"AEROFLOT, THE SOVIET AIRLINE - A CONDENSED HISTORICAL SURVEY"
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T00246A023500390001-8
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C
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 29, 2013
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Publication Date:
October 14, 1963
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
50X1-HUM
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, tbe transmission or revelation of which in any 'manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CONFIDENTIAL
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
"Aeroflot, The Soviet Airline -
A Condensed Historical Survey"
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES 10
REFERENCES
14 Oct 63
50X1-HUM
THIS Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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50X1-HUM
a ten-page typewritten paper
entitled "Aeroflot, The Soviet Airline - A Condensed Historical Sur-
vey." This paper was prepared by Sergei Sikorsky, son of Igor Si-
korsky, the helicopter designer, as a resume of a speech he made
before a group of German aeronautical personnel believed in late 1962.
It is UNCLASSIFIED.
STATE
ARMY
['NAVY
-- end --
C ONFIDENTIAL
[AIR
1FBI
1A_Ec I I
50X1-HUM
5
4
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50X1-HUM
CONTROLLED
DISSEM: The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components
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accordr-nce with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly
participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be Obtseminated to organiza-
tions or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Goverpment without the written permission of the originator.
NO DISSEM ABROAD
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AEROFLOT, THE SOVIET AIRLINE
A Condensed Historical Survey
Following the Communist Revolution in 1917, the Soviets
inherited a mixed bap of Imperial Air Force fighters,
reconnaissance and bomber aircraft, estimated at
approximately 350 - 400 aircraft, including Caudron,
Nieuport, Ansaldo fighters, DH-4 bombers and some
35 - 50 Sikorsky four-motored heavy bombers. Most of
the pilots, engineers and technicians were refugees, dead
or dispersed, while the aircraft were scattered in small
units from the Baltic to the Balcans.
Early 1918, a conversation was held between three ren
that was of inestimable significance to Soviet air power;
Professor N. Zhukowsky and a young engineer by the name
of A. N. Tupolev (Caudron representative before the
Revolution) met with Lenin to sell him on the idea of
salvaging and re-organizing the crippled Russian Air Force
and industry. Tupolev recalled later that Lenin was cool
at first, but warmed-up as soon as the two pointed out
that a strong air fleet was possibly the only way of
holding a vast Russian continent under Soviet control.
Lenin agreed with this theory and immediately ordered
that an effort be made to re-organize the Soviet Air Force
and authorized the immediate creation of a central research
and design establishment which became known as ZAGI.
Its decisive role in the development of Soviet aviation is
well-known. Professor Zhukowsky was named the first
director of the research offices / university facilities
and Tupolev became his assistant.
In 1922 German know-how gave a vital push to the Soviets.
Barred by the Versailles Treaty from building aircraft in
Germany, a number of leading German engineers were invited
by the Soviets to establish a modern aircraft plant north
of Moscow. A number of German technicians pave the writer
Some interesting background on those early days. The main
technical know-how was provided by Professor HUPO Junkers
and his staff who created the Zili plant mentioned above
and spent nearly a decade teaching aircraft design and
production methods at Zili, at ZAGT in Moscow and elsewhere.
Tupolev is quite frank in admitting that a great deal of
his success is due to the education gained as a result
of his intimate association with Junkers. A study of
Tupolev-designed aircraft will show traces of Junkers-
inspired structures - even today.
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By 1922, German - Soviet communications were so heavy that
a j7R-Fi airline was formed, flying between Berlin, KOnigsberg
and Moscow using Junkers, de Havilland, Vickers and Fokker
aircraft. Deruluft was SO% Soviet, 50% German financed,
but crews and ground staff were mainly German.
In 1923 the first true Soviet airline was formed. Dobrolot
flew between Moscow and Novgorod. This airline carried
230 passengers and two tons of mail on its opening year.
Aeroflot today celebrates its anniversaries on the basis
of Dobrolot's founding in 1923 and ignores the fact that
Deruluft was already operating with Soviet blessing one
year earlier. A number of other Soviet shuttle airlines
were born, grew and died during this period but very little
precise data is available on these sporadic attempts.
In 1932 all local airlines were merged by a decree of the
Soviet Councilof Ministries into one organization, controlled
by GUGVF (a central committee for the control of all civil
aviation activities), and the airline that emerged from the
re-organization was almost immediately known as Aeroflot.
A period of consolidation followed but by 1934 Aeroflot
was carrying annually just under 97.000 passengers and
3.585 tons of mail.
By 1935 the number of passengers carried jumped to 127,500,
almost 7,000 tons of mail and 12,000 tons of freight.
That same year, the Supreme Soviet Council published the
revised air code of the USSR assigning overall control
to Aeroflot of all aircraft transport design, manufacture
and operation. Further, all development and operation of
airports, airport facilities, navigation aids, and radio
installations were to become Aeroflot's operational
responsibility. In addition, sole responsibility was
assigned to Aeroflot to provide support for all agricultural
activities (crop spraying, aerial seeding and dressing,
air survey and photography, etc.). In other words, Aeroflot
became the organization for every line of aeronautical
activity not directly concerned with the Soviet Air Force,
its missions and its facilities. Aeroflot, nevertheless,
remains a semi-military organization and it is significant
that Soviet Air Force officers of high rank are heavily
represented in Aeroflot. As is the case in USA and in most
of Europe, Soviet Air Force aircraft are allowed to land at
and use civil airport facilities, but Aeroflot is not allowed
to land at or use military airport facilities without prior
permission from Soviet military authorities.
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Fror 1935 through 1939, Aeroflot grew at a fast rate.
In early 1940, the 1939 traffic statistics were published
and showed an estimated 307,000 Passengers (UF airlines
carried 2 million) and 49,650 tors of Freight (Us carried
4,500 tons freight). Thus, Aeroflot carred 1/7 of the
passengers carried in the United 7tates but over ten-times
the air-freight tonnage. This is due to the fact that
Aeroflot was often used to transport raw materials to
critically-short industries, irresnective of the economics
involved. There are stories, most probably trUe, of
Aeroflot's transports being converted to carry coal, bauxite,
precision bearings and other material urgently recuired to
keen a refining plant or engine factory oPerating. The lack
of adocuate roads and the simultaneous exnansirn of soviet
industry behind the Urals forced Aeroflot to run airlift
operations repeatedly in order to supply materials which
could not be gotten to the remote industrial centers 'being
set lip in any other way.
fluring Yorld 'far IT the thousand-odd Aeroflot aircraft
were absorbed into the Soviet Air Force. They carried
VIP's, mail, wounded and were quite often used to airlift
ammunition and weapons to Soviet partisans operating behind
the Cern-an lines. At the end of 'qorld 'far TT, the A_er,oflot
ao-tivitY continued as rec-ards nd t ccl su-Dr,ort. The-- is
no doubt that even today, Aeroflot operates a great ram,'
"sensitive" missions which could not he executed by the
Soviet Air Force without ma-lor Political rePeroussiors.
7-1P Aeroflot trar=ort chotoc7ranh in Laos in 1961 T,'bile
air-dr=irr arms to the Laotion communists is a recent
ewar.Dle of this t"7,' of activity.
The most war Aeroflot started T,-ith a mixed fleet of 1.20
single and twin engined aircraft, all. of '7or7d war TT
virtar. A great boon were anproximatelY 600 C-u7 Dakota',
c4,eliver2,', to the Soviet as part of US m'itarv
with floviet-built comics of well 977' the '
TL-12 an(" IL-14 (copies of the rorvair 240 and 34n)
Aeroflot started on a fartastir exnansion. e.:cheduled servi
were extended into Central P:sia and into the Far rest.
Tr rotoher 1.47, the first scheduled trans-continental -ser
was4raizperated between '.'oc,00',7 and Vlar'ivostol, via the
nrtra center of 1-'"hbarovk, a rli,,,tance of L1,225 miles
(f.a*- vorl- - tnre or Chicago - Hawaii). Th.o 7,arvice con7iste,'
r= orgr first, then in 99. srhedu1eI
,start, into the centre] f,nian Htes on
ro114-- 'av 1011
rT=nr:: tr) the Publio.
Ar-H, fy,?rof'ot h,-,17an to
-evral ror-
rrn .1-'^r-t*r air-prvire ir aer r
arsa. on a nernittin-7"
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In 1956 Aeroflot started crew check-outs in the TU-16
badger bombers. The crew check-outs were intensified
during the late summer and in early fall of 1956, Aeroflot
received the first of the TU-104 transports. By the end
of 1956, Aeroflot had something over six of these aircraft
in service. The original version was a "quick and dirty"
conversion from the badger and carried only 50 passengers.
Even by Soviet standards, this was a terribly uneconomic
aircraft. In 1957, larger quantities of the stretched
TU-104A were delivered to Aeroflot. The stretched "A"
carried 70 passengers. Quantities of these aircraft were
also offered to other Communist-block airlines, but CSA
Czechoslovakian airlines was the only customer who purchased
same. In 1958 increasing quantities of TU-104's were seen
and the TU-114 turboprop entered airline service. This
passenger conversion of the "Bear" turboprop bomber was by
far the biggest (220 passengers) and heaviest (410,000 lbs)
aircraft in the world. Though limited quantities of the
aircraft were seen, there is no doubt that this aircraft
(and the 12,000 HP turboprops) were a major engineering
achievement.
In 1959, the IL-18 started schedule passenger service after
about 8 months of shakedown flying with mail and airfreight.
The AN-10 aircraft, which was designed to back-up the
Ilyushin went into Aeroflot evaluation. By June the TU-114
was already far enough in its development to justify the
Soviets to use it to carry Frol Kosloff, first Vice Chairman
of the USSR, his staff and senior Aeroflot officials non-stop
from Moscow to New York in 11 hours 6 minutes. The distance
was approximately 5092 miles. Later that year, Chruschtschow
also flew on the same aircraft non-stop Moscow to Washington.
By 1959, the first semi-realistic statistics became available
from the Soviet Union. Soviet technical missions accredited
to Aeroflot visited a number of foreign countries and a
preliminary "feel" for the Soviet Aeroflot performance was
gathered. From various sources it became apparent that
Aeroflot was already, in a number of respects, the world's
biggest airline operation. It was serving 129 major airports,
329 smaller "local fields" (many little more than a grass
field and a small hangar) and had a route mileage of
nearly 350,000 miles. Passengers carried in 1958 are estimated
as between 8.2 and 9 million.
In1960 Aeroflot development continued following the dictates
laid down in the first seven year plan, which sets goals for
the Soviet economy from 1959 through 1965. The introduction
of increasing numbers of turbine-powered aircraft resulted
in as dramatic an increase in the transport potential of the
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Soviet airline as was the case in the United States and
Europe with the introduction of turbine-powered aircraft.
In August the Ilyushin 11-18 was grounded, following an
engine fire in mid-air which burnt a wing off and resulted
in a bad crash near Kiev. This crash had unpleasant
after-effects, because of a number of victims were members
of an African trade delegation visiting the Soviet Union.
An intensive investigation (in its own way, as urgent as
that which followed the series of Electra crashes in the
States) soon determined that the engine fuel system was
at fault. Following suitable modifications the Ilyushin
aircraft returned into airline service later that same
year and Aeroflot's development continued upwards. Soviet
services quoted a 30% increase over 1959 in passengers
and airfreight; 1960 passenger totals were reliably estimated
at 12-14 million passengers.
1961 saw the previous years' performance exceeded by 28%
more passengers carried and 16% more airfreight carried.
The 11-18 was defintely out of trouble; proof of that was
the use of these aircraft to carry Nikita Chruschtschow
on repeated official visits from Moscow to Soviet Republics
(in May to Armenia, June from the Vienna discussions with
Kennedy and later that same month to Alma-Ata). Soviets
were still reluctant to release exact passenger and ton-
km figures at that time but Western experts were beginning
to gather a fairly accurate picture by extrapolating Soviet
"percentage gains" annually reported. The following
figures based on available data represent one expert opinion
regarding scheduled Aeroflot services during calender 1961:
Passenger volume 22 million, freight ton-miles 455 million,
route mileage (unduplicated) 240,000. Aircraft in service
were estimated at 200 turbine-powered aircraft and about
1600 piston-engined aircraft. Performance logged in 1961
from another source tallies closely with the general
impression; with Aeroflot carrying 21.8 million passengers
against 58.4 million in the USA. Average 1961 trip length
in Aeroflot was 467 miles against 681 miles in the USA.
Average aircraft utilization had climbed to 12 hours
per day but only on aircraft assigned to long range
operations.
1962
After a two-year shakedown, the TU-124 was placed in service.
This was the first of the short-haul jets and appeared in
service significantly earlier than either the BAC 111 or
the Boeing 727. From another ICAO source, the 1962 Aeroflot
fleet was estimated to be as follows:
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- TU-104, -A and -B, 135 in service, 130 with
Aeroflot, 5 with CSA. The first TU-104
production run ended with probably aircraft
registry CCCPL 5460; approximately 120
individual aircraft registrations have been
noticed.
- TU-114, estimated 8-12 in service with Aeroflot.
British source which has kept careful track
of aircraft registration numbers estimates
that in addition to the prototype TU-114,
CCCPL 5611, 13 additional TU-114 registry
numbers have been "spotted", ranging from
CCC? 76460 to CCC? 76482.
- 11-18 well over 80 of these aircraft were operating
with Aeroflot, starting with the prototype,
CCCPL 5811 and ending about CCCPL 5821;
a second batch of registry numbers runs from
CCCP 75639 to CCC? 75835. British sources
estimate at least 80 individual 11-18
registrations have been identified. Another
40-plus aircraft are in service with satellite
airlines.
- AN-10A, -12A, approximately 25 in service with Aeroflot
and one with Gana.
- 11-14 It is estimated that some 1000 of these aircraft
are still in service (or available) including
possibly 100 of the over 600 C-47's given
during World War II to the Soviets.
Aeroflot's explosive growth can also be explained by Government
planning and support:
1) Soviet Government is making a concentrated effort to
replace the rail road by the airline as the main
transportation of passengers. This relieves the
Soviet rail system_ (chronically a weak point in
Soviet-economic and military potential) for its
primary job of freight transportation.
2) Aeroflot practices very low fares; for example the
Moscow - Leningrad run takes 55 minutes by air and
costs 130 Rubels. The same run by train takes
12 hours and costs 150 Rubels.
3) Aeroflot scrapped, in 1959, the two-class domestic
service; all Soviet citizens now fly "standard
economy". In addition, all sorts of discount plans
are in effect to allow the factory worker on vacation
to fly at reduced fare; a 25% reduction for students
travelling to or from their home on vacation, and
various other promotional ideas.
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4) strongly stressed in the first 7 year plan
(1959 - 1965) has been the expansion of feeder
routes into the less-developed areas of central
and Asiatic Russia. To accomplish this, special
emphasis is being placed on development of small,
STOL-type aircraft able to operate from primitive,
unprepared air fields.
In 1962 and 1963, Aeroflot intensified its operations into
the near East and into Africa. Though not successful in
selling aircraft to the new nations, Aeroflot has been
penetrating Africa directly, as well as by means of the
satellite airlines.
Aeroflot is, through the Soviet Government, increasing pressure
on various South American areas in order to get landing rights.
It has been operating a bi-weekly service from Moscow to
Havanna which is being flown with the Turboprop TU-114. The
approximately 7,000 mile flight is done in 13 1/2 hours but
passenger load is reduced from 180 to about 60 passengers.
Aeroflot is also a military weapon; the number of aircraft
assigned to any one area far exceeds the number of aircraft
actually needed. In 1960, a visiting American delegation
noted an almost 3 to 1 surplus of aircraft over those
required for the schedules of that particular area. Even
allowing for special flights and maintenance, it is safe
to conclude that Aeroflot has at least a 50% surplus which is
in effect a reserve air transport fleet for military
operations. In this connection, Soviet military spokes-
men have repeatedly stated that the Soviet Aviation is
capable.of airlifting 100,000 soldiers to any spot in Europe
in the case of military necessity.
Soviet satellite airlines, until recently were captive
customers of the Soviet Aero industry, but recent purchases
of Western aircraft show a new trend which may have very
interesting repercussions in the future.
- LOT (Polish Airlines) operated four CV-240's; recently
re-equipped with three Viscount 800's despite strong
pressure to buy the 11-18 turboprop.
- CSA (Czech National Airlines) purchased one Britannia 310
from BOAC.
- Communist China has recently (July 1963) ordered six Viscounts
Chinese delegations are reported to be negotiating for the
possible purchase of the VC-10. Though these rumors are,
as yet, unconfirmed a marked interest in Western commercial
aircraft is becoming apparent and could signal the opening
of a major new market area, both in China and in Eastern
Europe.
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Aware of increasing competition, as well as for prestige
reasons, the Soviets are making major efforts to develop
commercially-attractive aircraft.
- The Turboprop 11-18 has been "stretched" to allow space
for 14 more passengers (for a total of 125 tourist-class).
Integral wing fuel tanks (wet wings) have increased range
to 5000 miles. The 11-18 seems to be the first truly
commercial aircraft developed in the Soviet Union, but its
operating costs are still such as to make it less attractive
than similar Western aircraft.
- Late September of 1962, the Soviets displayed the giant
11-62 transport. It is probably the biggest jet airliner
currently known, and is being groomed for the Moscow -
New York run; 5000 miles non-stop carrying up to 180
passengers. It resembles the VC-10, with four Kusnetsov
turbo-fan engines aft-mounted, each reported to deliver
23,000 lbs thrust.
- The TU-104 (always famous for high operating costs) should
shortly be coming out as an aft-fan jet. The Tupolev design
team is reported to be cleaning up the whole aircraft and
hopes to have it rolled out in the winter of 1963-64, and
in service by possibly summer 1965.
- In addition, a whole family of short-range jets and prop-
driven aircraft are flowing from Soviet factories to comply
with the goals of the Soviets first seven year plan. They
include the TU-124, a short-haul jet at least two years
ahead of the BAC 111 or the Boeing 727. Reported to be
able to operate from grass runways, it carries 40-60
passengers at cruising speeds of 500-530 mph. The AN-10
and AN-12 series of high-wing turboprops are also entering
service with Aeroflot; some 25 have been identified to date.
Close behind comes the AN-24, in the class of the Fokker
F-27, carrying 30-40 passengers at 290 mph. The AN-14
"Pchelka" (little bee), in low priority development since
1957, now seems to be in accelerated development status.
Powered by two 300 HP piston engines, this super-STOL
aircraft carries 7 passengers or 1,300 lbs payload up to
400 miles. Reported in production both in the USSR and
in China.
- Speculation is increasing about a Soviet supersonic transport.
Airframe and powerplant experience in supersonic flight is
amply available in the USSR; "Bounder" has been flying since
1959. This supersonic monster grosses at over 136 tons and
is capable of Mach 1.5 or slightly more. It is, to date, by
far the largest and heaviest supersonic aircraft ever flown
anywhere. At least two, possibly three test articles are
rumored to exist. Repeated references by Soviet engineers
would tend to confirm the impression that a supersonic
transport will be shown in the near future.
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That Aeroflot and Soviet airline traffic has now reached
major proportions is evident from recent data published by
ICAO in its latest annual report (Annual Report of the
Council to the Assembly for 1962). Though ICAO's sources
are not quoted, they must be fairly official, otherwise
ICAO would not have published them. The figures show
that Aeroflot carried:
- 20% of total passengers carried by all ICAO member
airlines,
- 25% of total cargo/mail ton-miles carried by all
ICAO member airlines.
The detailed ICAO report on Aeroflot growth during the current
seven year plan is worthy of close study:
Development of Soviet Civil Air Transport
All services of Aeroflot 1958-61 (millions)
Years
Passenger- Cargo and Total+ Tonne-
Passengers kilometres mail tonne- kilometres
carried (Passenger- kilometres (Ton-miles)
miles)
(Ton-miles) Iperformed
(
r
1958
8.2
6,400
399
1,040
(3,977)
(273)
(710)
1959
12.2
9,100
439
1,350
(5,655)
(301)
(925)
1960
16.0
12,100
563
1,775
(7,519)
(386)
(1,215)
1961
21.8
16,400
802
2,440
(10,191)
( 549)
(1,670)
_ _Annual_percentage. Increases
_
1958-59
49%
42%
10%
30%
1959-60
31%
33%
28%
31%
1960-61
36%
36%
42%
38%
+ Approximate figures
Equally impressive are the detailed figures of Aeroflot
percentage of the world's total traffic. Data furnished
reflects total ICAO airline performance vs. Aeroflot, but
excludes China, for which accurate data is not available:
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^
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A Comparison of Airline Traffic in 1961
(millions)
Total
operations United USSR United Total 98
(international States Kingdom ICAO
and domestic) States
Passengers carried 59.0 21.8 7.8 111
Passenper-kilometres 64,100 16,400 8,136 117,000
Cargo and mail tonne-
kilometres 1,670 802 198 3,200
Total tonne-
kilometres performed 7,257 2,4401+ 908 13,440
USSR as
percent-
age of
total
ICAO
States
20%
14%
25%
18%
+ Approximate figure
Though Soviet airline operations are not as polished as those
of Westrn nations, Aeroflot is generally doing the job given
it by the Soviet economic planners. The past 30 years have
been a period of "Quantity, not Quality" aircraft and services.
This trend should reverse itself by the late 1960's and Soviet
aircraft will become increasingly competitive while enjoying
the export advantages of a 100% politically-oriented and
directed trading policy. This could give Western aircraft
industries major problems.
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