(SANITIZED)RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE USSR AND POLAND UNTIL 1956(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A005800650002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 19, 1959
• Content Type: FORM

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PART I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE USSR AND
POLAND UNTIL,1956
Chapter I.
The Beginnings of Relations Between the CPS U and the Communist Party of
and old and have caused
r.A
peculiarities are based on historical facts. The facts are both new
Soviet Union and Poland shows several peculiarities. Some of these
(. a---The development of relations between the leading strata of the ?I
of the- Polish people toward iuss3~
In k66 in other satellite/"(for' example,
Czechoslovakia, and Albania).
he Polish leaders, appointed i7 ~ Stalin, to p'oeeex much more
callously aga st their own people; the Polish communist leaders
were among the most "zealous" until 1956 rwere diligent in their
emulation of the Soviet Communist Party and pushed the '"Stalin?Cult"
to its very peak (much like Rakosi did in Hungary).
a., The following are among the factors of the past which led to the
above contentions:
A large part of Poland, including the largest towns of Warsaw,
Lodz and Wilno were under Russian rule for more than one hundred years.
The Poles are quite familiar with the Russian character and vice-versa.
This knowledge, howevera did not result in any rapprochement; on the
contrary it resulted in estrangement, in emphasis the difference
between the two nations, and in mutual condemnation.
groups were united on certain of their goals and many Poles were extremely
active and played significant parts in the creation of the revolutionary
movement in the USSR.
The Polish Freedom Fighters were the enemies of the Czar, just
the Russian..evolutionaries. Aa % for varying reasons both
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Many deported Polish Freedom Fighters and Russianevolutionaries
came together in the penal colonies of Siberia.
n 1895 1915, the Polish 'Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom
q, AI(PUA
of Poland and Lithuania was the "most loyal" m-*'fo the Leninist
Bolshevik group and, at the international congresses of the Communist
Par ~e frequently the only party which supported Lenin's program and
helped him to success.
The Bolshevik-inspired street battles of 1901, 1905, and 1912
were always accompanied by simultaneous battles in Warsaw and Lodz.
Until World War I, Polish and Russian communists worked hand in hand
and the personal and organizational relationships between these two
parties were closer than those between the CPSU and communist parties
of other countries.
After the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in
1918, Polish Communist leaders were active in the highest places of
Bolshevik dictatorship. For example, there was~e1, the
founder of the Chka; there were Urycki, Marchlewski, Feliks Kon, and
others. Rosa Luxemburg was dispatched to Germany in~ to lead the
communist arty there. Many young Poles entered the services of the
Russian Che ka or the Russian military (B ierut, RokossoV!3ki, MalinoVS1
and others).
Thus, around the period of 1918-1921, the Polish communists
wielded an important influence and enjoyed a great deal of confidence,
Ver_ At the beginning it appeared as though strong
communist influences were at work among the Polish people; howeve, it
soon transpired that the Polish people rejected Communisfn abed, in 1921,
the peace treaty between Russia and Poland was signed at Riga finally
quashing the Russian evolutionary hopes for Poland.
In 1926, when Pilsudski was developing a strong anti-Communist
and anti Russian policy in Poland, Stalin criticized the Polish Communist
Party for its blindness; since that time, relations between the Bolsheviks
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and the Polish Communist Party began to cool visibly. These relations
had been warm and friendly under Lenin; finally, in 1936, the Komintern
decided, uprtm Stalin's instigation, to dissolve the Polish Communist
Party (under the pretext of accusing it of being permeated with traitors
and provocators).
The Polish communist leaders, Warszawski, Warski, Ryng and many
others, who had been invited to Moscow, were killed there r
vc.~.-e- `ter
--w& probes 3erh ert they were members of the same group of old-guard
communists (to which Rykov, and Bucharin also belonged) aaa which was
liquidated by Stalin.
Chapter II.
Ne-w-Leaderstrip for the Polish Communists
3 Stalin began to 'prepare a new leadership [for-the Poles],
blindly loyal Polish communists capable of any deed
(even deeds directed against the Polish people). This group included
such people as Wanda Wasilewska; Franciszek Mazur who was the only
surviving member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party;
Berman; Radkiewicz; and others. In 1939, when Stalin annexed Eastern
Poland, all Polish communists were carefully "sifted" and examined and
many of them were deported or murdered. Only a small part3~ the
Bolshevik followers) people blindly loyal to Stalin )#were
recognized as equals and these entitled to stay alive,oere assigned
to the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party to be generally used as denunciators
and propagandists. These were the people who not only did not raise
any objections to the deportation of 1.5 million Poles (their own
countrymen), but actually assisted in these moves.
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In 1941-1942, a change took place. In order to convert the
deported Poles into a Polish army under Russian leadership, Stalin
needed more political agitators of Polish origin. The "Ztriazek
Patriotow Polskich'(ZPP -- Association of Polish Patriots), which
was created in 1942 in Moscow, consisted of the following:
(aa The few remaining Polish communist of the Bolshevik group;
(b~ Former Polish communists ugh were "fished out of" the
resettlement areas of Kazakhstan, Siberia, etch, and who were now
assigned to the First Polish Division in Lenino on the Oka River;
C) Russians of Polish origin who still spoke a little Polish
and who suddenly appeared in leading positions in the new divisions as
"Polish Nationals."
3-: The change in the relationship between Stalin and the Polish
Communists in 1942-1943 thus was based on the fact that he trusted them
only a little; he had only some confidence in the newly-created communists,
that is to say, these people who were left after the liquidation of the
Polish Communist Party and after the 1939-1941 purges.
These people were placed under the leadership of Beria agents
such as Bierut; Berman; Mazur; Radkiewicz. From this first division
sprang the upper strata of the Polish government and Polish Communist
Party in 1944. This strata included such names as Minc, Jedrychowski,
Naszkowski, Nowak, Zambrowski, Modzelewski (died in 1950), Jaroszewicz
and others. But Stalin continued in his distrust of the Polish people
and those Communists who were active in occupied Poland.
4. In 1943 and 1944, as the field of the battle shifted to Poland,
the Moscow-trained Polish Communists created partisan groups which,
from the very beginning, did not work together with other,National
Polish underground groups. These emissaries, who had been sluiced
into Poland by parachute from Russia, collaborated with the following
groups which were then active in Poland:
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AL (Armia Ludowa - people's Army); BCH (Bataliony Chlopskie -
Peasant Battalions), and the GL (Gwardia Ludowa - People's Guard), but
they worked against the AK (Armia Krajowa - Home Army) and the NSZ
(Narodowe Sily Zbrojne - National Armed Forces).
5. The Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (Polish National
Liberation Committee) which was created in Lublin in 1944, consisted
on the one hand, of the elssaries who had returned from Russia,
Beria agents, Russian-trained members of Patriotic Association and
leaders of the First Division, and on the other hand of the leading
communistswho had not been in Russia but had been active in German-
occupied Poland. These latter included such persons as Gomulka,
Spychalski, Albrecht, Zawadzki, Mijal, Loga-Sowinski, Dworakowski,
etc. or persons who were active in labor camps during their confinement
by the Nazis, such as Cyrankiewicz, Izydorczyk, etc. However the
difference between the communist leaders, that is to say the difference
between those who had come from Russia at the behAst of Stalin, and the
Poles themselves who had been recognized by Bierut and had been utilized
for collaboration, remained. Thus, the first group from Russia had
Stalin's confidence. On the other hand group B, although they were
indispensable to the government of Poland, were under constant
surveillance by Russian NKVD agents working in Poland.
There was a thir, group, however, This consisted of Polish communists
who had once been active in the West, for example in Spain. These
included such names of Swierczewski, Walter, Komar, Sur, Konar; or
those who had worked in France and Belgium (Gierek). Even this group
of 'deserving1' Communists did not enjoy Stalin's confidence, although
many of these people had been in the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945.
The Soviet NKVD experts worked with group A and determined which persons
from groups B and C were temporarily indespensable but should, in due
time, be purged.
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6. At first, however, group A had more important work to do
between 1945 and 1947, namely the combating of the National Partizan
groups, the combating of several Home Army groups and the UPA
(Ukrainian Anti Russian) groups. Group A also had to liquidate the
coalition parties such as the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Polish
Peoplets Party) under Mikolajczyk, the PP (Polish Workers Party) under
Popiel, the PPS (Prawica-Rightist Socialist and Center Party) and the
socialist parties such as the WRN (Wolnosc, Rownosc, Niepodleglosc --
Freedom Equality and Sovereignty Party) and WIN, (Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc T
Freedom and Independence Party).
This mission was accomplished by Group A to the grestest
satisfaction of Stalin (in Czechoslovakia for example it was necessary
to create a coup dtetat, whereas in Poland, Bierut accomplished these
missions with much less fuss).
7. Upon completion of this mission the internal purge began. A
part of the socialists went over to the communist (with their leaders --
C
yrankiewicz, Rapacki, Matuszewski). The remainder of the socialist
party was purged (Osobka, Morawski, the first Premier, etc.).
A part of Group B and Group C blindly subordinated itself to
Group A. These defectors including Albrecht, Zawadzki, Mijal,
Dworakowski, Such others as Gomulka, Spychalski, Loga Sowinski,
Kliszko, Bienkowski (from Group B), Rola Zymierski etc., were excluded
from the party. Some from Group C, such as General Swierczewski,
disappeared forever. Komar was arrested later.
In any case, in 1948, Group A held the entire balance of power
in its hands and began the execution of the second mission.
8. Uncovering of a Tito Plot and Show Trials
This mission was not accomplished by Bierut quite as rapidly as for
example in Hungary (Rajkq trial); in Czechoslovakia (Slansky - trial);
in Bulgaria (Koslow - trial); and in Rumania (Anna Pauker - trial).
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For unknown reasons there were no such show trials in Poland, although
there were executions and trials of military leaders such as Kirchmayer,
Tatar, Rzepecki, Lechowicz, Jarosiewicz, etc., and show trials directed
at bishops, accompanied by imprisonment of generals and communists such
as Komar, Kuropieski and others.
Some people attributed this fact to the tenacity of Gomulka and
Spychalski but this does not appear to be credible. It is more likely
that the reason lies in "long-lasting preparations"; preparations were
so long that in the meantime Stalin died and the party line changed.
Nevertheless, through these preparatory measures, Bierut presented
"proof that the Polish military is unworthdof trust" and Rokossowski
took over the military leadership. The prewar officers and the officers
of the Home Army were considered unreliable from the very beginning.
Now, after the arrests of Spychalski and Rola Zymierski, Bierut and
Stalin wanted to prove that the communist generals of the underground
movement in Poland between 1939 and 1915 were also not trustworthy.
Thus, according to Bierut, the necessity "arose" of obtaining a
supreme commander from the USSR. Rokossowski was given the broadest
powers. He became Minister of Defense, Deputy Premier, and Member of
the Politbureau, and became the second man following Bierut (some
claimed he was number one). In no other satellite (as far as source
knows) did an analogous situation exist, namely that a Russian stood
at the head of the military forces and of the state. This unusual
step had its special reasons. They were:
a. Distrust of Polish generals. No single general (even a
communist) could be found whom Stalin trusted completely.
b. Distrust of the Polish military and of the Polish people
who, in 1939-1945, were constantly active in partizan warfare and in
underground movements. The combination of Polish will-to-fight, training
in street fighting and anti Russian feeling was considered by Stalin to
be particularly dangerous and required special precautions.
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Simultaneously, the stragetic significance of Poland, as a result
of war tensions (Berlin and Korea) was rising and Stalin ordered the
creation of a war industry in Poland. This gave him more reason to
want to maintain strict supervision over everything and so Rokossowski
was sent to Poland.
Chapter III.
9. Under Rokossowski the following developments took place:
The military was Russified; the amount of equipment was
increased; assignments for military purposes were increased; the
entire economy was militarized; the living standard declined, and
the income and standing of the military rose; police power increased.
In the other satellites. similar steps were taken but Bierut was
particularly zealous. Polish efforts were greater than those of the
other satellites.
The Polish communist leadership was particularly obedient and
extra zealous; they bent every effort to increase Stalin's confidence
in them, to dispel the last shadows of doubt; pro Russian propaganda
in Poland was particularly abundant the Stalin Cult was being
untiringly propagated. In the "family of Stalin students," Bierut
-s
and Rakosi were the "Exemplary Pupils." Bieru,propaganda did not
shy away from claiming that the Warsaw uprising was an act of treason;
that the members of the Home Army were enemies of the people or were
mislead by the enemies of the people; that the deportation of from
one to 2 million Poles Siberia between 1939 and 1911 was justified;
that the annexation of Eastern Poland in 1939 was actually an act of
benevolence; or that Lwow, Wilno, and other cities were of long-standing
Russian or Ukrainian origin, etc.
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This type of propaganda tended to desecrate everything dear to
the Poles, including Polish traditions, Polish pride and willingness
to make sacrifices, and Polish heroism during the occupation (unlike
propaganda in Czechoslovakia, for example, where the number of Nazi
victims and battles with the Nazis was much smaller in comparison to
Poland). Bierut sent triumphant reports on the development of the
"Society of Polish-Soviet Friendship" (official statistics quoted
the society's membership in 1954 at 7,000,000 members); he reported
triumphantly on the "love" and "gratitude" of the Poles to Russia
and to Stalin; he sent glowing reports about the Stachanovite movement
in Poland; etc.
Somehow this must have had an influence on Stalin, since he
occasionally praised Bierut. Later he donated the Palace of Science
and Culture in Warsaw; at this time the Poles played the leading role
among the satellites.
Chapter IV.
Relationships Between Government Representatives
At official meetings of ministries the highest degree of
friendliness was observed. Polish delegations in Moscow (for
example, the delegation on science and technical cooperation) were
treated cordially, enjoyed banquets, plenty of drinks, joy-rides
and visits to the theater, etc.
One delegation of Polish party officials from the industrial
sector of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, who
were in the middle rank (not in the highest positions but so-called
Central Committee instructors) who visited he USSR in 1952, were
received in Luxury and toured the country for a period of Lt weeks.
Upon departure, each received a present plus 1,OQO rubles for
personml purchases. In Poland, the Russians were treated with
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excessive cordiality during official encounters. Russian experts
were received by Bierut personally and one word from the Russian
expert was sufficient to cause a dismissal of a high ranking Polish
official.
During the period from 1945 to March 1956 it was virtually
impossible, for example, to oppose the views of a soviet expert
during a conference or meeting. The chairman of such a conference
was always briefed beforehand on the opinion the expert would
express and in his resume at the end of the conference would always
confirm the views expressed by the rviet experts, taking the
opportunity to express his thanks to them; not only his personal
thanks but he would also thank them as representatives of the
government of the USSR or the CPSU. In most cases, these experts
were members of the CPSU and personally accepted the thanks in the
name of the party and government. Source can recall no single case
in which a soviet expert was not a party member. Only among the
workers who built the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw was
a small part (particularly good welders and machinists eat,.) not
party members or members of the Komsomol.
Every conference or meeting in which Soviet delegates participated
was used for propaganda purposes to stress the authority and
ttunselfishness" of the Soviet Union and to emphasize that the Soviets
only had the interests of Poland at heart and that all their services
were rendered only in a spirit of friendliness and fraternity.
Any kind of criticism or even differences of opinion were
undesirable and not permitted; even the best Polish engineers and
the highest ranking department directors who had expressed any kind
of criticism were, for the most part, not promoted to higher positions
and sometimes demoted to lower positions. In any case, they were
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withdrawn from future collaboration with soviet experts. On the
other hand the 'Soviet delegates had strict orders to exercise the
greatest degree of courtesy and their behavior was to be exemplary.
The latter was not always the case and there were certain incidents
of drunkeiYess.
The entire period from 1945 to 1956 was dubbed in Poland as
of
the period the the three ""P" namely Przyklad - Przyjazn - Pomoc
(example - friendship - assistance) of the Soviet Union primarily
because this theme was repeated time and time again in every Bierut
speech and in every speech by Minc and Jedrychowski, as well as other
leading personalities, and in all lead editorials published in the
QMN
With such attitudes %p directives it was absolutely impossible,
in the course of any negotiations or trade agreements between Poland
and the Soviet Union, to make any kind of justified demands, for
example in relation to price or transit conditions etc., since both
sides constantly emphasized that they were dealing in relations of
a new kind in which there was no question of one side having an
advantage over the other. After all, the Soviet Union was rendering
the Polish people the maximum amount of ttfraternal'l assistance,
without thinking of an'advantage for herself. Simultaneously,
Polish propaganda concentrated on praising the achievements of the
USSR in all fields; this included fields of culture, science,
history, technology, industry, military might etc., and everything
which originated from the Soviet Union was represented as being
exemplary and worthy of emulation, with the political and social
achievements naturally standing at the peak.
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Chapter V.
Beginning of Criticism Following Stalin's Death
However, this propaganda was struck a serious blow from the
very side from which the Polish party leadership had not expected
it, namely from the Soviet Union herself in 1953 and 1954.
In the Soviet Union, the death of Stalin was followed first
by a quiet and later by a louder criticism of various economic and
cultural phenomena from the period of his reign. After the official
announcement of Beria's execution at the end of 1953 there was also
partial criticism of the methods used by the secret police. These
new stands adopted by the new Soviet leadership were relayed to the
Poles by the Soviet experts in Poland with some delay and found
expression in the economic resolutions of the Second Polish Communist
Party Congress in the spring of 1954. However, no deterioration of
relationships between both parties, between both governments, was
felt (with a few minor exceptions) and the existing relationship
resting in every respect on blind obedience and recognition of
Soviet authority in all respects, with demonstrative "gratitude"
and "admiration't on the part of the Polish Communist Party and
government, remained.
The Stalin line on absolute supremacy of heavy industry was
now (1954). replaced by the Malenkow line of the necessity for
simultaneous expansion of consumer goods industries.
The Stalin line revolving around gigantic irrigation systems
(so-called Stalin's Structures of Communism) was replaced by the
Khrushchev line of rendering new land arable. This new line
influenced the Poles (where there are no steppes and unoccupied
land) to the extent that, in general, the line of "giantania'f
was abandoned.
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In place of the monumental architecture of Stalin, including
magnanimous skyscrapers, Khrushchev stated the necessity for a
simple, frugal building style. This style was adopted in Poland
with particular interest because leading Polish architects had
always hesitated to acquiesceto the idea of the Bierut show style
and tongue-in-cheek had protested against the "Byzantine" foreign
element in Polish postwar construction. This criticism of
architecture led to the downfall of some "party architects" who
were personally favored
Bierut in 1955 and 1956 and since
Bierut was evincing a strong personal interest in all architectural
problems, the defeat of his architects was more or less a partial
defeat of the party line. Even the Palace of Culture, which Bierut
praised so often as "Stalints gift and the most visible symbol of
Soviet-Polish friendship," became more and more frequently the
theme of Polish satire (naturally -- as long as Bierut was
alive -- only in hidden form).
A generally sobering influence became apparent throughout the
economy. The sensational results of professor Lysenko (new plants)
and Lepienskaja (who claimed to be able to create artificial living
cells) were disproved. However, since these research results had
previously been lauded by the propaganda machine as a victory of
Marxist science over "capitalist" science their disproval meant a
political defeat. This had its Affect on personnel policies. Bierut
began to place individual specialists in higher positions; specialists
who were not deserving communists and possibly not sons of Workers
or peasants (which had up to now been the primary prerequisite for
occupying a leading position). Actually, three vice-ministrs were
appointed who were not even party members. Propaganda in favor o
"the wonder plants of Mitshurin and Lysenko" was replaced by propaganda
for Khrushchev's corn cultivation.
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The changes in literature were more significant. Here the
period of the so-called "thaw" began. In 1954, and still more so in
1955, Polish literature was filled with critical articles attacking
the cultural policy of the party. The significance of this criticism
soon burst the bounds of the tecultural framework" and, in 1955-1956,
grew to a criticism of the entire propaganda apparatus of the party.
In addition, almost all Polish periodicals are not purely literary
papers but are cultural-social-political papers, so that the criticism
began to encompass the field of internal policy and the economy. The
Adolf Berman who was criticized because of his cultural policies was
simultaneously (with Bierut, Mazur, Radkiewicz) the person responsible
for the secret police; consequently the criticism of these persons
took on special significance.
Chapter VI.
Relationships Between Khrushchev and the Polish Communist Party Until
the 20th Congress of the CPSU
As long as Bierut was alive, he maintained the relationship
between Poland and the Soviet Union on the basis of complete subservience
and obedience. Nevertheless, he was forced to permit a certain amount of
criticism of Polish conditions since even in the Soviet Union a wave of
criticism was permitted and actually encouraged by Khrushchev (within
certain limits prescribed by him).
In this period, a certain amount of criticism was fashionable in
all Satallites and the actual party line was "criticize the old party
line within certain limits"; thus, as an exemplary satellite leader,
Bierut also had to fill a certain "quota" of criticism in his country.
However, he accomplished this with exceptional care and fear, since
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he sensed the special situation in Poland which was dangerous for him.
First, he had lost his benefactor with Stalin's death and Khrushchev
treated him without special preference. During the Stalin era, he was
praised as the first among the satellites of Europe; at congresses,
conferences, etc., he sat in the first row among the invited guests.
Second, the downfall of Beria was a personal blow for Bierut, who
had served under Beria for years and who understood him very well
(on the other hand, he did not, for example, understand Mikojan who
was not treated very highly by Stalin). Khrushchev treated Bierut
in the same manner as all the other satellite leaders but without any
special sympathy, which after all, he could not have for a Beria man.
This status of akairs made itself felt more severely after'the
"Swiatlot' case. During the Stalin era, this case might have cost
Bierut his job, if not more. Stalin would have held him responsible
for the whole situation, for the fact that Swiatlo had left Poland at
all; Stalin and Beria would have punished Bierut for carelessness and
inability to prevent such a "mistake."
For Khrushchev, on the other hand, the involvement of Bierut, and
the exposure of the Beria system of Stalin's secret police, did not
come as an altogether unwelcome episode; nevertheless, thereafter he
treated Bierut in a more detached way and Czechoslovakia began to
emerge more and more as the first among the Satellites. Bierut lost
prestige in his personal position and was extremely zealous in
attempting to win the favor of the new Kremlin leadership once more
through obedience and srvility. Nevertheless, Khrushchev had no
reason to depose Bierut, first because he himself was having internal
difficulties with the Soviet party leadership and secondly, he could
hardly have found more willing tools than Rokossowski and Bierut in
attempting to counter any anti Russian movement in Poland, possibly
even with force.
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Qb G 1II \1
The unexplained death of Bierut after Khrushchev's revAlations
during the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 (Bierut died
at the beginning of March 1956 in Moscow) brought a solution to the
"Bierut question." Simultaneously, this point of history signifies
the beginning of a change in the relationship between the two parties
and the two governments.
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CON
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Part II. -- RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES FOLLOWING THE 20TH CONGRESS
Chapter VII.
Relationship Between-the CPSU and the Natolin Group
Following Bierut's death, Edward Ochab was elected First Secretary
of the Polish Communist Party with Khrushchev's approval. Ochab was a
Polish communist about whom it was known that he had no dictatorial
intentions and that he was less connected with the terror and secret
police activities of the past years than the other members of the Polit-
buro. He belonged to the old guard Polish Communists and was not an actual
NKVD agent such as Bierut had been. He was affable, had no special ene-
mies, and was relatively popular with party members. He was no "strong
man" and was considered obedient and moderate. His election went off
without any special difficulties and Khrushchev instructed his ambassador
to Poland, Ponomarenko, to look around for a successor to Ochab for a later
date. Ponomarenko and Rokossowski did this in a fairly off-handed manner
and actually in an overtly conspicuous manner. Ponomarenko invited vari-
ous Polish communists to visit him at his villa at Natolin near Warsaw and
there negotiated with them regarding future power positions,etc.
A rare and particular relationship began to develop between the com-
munist party of Poland and.the CPSU. The Natolin group gained in trust
and confidence and the center group (as the group with Ochab as its head
was known) began to be less important and the relationship toward this group
began to cool. This division of groups came to pass because Ponomarenko
favored the Natolin group and considered it suitable for future leadership
assignments rather than the more conservative center group which, at this
point, still was at the helm. This latter group felt itself endangered
and began to prepare for a power struggle; during this phase, Cyrankiewicz
and Zambrowski were more the actual strategists than Ochab himself.
- 17 -
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Ponomarenko and Rokossowski considered it a certainty that during
the next elections of the Politburo the group proposed by the Soviet
leadership and the candidates supported by it would be elected, since
this had always been the case. When, during the course of the plenary
session, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke in behalf of a
certain candidate in the name of the presidium of the CPSU, this suf
ficed to accomplish the election of the candidate. Normally, everything
was agreed upon prior to the elections. The Natolin group made no great
secrets about the fact that at the next plenary session new Politburo
members would have to be elected and that Minc, Berman, Radkiewicz, and
Zambrowski were to be removed in favor of Klosiewicz, Witaszewski, Lapot
and Dworakowski. On the other hand, it was less well known that the rul-
ing group intended to defend itself. Both groups knew precisely that Minc,
Berman and Radkiewicz (following Khrushchev's revelations and discussion
of his speech in April by all parties) were bound to be expelled from the
Politburo.
Thus the situation was such that the "conspirators" who wanted to
usurp power for themselves were acting fairly overtly, whereas the "legal"
ruling group kept their defense measures secret.
It was difficult to see in what manner the center group could prevail
against the will of the Soviets. After all, it was known that of seven
Politburo members, three were out-and-out Natolin group members (Rokossow-
ski, Nowak, and Zawadzki, the latter being scheduled for first secretary
in case the Natolin group was victorious) and that 25% of the members of
the Central Committee were already actively working for the election of
the Natolin group, whereas the remainder were indifferent and most certainly
did not intend to oppose the directives from Moscow. As far as party of-
ficials throughout the land were concerned, they were predominately in favor
of the Natolin group.
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_ C0NUMI G TI AL
Thus it was clear that the balance of power had shifted against the
center (Ochab and Cyrankiewicz) and in favor of the Natolin group, (not
even taking into account the fact that military power was in Rokossowski's
hands); this balance of power would appear this way as long as the analysis
of it was kept within the conventional framework, that is to say as long as
"obedience and servility" to the Soviet party was concerned.
However, the situation was different when this framework of blind
servility was breached, if the Polish party were to travel an independent
road.* In order to be able to maintain his leading position, Cyrankiewicz
dared to oppose the will of the Soviet party. Cyrankiewicz was possibly
known as the most daring "player" at the party head. Even Zambrowski, a
very experienced party official who knew that a victory for the Natolin
group would spell the end of his career or possibly worse (the Natolin
group had marked him as the next guilty one after Berman), dared to take
this 'step and they together convinced Ochab (after some hesitation on
Ochab's part) to take up the battle against the Natolin group despite the
fact that the Natoliners were supported by the Soviets.
The center party adherents did not at first turn to the public with
their proposition; they knew very well that if they were to confront the
Polish people with an anti-Russian solution then the resulting anti-Russian
Q
wave would also sweep away the communists and Zambrowski and Cyrankiewicz
in first place. However, they slacked off on censorship and this was suf-
ficient to permit the development of criticism, not only of the Polish but
F/
also of ussian party in the press. They sought allies among the 90 or so
still uncommitted members of the Central Committee. The justifications they
used to convince some of these members who were elected in 1954 vary in na-
ture; sometimes they were even controversial.
19
CCNMLTbal
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Chapter VIII.
Positions Taken by Various Groups in the Central Committee of the Polish
Communist Party Toward Khrushchev
1. A part of the membership of the Central Committee was of the opinion
that the methods used by Khrushchev (brutal disclosures) had caused irrepar-
able damage to the prestige of world Communism and did not want to support
him in this venture. They also criticized him for not having prepared the
Communist Party leaders throughout the world for this move in any way so
that these leaders were completely taken by surprise.' This part of the cen-
tral committee membership was against Khrushchev, not because they did not
believe in Communism or had any doubt in respect to Stalin's atrocities, but
because the methods Khrushchev used appeared clumsy and "bear-like" and they
believed that in their opinion a man using such unthought-out methods would
not prevail for long.
They justified this "unwise" method by claiming that he permitted him-
Awn
self to be carrie y his hatred for Beria and by long years of fear of Sta-
G
lin, which had now culminated in shene hatred and in the throegs of which he
had gone toDfar; they felt that this mistake would come home to roost to
Khrushchev.
2. Another part of the membership however continued in their convic-
tion of Stalin's "genius" and looked upon Khrushchev's steps not only as
"unthought-out" tactics but more as a criminal action; this part of the mem-
bership took a stand against people sponsored by Khrushchev.
Thus, both of these groups were opposed to the Natolin group pri-
marily because both were against Khrushchev in varying degrees of severity.
They did not oppose the Natolin group because perhaps the Soviet policy of
the group did not appeal to them (this group was Just as friendly toward the
Soviets), but because they did not as yet believe in Khrushchev's complete
success.
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kn)
C' IjBt~
3. There was another group, which was not opposed to Khrushchev at
all, was actually favorabl inclined toward him but was nevertheless defi-
nitely oriented against the Natolin group. The Natolin leaders (Nowak,
Mijal, Witaszewski, Klosiewicz and others) who were so strongly pushed to
the front and supported by Ponomarenko and Rokossowski, had a very bad
reputation regarding their capabilities and wisdom. They were considered
malicious and inflexible and void of any capability and intelligence re-
quired to lead a country. This third group was not so much opposed to the
program of the Natolin group as to the persons which headed it.
4. Another faction of the Central Committee felt personally endangered
by the Natolin group, since the Natolin people were known to favor a police
and dictatorship system (strict leadership, terrorist tactics and secret
police); there were even some members of the Central Committee who had al-
ready had difficulties with the secret police and feared further retribu-
tions. These were primarily the so-called "Dabrowszczaki" who had fought
in Spain; Communists who, during the war, had spent time in prisoner-of-war
camps in Germany and who were already suspected by the secret police because
they had survived imprisonment at all. There were also individual cases in
which harassing tactics were employed against persons (for example against
Albrecht, whose wife was arrested, etc.).
5. Still another group which felt itself endangered or threatened
were the Jewish members of the Central Committee. The Natoliners, as well
as Rokossowski and Ponomarenko did not bother to hide their anti-Semitic
stand and one of the main planks of the Natolin platform was the purging of
Jews from the party apparatus and from higher positions of the administration.
One such purge in the military had just been completed by Rokossowski and his
deputy Witaszewski after two years of preparatory work. In their platform,
the Natolin group was able to refer to various anti-Semitic expressions used
by Khrushchev.
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6. There was also a group which at that time was actually opposed to
the entire leadership of the CPSU. These old communisttrecalled that in 1936
not only Stalin but the Komintern dominated by him (Kuusinen, Togliatti and
a total of seven party secretaries and Communist leaders in various coun-
tries) had dissolved the Polish Communist Party and that Stalin had caused
the liquidation and death of Polish party leaders. They said among them-
selves that they would never permit the development of a situation again in
which they would be forced to spy on their own party leadership and their own
party. They emphasize that Khrushchev, in reviewing the various atrocities
committed by Stalin, never once mentioned the dissolution of the Polish Com-
munist Party and the murder of its leaders and that he himself was the most
dangerous enemy of the old Polish communists in 1939 and 1941.
These feelings receded after several months but at this time, dur-
the second half of 1956, they were discernible close to the surface in many
an
old communist group (although not overtly).
7. Still another group really believed naively that Khrushchev's new
policy would mean a greater degree of independence for the Communist Parties
in the satellites and that he was sincere with his slogans of "collective
leadership" and "An end to the cult of the personality." As an example, they
cited his new line toward Yugoslavia and they were of the opinion that he
would not mix into personnel problems of the Politburo of the Polish Commu-
nist Party too dictatorially but would permit the existence of an elected
loyal leadership group in the party. Those members of the Central Committee
who were of this opinion were not opposed to him but were for him; neverthe-
less they did not feel any compelling urge to vote for the unpopular Natolin
group -- they were much more in favor of the Ochab-Cyrankiewicz group, being
convinced that this leadership would be loyal and could cooperate with the
CPSU and with Khrushchev loyally and respectfully and much more effectively
than the Natolin group, which was bound to meet with a considerably amount of
resistance (even if only passive) among the Polish people.
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This then was the way in which it was possible for the Central
Committee, elected under Bierut (in 1954) and completely obedient to the
Soviets, to defend a point of view during the Seventh and Eighth Plenum
sessions, which was diametrically opposed to the view of the First Sec-
retary of the CPSU; the Polish Central Committee did not bow before
Khrushchev's orders or even his threats. This unprecedented procedure
in the history of the CPSU can be compared with the various party vacil-
lations and minor or major internal revolts in the history of the CPSU.
Previously, such actual or imagined disputes were immediately followed by
the "punishment" and complete sublimation; when Tito opposed, a break
ensued and he was condemned throughout international Communism; the Hun-
garian revolt (which took place shortly after the Eighth Plenum session
of the Polish Communist Party) was drowned in blood; only here in this
case, in Poland, did Khrushchev and the.CPSU have to suffer an undeniable
A
defect without following it with any immediate punishment for the oppo-
This opposition was already evident at the time of the Seventh
Plenum session (July 1956) and led to the unprecedented case in which
Romans Granas, alternate member of the Central Committee, pointed out to
Khrushchev, who was present during a party session, in reply to Khrushchev's
personal proposals calling for a renewal of the Polish leadership, that this
kind of interference on the part of Khrushchev stood in contradiction of
"Leninist principles" and represented an unpermissible restriction of the
sovereignty of the Polish Communist Party. Even this move was not followed
by any punishment. Although Romans Granas became the object of many subse-
quent attacks and was dropped from her position as chief of the party school
in 1957, she was appointed editor-in-chief of the weekly Polityka which is
the economic-political organ of the Communist Party, in 1958.
01211 E. ~?T1 I
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Chapter IX.
The Period of Disobedience
All of the above are signs of a temporary change in the mutual rela-
tionship between both parties, that is to say between the CPSU and the
Communist Party of Poland. The period during which these changes took
place extends from March 1956 through October 1956.
The following are some of the indicators of this period:
1. Following the death of Bierut, and in the wake of the revelations
made by Khrushchev, which were followed in all countries by the feelable
weakening of Communist Party authority, the Polish Communist Party faced
great internal difficulties. The party prepared to fight against these
W40
difficulties and needed help. However, help from the CPSU i a problem
, `
WO
the CPSU had its own difficulties; at that time, it A not clear whether
wM
Khrushchev willing to help former Stalinists and present-day "moderate"
cent ralist.~, In other countries, the i inent downfall of such Stalinists
ti
as Ulbricht, Rakosi and Novotny was being discussed. The Polish leaders
did not know at that time that Khrushchev would in fact support such Sta-
linists as Novotny and Ulbricht. They sought assistance from other directions,
namely from China and generally, because of the gravity of the situation,
decided to pursue their own policy in internal affairs. This policy, how-
ever, required at least token restitution of civil liberties, the release
of political prisoners, and a minimum of freedom for the press and freedom
of speech. Despite efforts on the part of the Communist leadership to sup-
press them, these small freedoms immediately brought all of the anti-Russian
feelings of the Polish people to light, even though they made themselves
known in a partially concealed manner.
The Russians, particularly Ponomarenko and Rokossowski, were taken by
surprise. Without much thought, they made the Polish Communist Leadership
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(Secretary Ochab) responsible for the anti-Russian expressions and began
to look around for other people. Once again they did not hesitate very
long but looked for their people among the highest party functionaries,
among those who promised blind obedience and assured the Russians that they
would find the means and methods (terrorism, secret police, low standard
of living, etc.) by which they would be able to assure this kind of blind
obedience throughout the country. These people were (and this is no ac-
cident but a logical deduction) the most malicious, inflexible and primi-
tive among the party leaders and sought their own support among party of-
ficials throughout the landIwho were hated by the people but who never-
theless retained the power in the cities and in the villages. Thus, a type
of double relationship began between the CPSU and the Polish Communist
Party. The former relationships remained in effect, that is to say the
demonstrative cordiality, the blind obedience toward the First Secretary
of the CPSU, these things remained but only partially within the Polish
Communist Party among a group selected by the Russians from among the Nato-
lin followers. There was a definite cooling off and an actual feeling of
mistrust toward the legal party leadership of the Polish Communist Party.
This was accompanied by a mood of disdain, during which the CPSU frequently
voiced the opinion that "these people (Ochab and his Centralists) would not
remain at the helm too long anyway."
The relationship between members of the government and members of dele-
gations also underwent a cooling off. By and large, the government and the
highest civil servants were considered by the population to be in favor of
Ochab-Cyrankiewicz and not in favor of the Natolin group. In addition,
Khrushchev's antip /` civil servants, managers, etc., even in the
Soviet Union, became, visible at this time (in 1956). The managerial class
were considered followers of Malenkov. Thus the relationships between gov-
ernment delegations etc. became cooler, more official, and without additional
courtesy being demonstrated. Also, Polish engineers and managers discarded
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~~~ I?'i,,'i~ ` icy !;\
the "Toga of Wonderment" which they had thus far audibly and visibly
0
wfrn in discussions with Russian experts as a "duty" and began to speak
openly -- frequently with unconcealed glee -- of the mistakes of the
Soviet Economy; Soviet experts began to feel a little worse. Negotia-
tions on trade agreements were handled by both sides more officially and
on a somewhat harder basis.
However, these changes, that is to say the cooling-off of relation-
ships between the representatives of both governments, between the CPSU
and the "official" part of the Polish Communist Party, and the strong
identification of the USSR with another part of the party, the Natolin
group -- these three phenomena became known only by fragments to the Po-
lish people and in the meantime events in Poland took another course than
the one visualized by the Centralists, the Russians or even by the Natolin
group. The desire for freedom on the part of the Polish people, which came
to the fore during the Pozna rebellion, showed that all party groups were
hated and particularly the following factions:
Rokossowski, who ordered his troops march into PoznaA;
Deputy Premier Lapot, who was directly responsible for the state of
affairs at the Cegielski factory (Lapot was a leading Natolin group member);
Cyrankiewicz, who came to Poznapto suppress the rebellion.
During the attack by the demonstrators on the building of the secret
police, it transpired that the secret police chief had waited for hours for
directives from Warsaw on how he was to handle the situation. He waited
without results. Following the Poznan rebellion, the Poznan office of the
secret police decided to disband; this was the beginning of the subsequent
disbanding of secret police offices over the following months. They were not
so much completely disbanded as they were integrated with the people's militia
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and the organs of the Ministry of the Interior. The rebellion also
compromised the party in general and documented the hatred of the Polish
workers for the various party officials.
Both the Natolin group, as well as the Centralists, learned a common
lesson from the uprising, namely that all party leaders are much too hated
to permit any kind of old name to be put before the Polish people and both
groups cast about fir a Communist who was pppular with the people. lft~L
groups found only one name, that of Gomulka, who enjoyed a great deal of
sympathy in worker circles, not because of his Communism but because he
had spent 7 years as a prisoner of Beriag's and Bierut's secret police.
Chapter X.
The Nadir of the Relationship Between the CPSU and the Polish Communist
Party
Characteristically, during the Eighth Plenum session of October 1956,
Goomulka was unanimously elected to the Central Committee, even with the
support of the Natolin group. Mijal praised him in a speech (Mijal was a
leader of the Natolin group, one of the worst offenders under Bierut who,
in 1948, had spoken most vociferously against Gommulka).
Both groups were desirous of carrying on their own policies under the
name of Golmulka. He, on the other hand, had the following choices:
He could follow either the Natolin policy of blind obedience to
the CPSU and clear contradiction to the feelings, desires, and expressions
of the Polish people; or
He could follow the centralist policy, acquiescing to the will of
the Polish people, in effect being in contradiction to the CPSU and to
Khrushchev.
Gomulka chose the latter course. The Natolin group was defeated, Rokos-
sowski was removed from the Politburo and there was a dramatic conversation
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with Khrushchev in Warsaw. The military power-grab, prepared by Rokos-
sowski, was opposed by the centralists through their preparation of the
Corps of Internal Security, commanded by General Komar, and by mobilizing
the workers of Warsaw. At that time, Khrushchev shied away from a bloody
battle and returned to Moscow with the matter not settled.
However, the affair had not been completely clarified as yet. Many
threatening situations hung in the air. Gomulka was not certain of Khrush-
chev's immediate moves and Rokossovski was still dangerous. In order to
strengthen his own position vis-a-vis the USSR, Gomulka had to rely on the
Polish people, had to make concessions to the people which at times went
"too far" (from the Communist point of view) and whose future negation
would certainly prove very difficult; however, he had no other way out,
he had to count on the will of the people.
Many promises were made to the people but only some of them were ful-
filled. The following is the status of some of the items promised:
1.
Dismissal of Russian experts -- only 70% accomplished;
2.
Dismissal and punishment of Rokossowski -- only dismissed;
3.
Punishment of Berman, Rokossowski and others -- only very
inadequate;
4.
Payment of various wage claims -- very quickly halted;
5.
Disbanding of collectives -- implemented;
6.
Religious freedom -- for the most part carried out;
7.
Freedom of the press -- only at the onset, later called off;
8.
New type of economy -- only very superficially;
9.
Development of worker councils -- permitted, but their further
development somewhat more hampered than supported;
10. Complete sovereignty -- not implemented;
11. Depriving t the party dictatorship of its power -- not im-
plemented, although some of the hated party officials were swept aside in
the first weeks. Gomulka continued to support the supremacy of the party;
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12. Removal of secret police -- formally, but actually not com-
pletely;
13. Free parliamentary elections -- some degree of freedom at-
tained.
Although this list could be expanded further, this is another topic.
In any case the relationship between the CPSU and the Polish Communist Party
had reached its lowest point in October 1956 and anti-Russian feelings
found many expressions among the population. The period of this overt
two parties was only very short. Gomulka did everything
within his power to heal the break without provoking the Polish people or
disillusioning them completely right at the start. He was aided in this by
the Hungarian revolution. First of all, Khrushchev was so absorbed in the
Hungarian revolution that he was unable to worsen the relationship between
the USSR and Poland at that time. Secondly, he was having internal difficul-
ties with the other leaders of the CPSU, who were attributing the Hungarian
revolt to his disclosures. Thirdly, this was a warning for Poland that overt
resistance against Russia could only lead to bloodshed and a clear indication
that an agreement with the CPSU would have to be accomplished, a factor which
was also one of Gomulka's wishes from the very beginning.
The Polish people began to return to the status of maintaining silence
in Soviet affairs and started once more to "thin realistically." Although
at first the workers were warning Gomulka not to go to Moscow, they wel-
comed him enthusiastically upon his return in November 1956; he brought
results back with him.
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~1~~4J t13iil1.^JV Y tiff
Chapter XI.
Reconstruction of Relationships By Gomulka
Beginning in November 1956, a new period in the relationships between
the two parties and governments ensued and lasted until about October 1957.
.This period did not include any blind obedience, or blind servility; dur-
ing this period discussions were apparently conducted on the basis of equal-
ity but drawn out by the Russians, nothing was accomplished which could be
at all postponed. In relationships between representatives of either gov-
ernment, negotiations were conducted on a very official and formal level,
full of distrust and with commercial hardness. The problem of behavior
toward Polish delegations was accurately assessed during this period and
the instructions read that they were to be treated like delegations from
capitalist countries but without attempts to impress them with propaganda,
etc. Polish delegations were to be treated coolly and correctly and were
not to get much accomplished. Instructions included warnings to stick to
the point at hand, not to engage in private conversations, for individuals
to be very careful and restrained, to elicit information but to tell nothing
and also to stay away from criticism.
In February 1957, during a two week trip to the Soviet Union as a mem-
ber of the Polish delegation, the source of this report was able to observe
the following:
The decorum of the Russians was very official, cool, but courteous.
The anticipated celebrations in connection with the Tenth Anniversary of Rus-
sian and Polish Scientific-Technical Collaboration were not held. They were
not canceled but they were postponed until the summer session. The farewell
banquet was shorter than usual. The Russians had been instructed not to
drink very much and also not to encourage drinking. The banquet itself was
held in a stiff and boring atmosphere with a minimum of toasts, which were
very polite but not warm. Private conversations were rare but, as an excep-
tion,did take place between people who knew each other from previous occasions.
17 1
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Anatol Siergiejevicf Ladynski, director of
a section of the Gos-stroj, who had been a construction expert with the
Polish government between 1954 and 1956
rest in higher official circles in connection with Khrushchev's decentrali-
it was clear that Khrushchev was
unpopular in Moscow but had numerous supporters in the provinces. Ladyn-
25X1
ski said, among others: "In Poland one may at least be unemployed; here
in Russia, when one loses one's position one is transferred to the distant
provinces within 2 weeks -- this is probably the object of Khrushchev's re-
forms." 25X1
In relation to the changes in Poland, Ladynski felt
that the disbanding of the collectives was a mistake which will come home
to roost. On the other hand, he believed that a little "private initiative"
could be quite useful and that the State would be able to retain control so
that no risk would arise from this kind of initiative for the Communist econ-
omy. The partial re-establishment of artisans and the private construction
of one-family houses in Poland was considered by Ladynski as being worthy 25X1
of imitation.
Rokossowski was a good general
but a hopeless statesman who does not know his way around in Polish psychology
and who has pushed the "wrong people" to the top. On the subject of Poland,
Ladynski felt the Poles were industrious, unpredictable, and difficult to
lead. Subject was convinced that the relationship between both governments
and parties would soon be completely mended, that Polish demands of sover=
eignty would subside and that the Russians would show a greater measure of
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Cr\ , rail ~`'L~\t
understanding. He was convinced that the Poles would soon return to a
period of obedience and,servility.
In general the attitude was one of a little bit of recognition, a
little bit of envy and much criticism and compassion, particularly for
the period of future Polish development. 25X1
Regarding conditions in the Soviet Union, much consterna-
tion regarding the methods used by Khrushchev; a good deal of personal dis-
satisfaction but absolute belief in the power of the party which will al-
ways be able to overcome its own mistakes and which is considered invincible.
An "improvement" in relations between the Polish Communist Party and
CPSU began to show up as early as the summer of 1957. The indicators of
this improvement are as follows:
The Polish Communist Party began being more obedient toward the
CPSU. Although there was an absence of wonderment and praise, there never-
theless was recognition of CPSU supremacy and power. There was subordina-
tion to Khrushchev's policy, with the objective of attaining as much as pos-
sible but in the most painless manner. There was also Gomulka's conviction
that "one can talk with Khrushchev but it is too dangerous to fight him."
Added to this was the conviction of Khrushchev that, f4%m the time being,
a person like Gomulka can be useful, since he nevertheless governs a diffi-
cult-to-lead people, leads them in moderate channels and is prepared to
come through with wide concessions. By this time, Gomulka fully recognized
the supremacy of the USSR in foreign policy,?in military problems, in the
Hungary question (which was a heavy blow to the Polish public), in the Tito
problem, and instituted the throttling of the so-called "revisionist" press;
he also accepted Khrushchev's directives in regard to "purging" the Polish
Communist Party (he postponed the party congress and halted the development
of worker councils). In return for this, he was permitted, for the time be-
ing, to carry out his farm policy, his policy toward the Catholic Church and
lit
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his negotiations regarding United States loans. Furthermore,. Gomulka
has ceased speaking of the "Polish Road to Socialism" completely. This
situation satisfied Khrushchev for the time, because he still has some
internal matters to deal with.
Subsequently, the purging of the Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich group,
h
as well as the demotion of Zukov, resulted in personal supremacy for
Chapter XII.
De-Facto Relationships
October 1957 signaled the onset of the next period in the relation-
ship between the CPSU and the Polish Communist Party. The crisis of CPSU
prestige was, for the most part, negated following the successful launching
of Sputnik I; all Communist parties, with the exception of that of Tito's
Yugoslavia,1including those of Poland and China, again recognized the abso-
lute supremacy of the CPSU. Tito, who did not want to sign the November
1957 Moscow declaration, was promptly punished by being outlawed, just as
at the time of Stalin. In the spring of 1958 Khrushchev took over the reigns
of government, Bulganin was removed, and.Khrushchev actually has the same un-
limited power position in his own hand as Stalin did in his time (although
he himself at one time spoke so harshly against the concentration of all
power in one hand, following Stalin's death.)
Since 1958, the by-word in Russian-Polish relations is once more obedi-
ence and servility, even within CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance);
everything is as it was at the time of Stalin, with the exception that fewer
overwhelming acts of praise on the part of Polish propaganda speak of the
"infallibility" of the CPSU, since it is felt that it is a little too early
to ply the Polish people with such crass propaganda again. On the part of
the CPSU and Khrushchev, there is more distrust and much cooler demonstra-
tions of friendship than existed under Stalin. These differences are more olQRf.
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W LEHTIAL
As to content, relations between the two countries and the two parties
follow along the line of "obedience and servility;" however, Gomulka must
be prepared for more distrust on the part of Khrushchev than Bierut, in
his time, on the part of Stalin. It is also probablA that Khrushchev has
not forgotten his defeat of-October 1956 and that he will later take his
revenge on Gomulka, although the latter is becoming a more and more willing
servant and tool in Khrushchev's hand. In relationships between government
representatives, more servility was demanded of the Poles; on the other
hand, the Russians are very reserved in reciprocating and frequently aban-
don the Poles in their economic difficulties. In any case, Khrushchev is
very slow in granting long-term credits, etc.
For the immediate future, there are continued indications of more
Polish dependency on the USSR in all respects and in all fields and propa-
ganda will slowly but surely revert to a cult of the personality centered
around Khrushchev, although it will be more moderate than during the time
of Stalin.
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