instruments with
counterfire, after which the missile becomes unguided.
For wire, radio, and infrared ray guidance it is necessary for
the operator to see the target during the entire flight time of the
missile in order to keep the missile on the line of sighting. As a
rule, in cases when the target is lost for a few seconds, the missile
will also be lost.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A029200060001-1 M
Firing by tanks at guided missile launching mounts, the laying
of smoke screens, and also the utilization by tanks of folds in the
ground, features and structures, trees, and bushes when approaching
the enemy will lead to a considerable reduction in the effectiveness
of guided missiles used against tanks.
The analysis of the qualities, possibilities, and conditions of
combat use of recently developed models of antitank guided missiles
with shaped charges, possessing high armor-piercing capability, allows
us to state with full responsibility that their appearance in the
presence of means of mass destruction and tanks does not give us
sufficient basis to conclude that it is inexpedient to use a strong
armor protection on the basic types of Soviet tanks. Besides, it
should not be forgotten that a tank with strong armor, moving rapidly
over the battlefield and firing simultaneously, has always had
superiority over antitank weapons. Of course, it is necessary to
consider the possibility that the antitank weapons mentioned may be
improved or that new, more effective ones will appear. However, tanks
will not remain at their present stage of development either.
In examining the question of the necessary armor protection of
the basic types of tanks, we consider that it must be over-all, i.e.,
capable of giving the tank great resistance, protecting the crew
from weapons of mass destruction and enemy tanks, and also from
various modern antitank weapons.
Therefore, we must not slacken our efforts to perfect the strong
armor protection of the basic types of tanks, which must be strengthened
supplementarily for the biological protection of the tank crew from
penetrating radiation by the use of special "linings" (podboy) which
inhibit the flow of neutrons. But, again, it must be remembered that
the "lining" will be of use only in conjunction with dependable armor.
Improvement of the armor protection of tanks from all types of
shaped-charge weapons (and not only from PTURS) must be carried out
by using large angles of inclination of the armor details, the
differential distribution of armor in relation to the probability of
damage to the tank on the battlefield, the use of shields of various
designs to induce activation of the fuse of the missile before it
reaches the main armor, and, finally, by creating a combined armor
consisting of armor steel and glass plastic (stekloplastik) which
resists the shaped-charge effect well.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A029200060001-1
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
Nor should it be forgotten that the presence of weaker armor
protection on tanks on one belligerent side puts the tank troops
of that side at a disadvantage in advance, especially in carrying
out a meeting battle and engagement. But this type of combat action
will be basic, as we know, especially in the initial period of a
war.
As regards the position taken on the need to increase the armor
protection of the basic types of tanks, one must not conclude that
it is inevitable that their weight will be increased thereby. Even
now we should strive to reduce the weight of tracked combat vehicles,
but not at the expense of their combat qualities, because weight still
adds to their great resistance to a nuclear explosion, which leads
to the broadening of the sphere of their combat utilization.
When we speak of resistance, we mean not only resistance to
overturning, but also the ability to withstand all the other factors
of a nuclear explosion.
The possibility of increasing the armor and still retaining the
same weight of a tank can be illustrated by an example of Soviet tank
construction.
Thus, the T-34 tank, which was the best tank of its day, has been
replaced by the T-55 medium tank, which has armor and armament more
than twice as powerful, with only a 12 percent increase in the weight
of the vehicle.
Even now there are certain opportunities to increase further the
combat qualities of tanks under conditions of their use in a war
employing nuclear weapons without increasing their weight. At the
same time, however we strive to reduce the weight of tanks, we should
not do so under any circumstances at the cost of weakening the hull
of a tank.
The heavy tank: Up to the present some comrades have expressed
the thought that it is pointless to produce heavy tanks. We hold a
different opinion indeed.
First of all it should be noted that the concept of a "heavy
tank" is quite relative. Our T-l0 and T-10M tanks with a weight of
50 tons are called heavy, while the American tank M60 that weighs
47 tons is medium. The British 50-ton "Centurion" tanks are also
considered medium. The latest models of American and British heavy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
tanks weigh 57 tons and 65 tons, respectively, and the well-known
heavy "Tiger-B" tank of the former German-Fascist army weighed 68
tons.
Therefore, it seems to us that it is not a question of the
name, but of whether we need a type of combat vehicle such as our
T-10M tank, or not?
When this question is examined it is helpful to recall the
relationship between our tank types during the last war. Statistics
show that during World War II we had about 55 percent medium tanks
and assault guns (SAU), up to 25 percent light tanks and SAU, and
about 20 percent heavy tanks and SAU. Of course, such a high per-
centage of light tanks existed because of the well-known conditions,
and, in particular, because it was possible to build them in ordinary
automobile plants.
So far as the production of heavy tanks is concerned, they were
produced only out of necessity, because of the harsh demands of war.
They were produced despite all wartime difficulties and, as the
experience of the last war showed, their production was fully
justified.
In our opinion, it is impossible to go only on economic
considerations in evaluating the significance of heavy tanks under
the new conditions. It is really hard to produce heavy tanks; they
require a lot of metal, but for defeating an enemy one cannot skimp
with metal. Apparently, in this case, when examining the question
of heavy tank production, it is necessary to approach it not only,
and not mainly, from a purely economic standpoint, but above all
by evaluating military necessity and expediency.
Let us note here that at the present time the percentile
relationship of heavy tanks to medium ones (if we consider only
the T-10 and T-10M tanks) is in all only about 4 percent. In
other words, we actually have only one type of tracked combat
vehicle, since the light, reconnaissance amphibious tank is not
suitable, it seems to us, for conducting tank battles, and in
reality we have so few heavy tanks that any restrictions on their
production will reduce their significance in our troops to zero.
The question arises: Do we actually have to limit ourselves
to one type of tank and to consider this a normal phenomenon in
the development of armored technology?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
In our opinion, this must not be done, not only from consider-
ations of ensuring qualitative superiority over the enemy, but also
on the grounds that it is essential to broaden the development of
designs of tracked combat vehicles.
It is known that the U.S. Army, our probable enemy, has accepted
the M60 tank into its armament, and it not only concedes nothing to
our medium tank in most respects, but is even superior to the latter
in some. For example, the armor protection of the frontal (lobovaya)
armor of our T-55 tank hull is 100 mm, androf the American M60 tank,
120 mm. Our tank is armed with a 100 mm gun, and theirs with a 105-mm
gun. The muzzle velocity of an armor-piercing shell from our gun is
900 m/sec, and from theirs - 975 m/sec. Our unit of fire is 43
rounds, and theirs - 57. The engine power of the T-55 tank is 580
h.p., and the M60 - 750 h.p. The capacity of our main fuel tanks is
680 liters, and theirs - 1,300 liters.
Our T-55 tank has an advantage over the M60 tank, for example,
in the dimensions and weight of the vehicle. This, however, does
not give us the right to disregard the definite progress attained
by the USA in the construction of medium tanks.
At the same time our T-10M heavy tank is superior to the
latest models of foreign medium tanks, including the M60, in a
number of basic combat features, especially in firepower and armor,
and is equal to them in maneuverability.
Consequently, if we reject the T-10M tank at the present time
it can lead to the loss of our qualitative superiority over the tanks
of the enemy. Therefore, we should not reject heavy tanks at the
present time, particularly the T-10M tank, but on the contrary, it
is necessary to arrive at a decision that would again ensure our
superiority over the tank technology of the enemy, especially in
tank battles and engagements.
It follows that an incorrect selection of the necessary types
of tanks will do serious damage to the army. This problem assumes
special significance at certain stages in the development of tanks,
as the result of general technical progress and the appearance of
new methods of conducting combat operations.
Q W corder hat the main purpose and meaning of the existence
of hPavv a in nur army nnnaiata of the fart. that._ havincr
stronger combat characteristics than medium tanks, especially in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
5UX1-HUM
firepower and armor protection, they ensure our qualitative superiority
over the tanks of the enemy, which is impossible to achieve with medium
tanks alone.
The M60 tank that the U.S. Army has adopted is called the "basic
combat tank". At the same time, despite its extremely powerful arma-
ment and armor, the Americans, as a reinforcing measure, have created
numerous tracked assault guns of large calibers (from 155 to 240 mm),
with armor giving full protection from bullets and with a special
system of anti-atomic defense.
The armament of the newest models of these assault guns is
installed in revolving turrets: it has mechanized loading and a
fairly large unit of fire. Some of them are so adapted that they
can cross water obstacles afloat.
Consequently the American "basic combat tanks" have various and
powerful means of reinforcement which have great mobility and cross-
country ability, adapted for crossing terrain that is contaminated
with radioactive substances. However, the weak armor of the assault
guns limits their use in certain types of combat.
Under prevailing conditions our basic (medium) tanks also need
means of reinforcement that would be capable of destroying the enemy's
tanks at great distances, firing by direct laying and without reducing
the maneuverability of the tank troops.
These methods for the qualitative reinforcement of medium tanks
can be:
- heavy tanks, greatly superior to medium tanks in firepower
and armor;
- assault guns, created both on special chassis and on the
chassis of a medium tank, which would have more powerful
armament than the latter.
The first way is preferable. The presence of strong armor
protection on the heavy tanks increases the possibilities for their
combat utilization, compared to the SAU mounted on the chassis of
medium tanks, not to mention the assault guns with only bullet-
proof armor, especially in a meeting engagement.
-13-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
Besides, if the final design of a heavy tank exists, new combat
vehicles for various purposes can be created on this basis in a
relatively short time if the need arises (missile carriers, powerful
assault guns, including those using nuclear weapons and others).
Thus, bearing in mind that the enemy has the 47-ton M60 tank
and various reinforcing means, we come to the conclusion that in order
to ensure superiority over the tanks of the enemy and to strengthen
our medium tanks qualitatively, it is necessary for us to have heavy
tanks or some other vehicles which have firepower superior to that
of the basic tank of the enemy.
The aspiration to reject heavy tanks and to reduce the weight
of tanks by reducing the thickness of the armor, will lead inevitably
to a sharp decrease in the combat capabilities of tanks and will
place our tank personnel in an unequal position in the conduct of a
battle with the tanks of the enemy. As has already been pointed out,
the weakening of tank armor does not conform with the requirements
for anti-atomic protection.
In consequence, if we examine the heavy tank question scientifi-
cally, it is essential to study many conditions. Therefore, the
decision which is adopted has to be deeply founded to eliminate any
possibility of making a mistake in this important question.
Some questions of the organization of tank troops: Lately, as
we have already mentioned, there have been statements on the necessity
of reviewing the organizational structure of the tank troops. More
than that, there are even suggestions that we should reject the concept
of "tank troops".
The supporters of the views indicated consider that the mechaniza-
tion of modern ground troops and their saturation with tanks has some-
how led to the fact that there is little difference in the ground
troops between motorized rifle divisions and tank divisions, with the
result that tank troops nowadays lose their independent significance.
For this reason there are proposals to abolish tank divisions, tank
armies and the concept of "tank formations".
In stating the concept of creating unified divisions as the basic
tactical large unit (soyedineniye) of the ground troops, its pro-
ponents have foremost in mind the rejection of tank divisions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A029200060001-1
In examining this question the experience of the last war and
the economy of the country must be taken into consideration. It
appears to us that unified divisions, saturated with tanks, will not
be needed everywhere. In many cases, in some theaters of military
operations, and in many areas of the West European theater, it will
also be possible to have standard motorized rifle divisions with a
limited number of tanks, or even without them. If all the divisions
are thoroughly saturated with tanks, the economy of the country will
be unable to support such a huge tank park. Moreover, the opportunity
to mass tanks where it is deemed to be operationally expedient always
remains, without their organizational disintegration.
These concepts oblige us to have at least two types of divisions.
It is well known that nuclear weapons have brought about many
corrections, not only in combat tactics, but also in military art as
a whole. Under conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction,
war will be more mobile with higher rates of advance than formerly,
and operations will attain a large scale. All this will call for
more frequent and more intensive troop movements than before.
Proceeding from this, some comrades consider that tank divisions
do not fully meet specified requirements, and that they are inferior
to the motorized rifle divisions in mobility except on the battle-
field. In particular, they assert that the motorized rifle division
is superior to the tank division on the march, because it is necessary
to have strong bridges, heavy ferries, and pontoon bridges for tanks
to cross a water barrier, and tanks are supposedly slower than
wheeled vehicles and armored carriers, etc. Therefore, in their
opinion, all the advantages remain with the motorized rifle division,
in a given case.
It is entirely obvious that none of these conclusions is sound.
On the march the motorized rifle division has no advantages, and can-
not have any, over the tank division, because it has tanks of its
own and moves at the speed of the tanks. Because of the presence of
tanks in the motorized rifle division it needs bridges just like the
tank division, so even in this sphere the motorized rifle division
has no advantages of any kind.
Indeed, in battle, as soon as the motorized infantry (motopekhota)
leaves the armored carriers, the motorized rifle division will be
forced to advance at the speed of infantry (this will sharply curtail
its maneuverability and rate of advance), while tank units and sub-units
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A029200060001-1
 50X1-Hl JM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
will have to operate without infantry, because on the battlefield it
is impossible to combine the speed of tanks -- 20 km/hr -- with the
speed of infantry -- 4 km/hr -- and the power of a protected engine --
500 hp -- with the strength of a man without any protection.
All combat experience of World War II points to the fact that
it was not rifle divisions reinforced with tanks that determined
the success of operations, as, for example, French military theore-
ticians believed, but tank divisions, tank corps, and tank armies.
All those who maintain that the organization of a unified
division is more progressive than the organization of our tank
divisions, are, in our opinion, bearers of old-fashioned ideas.
The tank division fully justified itself in the last war, and
it will justify itself even more under the conditions of a war
conducted with the use of nuclear weapons. In examining current
problems, one should proceed first of all from the effects of the
employment of nuclear weapons. This must be taken as the basis of
the organization of the troops. If this is so, and if it seems
that no one takes issue with this thesis, then we have to create an
organization that will meet all the modern requirements.
Upon thorough examination of this question, one may assert that
the inadequacy of the proposed organization of a unified division
will be proven by every nuclear explosion. A nuclear explosion will
put everything that is on the battlefield out of commission, except
the tank crews, who are covered by thick armor. It might be asked,
why build illusions and create an organization of troops that is
known beforehand not to meet the requirements of modern warfare?
More than once, the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet
Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, pointed out that in the next war, as never
before, there will be an increase in the number of tank meeting
engagements and battles. He did not forget to remind us of this
during this year's critique of exercises, by pointing out that
"meeting battles and engagements will be the most common phenomenon".
This is understandable. These battles and engagements will have to
be carried out, above all, by our tank troops against the tank
troops of the enemy; this is borne out by the fact that they are
best adapted for the conduct of battles under nuclear warfare
conditions, and that they can engage, most successfully, the enemy
tanks. This thesis is upheld by the entire course of World War II,
and especially during the engagement at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943.
-16-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A029200060001-1
During this meeting engagement the blows of the German tank troops
were sustained only by our tank troops. It is a fact that the fresh,
battle-tested 5th Guards Combined Arms Army under the command of such
an experienced warrior as Lieutenant General A. S.Zhadov, not only
did not fulfill the order of the Commander of the Voronezh Front,
General of the Army N. F. Vatutin, and member of the Military Council
N. S. Khrushchev to carry out a joint counter attack with the 5th
Guards Tank Army, but did not even hold the lines being occupied.
Its corps on the left flank, unable to sustain the onslaught of the
German tanks, withdrew quite a distance to the east, and exposed the
right flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which was already in a
difficult situation without this. Despite the conditions that arose,
the 5th Guards Tank Army not only closed the right flank with its
own tank units, but also detached one brigade to the assistance of
the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army. How can we forget these lessons
of history now, and propose without foundation or due analysis a new
universal division whose combat value appears highly dubious, and
reject the tank division which proved itself throughout all of World
War II and has not compromised itself yet?
It is perfectly apparent that the conversion to a universal
division will lead to the rejection, not only of the tank division,
but also of the tank army, and this will lead inevitably to the
extensive dispersal of tanks and to the loss of all the advantages
which they possess when they are organizationally massed.
A'srespect, we consider it quite proper that a lot of atten-
tionjto 4irected to the question of a new organization of the troops.
In modern conditions military art does not at all presuppose a
universal organization of the basic large units of the ground troops,
for it would be hard to combine the combat qualities of the various
new types of weapons and combat equipment. On the contrary, it is
necessary to create an organizational structure which will provide
the most effective ulitization of combat equipment.
Thus, it seems advisable to us to have not one universal type
of division, but three types of divisions:
First - a tank division to conduct combat operations under
conditions when nuclear weapons are used, to conduct meeting battles
with enemy tanks, and as the basic means for carrying out deep strikes
on the offensive and repelling enemy strikes on the defensive. Its
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A029200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
organizational development must tend toward the further reduction of
personnel not protected by armor and saturation with heavily armored
tanks.
Second - a motorized rifle division which should be more or less
the same as it is now, maybe even with some reduction in the number
of tanks, or else in wartime we may not be able to maintain all
motorized rifle divisions at TOE strength in tanks. Besides its general
missions that were pointed out in the order of the Minister of Defense
for 1961, it can be used to secure general success in the main
direction, for performing basic missions in minor directions, and for
effecting a firm defense.
Third - a light motorized rifle division without tanks. In our
opinion, a division of this type could carry out fast marches in armored
carriers over light bridges and crossings, cross contaminated zones
without engagement, move by air into the enemy rear or into an area of
our strong tank formations to consolidate their successes, conduct
stubborn defense of terrain that tanks cannot reach easily, etc. If a
division of this type is armed with modern antitank weapons, under
favorable conditions, it will be able to hold an area or line securely
and repel enemy tank attacks. In cases when a division of this type
is thrown into an area where we have strong tank formations it can be
reinforced with tanks if the necessity arises.
It seems to us that the presence of three types of divisions in
the organization of the ground troops will fulfill the requirements
presented by modern warfare better than one unified division.
The pronouncements of some of our military leaders that the tank
army has outlived itself, and that the time has come to shift to an
army of unified organization, are not new. Such conclusions are a
direct consequence of the rejection of the tank division and the
creation of a single, unified division.
In this connection, it is pertinent to remember that in the
history of the development of armored troops there was a sad day
when the tank and mechanized corps found themselves disbanded.
Everyone knows what consequences this led to.
At the root of such views on the modern tank army is the assertion
that it does not differ in any way now from the combined arms army,
that in operations, exercise experience shows, it cannot break away
from the other forces of a front, and its existence is, therefore,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1
supposedly not justified in any way.
Such pronouncements are, to say the least, unfounded. The
experience of World War II testifies to the fact that all of the most
successful operations, not only offensive but also defensive, were
won by our troops largely with the participation of tank armies.
Tank armies provided the front with wide mobility, power, and depth
of strike, developing operations at high tempo.
It is permissible to pose this question to all comrades who
espouse the concept of abolishing tank armies: Do they now reject
the concept of massed strikes, or is this method of defeating the
enemy also obsolete?
If we consider that even now, in the age of nuclear weapons,
it is necessary to fight with the fist, then how can we come out
against the tank army if its organization already incorporates the
principle of massing tanks. We do not wish to go into this question
further and introduce other arguments of the superiority of the tank
army over the combined arms army in offensive operations, but it seems
to us that, to any person capable of objective evaluation, it must
be clear that if tank armies played a leading role in the success of
operations carried out during the last war, then their role in a
future war, more mobile than the last, will increase more and more.
The tank army was and will remain the most menacing force to the
enemy, especially in a meeting engagement against his tank formations.
The experience of World War II teaches that the utilization of
tank troops differed, and will continue to differ, from the use of
rifle troops reinforced with tanks. Therefore, the various proposals
directed, in actuality, toward abolishing tank troops in their present
organization, do not strengthen the ground troops in any way, but push
us towards the French tactics which failed completely in the last
war. We need powerful and well-organized tank troops - all the
experience of the last war speaks eloquently of this, and it is
demanded by modern conditions of carrying out combat operations
arising as a result of the appearance and development of missile
troops and nuclear weapons.
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29200060001-1