SOVIET POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY (CIA CONTRIBUTION TO SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY)

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A000100700001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 125
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 November 109 50Th_HUt/1
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SOVIET POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY
(CIA Contribution to Senate Subcommittee on
National policy Machinery)
50X1-HUM
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SOVIET POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY
Table of Contents
Page
I.
INTRODUCTION
1
3
4
POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY-
Chapter.1.. THE SOVIET STATE SYSTEM
Territorial-Administrative Sturcture ,
The Government Hierarchy
5
The Party Hierarchy
5
,.1
.The Interlocking Directorate
7
Chapter. 2. PARTY CONGRESS AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE
8
.Congress
8
Central Committee
9
Chapter 3. PRESIDIUM
11
Organization
11
The Functioning of the Presidium
13
Chapter 4. -SECRETARIAT
19
Organization
19
The Functioning of the Secretariat
22
Chapter 5. SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
25
Chapter 6. PRESIDIUM OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.
28
Chapter 7. MINISTRIES, STATE COMMITTEES, AND OTHER
AGENCIES OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
?.31
Ministries
31
State Committees
34
Specialized Agencies
35
III.
FOREIGN POLICY
36
Chapter .1:. INTRODUCTION ?
36
Chapter 2. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS . .
39
Organizaticinv
39
Foreign Missions
?
39
Personnel
40
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Table of Contents
Page
Chapter 3. STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC
RELATIONS.
43
?
'Organization
43
Functioning
43
Chapter.4. MINISTRY OF .FOREIGN TRADE
45
Organization
45
Functioning
46
The Foreign Trade Plan
47
Chapter 5. COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
49
Organization
49
Functioning
50
Soviet Control
50
Chapter 6. FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES
51
Direct-Contact
51
Bloc Parties
51
Central Soviet Organs
52
Training and Guidance
52
Diplomatic Channels
53
Front Organizations
53
Effectiveness
54
IV.
ECONOMIC POLICY
55
Introduction
55
Central Organs
55
Republic and Lower Level
58
The Planning Operation
58
Periodic Plans
59
Effectiveness
60
V.
SCIENTIFIC POLICY
64
Chapter. 1. Scientific Organizations
64
Chapter 2. Formulation of Policy
66
Role of the Party Presidium
66
Functioning of the Mechanism
66
Role of the Council of Ministers
67
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Table of Contents
Page
VI. MILITARY POLICY 70
Introduction 70
Organization 70
Interservice Problems 71
Relations with the Party 71
Influence on Policy 72
Execution of Policy 73
ANNEX A: ORGANS AND MEDIA FOR DISSEMINATING
POLICY DECISIONS 75
Party Control and Guidance 75
Media of Mass Communication 76
Controlled Dissemination 77
ANNEX B: SOVIET COLD-WAR OPERATIONS IN SYRIA,
1955-1957 79
Background 79
First: Phase of Penetration 79
Moscow Moves to "Protect" Syria . . 81
The Development Phase 82
Effect of These Successes 83
ANNEX C: "ROCKET DIPLOMACY" IN THE MIDDLE EAST 84
The Situation in Syria 64
Soviet Views of the Military Balance 85
Pressures on Turkey. 85
Soviet Treatment of./srael 86
Elaboration of the "Plot" 86
Gromyko in.the-UN. 87
Tightening the Screws 87
The Crisis Comes to a Head 88
Moscow Overplays its Hand 89
Postlude and Conclusions 90
ANNEX D: WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 91
Introduction 91
Initial Formulation Of Strategic Goals 91
Selection and Approval of Specific,
? Military Weapons Programs 91
? Testing 94
Costs 96
Firma Directives 98
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Table .of Contents
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ANNEX E:. PRESIDIUM GUIDANCE AT THE PLANT LEVEL 100
Chains of Command 100
Assignment of Production Targets, pri-
orities., and Resources to Plants . . 101
Reporting of Plan Fulfillment . . . 101
Control by Financial and Statistical
Organizations 101
Resolution of Current Problems . . . 102
Resource Reserves 103
?
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this study CIA has attempted, at the request of
the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery,
to reconstruct from a mass of fragmentary evidence the
machinery for national policy-making in the USSR.
The reader will quickly find that all Soviet pol-
icy of any importance is determined by the Presidium of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and that the exe-
cution of policy is supervised by the Presidium in con-
siderable detail. Thus this study, while it deals with
many different aspects of the Soviet regime, is focused
ultimately on the Presidium. The centralization of power
in this-dmall group of men--and ultimately in one man--is
the distinguishing mark of the Soviet system. The Pre-
sidium deals with questions of national security as an in-
tegral part of its consideration of the entire range of
national activity. Furthermore, its members are responsible
aS'indiViduaIs' for the execution of policy in every
field, and for this purpose they have a control over na-
tional life limited only by their resources of manpower
and materials and by certain deep-seated national prej-
udices. /n their response to an international challenge,
the members of the Presidium can bring the full weight of
Soviet power to bear without consideration of past prece-
dents or future elections. They do not have to balance
the conflicting interests of forces they do not control,
except perhaps in their relations with one another.
These are strong men--men who fought their way up
through the ranks of the Communist Party at a time when
this was indeed a risky business. As a corporate body
they present a solid front to the outside; within, as
with any body of strong men, there are inevitably strains
and disagreements. However, for a number of reasons not
directly related to the organization and functioning of
Soviet policy machinery, such strains normally do not great-
ly affect its operation. Each Presidium member, in his
course to the top, has become an able administrator in sev-
eral fields and widely, knowledgeable over the whole range of
national policy--he has lived national policy for many years.
(MikOyani;,fot.instance., has een involved in Poli6i formula-
tion since the 1920s).
Furthermore, the Soviet leaders are all Communists.
From their lifelong membership in an elite corps, from
their single-minded submergence of self in what they re-
gard as a crusade, they draw a strength and unity of pur-
pose which overrides many of the usual problems of committee
decision. A common ideology provides the Soviet leaders
with a uniform set of basic objectives; there is no need to
argue these out before turning to the methods to be used in
attaining these goals; Presidium members all start from the
same basic assumptions. They are all trained in dialectic
materialism; both literally and figuratively they speak the
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same language. Finally, they and all the officials beneath
them are accustomed to the discipline of democratic central-
ism: open discussion Until a decision is made, then absolute
obedience. These principles govern their relations not only
with one another, but also with Khrushchev who--as the final
arbiter--gives to Soviet policy the flavor of his own person-
ality.
It should be pointed out, however, that the same kinds
of men--and in many cases the same men--staffed the upper
levels of the Soviet regime in Stalin's last years, when
the USSR's policy was as rigid as it today is pragmatic.
Furthermore, the formal organization of Khrushchev's central
apparat differs very little from that of Stalin's. The man-
ner in which uses the men and administrative ma-
chinery available to him is thus the central problem of this
study.
This consideration has led us to show the Soviet appa--
ratus in both a static and a dynamic sense; we have attempt-
ed to interweave what it is with .how it workso Section II
deals with the central organs of party and state--the struc-
ture immediately surrounding Khrushchev and the Presidium. ?
Sections Ill-VI then take up the advisory and executive or--
gans ih thetfieldsneftforeign, economic, scientific, and mili-
tary policy respectively. They deal not only with the struc-
ture, but also with the functioning and, when feasible, with
the participation of the Presidium in each of these fields.
There are also six sections which we have included as
annexes. Annex A is an account of the apparatus used by
the Presidium to mobilize public opinion in support of its
policies. Annexes B and C are "case studies" of the coordi-
nated use of several arms of government in pursuit of specific
iforeign policy objectives. Annex D analyzes the machinery-
used in the development of weapons systems. Annex E describes
the methods by which the will of the Presidium is brought to
bear at the production level. Finally, Annex F deals with
the Soviet intelligence services; this subject is handled
separately because its content is TOP SECRET.
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II. POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY
ChaPter'1.-, THE SOVIET STATE SYSTEM
In theory,the USSR is a federally organized con-
stitutional democracy. In actuality, however, there
exists no concept of the constitution as a supreme law
limiting the powers and operations of government. De-
spite its democratic trappings, the Soviet Constitution
is merely a formal description of the gocialist State-
organization, and thus it chronicles rather than deter-
mines the development of the state.
The Soviet system is a dictatorship in which ulti-
mate power is exercised by the leaders of the Communist
party. While the government apparatus is patterned after
that of a Western political democracy, there is no system
of checks and balances, and any concept of the separation
of powers is definitively rejected. The functions of the
government are dictated by the party, whose, hegemony is
explicitly acknowledged by the Constitution. The prerog-
ative of the party to make state policy and supervise? its
implementation without direct popular controls or checks
is unquestioned, and party influence and power pervade all
phases of life from the lowliest private dwelling to the
highest councils of state.
This authority derives from the superior understand-
ing of "the science" of Marxism-Leninism allegedly enjoyed
by Communists. The party's collective understanding of
these "scientific" laws makes it the only body capable of
translating Marxist dogma into action. For this reason
no other political parties are considered necedsary, and
none are allowed. Nonetheless, democracy is theoretical-
ly safeguarded because the will of the party is supposed
to be identical with the will of-the people, and because
power is exercised through the process of "democratic cen-
tralism."
In its structure, the Soviet Government is like a pyra-
mid rising from a broad base of primary organs to the single
directing body at the top. This applies equally to the par-
ty hierarchy and to the various mass organizations such as
trade unions, producers and consumers cooperatives, writers
unions, etc. According to democratic centralism, each high-
er body, in whatever field, is elected by and is directly
responsible for its actions to the body immediately beneath
it, with final authority resting at the base of the pyramid,
the people. In reality, however, the exact opposite is true.
Soviet life is ruled from the apex of the pyramid, the lead-
ership of the party, and the membership of each lower body
in whatever field is approved by and directly responsible to
its immediate superior.
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Territorial-Administrative Structure
The Soviet Union is a federation of 15 theoretical-
ly independent republics. The largest and most important
Of these is Russia proper, which is organized into the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR).and
occupies a land area almost twice the size of the con-
tinental United States (excluding Alaska). The other 14
republics are formed primarily on the basis of national-
ity and in essence form a ring of satellites around the
RSFSR.
In keeping with the federal principle, each republic
has its own constitution, government, and party hierarchy,
and is impowered'to run its affairs as it sees fit so long
as it does not assume any of the prerogatives of the na-
tional apparatus in Moscow. In practice, little is left
to the discretion of the republics, and in most respects
they are nothing more than pale reflections of the cen-
tral authority.
From the standpoint of territorial organization, the
USSR is comparable to the United States on a magnified
scale. Republics are similar to American states, although
they are generally larger in size. The eight largest re-
publics are divided into 116 oblasts, or regions, which
for practiCal purposes equate to the US county. There is
a great disparity in geographical area between the largest
and smallest, but the average oblast is approximately the
size of the state of Tennessee. The major city in the reg-
ion is usually the oblast center, or county seat.
()blasts are subdivided into rayons, or districts, and
these in turn are subdivided into the smallest territorial-
administrative unit--the rural soviet. Large cities are
also divided into rayons, which are roughly the equivalent
of a precinct or ward.
Oblasts do not exist in the seven smaller Soviet re-
publics; the chain of administrative--territorial command
goes directly from republic to the rayons. In the RSFSR
there are six territorial units called krays. The dis-
tinction between a kray and an oblast is not clearly de-
fined; for practical purposes they seem to be the same,
although five of the krays contain subordinate autonomous
oblasts. Autonomous oblasts, autonomous republics, and
national okrugs (areas) are administrative units formed
as concessions to various small but homogenous nationality
groupings, and they are completely subordinate to the re-
publicror kray of which they form a part. They are the
exception rather than the rule, however, and in general
terms the line of subordination runs from republic to oblast
to rayon to rural soviet throughout the country. (See Chart
A).
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The Government Hierarchy
The executive branch of the Soviet Government is
the USSR Council of Ministers. It is organized and,
with the exception of its subordination to the Commu-
nist Party, functions in much the same manner as the
government of a Western democracy. Each of the Soviet
republics has its own Council of Ministers, which is
in most respects a carbon copy of the central organi-
zation in Moscow. Republic governments do, however,
enjoy a certain amount of autonomy in administering
those purely local affairs which are not sufficiently
important to warrant administration from Moscow. Gov-
ernments of oblasts and smaller units are called Execu-
tive Committees, and these enjoy the sameepowers and
functions in their bailiwicks as a republic government.
These executive organs are constitutionally sub-
ordinate only to the legislative branch, but in reality,
legislative bodies have little actual power and function
as rubber stamps which grant "approval" to laws and ap-
pointments already decided on by the party. Known as
the Supreme Soviet at USSR and republic level and as
Soviets of Working People's Deputies at the oblast and
below, these "legislatures" consist of deputies "elected"
by direct, universal, secret suffrage. However, candi-
dates are actually chosen in advance by the party, and
only one name appears on a ballot in each constituency,
thus making any truly democratic choice of representa-
tives an impossibility.
The Soviet judiciary, organized in somewhat the same
manner as the government. proceeds downward from the USSR
Supreme Court to republic Supreme Courts and oblast and
lower courts. The USSR Supreme Court "issues guidance
on questions of judicial practice," but it does not rule
on questions of constitutionality and has no function of
judicial review. Other higher courts are simply the courts
Of appellate jurisdiction. -
,
The Party Hierarchy
The membership of the Soviet Communist party (8,239,-
131) is slightly less than 4 percent of the total popula-
tion of the country. This highly disciplined elite exer-
cises firm control and direction of Soviet life through a
rigidly hierarchical professional party, machine responsive
only to the center in Moscow which controls the strategic
assignment of Communists to key positions in all institu-
tions and enterprises.
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The apex of party power is the Presidium, the Secre-
tariat, the Central Committee, and the various staff de- -
partments of the central apparatus in Moscow. This organ-
izational scheme is duplicated in all territorial subdivi-
sions of the USSR, and lower organizations differ from
higher only in size and over-all responsibility. At the
republic and lower levels, the body corresponding to
the Presidium is called the Bureau, and from oblasts
down the counterpart of the Central Committee is known
as the Party Committee. The territorial party organi-
zations are run by full-time pally employeesosecretaries
of the local organizations and members of the staff de-
partments.
In addition to its territorial units, the party has
an organization in every institution of SoViet society.
These exist in all ministries of the government, in mass
organizations in the armed forces,in factories, shops,
departmentestores, universities, and even on the dollective
farms. These so-called "primary" party organizations,
ranging in size from 3 persons to 3,000, are charged with
supervising the activities of the management of the enter-
prises in which they exist. Membership in the party is
expected of all managerial personnel and is a requisite 'for
appointment to more important positions. The most im-
portant figures in the territorial governments are also
members of the ruling party body; the premier of a repub-
lic is a member of the Bureau (Presidium) of the republic
party, and his chief governmental deputies are members of
the republic's Party Central Committee. The pattern is
repeated in the oblasts and rayons.
Party control effectively prevents any genuine exer-
cise of autonomy by governmental bodies. The party does
not function on a federal basis but is a completely uni-
fied monolith in which the line of command runs directly
from the center. It is organized on an administrative-
territorial basis in order to facilitate complete party
control of the government, mass organizations, and all
phases of life. :.Under)thiS'etructufeAbeAMpossfbility
6fahy.7independence for the republics was clearly under-
stood as early as 1923, when a leading Communist from the
Republic of Georgia told the 12th All-Union Party Congress:
There has been talk here of independent and self-
dependent republics. On this point it is necessary
to exert the greatest caution so as to avoid any
kind of exaggeration whatsoever. It is clear to
all of us what sort of self-dependence, what sort
of independence this is. We have, after all, a
Single party, a single central organ, which in the
final resort determines absolutely everything for
all the republics, even for the tiny republics, in-
cluding general directives-right-up lo'the-appoint.;.
ment?Of responsible-leaders'in this Or .that republic-.-
All this derives from.theV6ne orgati7so'that.to .speak
under 'theser:conditiOns:Of Self-Klependende;.of Jude-
pehdence4 reflects to .the.highestdegree an in-
trinsically incomprehensible position.
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The party thus enjoys a pre-eminent place among the
instruments of authority available to the regime. Khru-
shchev's methods of gaining, holding, and wielding power
have reinforced this pre-eminence; he has based his ad-
ministration squarely on the party apparatus. This means,
in practical political terms, that the lieutenants he
has chosen to implement his policies, the men on whose
loyalty he must rely, have been drawn primarily from the
professional party machine. At the summit of Soviet
power, this method of administration is reflected in
the two-to-one majority of party secretaries over rep-
resentatives of other organs in the composition of the
ruling party Presidium:
The Interlocking Directorate
At the top of the Soviet administrative structure
distinctions of background and function fade. Supreme
authority in both party and government is vested-in one
man--Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman'of'the government's
Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the party,
*Immediately below him stands a close:aknit group of top
assistants who draw into their hands the imin lines of
command of both party and government. The frequent
practice-of announcing national policy in, joint decrees..
of the party and government?a practice which, incident-
ally, has no explicit constitutional sanction--illustrates
this integration of th& lines of command.
This merging of authority at the top demonstrates
the interlocking nature of the Soviet administrative
directorate, with tae parallel lines of party and gov-
ernment organizations extending down through the whole
Soviet system. (See Chart B). The Soviet Union is a
one-party state, ruled by a group of men who exercise
effective authority by virtue of their control of the
Communist Party. (See Chart C).
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CHART B
PARALLEL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE (REPRESENTATIVE).
BASIC TERRITORIAL- .
ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
USSR
Republic
Oblast
1
Rayon
Rural
Soviet
PARTY
CPSU Central Committee,
Presidium and Secretariat
? Republic Central Committee,
Bureau and Secretariat
Oblast Party Committee,
Bureau and Secretariat
Rayon Party Committee,
Bureau and Secretariat
Primary Party Committee
in each enterprise, collective
farm, office, school, etc.
Decisions of Higher Organs are
unconditionally binding on lower
organs.
GOVERNMENT.
USSR Supreme Soviet and
Council of Ministers
Republic Supreme Soviet
and Council of Ministers
UNCLASSIFIED
Oblast Soviet and
Executive Committee
Rayon Soviet and
Executive Committee
Council of
National Economy
(Sovnarkhoz)
? Rural Soviet and
Executive Committee
(limited functions, such as
maintaining registries, etc.)
Enterprises, collective farms,
office, or school, etc.
Though the system Is extraordinarily centralized,
a degree of autonomy fixed in law is accorded
each lower level in administering local affairs.
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CHART C
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE-USSR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
1 OCTOBER 1959 UNCLASSIFIED
PARTY
PRESIDIUM OF SECRETARIAT OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MEMBERS FIRST SECRETARY
hrushchev - --..1101TIPMEnIrt-
Voroshilov ....
Koz ov t.
Mayan- ?
GOVERNMENT
PRESIDIUM OF
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
SUPREME SOVIET
Presidium
CHAIRMAN
????
CHAIRMAN-CEREMONIAL
HEAD OF STATE
FIRST DEPUTY
CHAIRMEN
SECRETARIES
%Tr' r
Brezhnev--)13, rezhnev
I
I
Furtseva L.
?f,Furtseva
Kirichenko A- airichenko
Kuusinen -i u
Mukhitdinovl- --- - --- JIMusinen
,. ukhildinov
I
uslov ---4---- - ----Buslov
hvernik 1
Belyayev?
gnatov - ? 4. ? .
4
CANDIDATES
KbrOtthen a ?..
Pospelov --
Kosygin
KaInberzin
Kirilenko
Mzhavanadze
Pervulchin.
Polyansky "
Mazurov
Podgorny ?
?
rr
rr
Mikoyan
?1Voroshiloyi
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
(The Chairmen of the
Supreme Soviet Presidiums
in the 15 Republics)
IDEPUTY CHAIRMEN
Zasyadko
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Finance
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
PARTY CONGRESS
90924 C
25 other Ministers
17 other officials of
Ministerial Rank
The 15 Republic Premiers
Is others
SECRETARY
MEMBERS
ririrnI7
aLetyrlyev
SUPREME SOVIET
COUNCIL OF
COUNCIL OF
THE UNION NATIONALITIES
= Fu 1 Member, Presidium Soviet Communist Party.
c:3 Candidate Members, Pre Mum, Soviet Communist Party.
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Chapter 2. PARTY CONGRESS AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Congress
According to the statutes of the Communist Party,
the national party congress is the "highest body" of
party authority. Made up of delegates ostensibly
elected in a democratic manner by lower party bodies,
the congress is supposed to embody the wisdom and
will of thi whole party. The specific duties of the
congress laid down in the party rules are: to hear
and approve reports of the party Central Committee
and other central organizations; to review and amend
the program and Statutes of the party; to determine
the tactical line of the party on fundamental ques-
tions of current policy; and to elect the Central Com-
mittee and the Central Auditing Commission of the Com-
munist Party.
However, the party congress has not exercised
these "prerogatives," in anything more than a formal
sense, for aamost 30 years. During the early years
of the Communist regime the congress did participate
actively in current policy determination; it acted as
a consultative and ratifying body and supreme arbiter
of disagreements on policy. Then, under Stalin, who
convened only fbur-congresses after 1927, it degene-
rated into one of the regime's policy-propagating or-
gans, automatically granting unanimous approval to
the basic principles and current policies of the self-
perpetuating party leadership but giving them a facade
of democratic aegitimacy. 'Though convened more often
in the post-Stalin period (the statutory requirement
of once in four years has ?been met), the role and opera-
tions of the congress have not perceptibly changed.
The declining influence of the congress was ac-
companied by an extremely lane increase in. membership.
In 1918, shortly after the party came to power, the con-
gress consisted of 104 delegates. The number of dele-
gates has now stabilized at around 1400.
Delegates are formally "elected" at oblast party
conferences in the RSFSR, Belorussia, and the Ukraine,
at the republic party congresses in the other republics,
and at party conferences in military units abroad. The
norm for the 19th Congress (October 1952) and the 20th
Congress (February 1956) was one voting delegate for each
5,000 members and one nonvoting delegate for each 5,000
candidate members of the party. With the increase in
party membership (about one million in the next three gears,)
the norm was changed for the 21st Congress (January 1959X
to one per 6,000. Though theoretically elected, each
slate of delegates is carefully prepared in advance by
the respective top regional and republic party officials
with the advice and consent of the central leadership in
Moscow,thus assuring a body amenable to the regime's control.
(8)
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CHART D
UNCLASSIFIED
DATA ON RECENT PARTY CONGRESSES
19th Congress. 5-14 October 1952 (10 days)
1,192 voting delegates 167 non-voting delegates
Agenda: 1) Report of the Central Committee*
2) Report of the Central Auditing Commission**
3) Directives of the 19th Party Congress on the
5th Five-Year Plan for developing the USSR
from 1951 to 1955
4) Changes in the Party statutes
5) Election,of central party organs
20th Congress 14-25 February 1956 (11 days)
1,349 voting delegates 81 non-voting delegates
Agenda: 1) Report of the Central Committee*
2) Report of the Auditing Commission**
3) Directives of the 20th Party Congress on the 6th
Five-Year Plan for developing the USSR national
economy from 1956-1960
4) Election of central party organs.
In addition, at a closed session, heard Khrushchev's
speech "On the cult of the Individual and its Consequences"
21st Congress (special) 27 January - 5 February 1959 (9 days)
1,269 voting delegates 106 non-voting delegates
Agenda: 1) Control Figures for the Development of the National
Economy of the USSR from 1959-1965
* The Central Committee report, usually divided into three
parts--the external situation of the USSR, its internal
position and the condition of the party-- reviews the main
developments since the last congress and sketches the
course for the future.
** The auditing commission report is a rather perfunctory
statement on party finances.
90924
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In addition to clothing the acts of the regime
with the aura of legitimacy, the congress is also an
international forum for propagandizing achievements,
summing up and disseminating the experience gained
in the preceding period, and outlining basic paths
of development and the main task for the future. Its
function is the periodic propagation of the broad
lines of national policy, rather than the exposition
Of tactical plans. (See Chart D).
Central Committee
Even if the party congress did fulfill its the-
oretical role of supreme decision-maker on the most
important questions of policy, tactics, and organiza-
tion, the infrequency of -its peetings-: would'
necessitate It'. .body. 'empowered to 'Act.Jor it in
the interim. In the make-believe system of Soviet
party democracy this role is played by the Central
Committee.
A Central Committee is "elected" at each regular
congress* to serve until the next regular congress is
convened and is supposed to meet at least once every
six months. The Central Committee elected in February
1956 at the 20th Party Congress consisted of 133 full
(voting) members and 122 candidate members. Although
the Central Committee is empowered to fill vacancies
arising in the list of full members from among the can-
didates, this apparently has not been done. The Cen-
tral Committee now consists of 123 full members and 113
candidate members.
As in the selection of delegates to the party con-
gress, "election" to the Central Committee simply means
formal approval of a slate already prepared by the top
party leaders. This Slate consists of the most influ-
ential officials in the Soviet Union--leading provin-
cial party secretaries, military leaders, and government
executives, as well as the central party leaders.**
*A Central Auditing Commission' is also 'elect-
ed' to 'inspect' the speed and correctness of actions
of central party bodies and the condition of the treas-
ury. It is politically inferior to the Central Commit-
tee, and its functions are largely pro forma.
**There is also a meager sprinkling of bench work-
ers and farm and plant managers to propagandize the work-
er foundations and orientation of the party.
(9)
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Thus the Central Committee is potentially powerful,
but although its individual members are important and
relatively influential, the committee as a body has on
only a few occasions had an effective voice in policy
decisions in recent years. During the struggle for
power in the immediate post-Stalin period, the Central
Committee once or twice was apparently called upon to
arbitrate disagreements which the Presidium members were
unable to resolve among themselves. Since Khrushchev's
victory over his principal opponents in June 1957 and
his emergence as unchallenged boss, the Central Committee
has not exercised decision-making powers.
If the stenographic records* of the two most recent
plenary meetings of the Central Committee are any guide,
the Central Committee has become just another public
forum for the transmission of Khrushchev's ideas. The
proceedings seem completely stereotyped with care-
fully prepared speeches grinding through to preordained,
unanimpus,decisions, which differ only slightly--for
the sake of likiearances--from the regime's original pro-
posals.
But if the Central Committee as a body has no ef-
fective role as a decision-maker, it does provide the
regime with an important and authoritative forum for
expounding and 2xplhining some of its major policies.
Participants in the recent plenums of the Central Com-
mittee, in addition to the full and candidate members
of the Committee, have included the members of the Cen-
tral Auditing Commission and a number of lower echelon
officials, some even who are not party members. They
hear the regime's major policies elaborated and the
necessities for courses of action expounded, and receive
a certain psychological "recharging of batteries" for
the tasks and responsibilities laid down. They in turn
transmit that information to officials and fellow-workers
in their respective offices and bailiwicks and impart
some of the enthusiasm for the aims and policies of the
top leaders which was engendered at the plenum. The
Central Committee is therefore a useful tool for dis-
seminating and implementing policy and, through the se-
lection of topics, for highlighting especially important
areas of current concern. (See Chart E)
The practice begun late in 1958 of announcing dates
and agenda of Central Committee plenary sessions in advance
has further highlighted the subordinate status of that body
in the chain of command. In addition, this advance schedul-
ing has almost certainly had a disciplinary effect on the
Central Committee members, forcing them to place their re-
spective houses in order in anticipation of a collective
airing of problems.
*Until December 1958 the proceedings of plenums
were kept secret. Full or reasonably full accounts
have been published for only the December 1958 and
June 1959 plenums.
(10)
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CHART E
UNCLASSIFIED
DATA ON RECENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUMS
27 February 1956 Elections of leading Party organs following 20th Party Congress
20-24 December 1956 - Modification of the 6th Five-Year-Plan and Improvement of the Administration
of the Economy
13-14 February 1957
Reorganization of Industrial Management
Organizational Matters:
Shepilov ?appointed to Secretariat
Kozlov ? appointed Presidium candidate
22-29 June 1957 Organizational Matters: (Anti-Party Group)
Malenkov
Molotov expelled from full member, Presidium, and from the Party
ICaKanovich Central Committee
28-31 October 1957
(1 day)
(5 days)
(2 days)
(8 days)
Shepilov ?expelled from candidate member, Presidium, and from the Party CC
Pervukhin ? demoted to Presidium candidate
Saburov ? expelled from the Presidium
Ignatov
Kuusinen appointed full members, Presidium
Aristov
Belyayev
Kozlov
Shvernik
Brezhnev promoted to full members, Presidium
Furtseva
Zhukov
Pospelov
1Calnberzin
Kirilenko
Mazurov
Mzhavanadze
Kosygin
Korotchenko
appointed Presidium candidates
On Party-Political work in the Soviet Army and Navy
Organizational Matters:
Zhukov ?? expelled from full member, Presidium, and from the Party CC
16-17 December 1957 "On the Work of the Trade Unions of the USSR"
"On the Results of the Conferences of Representatives of Communist & Workers
Parties"
"Organizational Matters:
Furtseva ? assigned full time secretariat duties
Kirichenko
Ignatov appointed to the CC Secretariat
Mukhitclinov
(4 days)
(2 days)
Mukhltdinov ?promoted to fell member, Presidium
25 - 26 February 1958 MTS reorganization (2 days)
6 - 7 May 1958 Chemical Industry Decree (2 days)
17 - 18 June 1958 Agriculture Procurement reform (2 days)
Organizational Matters
Podgorny
? appointed Presidium candidates
Polyansky
5 September 1958 Called 21st Congress and set its agenda (1 day)
Organizational Matters
Bulganin ?expelled from the Presidium
12 November 1958 Approval of Seven-Year-Plan Directives (I day)
Education Reform Decree
15 - 19 December 1958 Development of Agriculture in past five years and Tasks for Further Increase of (5 days)
Agricultural Products
24 - 29 June 1959 Implementation of 21st CPSU Congress decisions on mechanization and automation (5 days)
Report on implementation of 7 May 1958 Plenum on development of chemical industry
909 24
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Chapter 3. PRESIDIUM
Organization
The Presidium of the Communist Party Central Com-
mittee, charged by party statutes with directing "the
work of the Central Committee" when that body is not
is session, is the supreme policy-making body in the
USSR, responsible for all spheres of national life--
foreign policy, economic policy, military policy, etc.
This self-perpetuating body consists of individuals
who, although nominally "elected" by the Central Com-
mittee, occupy their positions by virtue of their ad-
ministrative ability, political prowess, and loyaltY'
Co Khrushchev. (See Chart F)
At present the Presidium is composed of 14 full
(voting) members who exercise the prerogatives and re-
sponsibilities of national policy-makers, and 10 candi-
date-members, who participate in varying degrees) in
the policy-making process. The extent to which various
members participate in Presidium deliberation is gov-
erned, apart from the political weight which they carry,
by their collateral duties. And by virtue of the locale
of these collateral duties Some are even precluded from
regular attendance. Belyayev, as the Kazakh party sec-
retary, is not usually in Moscow and most of the candi-
date members, since they are, in the main, regional
party administrators, are also often absent. Of the
candidates, only three--party secretary Pospelov, plan-
ning chief Kosygin, and RSFSR premier Polyansky--are
normally situated in Moscow, where they would be regu-
larly available for Presidium meetings. The .
nature of their collateral duties also makes it likely
that these three would take a more active part in Presi-
dium deliberations than their colleagues of equivalent
rank.
The composition of the present Presidium bears the
heavy imprint of Khrushchev's power and influence, With
the ouster of the "antiparty" group in 1957 and the in-
flux of new, younger elements, the Presidium now has an
average age of 57 and has lost its Stalin-appointed flavor.
In contrast with earlier practice, under which the ruling
group normally included a large number of governmental
administrators, it is now largely composed of individuals
whose professional experience was primarily acquired in
Khrushchev's party machine. Twelve of the present full
Presidium members, for example, have had or now have
party responsibilities almost exclusively. This pre-
ponderance of party administrators in the top policy-
making body reflects Khrushchev's efforts to reassert
the primacy of the party in all aspects of Soviet life.
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CHART F
TOP ECHELONS ? OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
THEORY PRACTICE
UNCLASSIFIED
PARTY CONGRESS
YoRuco DELEGATES
DEMOCRATICALLY PRATT ORGANIZATIONS OEALNELVZO
By LOWERIONS
SUPREME PARTY BODY
LETS AT LEAST ONCE EVERY FOUR TEX
4
PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE
SIZE UNKNOWN
RIAL AND APPEALS BOARD FOR CASES
OF PARTY DISCIPLINE
MEETS AT ITS OWN DISCRETION
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
123 FULL (VOTING) MEMBERS
115 CANDIDATE MEMBERS
DIRECTS WORK OF PARTY
BETWEEN CONGRESSES
MEETS AT LEAST ONCE EVERY
SIX MONTHS
PRESIDIUM
141 FULL (VOTING) MEMBERS
10 CANDIDATE MEMIIERS
DIRECTS WORK OF CENTRAL
COMMITTEE BETWEEN PLENUMS
MEETS AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK
ELECTION
ACCOUNTABILITY
um INSPECTS
9092)4 F
CENTRAL AUDITING
COMMISSION
60 MEMBERS
NECKS UP ON SPEED AND CORRECT-
NESS OF ACTIVITIES OF CENTRAL
PARTY BODIES AND CONDITION OF
PARTY FINANCES
EETY Al ITS OWN DISCRETION
4
SECRETARIAT
9 MEMBERS
DIRECTS CURRENT WORK OF THE PARTY
CHIEFLY AS CONCERNS CHECKING ON .44
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY OLOSIONS
AND SELECTION OF PERSONNEL
MEETS FREQUENTLY
t 1
CENTRAL APPARATUS
ABOUT 30 DEPARTMENTS
(APPROXIMATELY 3500 PEOPLE)
EXECUTWE STAFF FOR
THE SECRETARIAT
4- - - ?
SELECTS
ADVISES
INSPECTS (PRO FORMAI
?
PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE
SIZE UNKNOWN
TRIAL AND APPEALS BOARD FOR
CASES OF PARTY DISCIPLINE
DISCRETION
PRESIDIUM
II WU NOTING) PADANERS
IT CANDIDATE MEMBERS
USHCHEV AND HIS PRINCIPAL LIEUTENANTS
VIRTUALLY SELF-PERPETUATING
EFFECTIVE SOURCE Of ALL TOP
POLICY DECISIONS FOR THE USSR
MEETS AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
123 FULL (VOTING) ONIK3ER5
115 CANDIDATE MEMBERS
FORUM FOR DISSEMINATING AND
EXPLAINING MAJOR CURRENT
POLICY DECISIONS
MEETS IRREGULARLY-AVERAGES
ABOUT 12 DAYS IN SESSION A YEAR
PARTY CONGRESS
1383-1400 DELEGATES
FORUM FOR PERIODIC PROPAGATION
OF DISTILLED EXPERIENCE OF REGIME,
ITS BASIC POUCIES AND TASKS SET
FOR THE FUTURE
MEETS IRREGULARLY-ABOUT
EVERY 3 OR 4 YEARS
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?
SECRETARIAT
9 MEMBERS
(KHRUSHICHEV AND LICHT
OF HIS LIEUTENANTS)
DIRECTS DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES OF
THE PROFESSIONAL PARTY MACHINE
MEETS FREQUENTLY
CENTRAL AUDITING
COMMISSION
60 MEMBERS
PERFORMS PRO FORMA CHECKS ON
SPEED AND CORRECTNESS OF ACTIV-
ITIES OF CENTRAL PARTY BODIES AND
CONDITION OF PARTY FINANCES
MIGHT NOT MEET XS A BODY
CENTRAL APPARATUS
ABODE 30 DEPARTMENTS
(APPROXIMATELY 3500 PEOPLE)
EXECUTIVE STAFF FOR
THE SECRETARIAT
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An important.effect of this policy is the new re-
lationship it has produced between the Presidium and
the Secretariat of the Central Committee. ?'According
to the party by-laws, the Secretariat is the executive
agency of the party, charged with "supervising current
work" and verifying the fulfillment of party decisions."
The Secretariat is now represented on the Presidium by
8 full members and one candidate member.* This, in ef-
fect, transforms the party secretaries into formulators
as well as executors of party policy. More important,
it gives the professional party viewpoint a greater
weight in the formulation of national policy thin that
of any other professional group in the Soviet Union.
(See Chart G)
From his vantage point at the head of the party
and government hierarchies, Khrushchev is clearly the
dominant figure in the Soviet ruling group and is in
a strong position to insist on his point of view in
the councils of state. However, it is characteristic
of Khrushchew's personality--by nature he is gregarious,
extroverted, and garrulous--and his style of leadership,
that he does not rule in the high-handed fashion of
Stalin. Khrushchev appears to delegate far greater re-
sponsibilities to his subordinates, to place ?more con-
fidence in them, and to take far greater acceunt of
their opinions. Thus, while he possesses supreme
power, his lieutenants play an important role in the
formulation of Soviet policy and the general administra-
tion of the Soviet state. They appear to have fairly
broad responsibilities for selected areas of national
life and show considerable versatility in their duties.
The influence exerted by individual Presidium mem-
bers varies with their training, experience, and current
administrative duties and also appears to depend heavily
upon their relationships with Khrushchev. Included
among Khrushchev's principal confidants are First Deputy
Premiers Mikoyan and Kozlov and Party Secretaries Kiri-
chenko and Aristov, all of whom enjoy close personal re-
lations with the party chief. These men, along with
Party Secretary Suslov, whom Khrushchev appears to regard
more as a valuable political and professional asset than
as an intimate friend, form the inner circle of top pol-
icy-makers immediately below Khrushchev in power and in-
fluence. Together they exercise broad responsibility
for major areas of domestic and foreign affairs, corre-
sponding roughly with their respective official assign-
ments in the party and government.
*It is doubtful that Presidium member Nikolay Igna-
tov, though still formally a secretary, is serving in
that capacity. In April 1959 he was elected Chairman of
the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (Russian Republic Pres-
ident), a full-time post which is probably incompatible
with party secretarial duties.
(12)
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CHART 0
UNCLASSINED
USSR: EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY PRESIDIUM 1952-59
OCTOBER 1952 MARCH 1953
FEBRUARY 1955
FEBRUARY 1956
JUNE 1957
SEPTEMBER 1959
Stalin
A ristov
Khrushthev
MalenkOv
Milthailov
Ponomarento
Suslov
Brezhnov
1gnatov
Pegov
Stairyatree ?
Andrianov
MelnikOv
Patolichev
Pozanov
CRETARIAT
PARTY CONTROL
COmAUSSION
PROVINCIAL
PARTY
SECRETARIES
Shrushchey
Busboy
Belyayev
Artstov
Breztme?
Fortson
Kuusinen
POspelov
Shverolk ?
Ignatoo
Kiricbenko
Kozlov
Kato& min
Kirilenlin
Mauro.
Mukhltdinov
? MzhaRanadze
TARIM
PARTY CONTROL
COMAUTTEE
PROVINCIAL
PARTY
SECRETARIES
IChrosbehev
Klricionko
Susloy
Aristov
Brozhnov
Furtseva
Kuusinen
Mukhltdizvov
Ignatov
Pospelov
Shve rink
Belyayey
KaInberzin
Kirlienko
Kavirev
atzhavanadze
Podgorny
CAE TalAT
PARTY CONTROL
COMAUTTEE
?
PROVINCIAL
PARTY
I SECRUIAMES
Khroshchev
Suslov
Brezhnev
Furtseva
Btepilov
Belyayev
A ristov
Pospclov
sAygrnik ?
Kirichenku
Idukhildinov jSECRETARIES
lARIAT
PARTY CONTROL
COmmiTTEE
PROVINCIAL
PARTY
Khrushchey
lintalYev
POspelov SECRETANAT
Shatalin
Busboy
PROVINCIAL
Melnikay
f PARTY
BagirOv J SECRETARIES
Khrushcliev
Suslov SECRETARIAT
Pospe/ov
PROVINCIAL
Ponomarenko ? PARTY
SECRETARY
Stalin
Shvernik
Bert),
Balkan?,
Ignatirev
Kaganovich
Malenkov
Malyshev
Mikoyan
Molotov
Pervukido
Ponomarcnko
Babe rev
Voroshlloy
Kabanov
Kosygin
TevOSYMI
Vyshinsky
Zverov
Korolchenko
Buns into
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
Berlya
Bulganin
Kaganovich
Malenkov
Mikoyan
Molotov
Pervokhin
Saburov
Voroshllov
Ponomarenko
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
Bulganin
Kaganovich
klaionkov
Mikoyan
Molotov
Pervuktiln
Saburov
Voroshilov
?t
CENTRAL
GOVERNtarn
OFFICIALS
Batsmen
VOroshilov
Kaganovich
Mikoyan
Molotov
Pervukhin
Saburov
Malenkov
Zhukov
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
BollEanla 1
VoroStilloy I
Mikoyan
Keen&
Pervukhin
Korotchooko?
CENTRAL I
GOVERNMENT
OffiCIALS
PROVINOM
GOVERNMENT
?MOM 4
Khrushehey
Kozlov
Milioyan
Voroshilov
Kosygin
PervitkMn
!Kalov 1
Polyansky
CENTRE].
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNALEKT
OFFICALS
Shvernik - misaunaous
UNCLASSIFIED
Full Member, Presidium,
Candidate member,
Rdl-time
?
Soviet Communist Party.
Presidium, Soviet Communist Party.
Party Functionaries.
Government Functionaries..
as a secretary since election
Presidium, 16 Agril 1959.
Korotcbenko J
Shvemik ? MISCEUANE01/5
as Chairman,
1=1 Pull-time
'Probably not functioning
RS1,3R Supreme Soviet
Chesnokov
Kuznolsov ALISCELIANEOUS
Mikballov
Yuan
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Mikoyan, who seems to have achieved the status of
an elder statesman, is Khrushchev's closest adviser in
foreign affairs, and he probably also has exerted(con-
siderable influence in domestic economic questions, a
field in which he has had long experience. Kozlov ranks
high in Khrushchev's favor--he reportedly is .selected
as the latter's successor--and appears to be responsible
for domestic governmental operations, particularly in
the industrial field. Khrushchev's protege from the
Ukraine, Kirichenko, acts as the party chief's alter
ego on the Secretariat, exercising general supervision
over the professional party macpine. Aristov, Deputy
Chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for the RSFSR,
is Khrushchev's watchdog over all matters of party con-
cern in- the all-important Russian Republic. Khrushchev
is Chairman of the Bureau but has little time for the
actual day-to-day supervigionand direction of its work.
The fifth member of the inner cabinet, Suslov, has had
responsibilities in the foreign policy, ideological,
and cultural fields, but he now appears to devote him-
self primarily to foreign Communist parties.
The Functioning of the Presidium
The absence of strong constitutional traditions and
deeply imbedded governmental institutions in the Soviet
Union tends to force decision-making functions to the
highest levels. Those who enjoy power in the Soviet
Union are forced to wield it, to plunge into the day-to-
day-supervision of the machine they operate, to prevent
subordinate bodies from installing themselves along the
lines of authority, and to keep open the channels of in-
formation and initiative from below. Presidium members
apparently involve themselves in great detail in the
whole range of activities connected with the initiation,
planning, coordination, formulation, and execution of
national policy. Published Central Committee decrees,
which express Presidium decisions, show that top lead-
ership responsibilities extend from the most weighty of
state issues to such relatively trival questions as the
wages of minor functionaries or the ideological qualities
of a small literary piece.
These facts concerning the nature of the Soviet po-
litical system provide a necessary preface to any dis-
cussion of the machinery of Presidium operations. The
Soviet Union is a government of men, not of laws, The
over-riding aim and the universal rationale is to get
the job done, and if machinery or legal red-tape stands
in the way, it is cut through, over-ridden, or abolished.
However clearly it may be drawn, the operating procedure
of the Presidium is at best merelya scheme which conceals
as much as it reveals the leadership which drives it.
(13)
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Apart from the identity of its membership, which has
remained fairly stable during the past two years, and the
products of its deliberations, which appear from time to
time in the form of published decrees of the Central Com-
mittee, less is known about the formal organization and
working practices of the Presidium than about any compar-
able group of men in history. Most of the available in-
formation on working procedures at the top level of the
Soviet leadership relates to Stalin's Politburo.* How-
ever, some of the procedures and habits of leadership es-
tablished there undoubtedly carry over to the present day
Under Stalin the Politburo was organized around a
system of committees, each headed by a Politburo member
and charged with special responsibilities in different
fields.**
In practice, the system of committees served as a
cloak for Stalin's dictatorial rule. The compartmentali-
zation of duties within the Politburo and the irregularity
of its plenary sessions meant that important policy ques-
tions came increasingly to be decided by Stalin personal-
ly rather than by the Politburo as a whole.
*Renamed the Presidium in 1952.
? **Much of the political work of the Politburo was ac-
complished through a Political Commission which before the
war consisted of Molotov, Serie, and Zhdanov, (Malenkov pre-
sumably replaced Zhdanov following the latter's death in
1948-.) Under the Political Commission were a number of com-
mittees, each headed by a Politburo member. Among these
committees were the Foreign Affairs Committee headed by
Molotov, the Security Committee headed by Serie, and the
Military Committee headed by Voroshilov.
Policy on; all matters handled by the Commissariat
of Foreign Affairs was determined by the Politburo. When
a question of policy arose, Litvinov and his experts from
the Commissariat would be called before the Foreign Affairs
Committee. Litvinov would make an expos?f the situation
and present his recommendations. -Discussion might ensue
and questions be protioanded by members of the Committee.
Litvinov and his associates *ould then be dismissed and
the Committee would discuss the question further and formu-
late its recommendations. These recommendations in turn
would be passed to the Political Commission, which normal-
ly would make the decision on the action to be taken. If
the question were a vital one, however, or if there were
disagreement in the Political Commission, the matter would
be referred to a plenum of the Politburo for consideration
and final decisidn.
Once a decision had been reached, either at the level
of the Politburo or of the Political Commission, it was trans-
mitted to the Foreign Affairs Commissariat in the form of a
directive. Such directives had the force of law and were expected
to .be. carried ?out explicitly without question on the part
of the Commissariat.
(14)
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Since Stalin's death, the working practices of the
Soviet leadership have undergone changes. Khrushchev's
disparaging remarks at the 20th Party Congress about the
old Politburo' committee system under Stalin suggests
that a more informal division of responsibilities exists
in the Presidium and that the top leaders function more
closely as a group. In an interview with a Western
journalist in May 1957, Khrushchev stated that the Pres--
idium "meets regularly, not less than once a week." Khru-
shchev added that at these meetings the Presidium members
thrash out various problems and generally arrive at a com-
mon viewpoint. In the event of disagreement, he stated,
issues are decided by a simple majority vote. Thus the
evidence suggests that the evolution of the working prac-
tices of the Presidium since Stalints death has produced
a more business-like, regularized pattern of top-level
decision-making. However, Presidium members are in close
enough daily contact that lateral coordination on many
problems can be effected without the .necessity of formal
Presidium meetings.
While the Presidium, like the party as a whole, has
regained more than a shadow of its earlier status and
functions, Khrushchev has secured firm hold on the sub-
stance of power. There is every evidence that as First
Secretary he controls the secretaries who form the core
of the Presidium and, on this basis alone, could dominate
the proceedings of that body. Even apart from this fact
of personal power, it is likely that Khrushchev could, by
virtue of his personality, turn the deliberations of the
Presidium in any direction he should choose. Essential-
ly, therefore, the Presidium is Khrushchev's cabinet, and
its prerogatives are exercised largely at his discretion.
Information on which the action of the Presidium id
based reaches the leaders through a variety of official
channels.* Regular reports on broad topics of general in-
terest such as the economy, party affairs, scientific. and mili-
tary developments, and foreign policy are disseminated by
the responsible party and government agencies on a regular
basis. It has been reported that a publication called "Red
Tass," a secret, uncensored, and unslanted coverage of the
foreign press As prepared by the Central Committee staff
and subtitted directly to the top leaders. This flow of
information has undoubtedly contkibuted to the keen aware-
mass of contemporary foreign affairs.revealed in Khrushchev's
many speeches and interviews. Periodic reports on topice of
more specialized interest, such as routine military matters,
cultural affairs, foreign Communist parties, etc., are also
(disseminated on the Presidium level. The insights into the
working thabitsflfthe:IJPresidium--membersinsights ,7af-
!forded i'by iloreigi:w.obSeryerSn and -by- the:-oceasional
remarks ':'Of .::the -.leaders themselves--suggest tthat
(15)
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an enormous amount of current informational traffic
flows over their desks. Khrushchev in a recent speech
complained of the "many tomes" of official documents
which he had to read.
This direct contact with a mass of data coming
'f torn independent, sometimes competing agencies, as
well as the experience gained through the direct par-
ticipation of each Presidium member. in the administra?
tion of party and government organs, provides the lead-
ership with a basis for independent.judgment in assess-
ing ahd disposing of 'proposals and recommendations com-
ing from below. It also puts them in a position to in-
itiate or amend policy on their own. For example,Khru-
shchev's initiatives in Soviet agricultural policy are
well .known: sponsorship of the cultivation of "new lands"
in Kazakhstan and Eastern Siberia; advocacy of corn cul-
tivation;cand, on at least one occasion, the upward re-
vision of certain planned goals against the advice of
his experts. At the same time, he exercises a dominant
rode in foreign policy. He is reported to have initiat-
ed the move within the Presidium for the concludion of
the Austrian Treaty, ahd to have dictated important pro-
nouneements on foreign policy, ostensibly authored by
other men.
Questions for Presidium deliberation normally origi-
nate in a subordinate party or government body. Access
to the Presidium is probably negotiated in various ways.
One avenue would be through the personal secretariats of
the individual Presidium members. The executive staff
of 'the party Secretariat also has direct access to the
Presidium. (since the secretaries are Presidium members)
and is presumably the intermediary agency most frequent-
ly used to get questions before the top policy body. Some
atencies, such as :the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report
directly to the Presidium on a regular basis, so that
questions ih this area would appear on the agenda:as a
matter of routine. . I
Normally; questions which are brought before the
Presidium for deliberation hive passed through several
stages of coordination before reaching the Presidium
table.. The first stage occurs when the originating body
seeks to elicit the support or satisfy the possible ob-
jectiohs of other interested agencies on a lateral basis
before moving its proposals forward for higher considera-
tion. This initial stage of coordination is probably gov-
erned less by formal procedural protocol than by the natu-
ral.bureaucratic abhorrence of an open not.. with the
tisk of possible later embarrassment. The brake ?wore-
cipitate or ill-considered initiative which this, provides,
however, is counterbalanced by the fierce competitive at-
mosphere of the Soviet bureaucracy which might occasional-
ly lead an agency to dispense with this lateral coordina-
tion in the hope of scoring an advantage over a rival.
(16)
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A second stage of coordination, probably indiSpens=
able for the great majority of questions-which reach the
Presidium, takes place in the Central Committee Secre?
taxiat. Almost any question for Presidium consideration
would fall within the area of responsibility.of one or
more of the departments of the executive staff of the
SecretariattiandAt is quite possible that Secretariat.
recommendations are required as a matter of course, on
all questions placed before the Presidium.
? An actual case illustrating the stages through
which a question passes before reaching the Presidium
was revealed in an account recently published in Rome
of talks held between a high-ranking Italian Communist
Party delegation and Soviet Central Committee officials.
The case in question involved the ;reprimand and restaff-
lit; of the editorial board of the journal Questions of
History, which had committed a series of ideological er-
rors a 1956.
It depends on the importance of the matter.
Information can be given orally to one of
the secretaries of the Central Committee.
On the other hand, information can be given
at the appropriate meetings of the Secretar-
iat or Presidium at which representatives of
writers and artists sometimes participate.
Our department is not limited Simply to
keeping the Central Committee informed oh
developments in the cultural debate but also
takes part in working out the projects and
decisions of the Secretariat and the Central
Committee. For example, the decision about
Questions-of History was taken after long
discussion inside the Secretariat of the
Central Committee which was based on a proj-
ect.-drawn up by the department. To draw up
the project, we invited at the start the com-
rades from the editorial board of the review
to the department. Next, in January, we held
a bigger meeting, convened by our department
and the propaganda depattmeht at which (there)
participated not only the editorial board of
the review, but also the president and vice
president of the Academy of Sciences and rep-
resentatives from the Academy of Social Sci-
ences. For two days we had eight-'..tounitie'-hOdr
discussions. At the next meeting of the Sec-
retariat, the editors of the review, the comrades
of the propaganda department and our department,
and finally Comrades Pospelov and Suslov all
spoke. After this debate, the decision to change
the editorial board of the review was approved....
(17)
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Whether this question actually reached the Presi-
dium agenda is not known, but the fact that the deci-
sion referred to above was formally published in a
Central Committee decree suggests that it was, since
the Presidium is charged by the party by-laws to act
for the Central Committee When,thatihodp. is not in
session. It seems probable that the item was placed
on the agenda for notation, that Suslov or Pospelov
may have been called on to,report briefly on the mat-
ter, and that a draft decree prepared by the Culture
Department was approved, probably without formal vote.
The important point to note in this procedure is
that the issue was resolved at the top leadership lev-
el, with the participation of Presidiumimembers, but
before reaching the Presidium table. In this case,
Suslov, acting within the framework of basic policy,
rendered the effective top-level decision, not as a
Presidium member, but in his capacity as a member of
the Secretariat. Much of the current business of Pres-
idium-level importance is probably handled in this way.
Similarly, Presidium members in a less formal way, may
act to screen out nonessential business from the Presi-
dium agenda and act as a court of next-to-last resort.
Major! foreign policy questions apparently are hand-
led somewhat differently from ordinary Presidium business.
Available evidence suggests that Khrushchev and other mem-
bers of the Presidium play a greater day-to-day role in
formulating basic foreign policy than any other field of
national policy. The Presidium, or Khrushchev together
with several of the top leaders acting for the Presidium,
probably constitutes a policy-planning board on all major
foreign policy issues. Foreign Minister Gromyko, who is
nota.member_of the Presidium, sometimes attends Presidium
meetings to make suggestions and supply technical advice.
In addition, Presidium members--Khrushchev in particular--
participate personally in the implementation ?of the policy
decided upon.
Conclusions as to the effectiveness of policy-formu-
lation machinery in the Soviet Union must be tentative
and cautious. The scope of responsibility exercised by
the leaders of the Soviet Union is in itself an indica-
tion of the effectiveness of the Machinery on which they
depend. It appears to provide well-defined and clearly
structured processes for getting policy questions before
the Presidium in digested and manageable form, and to
combine with this a degree of flexibility which prevents
these processes from becoming a limitation on the Presidium's
own initiative. The success of the system appears to depend
less on its machinery, however, than on the capacity and
energy of the men who run it. By placing a premium on po-
litical survival in conditions of fierce competition, the
Soviet system has ensured the advancement of men with such
capacity and energy to the top policy-making positions.
(18)
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Chapter :4...
Organization
The Central Committee Secretariat is the second most
important decision-making body in the Soviet system, rank-
ing next to the Presidium in this regard, and it is prob-
ably the most important body for the preparation of plans
and proposing new policy. Soviet officials insist that
all questions discussed or decided whether by the govern-
ment or the quasi-independent "mass" organizations be
first examined or approved by the organizations of the
party, and the most important of these are certain to
funnel through the secretariat at one point or another.
Unlike the party Presidium, which has no administrative
responsibilities, the Secretariat is the administrative
head of the party in much the same sense as the Presidium
of the Council of Ministers (cabinet) is the administra-
tive head of the government.
The secretaries are formally "elected" by the Central '
Committee in plenary session, but in practice the Central
Committee merely rubber-stamps approval of a slate already
drawn up by the top party leaders. In the post-Stalin
period the number of secretaries has varied from a low of
three (February to July 1955) to a high of ten (December
1957 to April 1959). As noted above, there are now only
nine secretaries actually functioning as such. The num-
ber probably was increased in part to relieve Khrushchev
of some of ?the burdens of party administration, to enable
him to devote more time to political leadership and criti-
cal policy problems, in part, to cope with the(!expanding
activities of the party machine in formulating and imple-
menting state policy, and in part to divide responsibility
within the Secretariat so that greater attention could be
given to daily problems.
The administrative duties of the Secretariat are di-
vided among its members, each of whom has a specific set
of responsibilities. In the information available there
are hints of division along both functional and geo-
graphic lines. Khrushchev, as First Secretary, is of
course head of the Secretariat. Aleksey Kirichenko acts
as his second-in-command, with general supervision over
the Secretariat and its central staff. The other duties
are parceled out among the remaining secretaries. ,(see
Chart H).
The variation in the number of secietaries and some
apparent shifting of responsibilities over the past sever-
al years suggest that the organization of work within
the Secretariat is fairly flexible. In addition to their
administrative duties, all the secretaries participate
in protocol activities at diplomatic and state functions
and at one time or another have represented the regime
in visits to foreign countries.
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CHART H
PARTY SECRETARIAT
1 OCTOBER 1959
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
Secretary Probable Fields (obviouSly incomplete)
Khrushchev ? 1st Secretary; head of the Secretariat
UNCLASSIFIED
Kirichenko 2nd-in-command; general supervision
of the Secretariat and its central
staff
Suslov
Aristov
Brezhnev
Furtseva
Kuusinen
Mukhitdinov
Pospelov-
90924 H
- CPSTJ relations with foreign Communist
parties; coordination of world Commu-
nist movement
- Party organizational and personnel mat-
ters; Russian republic party affairs
? Industry and transport matters; political
work in military and paramilitary
organizations
- Culture; education, propaganda and agi-
tation matters; youth and women's
affairs
? Assists in the field of party relations
foreign Communist parties
Central Asian and Moslem Affairs
with
- Ideology, .Propaganda and Agitation, Cul-
ture, education, party schools and
academies for political and ideological
research and training
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As noted earlier the secretaries are all members of
the party: Presidium. The numerical weight in the Presi-
dium thus lies with the party secretaries, whose judg-
ments and viewpoints will be conditioned by their common
day-to-day work with the professional party functionaries.
Through this interlocking relationship the Secretariat
can and presumably does exercise a very great influence
on policy.
The executive staff of the central party organiza-
tion performs work for the secretariat and is directly
subordinate to it. This staff is more than just a sup-
port body for the. Secretariat,, however; it is the nerve
center for the entire party machine (see Chart I) and as
such plays a key role in both policy formulation. and
policy execution. Key appointments in the executive
staff are made by the Secretariat, presumably with Presi-
dium approval.
The staff is organized by departments. (otdel) which
fall into three general groups.: those concerned with the
Russian Republic (RSFSR) and administratively subordinate
to the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR, those con-
-cerned with functions in relation to the other 14 re-
publics that make up the USSR, and those with union-wide
functions. A typicaLdePartment_of...the',..staff twill..
have somewhere between 100 and 150 people organized into
subdepattMents. (podotdel) and sectors (sektor). (see
Chart J).
. During the Stalin period, all departments had respon-
sibilities embracing the entire USSR. Experimentation
in 1954 and 1955 with a diviaion of the Department of Ag-
riculture and the Department of Party Organs along terri-
torial lines led in February 1956 to the formation of a
"Bureau for the RSFSR" in the Central Committee, Organized,
according to Khrushchev, to "provide more concrete and ef-
fective leadership" for this largest and most important of
all the republics. The Bureau corresponds somewhat to
the party bureaus already existing in the 'Other 14 repub-
lics but differs in the method of its selection., i.e., it
Is picked by the all-Union Central Committee instead of by
its republic counterpart.!: The RSFSR Bureau apparently
acts as a junior presidium and secretariat; making repub-
lic-level policy decisions, and has thus helped lighten
the load of the party Presidium and Secretariat. Previ-
ously they had the task of dealing directly with each of
the RSFSR's 76 principal administrative subdivisions as
well as with the other 14 republics.
The, exact relationship between the Secretariat and
the Bureau for the RSFSR is not completely clear. There
1 *Unlike the other republics, the RSFSR does not have
Its own Central Committee but is administered directly by
the central party organization.
(20)
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?
CHART I
THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE
1 OCTOBER 1959 UNCLASSIFIED
SECRETARIAT
Secretary
FA71.-xiii-en-akT?
Secretary
[12 I.-Brezhnev.
Secretary
First Secretary
[NrSflirruAhch.avi
Secretary
Secretary
Furtseva
Secretary
NrGrIglatc5F1
Secretary
1A7137AYialb7
Secretary
c0.-17.-Kuusinen1
Secretary
Tr11.-PospehWI
'Elected Chairman, Presidium, Supreme Sovi t RSFSR, on
16 April 1959 and though not yet formally removed is prob-
ably no longer functioning as a member of the Party Secretariat
DEPARTMENTS FOR THE UNION REPUBLICS
Party Organs
Pro a rxl.k. 8 la nation
eh
Agriculture
[G7:A..Der?a.rn5
Heavy Industry
prVrrin-cIF ktv]
Machine Building
Light & Food Industry
117.:17 Lubehnikov
Construction
I. A. Grishmanov
Transport &
Communications
Trade, Finance 8z Planning
Organs
Administrativ Organs
N. R. Mfronov
Culture
&fielPIFTFREFFFGG
Science, Higher Educational
Institutions & Schools
TrAPLImFini
= FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE ,CPSU
= CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
= MEMBER, CENTRAL AUDITING COMMISSION, CPSU
90924 t
BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR
Chairman
Deputy Chairman
rA.:13ArlW59
[NrG."-Ittitovl
MEMBERS
rAP-KiFnEl I. V. iridonov
D. S. Polyansky GIV7Eyex
P. N. Pos elov M. A. YasnovA
Not definitely identifi
because of their othe
Vorobyev-Head Agri
d as members but thought to be
positions (Polyansky-RSFSR Premier;
ulture Department for the RSFSR)
DEPARTMENTS FOR THE RSFSR
Party Organs
rinrchlawl
Propaganda fa Agitation
dry10.,RugNIgtM
Industry 8z Transport
S. A. Baskakov
Science, Schools & Culture
Administrative, Trade &
Finance Organs
Sovetskaya Rossiya
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DEPARTMENTS OF GENERAL CONCERN
Liaison with Bloc
Communist Parties
Yu. V. Andropov
Liaison with Non-Bloc
Communist Parties
IftCrPo on-Thainev
Foreign Affairs
Commission for
Travel Abroad
General
Pravda
rArAis
Kommunist
-Kons1 ntin?.
Chief Political Directorate,
Soviet Army & Navy
F. I. Golikov
Military Commission
Administration of Affairs
V. V. Pivovarov
?
Others?
"Fa. I. Kabkov
'May head one of those whose
chief is unknown or may head
a department thus far unidenti-
L fled
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CHART J
UNCLASSIFIED
PROBABLE ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE,
SCHOOLS AND CULTURE FOR THE RSFSR
Head
N. a Kazmin
Deputy Head
V. N. Derbinov
Deputy Head
Z. P. Tumanova
SUB DEPARTMENTS
SCIENCE AND SCHOOLS
Head
V. N. Derbinov
SECTORS
Natural Sciences &
Technology
Social
Sciences
Higher Educational
Institutions
Schools
90924 J
CULTURE
Head
Z. P. Tumanova
SECTORS
Literature
Art, Theater,
Music
Motion Pictures
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is no mention of the Bureau for the RSFSR in the party
rules, even though amendments were made to the rules at
the time the Bureau was created. Therefore it does not
have statutory status equal to the Presidium, Secretariat,
or Party Control Committee. The fact that First Secre-
tary Khrushchev is chairman, and that the deputy chair-
man'and one of the nine members of the RSFSR Bureau are
also members of the Secretariat, is, however, adequate
insurance against uncoordinated activities. The Bureau
should, perhaps, be viewed as a subcommittee of the Sec-
retariat for dealing with RSFSR problems. A close work-
ing relation apparently is maintained between an RSFSR
department and its union-republic counterpart.
The, fields of responsibility of most of the depart-
ments in the party executive staff are generally reflected
in their names. The "party organs" departments, however,
also have responsibility for the trade unions and the
Komsomol (youth organization); "administrative organs"
cover a potpourri--the courts, public prosecutor's of-
fice, organs of state control, the police and security
forces, and health, social welfare, and physical culture
organs; and "propaganda and agitation" covers the whole
field of mass communications. The publishing houses
Pravda and Kommunist function as separate departments,
but they maintain close collaboration with the "propa-
ganda and agitation" departments.
The chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army
and Navy is in fact a department of the central party
staff and is responsible for political training and loyal-
ty of the armed forces. There is probably also a mili-
tary commission for considering and approving officer as-
signments in the armed forces.
Responsibility for relations with foreign Communist
parties is divided between two departments, one dealing
with Bloc and the other with non-Bloc parties. These
are the principal working-level channels for Soviet sup-
port, direction, and control of the world-wide Communist
movement. Recent activities of personnel associated with
these two departments suggest that their responsibility
may include foreign affairs generally. The possibility
that there is a separate "foreign policy" department, how-
ever, cannot be excluded. A special "Commission for Travel
Abroad" rules on the political reliability and suitability
of individuals proposed by any Soviet agency for a foreign
assignment.
The "Administration of Affairs" performs general
housekeeping functions for the Secretariat and executive
staff and a "General" department handles sensitive materi-
al and secret communications; it May, in fact, be the
party's internal intelligence unit.
(21)
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The Functioning of the Secretariat
Collectively and through the individual activities
of its members, the Secretariat provides day-to-day di-
rection and leadership for the rest of the professional
party machine (full-time paid officials) which in addi-
tion.to the Secretariat and its executive staff includes
a highly disciplined hierarchy of subordinate secretari-
ats and staffs corresponding to the republics, oblasts,
and lesser administrative divisions of the country. (see
Chart B).
In general terms, the professional party machine
performs the following functions:
1) Disseminates, explains, and interprets party
and state policy decisions.*
2) Implements party policy.
3) Checks on and ensures the implementation of
state policy by governmental and other organs.
4) Mobilizes economic and social pressures for the
implementation.of party and state policy.
5) Allocates manpower and resources of the party.
6) Collects and filters information and prepares
reports, memos, and staff studies for the Secretariat?
and Presidium.
7) Calls attention of the Secretariat and Presidium
to problems and prepares, suggests, and-reCommends plans
for their solution. ?
The actual operations of the Secretariat are largely
unknown. Although most of the secretaries oversee one or
more of the departments in the executive staff, in only a
very limited sense are they agents of the particular points
of view Of their respective groups of departments. Each
secretary is a relatively free agent expressing his own in-
dividual opinion as one of the "elected" leaders of the
party. His point of view on policy issues, however, is
almost certain to be colored somewhat by the range of his
experience in handling day-to-day administrative chores
and in overseeing the execution of policy in particular
fields, and he will presumably gain an expertise in his
fields of responsibility which may tend toward parochial-
ism.
*The apparatus used in this process is described in An-
nex A.
(22)
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The Secretariat undoubtedly prepares reports and
papers for the Presidium and may even determine the
agenda for its meetings. As a matter of routine, poli-
cy papers prepared by the Council of Ministers or any
of the quasi-independent organizations, such as the
Academy of Sciences, the All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions, or the Central Union of Consumers Coop-
eratives, may be reviewed by the Secretariat before
presentation to the party Presidium, but it is doubt-
ful that the Secretariat could prevent Presidium con-
sideration if any of its members were determined other-
wise. Certainly Mikoyan and Kozlov have enough person-
al power and prestige to ensure such consideration un-
less it is adamantly.opposed by Khrushchev.
The full extent to which the Secretariat prepares
plans for approval or rejection by. the Presidium is
not clear. Fragmentary evidence suggests that the sec-
retariat does a good deal of the actual shaping of
plans. So far as is known there is no planning body
as such attached to it. The departments of the execu-
tive staff combine the functions of planning with those
of policy execution, and then only in their assigned
fields. The elaboration of plans cutting across those
narrowly defined fields apparently is done in the Sec-
retariat itself, either by the whole body' of secretaries
or possibly by ad hoc subcommittees of three or more
secretaries. The Secretariat is, of course, no more
capable of producing finished, coherent, well-meshed
plans than the Presidium. It may be assumed that much
of the planning consists simply of dovetailing material
derived from policy papers and information reports pre-
pared by the departments of the executive staff or other
agencies, with liberal interjection of the ideas and
points of view of the individual secretaries.
Under the supervisory direction of one of the sec-
retaries, each department of the executive staff, in its
assigned field, gathers and processes information, high-
lights problem areas, prepares reports and staff studies,
and recommends courses of action. Information and poli-
cy recommendations flow from the departments as the re-
sult of direct requests from the Secretariat or an indi-
vidual secretary, or as a by-product of the department's
function of checking on policy execution and the opera-
tions of agencies in the department's field of responsi-
bility.
The departments maintain constant contact with the
lower echelons of the party. The bulk of communications
is probably handled by post, telephone, and radio, but
personal contact also plays an important role. Respon-
sible representatives of a department are sent into the
field and may spend as much as three fourths of their
time visiting agencies, organizations, and operations.
They check on conditions, resolve many local problems on
the spot, and report the results of their investigations
(23)
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to their department in Moscow. Also, the regional party
and government officials, despite the long distances they
often must travel, spend a remarkable amount of time in
Moscow conferring with officials in the executive staff,
explaining their local problems and seeking solutions.
Frequently, departments organize conferences on topics'
of general concern, and these conferences are participated
in by appropriate officials from all over the country.
In these various ways emerging problems are identi-
fied and ideas generated for their solution, but though
this process may result in the fragments and pieces of a
national strategic plan, because it is carried out on a
largely departmental basis, it seldom produces a complete
plan. The fashioning of such an over-all plan is performed
by the top party leaders in the Secretariat and the Pre-
sidium.
As noted earlier, formulations of state policy emanat-
ing from the Presidium are sometimes vague and often in-
complete. Much of whatever unity and coherency Soviet na-
tional policy possesses arises out of the process of ex-
plaining, interpreting, translating into concrete tasks,
and resolving conflicts as they arise in the course of
trying to implement the Presidium ,decisions. The Secre-
tariat, through the departments of its executive staff,
probably does as much as or more than any other agency in
the Soviet Union in performing this function.
(24)
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Chapter 5. SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Although the Soviet system of government is in theory
a constitutional democracy, the all-pervading influence of
the Communist Party has prevented the formal governmental
system from achieving any independent life of its own.
The government is a major administrator of the policy
decisions emanating from the party Presidium, implement-
ing them as quickly and efficiently as it can, but in-
fluencing them only with the indulgence of the top party
leaders. This influence, however, is easily felt through
the presence of several Presidium members at the direct-
ing helm of the governmental machinery.
The governmental structure, to an even greater extent
than the party structure, is designed to create and main-
tain the fiction that it is based on popular support and
that the will of the mass of people finds accurate expres-
sion in its activities. The stellar role in the facade of
democratic processes is played by the Supreme Soviet,
which according to the Soviet Constitution, is "the high-
est organ of state power in the USSR." Ostensibly com-
posed of popularly elected deputies and performing the
usual functions of a Western legislature, the Supreme So-
viet is neither popularly elected nor entrusted with any
real role in the decision-making process.
The Supreme Soviet (see chart K) is formally a
bicameral legislature with coequal houses, the deputies
of one house--the Soviet of the Union--elected on the
basis of population, and the deputies of the other--the
Soviet of Nationalities--elected on a territorial basis
by nationality unit.
"Elections" of deputies are held every four years
and are the occasion. of a major propaganda effort to
popularize the regime and emphasize the "popular" base
of the Soviet system.,. In actual practice, however, only
one deputy--selected-by or with the consent of the party--
is allowed to run from any constituency. Being selected
as a nominee by the appropriate party body is tantamount
to election. Thus the electorate has no effective ?choice
on election day and traditionally votes over 99 percent
for the single candidate in each electoral district. Al-
though the party represents less than 7 percent of the
adult population, 76 percent of the deputies elected to
the Supreme Soviet at the last election (March 1958)
were party members. The others were members of the so-
called "nonparty bloc," i.e., not party members but con-
sidered by the party to be reliable adherents of its pro-
gram. While most of the deputies are important party or
government officials, nearly a third are workers at the
bench and the plow, which helps to give the Supreme So-
viet the appearance of a truly representative assembly.
Although the Constitution specifies that it convene
twice a year, the Supreme Soviet has not usually.beep
called into session that often (See chart L).
(25)
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CHART K
POSITION OF USSR SUPREME SOVIET
UNCLASSIFIED
PARTY PRESIDIUM,
CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
SECRETARIAT, AND APPARATUS
USSR SUPREME SOVIET
(1,378 deputies)
PRESIDIUM
15
OF SUPREME
Chairman
Secretary
Deputy Chairmen
16 Members
SOVIET
Protocol Department
Information-Statistics
Department
Chancellery
I
EQUAL-
i
SOVIET OF THE UNION
(738 Deputies) -CO
(One deputy for every 300, 000 citizens)
Chairman
4 Deputy Chairmen
STANDING COMMISSIONS
Legislative Proposals (31 members)
Budget ? (39 members)
Foreign Affairs (23 members)
SOVIET OF NATIONALITIES
(640 Deputies)
(25 deputies per union republic
11 deputies per autonomous republic
5 deputies per autonomous oblast
1 deputy per national okrug)
Chairman
4 Deputy Chairmen
STANDING COMMISSIONS
Legislative Proposals (31 members)
Budget (39 members)
Foreign Affairs (23 members)
Economic (31 members)
909 2 4 I(
USSR PROCURATOR
GENERAL
USSR COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS
Actual control
USSR
SUPREME COURT
ompow mo. mo. Formal constitutional control
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CHART L
SUPREME SOVIET SESSIONS
1st Convocation (elected 12 December 1937)
8 years - 12 sessions
2nd Convocation (elected 10 February 1946)
4 years - 5 sessions
UNCLASSIFIED
3rd Convocation (elected 12 March 1950
1st session 12-19 June 1950 (7 days)
2nd session 6-12 March 1951 (6 days)
3rd session 5-8 March 1952 (4 days)
4th session 15 March 1953 (1 day)
5th session 5-8 August 1953 (4 days)
4th Convocation (elected 14 March 1954)
1st session 20-26 April 1954
2nd session 3-9 February 1955
3rd session 4-5 August 1955
4th session 26-29 December 1955
5th session 11-16 July 1956
6th session 5-12 February 1957
7th session 7-10 May 1957
Jubilee session 6 November 1957
5th Convocation (elected 16 March 1958)
1st session 27-31 March 1958
2nd session 22-25 December 1958
90924 L
(6 days)
? (6 days)
(2 days)
(4 days)
(5 days)
(7 days)
(4 days)
(ceremonial session,
no work)
(4 days)
(4 days)
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The infrequency of its meetings and the restricted length
of. sessions is clear indication of its limited role.
Membership in the Supreme Soviet, however, does confer
prestige on the deputy and, thrOlighthe periodic trips
to Moscow and shoulder-rubbing with the important leaders
of the state, expands the number of persons feeling a close
identification with the regime. The Supreme Soviet is al-
so a useful forum for explaining and promulgating some of
the more formal legalistic, decisions of the,regime'and
generating enthusiasm for their implementation.
Patterned on the Western system of legislative com-
mitteee, each house of the Supreme Soviet has. permanent
commissions for preliminary preparation of legislation
(see chart 10. Until 1957 these commissions rarely met.
Since then, however, their meetings have been more fre-
quent and of longer duration, and there is some evidence
that they may now be'playing the useful though limited
role of searching out and resolving confliets.between pro-
posed and existing legislation and putting the proposals
into legal form. It has increasingly become the practice
to draw more of the Soviet citizenry. into the legislative,
process by 'publishing draft legislation and calling for
"nationwide" discussion.* The standing commissions of
the two houses of the Supreme Soviet, aCcording to one
Soviet law professor, "make a thorough study" of the
'critical remakks and suggestions made in the course
Of the public discussion and tailor the legislation ac-
cordingly. This is about the closest Soviet public
opinion comes 'to influencing legislation, and the changes
that result in the proposed laws are invariably so minor
as to rule out any-real public opinion influence.
Since important decisions on foreign policy are not
channeled through the Strethe Soviet, the Foreign Af-
fairs Commissions play an even more perfunctory role than
do the other standing commissions.**
, . .
Between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, formal leg-
islative power is vested in the Presidium of the Supreme
. Soviet, a 33-man body elected by the two houses in joint
session to serve as collegial president. This body of-
ficially represents the Soviet State and is granted broad
powers by the Constitution, including declaring war,
mobilization, and martial law, naming and relieving min-
isters And military commanders, and concluding interna-
tional agreements. The Supreme Soviet Presidium, however,
* *
This is never done, however', with matters of direct
strategic importance or of foreign policy.
The commissions probably average about two weeks a
year in session. The longest any commission has been
reported in session during any one year-was eight
weeks, and it may be presumed that only a portion of
the commission was functioning for the full period.
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(26)
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is little more than a formal instrument for promulgating
some of.the decisions of the top party leaders--decisions
which in-most states are made by organs of government.
? The official acts of the Supreme Soviet Presidium
are known as Ukases. The great majority of published
Ukases involve state awards to outstanding workers,
peasants, and officials, or to mothers with many children.
Others announce changes in the heads of ministries or
ambassadors to foreign countries. Ukases other than
awards are confirmed as a matter of course at the next
session of the Supreme Soviet. The bulk of what in West-
ern democracies is generally considered the business of
legislation, however, is promulgated in the Soviet Union
with the full force of law by the executive rather than
legislative organ.
The Supreme Soviet in theory "elects" the executive
organ of the state--the Council of Ministers--as well as
the judicial organt--the Supreme Court and the Procurator
General (public prosecutor). In practice, however, the
Supreme Soviet without discussion gives automatic, un-
animous approval to a list decided on by the top party
leaders and presented by the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers.
The judicial organs play no discernible role in the
decision-making process. The concept of precedent as a
source of law is expressly rejected, as is the idea of
the superiority of constitutional provisions over ordinary
legislation. Moreover, the all-pervasive influence of the
monolithic party precludes any "independent" court inter-
pretations.
The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, is the
most important agency in the governmental structure for
highlighting problems and planning policy, and it is the
body primarily responsible for the implementation of the
law. According to the Constitution, the Council of Min-
isters directs the work of ministries and other govern-
mental bodies, executes the national economic plan and the
State budget, strengthens the monetary system, conducts
foreign affairs, and supervises the general structure of
the armed forces.
The Council is composed of a Chairman (Premier),
First Deputy Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen, heads of various
ministries, state committees and other agencies, and
certain other individuals included on the Council be-
cause of either their position or their responsibilities.
As of 1 October 1959 there were 65 members of the Council
(See chart M). According to one Soviet author, "all
important problems within the competence of /The Council
of Ministers7 are discussed and resolved at regularly held
sessions by-a simple majority vote." The extreme bulk
of the full Council makes it seem more likely, however,
that the actual decisions are made by the much smaller
Presidium of the Council of Ministers, with the full Coun-
cil, if it does meet, giving pro forma approval.
(27)
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CHART M
USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
1 OCTOBER 1959
UNCLASSIFIED
PRESIDIUM
Chairman
u.drarignam
FirtirWman
Firjjman
Deputy Chairman
Depot Chairman
Deputy Chairman
1210121MII
( IMPernlosplan)
A. F. Zasyadko
and individuals personally des gas ed by the Council of Ministers"
? as of mid-1959
\
, ? be ?
, atalteKlai
(Minister of Agriculture)
Member
=err
(Minister of Finance)
Commission for
Current Questions
SERVICE UNITS
Protocol Department
Administration of Affairs
(housekeeping functions)
ALL- UNION
HEADS
OF MINISTRIES
UNION - REPUSUCAN
CHAIRMEN
OF STATE COMMITTEES
relamit
Construction of
Electric Power Stations
I. T. Novikov
A riculture
ForiaamLdar&
Gro
Automation &
Machine II Ilding
inffiggel
liviations Technoi
Yea
&IV vied
For rade
Communications
N. D. Psurtsev
Geology &
Mineral Conservation
P. Ya. AntronOv
Mattersl
Covnisitriocitnhot
Chemistry
V. S. Fedorov
IN-TS.T.Parhav
Medium
Machine Burgling
Ye. P. Slavsky
Culture
nr,CiirM
Health
S. V. Kurashov
Foreign Economic
Relations
S. A. Sicachkov
Defense Technology
K. N. Rodney
Railways
Defense
nigher & Specialized
Secondar Education
Labor 0 Wage
Grain Products
11210=21
hev
ItILY,Vallialbur .21
Sea Fleet
V. G. Bakayev
Finance
glefrimmal atri
Professional &
Technical Education
G. I. Zelenko
Radio Electronics
an=
Transport
Construction
Ye. F. Kozhevnikov
Science &
Technology
ITMIEMETEI
Shipbuilding
B. Ye. Butoma
Other Ministers
(Gosplan officials who on recommendation of the chairman,
USSR Council of Ministers, have been appointed USSR Min-
isters and Included In the Council of Ministers)
M. A. LeteChk0 (1st Deputy Chairman) G. V. Percy (1st Deputy Chairman)
ladiV-IKlirualchev1 (DeputyChairman) sit iii-blijAah. (Deputy Chairman)
EMI (Be uty Chairman)
(Department Read). ? (Department Head)
UnTril (Department Head) e. . ovoselov (Department Head)
(position unknown) k..0 /Kabano_vi (Position unknown)
V. E. Dymshlts
G. S. Kidamov
HEADS OF OTHER COMMITTIES, COMMISSIONS, ETC.
Committee of
Sur
Board of
State Bank
A. K. KOrOVUShltin
Commission of
Soviet Control
Central Statistical
Adml istration
V. N. Siarovsky
State Set Mille
Eleouncil
m
Ex Officio Members
(Chairmen of Republic Councils of Ministers)
A. Ye ICOCIDnyftn
M. A. iskenderov
T. Va. Kinder
rAlturs
cto.iDzhavattlehr
.I.A.TKunaytiV
K. D. DikambaYev
D. S. Polyansky (RS
(Armenian SSR)
(Aterbaydzhan MR)
(Belorussian SSR)
(Estonian SSR)
I (Georgian SSR)
(Kazakh SSR)
? (Kirgiz SSR)
R)
(Latvian &SR)
(Lithuanian SSR)
A. F. lb . lea (Moldavian $SR)
D. Dodkhudoyev (Tadzhik $SR) '
itt_mat
.es t (Turkmen SSR)
(Ukrainian MR)
A. A. Allmov (Uzbek SSR)
WM Full Member, Central Committee, CPSU
Candidate Member. Central Committee, CPSU
Mil Member, Central Auditing Commission, CPSU
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Chapter 6,-? FRKsIppld OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
The Presidium of the Council of Ministers con-
sists of the Premier, First Deputy Premiers, and Dep-
uty Premiers, and "individuals personally designated
by the Council of Ministers." As of mid-1958 the
Minister of Agriculture, V. V. Matskevich, and the
Minister of Finance, A. G. Zverev, were the addition-
al members of the Council of Ministers Presidium. (See
Chart M).
The Presidium is the administrative head of the
Council of Ministers and, in theory, exists to take
care of current operational problems so the full coun-
cil can concentrate on the "big questions." In prac-
tice, however, as noted above, the Presidium probably
makes the 'important policy decisions as well. Its po-
sition and role in the government structure are thus
somewhat akin to that of the party Secretariat in the
party hierarchy.
The government Presidium is hierarchically organized
with Khrushchev at ?its head. The two First Deputies,
Mikoyan and Kozlov, divide the major responsibilities
between them and substitute for Khrushchev when he. is
absent. Mikoyan concentrates on foreign affairs--in-
cluding foreign economic relations--while Kozlov is
primarily concerned with domestic matters. The Deputy
Premiers are assigned special responsibility for cer-
tain key fields (Fcbsyginfleconomic planning, Ustinov--
defense production, and Zasyadko--basic raw materials
and fuel). The two added members, Matskevich and Zverev,
are responsible for the fields represented by their re-
spective ministries, agriculture and finance.
?
As a body the government Presidium does not carry
political weight equal to that of the party Secretariat.
Only the Premier, Khrushchev, and his two First Deputies,
Mikoyan and Kozlov, are full members of the party Presi-
dium and one Deputy, Kosygin, is a candidate member.
Moreover, Khrushchev, who is above all Party First Sec-
retary, is ,probably too busy with other matters to par-
ticipate regularly in the work of the Council of Min-
isters Presidium. He has been somewhat distrustful of
the economic managerial group and impatient with the
narrow bureaucratic interests they tend to develop. He
has based his regime primarily on the professional par-
ty machine and is probably strongly influenced by sug-
gestions arid advice emanating from that source. Mikoyan
and Kozlov, however, have considerable personal influence
with Khrushchev, probably sufficient to ensure that any
point of view developed in the government Presidium on
major policy issues is given a respectable hearing in
the party Presidium. Their influence is probably also
strong enough to protect against the encroachment of
professional party officials ?in the managerial func-
tions of the government.
(28)
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The Presidium of the Council Of Ministers oversees
the preparation of plans add information, reports by the
ministries, state committees, and.other agencies of the
government; it reviews them, and, where necessary, it.
merges partial plans into a coordinated whole. It may
generate ideas and probably develops guidelines for
more detailed planning by subordinate units. It is ?
doubtful, however, that the government Presidium per-
forms the functions of a general policy-planning board,
preparing government-party coordinated plans on broad
Strategic issues for party Presidium consideration.
More likely, its responsibility is to see that the pol-
icy papers and information reports it forwards to the
party Presidium are adequately prepared and fully co-
ordinated within the government. When sharp differences
of view develop among ministries and state committees'
in regard to particular issues, however, alternate:pro-
posals are probably forwarded for the party Presidium's
consideration.
This view of the government Presidium's functions
in policy planning and processing Of information does
not rule out the existence of considerable,informal con-
sultation and coordination with the party Secretariat
and officials in its staff, although most such consulta-
tion probably takes place at working levels. Any dif-
ferences of view which remain unresolved after these con-
sultations will go before the party Presidium for deci-
sion.
The main work of the Presidium of the'rouncil of
Ministers as a: body and of its members individually is
'the supervision of policy execution by the government.
Within the framework of policies established by the par-
ty Presidium, decisions governing the.operations of gov-
ernment agencies are worked out, state policy is inter-.'
preted, tasks for its implementation are assigned, and
conflicts arising in the course of implementation are
resolved. Most of this current operational work. probably
is performed:by the deputy premiers acting individually,
with the full Presidium of the Council of Ministers called
to discuss and decide only the knottier problems.
Problems arising in operations of the governmental
machinery that require high-level decision--whether they
involve interpretation of laws or other state policy de-
cisions, jurisdictional disputes or decisions on specific
questions not adequately covered in existing laws and
regulations--are usually referred to the Deputy Premier
or First Deputy Premier who has responsibility for the
general field wherein the problem lies. Occasionally
other deputy premiers are called in to help with the so-
lution. If the problem:is general in nature or cuts
across the fields of jurisdiction of several deputy
premiers, it is referred to the Commission for Current
Affairs, a subcommittee of the Presidium of the Council
of Ministers charged with examining and deciding all cur-
rent problems other than those within the competence of a
First Deputy Premier or a single Deputy Premier.
(29)
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Decisions on basic problems of governmental ac-
.tivity are issued as decrees (postanoYleniya) of the
Council of Ministers and are signed by the chairMan'i
or First Deputy acting in his Stead, and the AdMihi-
:strator of Affairs, who combines the functions of
Chief clerk with the responsibility of. managing other
housekeeping chores,for the Council of Ministers. De-
cisions on questions .of current operational administra-
tion are issued as orders (rasporyazheniya) of the
Coundil of Ministers and signed-by the person who is-
sues them--the chairman of the Council of Ministers
or one of his deputies. Decrees and regulations of ?
the Council of Ministers have, the full force of law
throughout the Soviet Union. Although the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet has the constitutional power
to annul decrees and regulations which do not accord
to the existing law, the practice has been to change
the law instead.
(30)
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Chapter 7, MINISTRIES, STATE COMMITTEES, AND OTHER AGENCIES
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
The functional units of the Council of Ministers are the
16 ministries, 13 state committees, five other agencies whose
heads aremmeMbers of the Council, and several specialized
agencies of lesser importance.
Ministries administer specific sectors of the nation's
economic or cultural life such as agriculture, health, or
railways. State committees differ from ministries in that
they are not primarily administrative bodies. They super-
vise and coordinate activities of ministries and other ad-
ministrative agencies of the government which relate to the
committee's field of competence. For example, the State
Committee for Automation and Machine Building coordinates
the effort to increase automation in all spheres of the
national economy. The five special agencies do not fall
into either category, but they are regarded as having suf-
ficient importance to be included in the Soviet cabinet
because of the national character of their work.
There are also various other councils, chief dir'ec-
torates, directorates, and committees. These administer
specialized projects of short duration, important longer
term activities over which the government wishes to main-
tain supervision and control, or certain activities outside.
the sphere of established ministries but too limited to .
justify the formation of a new organ of ministerial hunk.
Among the more important of these special bodies are the
chief directorates of civil air fleet, highway construction,
peiceful.Ase of:atomic energy, and the Telegraphic Agency
of the Soviet Union (TASS). Other committees and councils
administer such activities as stockpiling useful minerals,
cultural relations with foreign countries, and radio and
television broadcasting. The heads of these agencies are
appointed by the Council of Ministers but are not them-
selves members of the Council.
Ministries
There are two types of ministries, "all-union" and
"union-republic." (See chart M). The former directly
administer enterprises and activities in their fields of
responsibility, regardless of their physical location
within the country. The "union-republic" ministries ad-
minister a few activities directly, but they operate pri-
marily through counterpart ministries in each republic.
For example, the USSR Ministry of Health does not maintain
field representatives of its own, but transmits its orders
to the health ministry in each republic. Such ministries
are subordinate both to the republic Council of Ministers
and to the parent ministry in Moscow. As previously ?noted
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republic governments also include ministerial portfolios
which are purely local in nature. Called "republic minis-
tries," they direct activities which are peculiar to the
republic in which they exist and which are not sufficiently
widespread or important to warrant the formation of a minis-
try in the national government.
The names of the ministries indicate their fields of
responsibility, except that Medium Machine Building is a
cover name for the atomic energy ministry (development
and military uses). The organizational structure of a
ministry is very similar to that of the Council of Minis-
ters on a miniature scale; like all other institutions in
Soviet society, it is analogous to a pyramid. At the
apex stands the minister. He is assisted by a first
deputy, who is second-in-command for general administra-
tion, and by several deputy ministers, each having juris-
diction over a 'specific area of the ministry's work.
Together with a few other responsible officials, these
men form the "collegium" (presidium) of the ministry.
Below the collegium are the chief directorates, director-
ates, and departments, each charged with general super-
vision of a geographical or functional area of work (or
sometimes a combination of both). Often, but not always,
deputy ministers are also heads of important chief direc-
torates or other units; in most cases, the heads of the
more important directorates who are not deputy ministers
are members of the collegium.
Branching out from central headquarters, ministries
maintain field representatives in oblasts and lower ad-
ministrative-territorial units, with the chain of command
thence extending downward into individual factories, shops,
combines, and other enterprises.
Ministries are executive organs; their work is per-
formed in strict accordance with tasks assigned by the
government and is guided by established party and govern-
ment policy. Any action taken outside their specific
fields of competence must have the explicit approval of
the Council of Ministers.
Within this framework, ministries are empowered to
decide all basic questions affecting the activities and
enterprises under their jurisdiction. They function on
the principle of "one-man leadership" (yedinonachaliye),
in which the minister ultimately and personally bears
responsibility for whatever takes place in his agency.
He enjoys fairly broad discretionary powers in assigning
and promoting personnel, allocating and re-allocating
basic means of production (both fiscal and material),
and assigning production tasks in order to fulfill the
demands levied on the ministry. However, he is always
under the watchful eye of professional party officials
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ever ready to call him to account for deviations from party
policy or failure to fulfill his assigned tasks.
The collegium, of which the minister is chairman,
functions as a collective coordinating body for the entire
ministry. It meets regularly to consider reports from
lower bodies on the progress of work, to resolve problems
which have cropped up, to formulate reports to be sent up
to the Council of Ministers, ?and to draft directives and
orders to the subordinate echelons. These reports are
signed by the minister, not by ?the collegium, and despite
the facade of collective leadership, his voice is final.
In cases of disagreement between him and other members of
the collegium, the minister's decision is put into effect
with the understanding that members of the collegium have
the right of direct appeal to the Council of Ministers.
The chief directorates and the directorates supervise
specific sectors of the ministry's work. Also functioning
on the basis of one-man leadership, but having no collegia,
they maintain a semblance of collectivity through frequent
"production conferences" of individual sub-units, or groups
of subordinate entities. The chief directorates translate
their general assignments into specific tasks and issue
the requisite orders to the lower echelons. It is unlikely
that the latter have very much leeway in interpreting
orders received from above, and independent initiatives
probably must be cleared with the collegium. Since the
governmental reorganization of 1957, however, there has
been an increased tendency on the part of lower echelon
officials to assert themselves, and they are not nearly
so hesitant to make suggestions and requests to the cen-
ter as in previous years.
In addition to recommendations and requests, the direc-
torates also regularly prepare work and progress reports
for the collegium. These papers are coordinated laterally
with other interested directorates and departments before
submission; this does not imply, however, that papers
reaching the collegium have the general agreement of all
concerned. Differences in point of view between lower
units are resolved by the collegium, and this body fre-
quently calls up representatives from lower echelons to
reinforce their standpoints by oral testimony. The colle-
gium of a 'ministrysof:thW "union=republic", has.:the -
authority to request reports from the corresponding minis-
tries in the republics. A report requested by a republic
ministry probably is not coordinated laterally before sub-
mission to Moscow. Lateral coordination of important
reports prepared by central ministries for the USSR Council
of Ministers can be presumed, however; such coordination
probably takes place at the collegium level in the minis-
tries concerned.
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State Committees
State committees are structurally similar to all-
union ministries; they operate through a system of field
representatives and, with the exception of the State
Planning Committee and certain of the specialized agen-
cies, do not have counterparts in the republics. Their
organization at the center is also analogous to that ofa
'ministry, being composed of the chairman, his deputy
chairmen, and functional subdivisions.
As stated above, state committees are coordinating
bodies for those activities of other government agencies
centering around a common problem. They make preliminary
examinations of the decisions of these agencies and pre-
sent to the Council of Ministers their conclusions and
suggestions on such matters as projected plans, techni-
cal-economic indices of work of individual branches and
norms for the utilization of the mechanical means of pro-
duction, and measures for improving the work of minis-
tries and departments.
Within the limits of their competence, the state com-
mittees are also charged with supervision over certain ac-
tivities of government departments. In the specific field
with which they are concerned, they oversee the rational
use of resources, introduction of new techniques, and at-
tempts to improve the quality of work, and they see to it
that the various agencies put resources into the state re-
'serves.
Like the ministries, the state committees also have
certain planning functions. Whereas the planning depart-
ments of the ministries draw up economic plans for the
ministry as a whole, the corresponding departments in
state committees have more clearly delineated responsi-
bilities. They pull together information from the rest
of the government and prepare for the CounCil of Minis-
ters and the State Planning Committee their recommenda-
tions on distribution and transportation of the resources
with which they are concerned, introduction of new tech-
niques, scientific-technical propaganda, and measures for
improving systems of labor and wages.
.1 Thus the state committees assemble from all over the
government a.variety of reports bearing on a common prbb-
lem (such as automation) and integrate them into general
reports for submission to the State Planning Committee and
the Council of Ministers. They receive from these bodies
general instructions which in turn are formulated as spe-
cific requirements to be put into effect in all govern-
ment agencies concerned.
The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) deserves spe-
cial mention because of its unique niche in the Soviet de-
cision-making, process. :Aa.the.central Authority supervis-
ing the USSR's planned economy, it formulates the specific
P
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plans for implementing the broad economic objectives laid
down by the party Presidium. Its importance is evidenced
by the fact that Gosplan Chairman Aleksey Kosygin is a
deputy premier and a candidate member of the party Presi-
dium, and several deputy chairmen and department heads
carry the rank of minister.
Gosplan is organizationally similar to a union-re-
public type of ministry, and each republic has a State
Planning Committee which in theory is subordinate both
to the republic Council of Ministers and to USSR Gosplan.
In practice the line of command runs almost exclusively
to the center, and Gosplan has direct operational con-
trol not only over its counterparts in the republics, but
also over the planning departments in individual minis-
tries and state committees.*
Specialized Agencies
None of the five specialized agencies which are a
part of the Council of Ministers plays a critical role
in decision-making, although they contribute to the
process through their special fields of work. The So-
viet Control Commission is primarily concerned with check-
ing on fulfillment of State directives, particularly in
the implementation of economic plans. The commission
has counterparts at the republic level, with representa-
tives stationed throughout the country. The State Bank
(Gosbank) is the principal_credit institution of the USSR,
It is the bank of issue and virtually the sole fiscal
agent for all levels of government; it has branches through-
out the nation.
The Committee of State Security (KGB) is the organi-
zation of the secret police; Its functions are similar to
those of the FBI, C/A, and the law-enforcement arms of the
Treasury Department combined.** The KGB has republic
counterparts, but these are completely subordinate to the
center rather than to the republic governments. The State
Scientific-Economic Council is primarily responsible for
coordinating research on technical-economic questions,
particularly in the improving of planning techniques.
, The Central Statistical Administration is the reppsi-
tory for facts and figures on all phases of Soviet life.
It publishes economic and production reports and limited
population studies; it supervised the taking of the Soviet
census last fall.
*For further discussion of its operations see Chapter IV
**For a discussion of intelligence organizations, see
Annex F.
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::FOREIGN -POLICY
Chapterniv-iINTRODUCTION
As noted above, major foreign policy .questions ap-
parently.are handled somewhat differently from Ordinary
Presidium business. Khrushchev has quite obviously been
impatient with the mechanisms of normal diplomacy and
patently dietrudtful of the ability Or professional dip-
lomats to handle critical foreign policy situations.
The Presidium--or Khrushchev together with several of
the top leaders acting for the Presidium--probably.con-
stitutes a policy-planning board on all major foreign
piney isSUes: Moreover, Presidium members, Khrushchev
in particular; participate personally in the implementa-
tion of the policy decided Upon: Foreign Minister Gromyko,
who is not a member of the Presidium, sometimesattends
the meetings to make suggestions and supply technical
advice. Khrushchev, however, has gone out Of his way in
public and private comments to underline the limitations
on Gromyko's authority and, in the process, to emphasize
the degree of his own personal domination of foreign
Khrushchev's confidence in speaking for the major-
ity of the Presidium has been reflected time after time
in his off-the-duff remarks-on international problems,
as he has proclaimed in public the aims and tactics of
Soviet foreign policy which he determines in private.
This is particularly evident on the few occasions he has
.used the first-persom.1 singular in speaking of the def-
inition or redirection of Soviet policy. Increasinfly:
as Khrushchev has dominated policy, Soviet conduct of
foreign affairs has come to reflect not only one-man
domination of the Soviet scene, but also some of Khru-
shchev's personal characteristics.
In line :with his openly. expressed dislike for
bureaucratic red tape and diplomatic usage, Khrushchev
has.:.experimented With a. number of devices to bring, to
bear a personal.touch in state-to-state relations:
marathon interviews with free-world visitors in order
to nail down the Soviet position on world problems, ex-
changes of visits With foreign heads of government and
of state, .and continued emphasis on the need.for summit
conferences to. solve outstanding issues. The new Soviet
tactics demonstrate Khrushohev's shrewdness, nerve, and
unscrupulousness and reflect his efforts fully to ex-
ploit Soviet technological., military, and scientific .
?progress.to extend Communist influence at the expense
of the west.. .This personal lector is also evident in
Moscow's occasional willipgness to press provocative
policies when seemingly to Soviet advantage, and then.
dramaticaiiy-as in the Syrian Crisis of 1957--shift
course when the policy has failed. '
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The form in which foreign policy plans are worked
up is not known, but the high degree of consistency and
coordination which Soviet foreign policy manifests in
action suggests that they are detailed and comprehensive.
They might include over-all strategic plans, setting
the basic objectives of Communist policy in various
areas of the world for stated periods of time; and opera-
tional (or country) plans, spelling out in greater de-
tail the specific tasks of the various aims of Soviet
policy abroad in achieving these strategic goals. All
such plans are subject to continuous review by the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, by departments in the staff of
the party secretariat, and by the Presidium, particularly
when the international situation is changing rapidly.
Policy decisions Made by the Presidium are executed
by the Foreign Ministry, assisted at the top by party of-
ficials and abroad by career diplomatic party-state
functionaries.* In the formidable diplomatic missions
The USSR maintains abroad there are, in addition to reg-
ular Foreign Ministry personnel, assigned representatives
of other; Soviet agencies who, though nominally subordinate
to the Soviet ambassador, maintain direct contact with
their home organizations. Increisingly numerous abroad
are officials of the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations, which is responsible for administering the
USSR's economic cooperation and military assistance pro-
grams. The Ministry of Foreign Trade also maintains both
permanent and temporary commercial and trade representa-
tives abroad. In those countries where several bloc mem-
bers are involved in economic assistance programs, an
embassy economic official may be charged with reporting
on these activities directly to the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance--the organ for coordinating Soviet
bloc economic activity. At all Soviet embassies abroad,
military intelligence and KGB officers are stationed,
although in some cases their 'affiliation is unknown to
the Foreign Ministry personnel. These special staffs
receive their instructi4ons'from their home organizations
in Moscow, and their various programs are coordinated
by Central Committee organs in Moscow rather than in
the field.
The activities of the official Soviet missions in
pushing the USSR's foreign policy., lines are supplemented
locally by Communist parties, taking guidance if not
*For descriptions of the use made by the Presidium
of its instruments of foreign policy in two types of
overseas operations, see Annexes B and C.
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always direction from Moscow, and by a network of Commu-
nist-controlled or Communist-supported front groups
which act as a bridge between ? Communists and actual Or
potential sympathizers.
All of these organizations are described in the
sections following.
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
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Chapter '2. THE:MINISTRY OF :FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The USSR Foreign Ministry is charged solely with
responsibility for Soviet foreign relations. Its func-
tions include negotiation with foreign representatives
in the USSR, establishment and maintenance of diplo-
matic relations with foreign countries, and supervision
of representatives of other Soviet agencies.
Organization
The headquarters staff of the Foreign Ministry con-
sists of 14 geographic divisions or 'desks with responsi-
bility for specific groups of countries Or international
organizations; several functional divisions dealing
with such matters as protocol, legal questionst.and_press
relations; a secretariat; and the collegium, 'or direct-
ing staff of the ministry. (See Chart N.
The collegium, chaired by 'the minister, includes
all deputy ministers and a few of the more important
division chiefs. Over-all supervisory chores are divided
among the deputy ministers, with the first deputy acting
in a general capacity as the minister's right-hand man.
The collegium advises the minister and, at the same time,
serves as a.coordinating board for the activities of the
various components of the ministry. It helps translate
policy directives into specific assignments, oversees .
their implementation, and assesses the results.
the geographic desks supervise the operations of ?
Soviet missions in the countries of their responsibility,
solve minor 'problems on their own, and seek solution
to major ones from the appropriate deputy minister or
.the collegium of the.ministry. The geographic desks
also perform the first stage in filtering, conSolidat-
ing, and synthesizing reports from field missions.
Foreign Missions
Soviet foreign missions have administrative and
general supervisory responsibilities regarding most
Soviet citizens in the country where the mission is ac-
credited. During the past six years the Soviet Union
has added 14 countries to those with which it exchanges
diplomatic representation; it now maintains 53 embassies,
four legations, and a permanent representation to the
United Nations. Most of the recent expansion has been
among the newly independent countries of Africa--Libya,
Sudan, Morocco, Guinea, and Ghana--and in Southeast
Asia--Indonesia, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Nepal, and
Ceylon. Very little progress has been made in Latin
America, where relations are maintained with only three
countries! Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.
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CHART N
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1 OCTOBER 1959 UNCLASSIFIED?
COLLEGIUM
Minister
F777Gni?omy
1stDepuLy Minister
V. V. Kuznetsoitll
De ut Minister
. P. . r ubin
Deputy Minister
rrgriemilv
Collegium Member
p. F. Podtserobl
FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS
Protocol
rnroroTT7
Treaty & Legal
m
Press
M. A. Kharlamov
I Economic
L.
_1
I Administrative
Personnel
I IE. I. 13aranenkov? II
90924 N
Deputy Minister
'Morin
Deputy Minister
A. L. Orlov
Collem Member
giu
p. -zimyanin
Collegium Member
A. A. Soldatov
Secretariat
Frimargrm-H.
GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS
International
Or anizations
S. K. sa rapk in
American
Countries
A. A. Soldatov
1st European
[S. Bazarol
5th Euro "ean
. S. ?eaushkln
Near East
Countries
South East
Asia
V. I. Likhachev
Deputy Minister
Collegium Member
FIRril?ap n
International Economic
Organizations
P. M. Chernyshev
African
Countries
A. A. Shvedov
2nd European
N. D. Belokhvostikov
4th European
A. L Gorchakov I
Scandinavian
Countries
LIc. K. Rodionovi
Middle East
Countries
P. P.avloi
Far Eastern
tf. V. Zimyanin
FOREIGN MISSIONS
United Nations
A. A. Sobolev
4 Legations
(1 post vacant)
IDTop level Ministry
personnel at time
of Stalin's death
alBrought into Ministry
since Stalin's death
Presumed to exist
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The most important single document which each So-
viet Embassy prepares on a routine basis is the Annual
Country Report. This report is a comprehensive des-
cription of events during the calendar year in all
phases of the country's political, economic, and cul-
tural life. Where appropriate, an analysis of a given
situation is included, together with conclusions and ?
policy recommendations. When the annual review of an
embassy's operations is under way in the ministry--and
occasionally at Other times as well--the Ambassador
may be called to Moscow to explain situations which
are difficult to render in report form and to partici-
pate in policy discussions.
Personnel
The intense personal interest of all Members of
the top patty leadership in foreign relations has served
to keep the ministry under close scrutiny and helped
to isolate its operating personnel from factional pres-
sures. Apparently few, if any, of the ministry's
personnel, for example, became embroiled in the political
intrigues of ferter.FbreigniMinistetg?Molotov .And,
The average Soviet career diplomat not only has
steered clear of top party politics, he has also been
generally successful in adapting to the demands of the
regime. Most of the important career diplomats displaced
in the. poSt-Stalin shake-up have been 'appointed-sub-
sequently to other posts within the ministry without
apparent. loss of status. Career development, routine
reassignment, and the shifting locus of problems re-
quiring depth of diplomatic experience appear to be
among the most .important reasons for these transfers
of career personnel.
On the other hand, an influx of outsiders into
high-level positions'in the ministry accompanied, and
in some cases may have precipitated, the transfer of
career diplomats. During the past six years former
high party officials and government administrators
have been assigned to top diplomatic posts over the
heads of career workers in the ministry, and they
now constitute a sizable bloc of the ministry's top
personnel.
The regime appears to have re-evaluated its bloc
diplomatic requirements and instituted a policy of
assigning to bloc countries men with party or govern-
ment administrative experience, rather than men trained
in the diplomatic sertice. In a number of cases the
necessity to exile some party or government figure
from the arena of power struggle and policy controversy
coincided with a need within the ministry for someone
with party or government experience. Most of the "out-
siders" were assigned to bloc countries or the head-
'quarters staff of the ministry. A few, however, have
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been assigned to nonbloc countries--notably Menshikov
to India, and then the United States; Pegov to Iran;
and Ryzhov to Turkey.
Revitalization of the ministry since Stalin's
death has been accompanied by an enhancement in the
prestige of diplomatic service. To a certain extent
this was a by-product of the assignment of high-level
party officials to the ministry, but it has also been
fostered as deliberate policy by the regime. In
Stalin's time comparatively few Soviet diplomats were
members of top party bodies. At the time of his death
only eight were so honored, and of these only Vyshinsky
was a full member of the Central Committee. !Six tete
maiedviullYmembera at the 20th Party Congress in February
1956, and today 19 enjoy the prestige of high party
rank--nine of them as full members of the Central Com- ,
mittee.
Major personnel assignments within the ministry
are the prerogative, not of the ministry itself, but
of the party, and are exercised by the foreign depart-
ments in the staff of the Central Committee Secretariat.
The most important assignments undoubtedly receive the
direct attention of Khrushchev and the party presidium,
The usual procedure is for the ministry to propose a
candidate to the Secretariat for consideration. If thec
candidate is unacceptable to the party department con-
cerned, Gromyko can appeal the decision to the party
presidium. Ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary,
since they are legal representatives of the Soviet
state, are formally appointed by decree of the Supreme
Soviet Presidium. Decrees on other top assignments
in the ministry are issued by the Council of Ministers.
The Soviet diplomatic service has Apparently
been divided into two parte--bloc and nonbloc. Per-
sonnel rotate within each service but seldom go from
one to the other. All top positions in the bloc Ser-
vice are staffed by former patty and government of,fi-
cials, and all but three of these--Molotov, ambassador.
to Mongolia; Tetenty Shtykov, ambassador to Hungary;
and Yury Prikhodov, ambassador to Bulgaria--entered
the Foreign Ministry after Stalin's death.
Desk chiefs and in some cases deputy desk chiefs
have the same rank as foreign mission chiefs, and it
appears to be a matter of polcicy to rotate top person-
nel from one position to thecother. Soviet career dip-
lomats are generally trained as area specialists, but
an effort is made to broaden their experience. During
the course of their careers they may expect assignments
in several different parts of the world, interspersed
with varied headquarters responsibilities.
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Soviet diplomats carry their ranks with them and
collectively form a pool of talent'available for specific
assignments as the need arises. Quite often a high-
ranking diplomat twill be reassigned to Moscow and not
be ideritified for many months or even several years,
only to reappear subsequently in -anew -post with no ap-
parent diminution in status. It may be assumed that his:
services have been? utilized on special commissions, ad
hoc committees, or in other ways which are not normally
reported.
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Chapter r3 , STATE :COMMITTEE :FOR iFOREIGN ECONOMIC 'RELATIONS
The State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
has ministerial rank and operates under the aegis of
the USSR Council of Ministers. It was created for the
establishment and development of economic contacts with
all foreign countries, as well as for the supervision
of technical and economic assistance and cooperation,
scientific collaboration, aid in the construction of
enterprises abroad, training and provision of special-
ists, and grants of credit.
Organization
The committee is organized both geographically
and functionally. Certain divisions have been identi-
fied, and it is possible that there ?are others still
unidentified. Those identified are: Administration
for Construction of Enterprises Abroad, containing
both functional and geographic sections; Main Engineer-
ing Administration; and Administration for Matters of
Scientific-Technical Cooperation, the latter being
composed of country commissions for Bloc countries as
well as for Yugoslavia and Finland. The provision of
technical military assistance and production facilities
is assumed to be the responsibility of the Main En-
gineering Administration.
The committee oversees the operations of its four
all-union associations--which are responsible for the
construction of installations abroad. These four associa-
tions, whose operations are to a certain extent similar
to the associations under the supervision of the Minis-
try of Foreign Trade (see below), in that they export
and import, also perform additional functions including
the furnishing of Soviet experts and the training of
native personnel for work in the enterprises built
under Soviet supervision. Three of the associations
consttuct.. specific types of installation and confine(c
their activities to Bloc countries. The fourth-- ,
"Tekhnoeksport?"--however, functions in countries out-
side the Bloc for all types of installation.
Functioning
Although the committee ranks administratively with
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, its function of establish-
ing and expanding economic contacts with foreign countries
appears to place it in a higher capacity than the latter,
which is concerned more with the implementation of for-
eign trade operations. Thus, a policy decision to
*Literally "Technically Export;' full title unknown.
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establish or expand economic.relatioils with any given
country is translated into action by the committee.
When a trade agreement has beenoncluded, the. Minis-
try of Foreign Trade comes into the. picture. The com-
mittee has a continuing function; of course, if an
agreement for economic or technical assistance is
involved.
The nature of the committee's connection with
the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) is
not 'entirely clear. It is, however, the appropriate
Soviet organ to deal with CEMA, and in fact some com-
mittee officials have ?been identified as being Soviet
representatives in CEMA. (See below).
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Chapteix4.vjM4NISTRY iffloritlari TRADE
Organization
The Moscow headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, composed of geographic, functional, commodity,
and service divisions (called administrations), super-
vises the activities of 1) its domestic representatives
--representatives at ports, border areas, large indus-
trial centers, councils of ministers of union and au-
tonomous republics, and councils of national economy--
to expedite and control foreign trade operations, for-
eign trade inspectors ofEmpprtai and imported commodities,
and customs representatives; and 2) its overseas represen-
tatives--officials of all-union export-import associa-
tions, permanent and temporary trade delegations, agencies
and missions, and commercial counselors and attaches.
There are four geographic divisions responsible
for planning and supervising trade with countries under
their respective jurisdictions. There are also four
commodity divisions which directly supervise the import
and export of specifically allocated groups of commodities
and consolidate the commodity export and import plan.
Functional and service divisions include the Foreign
Exchange and Finance Administrations which are responsi-
ble for preparing the consolidated foreign exchange and
financial plan. Other functional and service divisions
include those for transport, customs, arid :trade tgreements.
Actual day-to-day foreign trade operations are con-
ducted by the export and import associations (of which
there are more than twenty), with representatives both
at home and abroad. These associations are legal monopo-
lies; each usually has exclusive trading responsibility
for specific commodities, although certain associations
have responsibilities for all commodities for trade in
specified areas.. Allassociations are legally independent
economic organizations, liable for their own actions.
As a result, the government of the USSR cannot be held
responsible for debts and acts of the associations
either at home or abroad, nor can the associations be
held liable for actions of the Soviet Government. This
is an essential difference between a foreign trade as-
sociation and a trade delegation, which concludes trans-
actions in the name of the USSR. Both organs neverthe-
less are responsible for their actions to the Ministry,
and their freedom of operation is severely restricted.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade carries out its
planning, regulation, and control functions in foreign
countries by means of its trade delegations abroad, the
chief officials of which have diplomatic status. A
trade delegation regulates and conducts Soviet foreign
trade in the country concerned. It represents the export
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and import associations, acts as their agent, makes
market surveys, and negotiates contracts with buyers
and sellers for commodities offered or required by
export and import associations. Where a trade dele-
gation does not exist, such duties are handled by
trade missions, agencies, commercial counselors, or
attaches.
Functioning
? Soviet foreign trade is primarily designed and
executed to serve the needs of the Soviet economy as
determined by the Soviet planners.* Its objectives
are determined by the national economic plan, rather
than by market conditions as in most Western countries.
In order to ensure that Soviet foreign trade
serves the needs of the domestic economy, trade is con-
ducted almost exclusively by state organs.** Aside
from ensuring that the export-import plan (see below)
is coordinated with the national economic plan,
direct control over foreign trade is intended to in-
sulate the Soviet economy from foreign influence and
to give maximum protection to domestic industry.
Direct control also makes possible a flexible trade
policy. The Soviet Government can quickly change the
direction and composition of its trade simply by dis-
patching orders to its export and import associations,
and thereby it can take advantage of changes in economic
and political conditions abroad.
The bulk of Soviet foreign trade is conducted on
the basis of bilateral commodity and payments agree-
ments, by means of which the USSR attempts to balance
its imports from any given country with exports. Such
agreements provide for reciprocal deliveries of goods
to be carried out in accordance with commodity lists
specifying the quota of goods to be delivered. These
lists are agreed on between the parties for definite
periods of time and are defined in special annual pro-
tocols.
The rationale behind specifying what is to be ex-
ported and imported in trade with a country lies in the
very nature ofthe Soviet economy. In this way the So-
viet Union knows in advance what its exports and imports
will be and can more-easily integrate them into the
*For economic policy formulation, see Chapter IV.
**The, exception is Tsentrosoyuz, the Union of
Comsumers Cooperatives, which conducts a limited volume
of foreign trade in consumer goods.
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national aconomic plan. The USSR has beeniarning more
to the/use of long-term agreements, which have been
a regular feature of Soviet trade with the Bloc coun-
tries for a number of years. In the last two years
long-term,trade agreements have been concluded with
almost all major Western countries (usually for 2-3
year periods).
Soviet foreign trade with the Bloc countries is
conducted more or less on the basis of world market
prices; that is, the prices charged other Bloc coun-
tries for, Soviet exports or prices paid by the USSR
for goods from other Bloc countries are determined
in trade agreements for the coming year on the basis
of prices prevailing in Free World markets in the
current year. World market prices are employed because
Soviet foreign trade prices and internal prices are
unrelated. (Most Soviet domestic prices, are set
arbitrarily by the planners to absorb excess market
demand and to encourage the use of some commodities
while discouraging the use of others)) This gap is in
fact deliberate, since the Soviet foreign trade mechanism
is intended to isolate the planned internal economy
from foreign influence.
In conducting foreign trade operations for the
state, ?the Ministry of Foreign Trade deals with a
number of Soviet organizaticins,, Because the export-
import plan must be integrated with the national eco-
nomic plan, it is drawn up with approval of Gosplan
and receives final approval by the Council of Ministers.
Foreign trade questions are also resolved with the par-
ticipation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
other state organs. Financial questions dealing with
foreign trade are decided with the participation of
the Ministry of Finance, and foreign exchange questions
in participation with the State Bank. All financial
transactions with foreign countries go through Gosbank
and its subsidiary, the Bank for Foreign Trade, which
handles certain noncommercial accounts.
In planning and engaging in foreign trade activities,
the Ministry of Foreign Trade deals with the sovnarkhozes
and the various republics. Within the context of the
over-all export-import plan, export and import quotas are
assigned to various govnarkhozes and supply organiza-
tions in the republics by the Ministry. Actual day-to-
day transactions are conducted between the dovnarkhozes
and their industrial organizations,pon'the one hand and
the export-import associations on the Other.
The Foreign Trade Plan
Foreign trade planning is an integral pari of So-
viet national economic planning. The purpose of the for-
eign trade plan is to determine what is to be imported
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during the coming year in accordance with the require-
ments of the national economy and what goods will be
set aside for exports in order to provide the foreign
currencies needed for the payment of imports. The
USSR seeks to export only as much as it needs to pay
for imports. A major component of the foreign trade
plan is the foreign exchange plan, which envisages
the receipts and payments of the USSR in foreign cur-
rency for the year ahead. The foreign trade plan is
drawn up annually and is corrected semiannually and
quarterly.
The chief consideration in planning exports and
imports is normally availability (for export) and
domestic need (for import) in physical terms. Sec-
ondary consideration is given to other factors: e.g.,
long-term market prospects for a given commodity,
amount and type of currency to be earned or expended,
etc. Such considerations are, of course, necessary
in working out the foreign exchange plan. Therefore,
when it has been determined what goods are to be im-
ported and what goods can be spared for export, the
USSR will sell in the most expensive market and but
in the cheapest market with the aim of maximizing
export earnings and minimizing cost to the domestic
economy.
The principle is often modified, however, by po-
litical considerations. The centralized control of
trade which makes it possible for the USSR to switch
its markets rapidly for economic reasons also enables
it to use its trade in support of political objectives.*
Thus in 1955, when the Burmese Government appeared to
be taking a neutralist course; the USSR and other bloc
countries concluded agreements to purchase annually
750,000 tons of Burmese rice--a commodity then surplus
in Burma, but never imported in large quantities by
the bloc prior to this time. By 1958, with a pro-
Western government in Burma, the bloc had reduced its
purchases to only 100,000 tons.
To establish Soviet influence in Ghana following
its achievement of independence in early 1957, the USSR
increased its imports in that year of Ghana's chief
export--cocoa--400 percent above normal purchases.
As it became apparent that Ghana did not intend sub-
stantially to reduce its ties with the West, in.1958
the USSR withdrew almost completely from Ghana's
cocoa market. Its purchases have since remained well-
below those made prior to Ghana's independence.
*See Annex B.
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Chaptek754CT.COUNCILjF0flUTUAIrECONOMIC:ASSISTANCE
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
is the consultative organ coordinating the domestic
and foreign economic policies of the USSR and the Euro-
pean Satellite countries. Communist China North
Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia are not mem-
bers of CEMA, but they are represented at important
meetings as observers. Formally, the participating
countries in CEMA enjoy equal rights, and the decisions
of the Council require unanimous approval of the coun-
tries affected. Actually, however, the relative power
position of member countries within the Bloc largely
determines their respective roles in CEMA affairs, and
the undisputed leadership of the USSR ensures conformity
with over-all Soviet policy objectives.
Organization
The organizational structure of CEMA comprises the
Plenum, the Conference of CEMA Deputies, the Secretariat,
and the Permanent Committees for Economic and Scientific-
Technical cooperation in all important sectors of the
economy.
The Plenum provides policy guidance and direction
for CEMA. Composed of the chairman of the State Plan-
ning Commissions of the participating countries (high
party officials who usually also hold the office of
Deputy Premier), the Plenum meets once or twice a year
in the capitals of the participating countries to review ,
the activities of the Permanent Committees and recommend)
in broad outline form, the course of their subsequent
operations.
The Conference of CEMA Deputies--the permanent
country delegates resident in Moscow--meeting regularly
on a weekly basis, is responsible for Supervising and
coordinating the day-to-day activities of the Permanent
Committees to ensure their compliance with plenary di-
rectives.
The Secretariat, headed by the Secretary of the
Council, usually a Soviet representative, has both ad-
ministrative and executive functions. It prepares the
agenda for plenary sessions as well as a series of eco-
nomic and statistical reports. In addition,iit?Idiredts
some activities of the Permanent Committees and organizes
ad hoc meetings on problems outside of the jurisdiction
of these committees.
The Permanent Committees for Economic Scientific-
Technical Cooperation are the most important working
bodies of CEMA. They have the responsibility of working
out the details of the Plenum's recommendations and
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providing the machinery for carrying them out. Country
representatives on the Permanent Committees are usually
the Ministers, State Secretaries, or Chiefs of the Di-
rectorates responsible for the economic sector concerned.
As a result, these Permanent Committees constitute the
direct link between the pertinent ministries in the
participating countries and CEMA. The Pormaneht Com-
mittees meet periodically throughout the year; their
work is supplemented by bilateral consultations between
the participating countries.
Functioning
CEMA activities are usually initiated through pro-
posals submitted to the Secretariat for transmittal to
the Conference of Deputies. Unanimous agreement by the
Deputies is then required to place the proposal on the
agenda for a session of the Plenum, where unanimous '
agreement is required to formalize the proposal as a'
recommendation to the Permanent Committees of the Coun-
cil and to the State Planning Commissions of the par-
ticipating countries. These recommendations have no
legal force; they depend for their execution on enabling
acts bilaterally agreed to between the countries af-
fected. This has been one of the great weaknesses of
CEMA operations, for nationalist attitudes have frequent-
ly prevented the signing of the necessary bilateral
agreements. To eliminate this weak link, the USSR has
recently pressed for unanimous agreement to incorporate
CEMA recommendations into the national economic plans
of the participating countries and thereby give them
the force of law. No. final action has been taken on
this proposal as yet.
Soviet Control Over CEMA
As stated earlier, the participating countries in
CEMA are formally equal, although Soviet direction and
guidance is tacitly accepted. Soviet control is exerted
directly through CEMA channels and indirectly through
the Communist Party apparatus. The Soviet delegates
to CEMA are usually also members of the Soviet State Com-
mittee for Foreign Economic Relations. (See above) In
this dual capacity, therefore, the Soviet delegates are
in a position to guide CEMA activities in conformity
with Soviet policy objectives. Within the limitations
of these objectives, CEMA countries are permitted some
latitude concerning details of implementation, and the
USSR does not insist on minute compliance with its pro-
posals. On major issues, however, the USSR has not
hesitated to use the full weight of its political,
ideological, and economic leadership to enforce com-
pliance.
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Chaptee.6:ThIFOREIWCOMMUNIST PARTIES
Soviet control and coordination of foreign Commu-
nist parties is achieved through a complex--partly
overt, partly covert--system of communication and mani-
pulation, rather than through an organizational push-
button system. In the absence of any single organiza-
tional center comparable in size and bureaucratism to
the prewar Comintern, Soviet direction of foreign
Communist parties is exercised through a multiplicity
of formal and informal control mechanisms, ranging
from institutional channels inside and outside the So-
viet Communist Party to direct personal contacts be-
tween Communist leaders. Soviet objectives have also
been facilitated by the existence of such intangible
factors as the adherence of Communists to a common
ideology--Marxism-Leninism--and the world-wide impact
of Soviet national power and achievement.
Direct Contact
Khrushchev has shown great personal interest and
leadership in the problem of control and coordination.
He has generated and promulgated the basic ideas and
concepts of current international Communist strategy
and tactics. He generally meets personally with vari-
ous Bloc Communist Party leaders several times a year,
and he has traveded extensively in the Bloc area. Khru-
shchev has not participated as frequently in bilateral
talks with Free World Communists, but there have been
more conferences between Free World Communists and So-
viet Communist Party officials since he came to power.
In recent years many Soviet leaders and their aides
have traveled abroad--sometimes with delegations to
local Communist party congresses and conferences,
sometimes on special missions--for review, orientation,
and on-the-spot coordination.
For the purpose of discussing and coordinating
Communist plans and activities on a world-wide scale,
Free World and Bloc Communist leaders gather periodical-
ly in Moscow under the cover of Soviet Party congresses
or other official occasions. The Soviet leaders have
also initiated a series of smaller functional meetings
of less important Free World Communist leaders for the
purpose of stimulating discussions of ideological and
theoretical problems of international significance.
Bloc Parties
For Bloc Communist Parties, coordination and con-
trol.is effected chiefly through frequent and close con-
tacts between Bloc and Soviet leaders. In addition to
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these general and high-level contacts and exchanges,
there are numerous functional contacts involving par-
ty specialists, trade union officials, organizational
experts, etc. The Soviet party keeps a close watch
on developments in the Bloc parties and sends in its
own experts when weaknesses become apparent.
For the Bloc, governmental coordination is a part
of party coordination. Thus, the Warsaw Treaty (mili-
tary), CEMA (economic), and numerous treaties involv-
ing scientific, cultural, and other types of affilia-
tion and exchange buttress the inherent interdependency
of the Bloc parties and enhance the position of the
Soviet Communist Party. Soviet diplomatic establish-
ments ?in Bloc countries provide for immediate, on-the-
spot consultation seither on the party or government
level.
Central Soviet Organs
The principal working-level agencies handling
Soviet relations with foreign Communist parties are
the two departments of the Soviet party Secretariat
dealing with Bloc and non-Bloc parties respectively.
Divided into geographic subsections and staffed by
area specialists, these departments are a direct channel
between the foreign Colamunist parties and Moscow. They
provide advice and guidance to other Communist parties
and are responsible for all correspondence and exchanges
with them. These departments also administer the pro-
gram whereby foreign Communists are trained in Soviet
party schools.
In their contacts with foreign Communists, the
departments seek implementation of policy decisions made
by the party Presidium. The extent and nature of the
advice and guidance given var... Some powerful Commu-
nist parties, headed by veteran Communists of interna-
tional reputation, would not be amenable to direct
advice and instructions from department representa-
tives, but in the case of smaller, less sophisticated
parties--particularly those which have been outside the
mainstream of the Communist movement--advice and guidance
from any level are-welcomed.
Training and Guidance
Under Khrushchev's aegis, the USSR has greatly in-
creased its training program for Free-World and Bloc Com-
munists. The leadership training program of the Soviet
Communist Party serves as a mechanism for indoctrinat-
ing foreign Communists and strengthening their allegiance
to the USSR. Since 1956, for example, about 1,000
trainees from over 25 Communist parties in the Free World
have been trained in the USSR at the Higher Party School
under the Central Committee.
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The Soviet-controlled monthly Problems of Peace
and Socialism, published in Prague in 19 languages,
serves as a channel for exchanging information--
theoretical and operational--between foreign CommUnist
parties. The headquarters staff of the publication
is headed by a leading Soviet party official who has
several Soviet specialists working with him, and there
are representatives from all Bloc parties and from an
estimated 20 Communist parties from the Free World.
Transmissions of the Soviet wire service, TASS, to
foreign countries often contain guidance for foreign
Communist "Parties and front organizations in the guise
of "news" items, and the Soviet party newspaper Pravda
and journal Kommunist also are used to inform foFFTWIT-
Communists of changesin Soviet policy and to provide
guidance for their activities.
Diplomatic Channels
Soviet diplomatic installations in the Free World
frequently serve as a cover for specific technical co-
ordination-activities. The extent to which Soviet "dip-
lomats" take the risk of exposing themselves to accusa-
tions of "interference" depends largely on the political
and security climate of a given country. In several
cases, Soviet ambassadors have secretly:dealt directly ,
with the Secretary General of a given Free World Commu-
nist Party when the need for specific briefings has
arisen. Secret subsidies for the local Communist Par-
ty are often channeled through the Soviet embassies or
other diplomatic installations abroad, to be recovered
by the local Communist Party through clandestine methods.
Soviet embassies are known to have arranged for the
travel and training of Free World Communists in the Bloc
and to have investigated security and other problems
in the local Communist Party, presumably for the benefit
of Moscow. Representatives of the Soviet intelligence
services under diplomatic cover are known to have con-
tacted local Communist Party representatives for the
coordination of espionage activities. In areas where
Soviet establishments are few, several Communist parties
may utilize one establishment for contact.
Front Organizations
The USSR also has machinery to make international
front organizations responsive to :its: requirements
and control. Out of a total of 13 such organizations,
six have their headquarters behind the Iron Curtain.
Soviet officials, frequently from obscure positions,
covertly control the activities of these organizations.
The staffs of international front organizations are sup-
plemented by Bloc and Free World Communists and are of
sufficient size to coordinate and support the vast net-
works of affiliated Communist fronts throughout the world.
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The international front organizations coordinate their
progtathrthreugh:mArioUfliean0--iUternAtidUal-Ai
.rigiOni1YMStitigO',TfidiertriVel'WheadqUirt4Wper-...
scindeL:regio0A1 rejay4oStitOsPiCiii1Ytraiiiin'elAat.
litithyand:.MateriAllAnd:MotisiatOnal sUpP,Ori-k0ViadiE
Soviet bloc subsidies to foreign Communist parties
and international front organizations are regularly
employed as a covert means of ensuring Soviet control.
Mese subsidies coyer a wide range of activities, in-
cluding travel to and from Bloc Countries, election
campaigns in the Free World, and AUpport: fot froht
organizAtions. Annual Soviet subsidies to the French
and Italian Communist parties, for example, are reliably
estimated at about $8,000,000 each. The greater 'part
of the budgets of international front organizations is
known to stem from Bloc sources.
Effectiveness
The main Soviet technique for coordinating the in-
ternational Communist movement consists in ever-increas-
ing direct personal contacts, obviating the need for
frequent written directives. Since Rhrushchev's Advent
?to power, every Communist party--even such an: insignifi-
cant one as the Communist Party of Panama--hAs had re-
peated direct contact with the Soviet center and its
auxiliaries. Given the output of the overt Soviet press
and radio, which is accessible to Free World Communist
Parties, the international Communist movement in the
Fred World is much more intensively briefed than during
the last period of Stalin's life.
This does not mean that Free World Communist Par-
ties are always told of Soviet plans and intentions. At
the Soviet 20th Party Congress in 1956, for example, ? .
the foreign delegates did not know of Khrushchev's secret
de-Stalinization speech in advance. At the November
1957 meetings in Moscow, the Soviet leaders did not in-
form the foreign Communists of the agenda in advance.
On the other hand, several days prior ,to the Malenkov-
Molotov purge in June 1957, a number of Free-World Com-
munist Parties were informed of the situation. Also,
some advance information on subjects to be discussed
at meetings of Bloc and Free World Communist leaders
during the Soviet 21st Party Congress in January 1959 was
communicated to a few Free World Communist parties.
Nevertheless, the CoMmunist Party of the Soviet Union
formulates most of the policy for the international
Communist movement on the basis of national requirements
of the USSR and without intensive prior consultation. '
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IV. ECONOMIC POLICY
Introduction
In the USSR, there are four unusual and important -
characteristics in the method of formulating national eco-
nomic policy and in the functioning of the machinery form-
ally charged with this task.
First, economic policy-making carries the full weight
and authority of law. In the Soviet "command" economy,
policies are imperatives, to be ignored only under pen-
alty of law.
Second, policy-making for the economy is truly a mas-
sive enterprise. The state decides what is to be produced,
in what quantities, by what combinations of labor, capital,
and other inputs, and to what ends, whether investment,
consumption, or defense. With few exceptions the state
makes these decisions not only for the national domain as
a whole, but also for its subdivisions down to and indlud-
ing the individual plant or farm.
Third, policy-making foi the economy is highly regu-
larized. The process characteristically takes the form of
periodic programming. At various intervals of a year or
several years,, detailed economic plans are formulated and
carried out in accordance with predetermined schedules.
Fourth, policy-making for the economy is closely co-
ordinated with policit-making with the other realms of state
activity. Economic planning is closely associated with
planning of foreign and domestic political affairs.
Beside the supreme organs themselves (the State's
Council of Ministers, the party's Central Committee, and
their respective Presidia), the principal Soviet organs
involved in these operations are: at the center or na-
tional level, Gosplan and certain specialized State Com-
mittees; at the republic level, the Republic Councils of
Ministers and Gosplans; and at the lower levels, the
sovnarkhozes of the economic administrative regions and
the executive committees of oblast and rayon.
Central Organs
The All-Union Gosplan, or State Planning Committee,
is the economic general staff of the Council of Ministers.
It is the instrument for translating broad policy deci-
sions affecting the economy into concrete programs and
for monitoring fulfillment thereof. Its importance is re-
flected by the fact that whereas all other major organs
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of the Council of Ministers are represented in it by-their
chiefs only, the Chief of Gosplan and no less than ten of
his deputies are members of the council.
Gosplan numbers about 2,500 persons in Moscow alone.
These are organized into sections for aggregate planning-
(labor and wages, capital investment,etc.); sector plan--
ning (agriculture, defense, industry, etc.), supply'or in-
terrepublic deliveries (coal, metal products, etc.), area,
planning (planning for Union-Republic development), and
coordination and staff support (personnel etc.). Its
planning function; broad as the economy itself, embraoes
the formulation and adjustment of both the short-range (an-
nual) and longer range (five-Aarseven-year) program through
which the state seeks to direct the development of the
economy. Its monitoring function includes most notably-
the exercise of close control over the supply of key ma-
terials. Through institutes attached to it, it also plays
a leading role in theoretical economic research.
As a check on Gosplan there are various economic de-
partments in the Central Committee Secretariatwhich
serve both as watchdogs and as a means of keeping Gos-
plan continually abreast of thinking at the higher party
levels.
At the all-union level the specialized state commit-
tees concerned ?with the execution of economic policy fall
into two groups: those whose missions are defined in
terms of some facet of the economic process, and those
whose missions are defined in terms of some industrial
sector. Among the first group are the State Committee
on Questions of Labor and Wages, the, State Scientific-
Technical Committee, and the State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations.* (See Chart M) Among the second
group, the most notable are the State Committees on Avia-
tion Technology, Defense Technology, Radioelectronics,
Shipbuilding, Chemistry, Construction Affairs, and Auto-
mation and Machine Building.
The specialized committees of the first group may
be described as offspring of Gosplan with the function
of pushing development in areas that at themoment are
considered so vital as to require attention abovewhat
they would receive if entrusted to mere sections of the
parent planning agency. The Committee on Questions,tf
Labor and Wages, broken off from Gosplan in 1955, was
set up to tackle wage reorganization--that is to spear-
head the effort to eliminate major inconsistencies which
had crept into the wage system and to enhance the contri-
bution of that system to labor productivity. The Scien-
tific-Technical Committee, a reconstituted form of an
For discussion of this organization and the Minis-
try of Foreign Trade, see Chapter III.
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organization originally broken off from Gosplan in 1948,
has as its principal function the searching out and dis-
semination of new techniques. Research and planning "
are the phases of control to which these agenciee make
their primary contribution, but they do have a hand in
policy execution. The Committee on Questions of Labor
and Wages, for instance, monitors the inttoddction of
uniform wage scales in the various industries.
The specialized committees of the second group are,
in most cases, rumps of corresponding ministries abolished
in the general reorganization of 1957 and its aftermath.
They are charged mainly with research and development of
new technology in their respective fields. But though
primarily active in this phase of control, they too play
an executive role. For instance, decisions by the Com-
mittee on Chemistry concerning the introduction of new
processes in plants of the industry, although technically
"suggestions," are almost invariably accepted as direc-
tives. Moreover, these committees control pilot-plant
production.
Other central agencies of note concerned with the
execution of economic policy are the Central Statistical
Administration, the State Bank, and the ten remaining
economic ministries. Chiefs of these units are members
of the Council of Ministers.
The Central Statistical Administration is the head
of a hierarchy of information-gathering and reporting
organizations, the tentacles of which reach down in the
economy to the level of the individual production plant.
It is charged with providing the government with a con-
stant flow of accurate, up-to-date information on all
facets of economic activity. To secure the integrity of
this contribution to intelligent policy-making and policy-
eiecution and to avoid such attempts as individual pro-
ducers may make to misrepresent the performance of their
units, each reporter is made responsible to the echelon
next above the one on which he reports. This provision
is believed to constitute a fairly effective guarantee
against misrepresentations and distortion.
The ten economic ministries at the union level com-
prise six of the union type and four of the union-republic
type. :These surviving members of the 60 or so of 1957,
while primarily line units concerned with administration
of the plans for their respective fields, also there in
the formulation role. They draft proposals for programs'
of activity within their respective fields which Gosplan
takes into account in drawing up the master plan.
The State Bank, as the depository of funds for in-
dustrial and other enterprises, exerts an important check
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on plan fulfillment, as it has the power to refuse to
honor drafts not in accordance with plan.
Republic and Lower Level
The machinery for executing economic policy at the
republic level is so nearly like a smaller replica of the
machinery at the all-union level that it hardly needs
separate description. The supreme executive organ is
the Republic Council of Ministers. Beneath it, as above,
are to be found another (though smaller) set of special-
ized committees including, usually, a Scientific-Techni-
cal Committee; a Republic statistical organ; and a some-
what different set of ministries. Save for the fact that
they receive and defer to orders from their superiors at
the level next above, these units do on the smaller stage
about what their all-union counterparts do on the larger.
The principal organs concerned with the execution of
economic policy below the republic are the sovnarkhozes,
which preside over the economic administrative regions es-
tablished during the 1957 reorganization of industry and
construction, and to a lesser extent, the oblast and rayon
executive committees. The latter?while primarily admin-
istrative, also share in the planning operation. (See
Chart B)
The Planning Operation
The planning operation in the Soviet Union may be
described as a cycle embracing three-phases--design,
counterdesign, and reconciliation. They are carried out
respectively by the central government (notably Gosplan),
by the lower echelons of government and basic production
units, and again by the central government (Gosplan).
The design phase starts with Gosplan's transforma-
tion of presidium objectives into the numerical targets
for the more important economic aggregates and indivi-
dual products: so many thousands of workers for the
economy in the year in question, so many billion rubles
of investment, so many tons of steel and grain, etc.
These "control figures" are based on the economy's
achievement in the preceding time period and on esti-
mates of future manpower and progress in technology and
labor productivity. This phase ends with the passing
down of the "control figures" from Gosplan to the All-
Union Ministries and the Council of Ministers and Plan-
ning Committees of the Republics, and from these to the
Republican Ministries, the sovnarkhozes, the oblast ex-
ecutive committees and planning organs, and ultimately
individual factories and farms.
The counterdesign and more concrete phase of the
cycle involves movement in the opposite direction. It
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starts with the formulation of plans by factories and
? farms. These plans cover all phases of their operations
in great detail: what they are to make, in what quanti-
ties, and by what combination of labor and capital; what
construction they are to undertake; what new processes
they are to introduce--all of this in both physical and
monetary terms. It ends with coordination, amendment,
and aggregation of these programs by successive higher
echelons, first at the sovnarkhoz or oblast level, then
at the Republic, and finally at the center.
The reconciliation phase starts with GoSplac's ad-.,
justment of presidium objectives from above with the ag-
gregation of concrete programs from below, continues with
accommodation to government fiscal, foreign trade, and
defense programs, and ends with the approval of the Council
of Ministers and Central Committee. Finally, the tasks
for each level are passed down the pyramid in the form
of firm assignments backed with the full sanction of law.*
Periodic Plans
Generally speaking, the more distant the goals the
less regularized iS the procedure, the less important the
planning operation, and the more important the roles of
the Presidium of aftandiviauatAleadert.**
In setting economic policy for the middle range of
five to ten years, the periodic drafting of comprehensive
plans comes into its own. The establishment of perspec-
tive Five- and Seven-Year Plans follows closely the cycle
of design, counterdesign, and reconciliation. The Seven-
Year Plan, for instance, evolved on roughly this schedule:
In September 1957 the Sixth Five-Year Plan was abandoned.
Gosplap then presumably received its broad directives from
the Presidium. At the end of 1957, Gosplap sent its ten-
tative guidelines downward in the hierarchy, and by the
middle of 1958, it received the counterproposals from be-
low. By August, 1958,,Gosplan's draft, after being
*The detail involved is suggested by the fact that
the Seven-Year plan (1959-65) takes up nearly 30 volumes
of 500 to 1000 pages each. -
**Little is known of the precise character of the op-
erations leading to such decisions as Stalin's to indus-
trialize at maximum speed, and to give priority to heavy in-
dustry and collective agriculture, or of such decisions
as Khrushchev's to reduce some income differentials and
attempt to overtake the United States by 1970. It seems
reasonably clear, however, that when decisions on this
scale are made, little systematic correlation of goals
and paths thereto takes place beforehand. Rather, it is
left to the professional planners to pick up the pieces.
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returned:ferrevision several times by Khrushchev, was ac-
cepted by the Presidium. This draft was published in
November 1958 under the names of the Council of Ministers
and Central Committee, and in February 1959 it was ap-
proved by the 21st Party Congress.
The initial formulation of objectives is a very im-
portant part of policy-making at this range. Before Gos-
plan receives its task of elaborating particulars and
subjecting them to technical checks, the Presidium has
engaged in extensive discussion not only of such key points
as tempo of growth, proportions (e.g., relative growth
of heavy and light industry), and investment level, but
also of the major strategic posture to be sought and its
military and scientific requirements.*
In the adjustment of plans to the peculiarly press-
ing or the unforeseen, action takes place largely within
the Presidium and Gosplan. The new course of increased
deference to the consumer (1953-54), the program for over-
coming agricultural stagnation (1953-54), the program for
correcting imbalances arising from construction shortfalls
(1956-57), and the industrial reorganization of 1957 were
hammered out in the party Presidium and at plenums of the
Central Committee. Gosplan's role was that of elaborator
and transmitter of the reallocations of resources required.
Short-range economic policy-making is highly regu-
larized, consisting largely of the annual formulation of
the State Plan. The directives which set the framework
for the annual planning operation are derivatives of the
longer range plan. The cycle of design, counterdesign,
and reconciliation takes place on a schedule closely tied
to the calendar: for instance, sovnarkhozes are to send
their supply and output plans up to the Republic Gosplans
between 5 and 10 July, and the latter must send theirs
to USSR Gosplap by 1 September. In fact, the operation at
this range is of so highly technical a nature and so high-
ly programmed, that it may more legitimately ?be viewed as
a technique for carrying out policy than one of policy-
making itself. In this process the role of Gosplan is
critical, and the top organs confine themselves largely
to review and ratification.
Effectiveness
The formulation of economic policy in the Soviet
Union must be considered generally effective, since the
USSR has successfully expanded its economy over the 40
*See Annex D.
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years of its existence and has realized its goal ?of.gain-
ing world power status.
One of the main strengths oi the system is its abil-
ity to identify weaknesses. The regularity of the planning
process, the extensiveness of the reporting operation,
and the doubling of policymaker as executive, all combine
to aid early identification of soft spots.
Regularity means periodic review. Each year, when
plans for the succeeding year are being set, major courses
?for that year and for the balance of the current middle-
range planning period are re-examined.
The reports constantly fed to the top by the report-
ing organs, notably the Central Statistical Administra-
tion, enable the leaders to keep up with the economy.
Such reports alert them to trouble before it becomes acute.
Construction shortfalls in 1956 and their adverse impact
on production, for instance, could be followed, even by
the public at large, in the published (abridged) versions
of Plan Fulfillment Reports for the years immediately pre-
ceding 1956 and for the first halfoofthat year.*
Finally, Soviet policymakers divide the entire econ-
omy into spheres of influence in which they are severally
expectedeto,be,and generally are, expert.** Mikoyan's ex-
pertness in matters of trade, for example, made him quick-
ly aware of the inflation that developed in late 1953 and
1954, when price and loan reduction produced an expansion
of purchasing power greater than the increase in consumer
goods production. Khrushchev's awareness of the problems
of a manager led him to adopt measures designed to head
off autarchical tendencies among the sovnarkhozes es-
tablished under the industrial reorganization of 1957.
Proposals for treating weaknesses originate in a num-
ber of places. The first is Gosplan, but other groups
share in this role. The advice of the Academy of Sciences
and research institutes was used, for instance, in the
drawing up of the Seven-Year Plan. The State Committees
and Ministries form another such group. Finally, propos-
als. originate with the leaders themselves. Khrushchev,
when production in the Donbas coal mines lagged in
*Treatment of this problem was not timely enough, but
failure was ascribable to political factors: rather than to
lack of data.
**For a discussion of the apparatus which links the
leaders to the day-to-day operations of production, see
Annex E.
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mid-1956, made a tour of the area, as a result of which
he instituted a number of ameliorative measures, including
decrees to shorten hours and reorganize pay scales.
Policy proposals undergo much testing in the inter-
play between proposal and counterproposal and between suc-
cessive echelons. The assessments by the higher Soviet
authorities of the tasks to be performed by their subordi-
nates commonly disagree with the subordinate counter-as-
sessments. The former characteristically expect higher
efficiency in operation, higher output for given inputs.
The latter characteristically overstate input require-
ments and understate potential output. A classical ex-
ample of this give-and-take can be found in the proceed-
ings at the 20th Party Congress. Here the appraisal of
the top planners (represented by Saburov and Pervukhin)
directly contradicted that of the now defunct industrial
operating ministries, represented by the Ministers of Fer-
rous Metallurgy and the Coal Industry. The planners ac-
cused the ministries of loading their claims to invest?
-
ment allocations, and claiming that ministerial estimates
for 1956-60 would have required expenditures 250 billion
rubles higher than finally settled on (that is, than
were necessary lathe planners' view). The Minister of
Ferrous Metallurgy and the Minister of the Coal Industry
alleged in rebuttal that they had asked the minimum
necessary to meet their output targets, whith,.with.the
allotments finally decided on, would be out of reach.
The history of the sovnarkhozes, which replaced the
industrial ministries, furnishes other examples. The
1958 increment for output of Sverdlovsk enterprises, which
was placed by the enterprises themselves at 3 percent
over 1957, was successively raised to 4.4 percent by the
sector administrations of the sovnarkhoz, to 5 percent
by the sovnarkhoz itself, and to 5.5 percent by the Re-
public Gosplan, at which level it was finally confirmed.
The center retains the final word in setting targets,
but it must at least consider counterrepresentations
from below, and its final plan benefits from this con-
flicting/view.
Comprehensive plans also receive a test in the form
of a check for internal consistency: e.g., to see that
plans for the steel inputs of steel consumers agree in
total with output planned for the steel industry. The
technique for making this check is known as the "material
balance."
In these procedures, the making of economic policy
is generally but not always effective. The failures may
be exemplified by the responses to the problems raised in
1956 by the conjunction of _satellite disturbances (which
the leadership had failed totally to anticipate) with the
construction shortfalls in the basic materials industry.
. . .
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The decisions taken at the Plenum in December of that
year were equivocal. On economic organization, they ap-
peared to be calling both for greater centralization of
detailed decision-making in Moscow and for more delega-
tion to the republic and local organs. On the question
of the status of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, they appeared
to be calling at one time for repair and adjustment, at
another for replacement. A few weeks later, 1957 produc-
tion targets were set at relatively low levels, and Khru-
shchev called for replacement of the industrial minis-
tries with territorially based units. Some confusion
and ambiguity in both policy and detail seemed to remain
until the planning apparatus was able to rework the whole
complex planning cycle and set at least the outline of
the Seven-Year Plan.
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V. SCIENTIFIC POLICY
Chapter 1. SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS
Apart from major policies and certain high-priority
projects, decisions on scientific research and develop-
ment are made by administrative agencies of the govern-
ment to which Soviet scientific institutions are sub-
ordinate.
The Academy of Sciences, USSR, which is directly
responsible to the Council of Ministers, is the most im-
portant scientific body in the USSR.* The Academy's
membership, comprised of 167 academicians and 361 cor-
responding members, includes the Soviet Union's mOst
eminent scientists; In addition to-academicians, it
employs roughly 10 percent of all scientific workers in
the USSR, The Academy of .Sciences controls about 195
scientific institutions and coordinates the activities
of 13 affiliated union-republic academies of sciences.
Theoretical research is emphasized in academy institu-
tions, and its 'Scientists conduct more than half of all
the USSR's fundamental research.
The Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary
? .Education controls research done by higher educational
institutions. Nearly half of all Soviet scientists are
employed in- institutions of higher education,where they
are primarily concerned with teaching, but also perform
both basic and Applied research.
The State Planning Committee (Gosplan), USSR, con-
trols 4 number of central Scientific research institutes
and design bureaus in certain basic industrial fields
Such is steel. These institutes coordinate. research and
design activities in their respective fields-throughout
the country.
" The Ministries of Defense, Medium Machine Building
(responsible' for nuclear. weapons),-Communications, Health,
and Agrioulture control institutions which conduct research
related to their respective fields.
*. Regardless of its actual powers, it formally occupies
a special status as a quasi-independent, ostensibly self-
perpetuating body; thus its Chairman is not a member of
the-Council of Ministers.
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The State-Committees of Defense Technology, Aviation
Technology, Radio-Electronics, Shipbuilding, Chemistry,
and Automation and Machine Building control research insti-
tutions which are either directly related to the USSR's
defense effort or to high-priority nondefense 'fields.
The Councils of National Economy (Sovnarkhozee) control
all research institutions not subordinate to the five types
of agencies listed above. These are specialized in indus-
trial fields and are Concerned primarily with applied re-
search.
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Chapter 2. FORMULATION OF POLICY
Bits of organizational information on the party and
? government and policy directives on science and technology
provide the basis for deducing the probable mechanism for
?policy decision-making on scientific and technological mat-
ters.
Role of the Party Presidium
Decisions by the party Presidium on science and tech-
nology seem to be limited primarily to general organizational
problems and to the establishment of economic priorities
which determine priorities in scientific research. After
broad policy directives on science and technology are ap-
proved, decisions by the party Presidium on scientific and,
technical matters appear to be limited to the following
situations:
(a) A specific scientific or technical problem
involving the initiation of a research and development
program which requires considerable investment of money,
manpower, and facilities; e.g., the space rocket program.*
(b) An ideological or political issue of major
? importance in the scientific community, e.g., the dis-
missal of the editorial board of the Botanical Journal
in connection with the genetics controversy.
? (c) A major deviation from or change in previous
party policy.
Policy decisions by the party Presidium on scientific
and technical matters can come about in several ways: the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers may assume the ini-
tiative in referring problems to the party Presidium; the
Secretariat of the Central Committee, on the basis of staff
work done by its various departments, may bring an important
scientific and technical matter to the Presidium's attention;
the party Presidium members themselves may propose that cer-
tain scientific and technical matters be studied by the party
apparatus.
Functioning of the Mechanism
? The Presidium, *fth tte assistance of the Secretariat,
pchedules,meetings,specifically for the cOnSideration of ,
scientific-and. technical-policy. ' In support of. the Presi-
dium, the apparatus .of the Central Committee through its
departments maintains constant vigilance ;over :its fields
of responsibility. and gathers information with the aid
of regional and primary party organs. For example, notes
published from the Central Committee Plenum of July 1955
called for an increase in the role of the lower organs in
convening scientific-technical conferences--meetings of
*For a discussion of this procedure in the weapons
systems field, see Annex D.
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scientists, inventors, and ratienalizers. During 1956-58,
such meetings were held in all oblast centers of the USSR
and in various cities. The practical aim of the Central
Committee in having these meetings is to get information
and ideas and, on the basis of these, to take organiza-
tional and administrative measures to improve the work of
scientific organizations.
Scientists and technical experts are probably called
to advise the Presidium further on the problems under con-
sideration. The Presidium then formulates broad policy
proposals on science and technology which are to be given
emphasis in the preparation of directives for the devel-
opment of the national ec0119,1104441enfOtithe'establiShment
of:a:policy on a speccife scientific and technical matter.
Once decrees on scientific and technical matters are
issued, they have the force of law. For example, a directive
of the June 1959 Central Committee Plenum required certain.
AgencieS to furnish reCommendations_en:specitied.subjects to
the Council erMinisters, .USSR:
The USSR Gosplan, the Councils of Ministers
state committees 16t.different.branches of
industry and construction, Ministries, and
departments are to be asked to prepare by
1 January 1960 and to Submit to the USSR
Council of Ministers proposals relating to
the establishment of research institutes
directly at major enterprises, to the amalga-
mation of certain research institutes with
higher educational establishments, and to the
amalgamation of Scientific establishments working
in the same field. '
Role of the Council of Ministers
? The Council of Ministers is responsible for the implementa-
tion of party policy on science and technology through the
elaborate network of state organs subordinate to it. There-
fore it must make decisions on scientific research and
development problems within the broad policy framework of
party directives.
Within the Council of Ministers, policy decisions on
scientific research and development matters are probably
handled by a network of committees. These committees
possess considerable policy-making authority and probably
refer only the most important scientific and technical
matters of long-term and of far-reaching impact on the
national economy to the Presidium of the Council of
Ministers. For example, a committee on scientific and
technical matters relating to defense would be headed by
Deputy Premier Ustinov, who is generally responsible for
defense production, and be composed of the Chairman of
the State Committees for Defense Technology, Aviation
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Technology, Shipbuilding,and Radio-Electronics, and the
Ministers of Medium Machine Building and of Defense. Such
a committee would have a staff to study scientific and tech-
nical problems related to defense research and development.
It could initiate projects forconsideration of the_appro-
priate scientific and technical organizations, call'in
specialists for advice, and maintain a general check on
progress of various areas of research and development.
The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, which is
directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers, may also
constitute a special committee of an advisory nature to
report directly to the party Presidium on particular problems
in fundamental scientific fields assigned to it; e.g., on
the 1957 decision to establish "scientific cites" in Siberia.
In connection with the initiation of the new Seven-Year
Plan, approved by the 21st Party Congress in February 1959,
several supervisory agencies jointly produced a paper called
the "Main Directions for Scientific Research." The super-
visory agencies involved were the USSR Academy of Sciences,
the republic adademies, the State Scientific-Technical
Committee, and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Sec-
ondary Education. This paper listed about 150 tasks in
basic and applied research fields which were to serve as a
guide for research planning under the Seven-Year Plan. It
appeared to be the most detailed policy guide yet produced
for science planners.
Soviet leaders, pleased with this first "major direc-
tionepaper, have decided to make this type of policy plan-
ning a permanent feature of their scientific organization.
They have accordingly charged groups of existing supervisory
agencies with the taskof working out future "major directions;-"
Representatives of these agencies are apparently organized
into five interagency advisory committees responsible for
determining the "major directions of research" within the
framework of the party directives. The Presidium of the
Council of Ministers may call on these committees for
advice or recommendations on major problems referred to it
for decision. The interagency committees represent the
following agencies:
(a) For the natural and social sciences: the
Academy of Sciences, USSR; the academies of
sciences of the union republics; and the Min-
istry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Edu-
cation, USSR.
(b) For technical sciences and new technology:
the State Scientific-Technical Committee of the
Council of Ministers; USSR; the Academy of Sci-
ences, USSR; the Ministry of Higher and Special-
ized Secondary Education, USSR; and the Commit-
tees of the Council of Ministries, USSR, in the
appropriate field of technology.
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(c) For the agricultural sciences: the Minis-
try of Agriculture, with its All-Union Academy
of Agricultural Sciences; and the Department
of Biological Sciences of the Academy of Sci-
ences.
(d) For the medical sciences: the Ministry
of Public Health, USSR, with its Academy of
Medical Sciences, USSR; and the Department
of Biological Sciences of the Academy of
Sciences, USSR.
.(e) For architecture and construction: the
'Committee for Construction Affairs of the
Council of Ministers, USSR; and the Academy
of Construction and Architecture.
To improve the coordination and fulfillment of plans
at the institute level, the concepts of "head" institutes
and joint scientific councils have been introduced. Pre-
sumably, those institutes which have demonstrated them-
selves to be the most competent and the best equipped sci-
entific institutions in a given discipline have been des-
ignated "head" institutes and are to provide leadership
to other institutions in the same or related disciplines.
"Head" institutes apparently serve as staffs to the joint
scientific councils, which are associations of institutions
in given'fields of science or of institutions brought to-,
gether for the purpose of solving a particular problem.
These councils may include representatives of related pro-
duction enterprises and other agencies. Their purpose
is to review draft plans of member institutions to see
that duplication is avoided, that tasks are divided prop-
erly among the institutions most qualified to do them, and
that planning policies have been taken into account. The
councils may also make recommendations concerning the de-
termination of "main directions" to the supervisory groups
listed in the paragraph above. The USSR has been experiment-
ing with these new forms of planning and coordination
since 1957; the final organizational form has not yet
been decided.
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VI. MILITARY POLICY
Introduction
Soviet military thinking has for some years re-
flected the belief that victory in a future war could
only be effected by the coordinated and unified efforts
of all services, The subordinationc of the armed
forces at the national level to the centralized Ministry
of Defense is unquestionably a reflection of this belief.
It is worth noting, however, that the armed forces have
not always been unified under a single ministry; they
weke combined from 1946 to 1950,rseparate from 1950 until
the death of Stalin in 1953, and combined again since
then. The air forces have never had their own ministry.
Organization
Within the military, all forces and commands, rpport
to the Minister of Defense. (Chart 0) The present Min-
ister is Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky,
who succeeded Marshal Zhukov on the occasion of the latter's
fall from grace in October 1957. Assisting the minister
are ten First Deputy and Deputy Ministers, the most impor-
tant and influential officers in the armed.forces; eight
are from the ground forces and one each from the navy and
the air force. For example, the Commander in Chief of the
Warsaw Pact Forces and the Chief of the General Staff are
both First Deputy Ministers. The Soviet General Staff of
the Army and the Navy combines the functions of the US
Joint Staff and the staffs of the individual US services.
An important section of this staff is the Chief Intelligence
Directorate. 50X1-HUM
At the same level as the General Staff is the Chief
Political Directorate, the main instrument for party con-
trol of the armed forces; it is in fact a department in
the Party Secretariat. Accordingly, its chief' reports
both to the Minister of Defense and to the Party Secre-
tariat. He has his own command channels to the political
officers who are to be found at every level down to bat-
talion, and they in turn send up periodic reports and in
general act as representatives of the party. The role of
the political officers has somewhat declined in importance
since the death of Stalin--the post of political officer
at the company level was abolished in 1955 -but,this or-
ganizational aspect is still the key to party control
of the armed forces. The gravest charge made against
Zhukov was that he had sought to eliminate party control.
At present the Chief Political Directorate is headed by
a widely respected regular officer, Colonel General
Golikov, who was appointed shortly after Zhukov's demotion.
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50X1-HUM
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CHART 0
UNCLASSIFIED
'MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
JOINT POLICY AND CONTROL
GENERAL STAFF OF THE
SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY
CHIEF OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
CHIEF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
CHIEF POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE
CHIEF
INSPECTORATE
CHIEF DIRECTORATE
OF THE REAR
CHIEF DIRECTORATES OF FORCE COMPONENTS
GROUND FORCES OF
THE SOVIET ARMY
GROUPS OF FORCES
90924 0
AIR FORCES
OF THE SOVIET ARMY
ANTIAIR DEFENSE
FORCES
MAJOR OPERA TIAL COMMANDS
.1
MILITARY DISTRICTS
SEPARATE ' ARMIES
AND CORPS
NAVAL FORCES
ANTIAIR DEFENSE
DISTRICTS
FLEETS AND
SEPARATE FLOTILLAS
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Responsible under the General Staff for the preparation
of tactical doctrine and the development of weapons* are
the four Chief Directorates of force components: Ground
Forces, Air Forces, Antiair Defense Forces, and Naval
Forces. These directorates are on a staff level and do not
have command functions.
The last echelon to be considered is that of the op-
erational commands, the actual fighting elements. These
report to the Minister of Defense and include the Groups
of Forces in Germany, Poland, and Hungary, the Military
Districts, the Naval Fleets, the Long Range Air Armies,
and the Air Defense Districts in the USSR. The Warsaw Pact
command is almost certainly treated as an operational com-
mand, despite its supposed international character.
Interservice Problems
The high degree of centralization under the Minister
of Defense and the General Staff facilitates a quick reso-
lution of the apparently few interservice disputes which
arise. A good example is the dismissal in 1955 of Admiral
of the Fleet Kuznetsov from his post of Commander in Chief
of Naval Forces. Apparently Kuznetsov favored an enlarge-
ment of the surface fleet, but was opposed by Zhukov and
Khrushchev. Since that time the navy has continued to im-
prove its large submarine fleet but has not given compar-
able emphasis to.its relatively small surface and naval air
forces.
There is no known instance of a dispute between the
army and the air forces, possibly for the reason that with-
in the high command the air forces occupT'a subordinate po-
sition. However, this does not appear to have affected
Soviet decisions on force requirements. Although the main-
tenance of powerful ground forces has always been funda-
mental, Soviet aviation, tactical or strategic, aircraft
or missile, has not been starved.
Relations With:the Party
In the upper levels of the party the.military,carries
relatively little weight, so that while powerful in his
own military domain, Malinovsky's influence outside his
own ministry is severely limited.** With the exception of
Zhukov, no professional military man has ever been a full
* For an account of the participation of the Ministry of
Defense in the development of weapons systems, see Annex D.
Note also that the party has always been careful to keep
the military well penetrated at all levels. At the 19th
Party Congress in 1952, Marshal Vasilyevsky claimed that
86.4 percent ?of all officers were members of either the
party or the Komsomol.
* *
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or candidate member of the Party Presidium. Voroshilov's
rank of Marshal was political, a reward for his service
in the party and his friendship with Stalin rather than
for his military service. Of the 123 full members of the
Central Committee, only five are military men, and the
figures for candidate members are 12 out of 115. In the
last two decades military representation has been cut back
considerably.
MILITARY MEMBERSHIP IN THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
1939
1941
1952
1956
Full Members
15.5%
12.7%
5.6%
4.1%
Candidates
14.7%
22.0%
20.0%
10.4%
Following World War II, Stalin purposely reduced the
stature of the victorious marshals. However, during the
three or four years of inner party political struggles be-
tween Stalin's death and the ascendancy of Khrushchev, ele-
ments of the military became politically involved. As the
struggle sharpened,military influence became stronger. Per-
haps Zhukov's career best illustrates this phenomenon. In
1955 he was appointed Minister of Defense; in 1956 he was
made a candidate member of the Presidium;* in mid-1957 a
full member. Then with the Presidium once again unified,
he was ousted in October 1957.
Influence on Policy
Since the ouster of Zhukov, the degree of direct mili-
tary influence on national security decisions is not as
apparent. With the military no longer represented in the
Party Presidium, its opinion on top policy matters is only
heard when the party leadership specifically asks for it.
Furthermore, Khrushchev has his own strong ideas in the
military field. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviet
military leadership today provides anything more than
purely military advice to the political leadership; the
issue of war or peace does not lie in its competence.
This is not to deny that the military retain a great, if
indirect, influence on matters pertaining to the military
and strategic strength of the USSR. Should the regime wish
to reduce the armaments load, however, the military could
hardly obstruct the decision. In any case, it is doubtful
that with the present system of party controls the mili-
tary could ever become an organized element in opposition.
On the other hand, during the past few years the ques-
tion of military doctrine--how a war will be fought--has
Even in ;this period his
was far from decisive.
tary action against the
the "events" of October
influence on major policy decisions
He is known to have favored mili-
Gomulka regime in Poland during
1956.
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largely reverted to the military professionals. This change
since the death of Stalin in 1953 is striking. While the
old dictator was being canonized as the, only great genius,
military science was stagnating. Although the USSR developed
nuclear weapons, organized and equipped a long-range air
force, and made a concentrated start 'on a missile program,
little was done to adjust military doctrine,-far less po-
litical objectives-to th'e implications of these new weapons.
Judging by the military journals of the day, no one but
Stalin had much to say.
Stalin's death opened the way for a spate of provocative
articles and speeches, including reprints of the views of US
military leaders. Basic principles were examined, including
the value of surprise, whether or not the next war will be
a long one, etc. Soviet military science now appears to be
reasonably pragmatic.
Execution of Policy
Whatever weight the Presidium gives to military views,
it seems determined to maintain forces sufficient to keep
the USSR generally secure from Western attack and consti-
tute a constant threat to the Free World. Short of major
hostilities, however, the Presidium apparently views its
armed forces as one of a number of instruments available
for the achievement of political objectives. Military
gestures are combined with diplomatic to build pressure
on hostile or neutralist governments.* Finally, within
the bloc, the Soviet armed forces remain the ultimate
guarantee that the will of Moscow mist prevail, as in East
Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956.
In the Hungarian operation military moves were closely
geared to political events. The shortness of reaction time
between appearance of a political crisis and the orders to
the troops to move suggests almost direct Presidium control
After the Hungarian Government.under the leadership of Gero
requested the USSR for help on 24 October 1956, the two
Soviet divisions in Hungary moved promptly and another
crossed the border from Rumania on the same day. (During
the next three days another division moved in from the
USSR) However, the actual engagement with the rebels in
the streets of Budapest was not going well, the Soviet
units present had their hands full, and the Presidium,
undecided on how far to go, decided on 29 October to dis-
engage.
Following a visit by Mikoyan and Suslov to Budapest,
the decision was made on 31 October to crush the revolt.
Immediately three more divisions moved in from the USSR
and the final assault, coordinated with certain political
moves, took place on 4 November.
* See Annex C.
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Perhaps the last word on the position of the military
in the USSR was spoken by Khrushchev in 1956. In a dis-
cussion of disarmament problems, he remarked that if the
USSR's generals did not accept a political decision they
would be replaced.,
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ANNEX A: ORGANS AND MEDIA FOR DISSEMINATING
POLICY DECISIONS
The Soviet regime places great stress on wide dis-
semination of its decisions and policies aimed at en-
gendering maximum public support. The monopoly which
the regime has over all media of mass communication gives
it unique opportunity and virtually unlimited resources,
in this field. It can direct and control the flow of in-
formation and at any given moment virtually saturate all
public media with whatever subject is considered of great-
est importance.
Party Control and Guidance
The party maintains direct or indirect control over
all public information and permits no independent commen-
tary or analysis of its decisions and policies. The key
agencies in the party's control are the Departments of
Propaganda and Agitation in the executive staff of the
party Secretariat. These departments are charged with
general responsibility for molding and mobilizing public
opinion. They unify and give central direction to the
vast and multiform activities carried on by party, gov-
ernment, and other agencies for informing and influenc-
ing Soviet citizens.
Within the framework of the policy decisions adopted
by the Presidium, these departments determine both the
general line and the specific courses of action for bring-
ing the decisions of the party and government to the pub-
lic, explaining them, winning popular support for them,
and mobilizing the people in order to secure their ful-
fillment. Not only are these departments the chief chan-
nel of communications for the party to the people, they
are also the chief instrument through which mass atti-
tudes are conveyed to the leaders.
Despite the range of their responsibilities, how-
ever, the departments are not primarily operational
agencies; they do no major publishing, nor do they oper-
ate the Soviet radio or newspaper networks. They func-
tion, instead, as planner, director, and watchdog of
these media. At every level of party administration
there are propaganda and agitation departments with
their own personnel in key positions in all local communi-
cations media as well as in important factories and other
enterprises. Directives and instructions are sent out
from the central department to the local offices and, in
return, reports on their fulfillment are funneled back to
the center.
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Media of Mass Communication
The press and radio are the principal media by which
decisions of the party and government are publicized
throughout the country. Texts of high-level decision's
generally appear first on the pages of Pravda and Izvestia,
the two largest central newspapers. Pi-I:RC the official
organ of the party, tends to emphasize partymatters;
Izvestia, the chief organ of the Council of Ministers,
stresses government affairs. Of the two, Pravda is un-
questionably the more authoritative. Pravda, Sovetskaya
Rossiya, the newspaper of the party bureau for the RSFSR
--the largest republic--and Kommunist, the party's theo-
retical journal, have the status of departments under the
party Secretariat. As such they receive guidance direct-
ly from the party secretariat and not, as in the case of
Izvestia and other Soviet newspapers, from the propaganda
and agitation departments. These three publications and
the two departments work closely together, however, and
their activities are well coordinated.
Pravda, said to have a circulation of over six mil-
lion,-Ii-lirtblished daily in Moscow and in 15 other Soviet
cities from matrices flown in from Moscow. Local news-
papers rely heavily on the central press, and sometimes
as much as 30 percent of one issue of a provincial paper
will consist of reprints from Pravda and Izvestia.
The radio is another important medium of communica-
tion for the regime. All radio stations in the Soviet
Union are under the general supervision of the All-Union
Radio and Television Committee which, although an organ
of the government, is closely supervised by the party's
propaganda and agitation departments. Radio Moscow, the
largest station, has an extremely powerful transmitter
for beaming broadcasts to domestic and foreign audiences.
Its broadcasts are picked up by local stations throughout
the USSR and relayed to remote areas or rebroadcast locally.
Radio stations play an important role in familiariz-
ing the population with important party and government de-
crees and in transmitting official explanations and
"clarifications" of established policy. In this, the
radio relies heavily on the press. Radio stations, for
instance, allot considerable time to broadcasting texts
of Pravda editorials and the like.
The Soviet wire service, TASS, is another medium.of
government communication. Like the radio, it is an agency
of the Council of Ministers. TASS, with offices through-
out the world, gathers foreign news for the use of Soviet
domestic radio and newspapers and transmits domestic Soviet
news abroad. It is also a major network for the gathering
and transmission of news between Moscow and the provinces.
TASS bureaus throughout the Soviet Union play an important
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part in reporting important local developments; Pravda,
for instance, prints numerous articles received from
localTASS offices.
Pravda is an official channel for informing lower
level officials of policy decisions. Pravda not only
transmits the texts of decrees but, in accompanying edi-
torials, interprets them and lays down broad policy guide-
lines. Second-echelon officials are expected to read
Pravda daily and act accordingly.
As soon as a decree is published, the propaganda and
agitation departments issue detailed instructions to local
party committees setting forth a program for propagandiz-
ing the decree, making certain that all personnel affected
are fully informed of its contents. These directives are
sent directly to local party secretariats and include such
orders as the kind and number of meetings to call to dis-
cuss the decree, who should attend, who should speak, and
what line to stress. A briefing of local professional
propagandists and agitators is one of the first meetings
held.
Agitators are generally part-time volunteers who are
charged with explaining decisions of the regime to small
groups--in many cases their co-workers in a factory or
collective farm. Most of the agitators are attached to
the local propaganda and agitation departments or to
quasi-independent propaganda organizations such as the
Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political
Knowledge. The agitators receive general guidance in
their work from the Agitator's Notebooks, published every
?ten days by the propaganda and agitation departments.
The agitator system is a much more flexible means
of communication than the mass public media. Unlike
Pravda, for example, the agitators can tailor their ap-
TailEE to suit a specific audience. Furthermore, direct
personal talks can often have a greater impact than the
printed word. Some idea of the importance the regime
attaches to the ?agitator network is afforded by the vast
number employed. Following the economic reorganization
decision in 1957, for example, 15,000 agitators were sent
to the Donbass coal mines alone to explain the decision.
Controlled Dissemination
There are, of course, numerous top-level decisions
and policy directives that are never made public but are
kept in closely guarded channels. Such information is
sent out to all regional party organizations in the form
of secret letters of the party Central Committee. Some
are marked for dissemination only to members of the local
party bureau, some to the full party membership. Late in
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1958, for example, discovery of "serious deficiencies"
in the administration of personnel policy in various
parts of the Soviet Union brought on a nationwide cam-
paign for correction of the deficiencies. A series of
party meetings was held at the local level at which this
problem was discussed on the basis of what was referred
to in the press as a "decision of 'the Central Committee
on errors in personnel policy in Stalino Oblast." The
text of the decision was never published, however, possi-
bly because public revelation of ?the contents might have
proven embarrassing to the regime.
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ANNEX B: SOVIET COLD-WAR OPERATIONS IN SYRIA, 1955-1957
We have attempted in this study to trace the coordi-
nated use by the USSR of its various instruments of foreign
policy in the penetration of Syria, and thus to illustrate
the marshalling of these resources by the Presidium in the
pursuit of a major strategic objective. In the years fol-
lowing Stalin's death in 1953, the Presidium apparently de-
cided to reverse his policy toward the uncommitted states
of Asia and Africa--essentially the concept that "he who is
not with us is against us." Instead, Khrushchev and his
colleagues planned a full-scale campaign to exploit the neu-
trality of these states and if possible win them over. The
operations against Syria described herein are one phase of
this campaign.
Background
After the fall of the Shishakli military dictatorship
in February 1954, political power in Syria gradually passed
into the hands of the Baath (Arab Renaissance) Party, which
was fiercely pan-Arab and professed a rudimentary socialism.
Years of steady deterioration of Syria's relations with the
West led to a deep-seated Syrian hostility to Western moves
and motives, as well as to those Arab governments which had
links or friendly relations with the West. Domestic polit-
ical instability and the intensity of Syrian anti-Western
sentiment held out to Moscow the prospect of a rapid Soviet-
Syrian rapprochement.
Moscow gave a high priority to cementing relations with
Syria, viewing the country not only as a center of anti-
Western, pan-Arab nationalism, but as a principal focus of
Arab-Israeli tension. Moscow's great interest stemmed also
from Syria's location astride two important oil pipelines
and, of even greater significance, its position at the rear
of the Western-backed "northern tier" defense system which
the West was building along the USSR's southern border.
Syria became the principal battleground of the foices for
and against the Baghdad Pact.
First Phase of Penetration
Moscow proceeded along two principal lines in consol-
idating its relations with Syria: on the one hand, it gave
increasing propaganda and diplomatic support to Syria; on
the other, it offered the country large-scale economic,tech-
nical, and military assistance.
In the United Nations, Moscow gave increasing support
to Syria, both in its border clashes with Israel and in its
complaints over Israeli plans to divert Jordan River water,
and "demanded" that action be taken against Israel. In a
similar manner Moscow sought to enhance Syrian hostility to
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the West by attacking Western aims and interests in the
Middle East. Moscow pushed the line that Britain was
interested in preserving its colonial positions and in-
terests at the expense of the Arabs, and that the United
States was primarily responsible for the creation and
continued support of Israel and was firmly committed to
backing British pretensions in the area.
Early in 1955 the shaky government in Damascus,
alarmed by pressure from neighboring Iraq and Turkey
that Syria join the anti-Soviet coalition of "northern
tier" states, turned instead in the direction of closer
relations with Cairo and on 2 March signed a treaty of
alliance with Egypt. To stiffen the new alliance and
preserve its anti-Western flavor, the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry issued a statement on 16 April offering support to
Middle East countries opposed to the recently concluded
Turkish-Iraqi alliance, which was to form the nucleus of
the Baghdad Pact.
The Soviet pose of respectability and support for
Damascus was seconded by the Syrian Communist Party, one
of the best organized Communist parties in the region.
Although technically outlawed, the party had been allowed
to operate openly with little restriction since the over-
throw of the Shishakli regime in 1954. Baathist leaders,
though non-Communist, accepted the domestic support of Sy-
rian Communists against right-wing opposition elements and
welcomed Communist bloc diplomatic support, confident of
Syria's ability to capitalize on this backing without sub-
mitting to Moscow's will.
Bloc efforts to develop economic relations with
Syria, foreshadowed by Soviet participation in the 1954
Damascus Trade Fair, developed in a number of directions
following heavy bloc participation in the 1955 Damascus
Fair. Trade and payments agreements were negotiated or
renegotiated between a number of bloc countries and Syria,
indicating an effort by the bloc to stimulate trade with
Syria which to that date had been insignificant. Vari-
ous reports of bloc economic and technical aid offers
preceded the signing on 16 November of a Soviet-Syrian
commercial agreement.
While Moscow's moves to expand trade and to offer
economic and technical assistance to Syria played a role
in smoothing the way for closer Soviet-Syrian relations, '
?in retrospect it is clear that it was the USSR's will-
ingness to sell arms to Syria and to Egypt which sealed
the anti-Western orientation of the Damascus regime.
Nasir's announcement in September 1955 that, over Western
opposition, he had concluded an arms deal with Czechoslo-
vakia--acting as front for Moscow--was greeted with en-
thusiasm in Syria.
Soviet offers to supply arms to Syria had been ru-
mored since the spring of 1955, but apparently it was not
until after Nasir's announcement that the Syrians felt
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.emboldened to accept them. By late March 1956, Soviet
artillery,. tanks, trucks, and military equipment began
to flow into Syria. Bloc-made armaments were publicly
displayed for the first time in the Independence flay
military parade in Damascus on 17 April 1956. It was
gradually revealed that Syria had contracted for jet
fighters, small naval craft, and submarines, in addi-
tion to the services Of a number Of bloc military ad- .
visers and instructors, and that some Syrian Military per-
sonnel would be sent to the bloc for training. Moscow
sugar-coated the deal by charging Syria cut-rate prices
and by accepting Syrian agricultural exports, princi-
pally cotton and wheat, as chief payment over a period
of years.
Thus one of the effectS of the arms deals was to
place the country heavily in debt to the bloc, necessi-
tating diverting to that area an important part of Syria's
traditional agricultural exports tram EUropean free .cur-
ready Markets. In addition, it Meant elbowing the West
out as a source of Syria'S arms and related ttaneporta-
tion, Communications, and hospital equipment. This is
reflected in the dramatic increase in trade with the blOc.
By 1957, .27 percent of Syria's export and 13 percent of
its import trade (arms excluded) was .with the bloc.
As ;aflieSult: of the months-long Crisis provoked on
26 July 1956 by Nasit's nationalization of the Suet Canal,
Soviet interest was necessarily concentrated on Egypt.
Nonetheless, Moscow's political, economic, and military
investment in Syria continued to increase. At the height
of the hostilities in Sinai, Syrian President Quwatli
made a short, Scheduled state visit to Moscow, taking
with him key officials from the Defense Ministry. Al-
though an innocuous communiqu?as issued at the cloSe
of the visit on 3 November, serious political and mil-
itary discussions took place and a Wide area of agree-,
ment was reached.
Moscow.MoVes to.7Proteiot Syria
By the end of NOVember, MOSCOWtS attention Was
again focused on Syria. Soviet moves to throw a mantle
of protection around the Damascus regime were prompted
by concern over stepped-Up *Stern pressures on Syria.
Moscow alleged that having failed in Egypt, the Western
powers, together with Turkey and Iraq, were preparing
military action to oust the DamascuE regime and place
in power a pro-Western government. The USSR's intense
propaganda drive was accompanied by diplomatic maneu-
vers and confidential Warnings that an attack on Syria
could mean the beginning of World War III. Moscow
sought to discredit all Western powera, inclUding the
United States, by attempting to implicate them in the
attack on Syria's ally Egypt, and accused them of suc-
cessive attempts to topple the Syrian regithe by polit-
ical and economic pressures.
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The Development Phase
? Soviet-Syrian cooperation continued to develop
throughout 1956. In March an engineering survey team
from the: Chief Directorate for Economic Relations*
toured Syria for three weeks and discussed possible
Soviet aid for Syria's Seven7Year Plan. This was fol-
lowed by the viSit of a Soviet cultural delegation and
by the Visit in June of Soviet Foreign Minister Shep-
ilov, following his stay in Egypt. Shepilov stressed
the developing ties of Soviet-Syrian friendship and eco-
nomic collaboration and hinted at even greater Soviet
economic and military support. In September, a Soviet
parliamentary delegation visited Syria in return for
the visit of Syrian parliamentarians the preceding year.
MoScovi's diplomatic support and offArs of arme
and economic aid. were?s4pitilemOhted,bran fhtense.oUltuial
and propaganda campaign..himed at nongovernmental cir-
cles. In late 1956,,,TASS opened an office in Damascus.
and began the distribution of free daily bulletins; these
were widely used by the Syrian press and radio. Soviet
bloc journals appeared in Syria in great numbers, and
the Soviet Embassy was active. in promoting student and
cultural exchanges.
Communist strength continued to build up under the
leadership of Khalid Bakdash, probably Communism's.most
able Middle East leader. Syrian Communist Strength de-
veloped principally in Damascus, Horns, and Aleppo, the
principal centers of political influence in Syria. Com-
munists succeeded in influencing the Syrian press, labor,
and the teaching profession, although their greatest nu-
merical strength was drawn from refugees and from Syrian
Greek Orthodox/ Armenian, and Kurdish minorities. Pro-
Communist front groups were active in Syria; with the
Congress of Syrian.Workers, a WFTU affiliate, wielding
the most influence, Affiliates of Communist interna-
tional youth,. lawyer, and women's groups were also
ac-
tive.
In March. 1957, Czechoslovakia signed a contract to
build. an oil refinery on credit at Homs, and other satel-
lites were active in construction and survey work in SYria.
Moscow had made generalized offers of economic assistance
to Syria as early as 1955, but Until the summer of 1957
the Soviet economic program had been less spectacular
than Its military aid program. A high-ranking Syrian
delegation visited Moscow at the end of July.and held
? Predecessor of the State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations.
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talks with an imposing array of working-level officials,
including Deputy Premier Kuzmin, a Deputy Chairman of
the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and
Deputy Ministers of Trade and Finance. As a result,
Moscow pledged further extensive economic and techni-
cal assistance to Syria. To implement this offer, a
Soviet-Syrian Aid Agreement was signed on 28 October
promising Syria up to $168,000,000 in credit to help
meet the foreign exchange costs of its Seven-Year Plan.
-Moscow's impressive offer seemed to the Syrians
considerably better than anything offered by Western
countries. and without visible political conditions. Pub- .
lic statements of Syrian leaders reflected no awareness
of possible dangers from engaging in unequal economic
relations with the bloc. With an economic program
hardly less impressive than its military Assistance pro-
gram, Moscow had built up a unique opportunity to pen-
etrate and control the Syrian economy.
The number of bloc economic and military technicians'
and advisers increased rapidly. During the' first half
of 1957 an estimated 325 bloc-tedhnicians spent one
month or more in Syria, mainly on short-term assignments.
Of this number, approximately 125 were industrial and
agricultural experts and 200 were military specialists.
Soviet military instructors were assigned to Syria's
military, air force, and engineering schools, and some
specialists were detailed as instructors to Syrian artil-
lery units. A small group of Syrian officers received
advanced flight training in the bloc, and negotiations
were under way to expand their number.
Effect of These Successes
On 13 August the Syrian Government expelled three
American officials on the grounds that Syrian military
authorities had uncovered "an American plot" to.overthrow
the regime. This move set the final stage, after months
of complex maneuverings between various Syrian civilian
and Army factions, for the ousting of remaining waverers
and neutrals and an apparent complete victery for pro-
Soviet elements. Moscow's posture of noninvolvement in
the army and government changes was intended to rebut
Western allegations of a Soviet "take-over" and to les-
sen Arab concern over leftward moves in Syria. Neverthe-
less, by a combination of diplomacy, propaganda, (ado-
nomid and military aid, and subversion, the USSR had
brought Syria substantially under its influence--a po-
sition to be overthrown six months later with the for-
mation of the United Arab Republic.
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ANNEX C: "ROCKET DIPLOMACY" IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Annex B dealt with the Soviet campaign in 1955-1957
to win over Syria. This paper, while concerned with the?
next phase of Soviet diplomacy in Syria, has a different
focus. In the fall of 1957 the USSR--seeking to exploit
the world impact of its successes in rocketry--used the
position it had won in Syria as the base for a major dip-
lomatic play in East-West relations. Diplomatic, polit-
ical, and military moves were combined with a skillful
use of propaganda to create a war crisis.
The major Soviet objective was to block moves to
reverse the trend in Syria which the USSR believed that
Turkey and the United States might set in motion. Other
objectives included: 1) regaining the prestige lost in
the Middle East by Jordan's swing to the West in April;
2) preparing the way for an attack on the West in the UN
General Assembly to distract attention from the scheduled
presentation of the UN reporet on Hungary; 3) blocking ac-
ceptance by the Arab states of further American aid un-
der the "Eisenhower Doctrine"; and 4) forcing high-level
East-West negotiations. Not all of these objectives were
achieved; in fact, the campaign was pursued with such in-
tensity that the Arab states recognized the artificiality
of the crisis. When it became clear that the Arabs would
not unite behind the USSR's leadership, Moscow abruptly
brought the operation to a close.
We have not attempted in the following pages to ex-
amine the crisis as a whole, but only the techniques--
typical of Khrushchev's diplomacy--by which the USSR
was able to raise and lower the level of international
tension.. We have therefore exclOded discussion, of
Western, Arab or Turkish activities.*
The Situation in Syria
By the early fall of 1957, the Syrian Government
had fallen into the hands of anti-Western, Arab nation-
alist, extremist forces who had 'ousted remaining moderate
elements following the discovery on 13 August of an al-
leged "American plot" to overthrow the Syrian regime.
The most influential 'pro-Moscow leader in the reshuffled
cabinet was Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister of
Defense and Finance nand al-Azm; who had headed the
July mission to Moscow and had played an important role
in the 1955 arms deal. The Syrian Army officer corps
also was purged and Afif Bizri, a Communist, appointed
Chief of Staff. A'semimilitary Civil defense organiza-
tion, the Popular Resistance' Movement, was reinvigorated
and promised weapons.
*For instance, certain Turkish troop movements during
this period were undoubtedly directed against Syria.
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Soviet Views of the Military Balance
Moscow's campaign to exploit an alleged "new bal-
ance of power" in world affairs was kicked off by the
PASS announcement on 26 August of the successful test-
ing of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Past
claims to parity with the West were thrust aside in
favor of assertions that the USSR not only had caught
up to but now surpassed the West.
In an attempt to exploit the ICBM announcement and
to support a stronger hand in international affairs,
Pravda on 8 September carried a long interview with
Soviet Air Force Chief of Staff Air Marshal Vershinin,
in which he painted a picture of overwhelming Soviet
military superiority vis-a-vis the West. Vershinin's
claims had been asserted previously by Soviet spokes-
men, but the marshaling of all these arguments at this
time into one highly publicized article was a move to
undermine the confidence of America's allies and to sup-
port Soviet allegations that ties with the West would
serve to increase local risks. It immediately became
clear that Moscow had singled out Turkey/ the linchpin
of Western defenses in the Middle East, as number one
target for these pressures.
Pressureson Turkey
Moscow's assertions of direct security interest in
developments in and around Syria took a variety of forms
and were backed up by a general flexing of Soviet military
muscles. Pravda on 9 September initiated this phase of
the Soviet diplomatic counteroffensive by voicing its con-
cern over the threat to Soviet security posed by "military
adventures," a line echoed by both Izvestia and Red Star.
Mikoyan, in an interview with Senator Ellender, alluded to
"evidence" in Moscow's hands of American intentions to
create an incident in Syria.
At a special press conference on 10 September, For-
eign Minister Gromyko charged that the United States was
preparing plans aimed at stifling Syria "as an independ-
ent state." Gromyko centered his fire on Turkey and in-
timated that Moscow might bring to bear pressures on
Turkey similar to those which it alleged Ankara was di-
recting against Syria. The Soviet press repeated the
charges in even sharper tones. Gromyko's remarks were
followed on the same day by a note from Soviet Premier
Bulganin to Turkish Prime Minister Menderes warning
Turkey against participating in hostilities against Sy-
ria. Soviet officials abroad--repeating a tactic Moscow
had used during the Suez crisis--warned privately that
an attack on Syria would precipitate World War III.
Moscow's hand was almost certainly also behind the
Rumanian proposal of 10 September that Turkey, Greece,
and Yugoslavia meet with the Balkan Satellites to discuss
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a regional nonaggression pact. This demarche was timed
to draw a prompt rejection from Turkey which could be used
to reinforce Soviet charges of Turkey's aggressive inten-
tions.
Soviet Treatment of Israel
Moscow at one point assigned Israel the role of co-
leader with Turkey in the planned assault on Syria, but
generally Tel Aviv was given only a secondary role. The
Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv warned Israel on 9 Septem-
ber against any provocative moves toward Syria. Four
days later Pravda, reviving a theme used during the Suez
conflict, kept up the pressure by alleging that Israeli
policy "spells danger to the very existence of Israel as
a state." The main purpose of claiming Israeli involve-
ment was to bring the other Arab states to identify their
interests with those of the USSR in its opposition to the
"plot" against Syria.
Elaboration of the "Plot"
Soviet President Yoroshilov, in a "personal letter"
on 17 September, warned the Shah of Iran of the dangers
of a major conflict and urged him to use his influence to
preserve peace in the Middle East. The same day Khru-
shchev, in an interview with British Labor Party leader
Aneurin Bevan, outlined a four-stage plot which he said
the Turks were planning with American backing. The Soviet
leader intimated that while he did not expect the United
States and Britain would push Syria's neighbors into an
actual invasion, he thought they would attempt to bring
off an internal coup to be followed by appeals from the
new leaders for military support from outside.
Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders both publicly
and privately dwelled on the USSR's possession of "secret
documents" which could be produced at the proper time to
prove its allegations. Soviet propaganda combined these
claims with its reporting of a series of "provocative"
Western moves, including Turkish Army maneuvers, US Sixth
Fleet movements, NATO exercises, and American arms ship-
ments to Jordan and Israel, to convey the impression that
the US had set in motion a vast military operation in the
eastern Mediterranean.
Moscow announced on 18 September that a cruiser and
a destroyer, which had been sent early in the month from
its Baltic Fleet to make good-will visits to Albania and
Yugoslavia, would make a ten-day visit to Syria--the
first Soviet warships ever to visit that country. This
gesture was probably intended to dramatize Soviet sup-
port for the Syrian regime.
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Gromyko in the UN
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech on 20 Sep-
tember at the newly convened UN General Assembly was more
moderate in tone than concurrent Soviet propaganda, prob-
ably because the Kremlin wanted any charges that Western
intervention was imminent brought before that body by an
Arab state. Gromyko, in attempting to impart the view
that Moscow continued to take a "serious view" of the sit-
uation, reiterated the USSR's security interest in Syrian
developments and asked General Assembly consideration of
Soviet proposals for a four-power renunciation of force
in the Middle East and a ban on arms shipments. These
proposals, first presented to Britain, France, and the
United States on 11 February, had been repeated on 19
April and 3 September. They were designed to demonstrate
the "reasonableness" of the USSR's position.
Tightening the Screws
Outside this arena, however, the USSR continued to
build tension. On 24 September, Moscow announced that
atomic and hydrogen weapons of various kinds had been ex-
ploded in connection with current Soviet military train-
ing exercises.
Encouraged by signs that no Arab state was lining up
against Syria, Moscow kept up the pressure. On 5 October,
in a four-hour talk with Secretary Dulles in Washington,
Gromyko emphasized that the USSR could not remain a pas-
sive observer in the repeated crises near its territory
and denied any Soviet intention of making Syria a military
base. Gromyko's stand was followed by an announcement on
7 October that on the preceding day the USSR had tested a
"powerful hydrogen device of new design." On the same day,
Khrushchev told. Now York Times correspondent James Reston
that Turkey would not last "a single day" in the Middle
East war, thus touching off a renewed campaign to magnify
the war sdare Over Syria. That evening, at a reception at
the East German Embassy, Khrushchev told newsmen that
Turkey should think twice before massing its troops on
the Syrian border, and he reportedly added that it would
be too. late to reconsider when "cannons begin to shoot
and.rockets to fly."
On 11 October, in an obvious attempt to build domes-
tic pressure on NATO governments and to isolate the United
States from its NATO allies, the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party sent letters to the socialist par-
ties of the eight West European NATO countries urging
joint efforts to preserve peace in the Middle East. Bloc
propaganda kept up a drumfire of charges against Turkey
and the Uhited States for "adventures which have made the
Turkish-Syrian border the most disturbed in the world."
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The Crisis Comes to a Head
Stimulated by Moscow's strong public and private sup-
port and probably under considerable direct Soviet prod-
ding, Syria on 15 October requested formal General Assem-
bly consideration of threats to its security and to "in-
ternational peace" and asked that a commission be set up
to investigate the situation on the Syrian-Turkish border.
Given this opportunity, Gromyko followed up on 16 October
with a letter to the President of the Assembly supporting
the Syrian move by accusing the United States of prodding
Turkey to commit aggression in Syria. He also stated there
was "reliable information that the Turkish General Staff,
together with American advisers, has elaborated detailed
plans for an attack by Turkey on Syria after the Turkish
elections on 27 October." In conversations with Arab and
Asian delegates, Gromyko assured them that the USSR was
prepared to use force if necessary. Moscow appeared to
want to force a vote in the General Assembly which would
oblige the Arab states publicly to line up with the bloc.
TASS issued a long, "authorized" statement on 18 Oc-
tober designed to reinforce the appearance of deep Soviet
concern and to review the history of the "plot." It
added little to charges contained in Khrushchev's inter-
view with Reston, in the messages to the Western European
Socialist parties, and in Gromyko's 16 October letter, ex-
cept to give details of military operations to be taken un-
der the "top secret plan." The statement said the USSR
would "take all necessary measures" to aid Syria if the
latter were attacked (Moscow did not, however, commit it-
self to specific independent action) and, repeating a tac-
tic adopted during the Suez crisis, it expressed the So-
viet Union's willingness to undertake joint measures with
the United States in order to dissolve the crisis.
On 20 October the Saudi Arabian radio announced that
King Saud had offered to mediate, and that both Syria and
Turkey had accepted and would send delegations to Damman
within two days. Gromyko met privately at the UN with a
number of the Asian-African delegations to impress on
them Soviet willingness to use force if necessary to sup-
port Syria. On the following day Turkey confirmed its
acceptance of Saud's offer, but Damascus radio denied its
previous reports of Syrian willingness to mediate. The
Soviet charg?n Damascus reportedly brought about
Syria's quick reversal.
Gromyko on 22 October made a bitter attack in the
General Assembly on the United States and Turkey and
warned against reported attempts to form a Syrian gov-
ernment-in-exile. However, by a vote of 37 to 10 with
34 ?atatentionstheAssembly suspended debate on the Syrian-
Turkish dispute pending the outcome of King Saud's media-
tion efforts and accepted a Soviet-Arab amendment for de-
bate to be resumed automatically in three days.
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Moscow Overplays its Hand
Now, at the height of the crisis, Moscow brought ten-
sion to a peak by a series of extremely blatant moves. On
23 October the Georgian newspaper Zarya Vostoka announced
that Marshal Rokossovsky, a senior Deputy Minister of
Defense who had been an outstanding combat commander in
World War II, had been transferred to command the Trans-
caucasus Military District which borders on Turkey. The
following day Moscow added that military exercises had
been carried out there under simulated atomic warfare con-
ditions. Extended Bulgarian troop maneuvers reportedly
were also conducted. Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov,
winding up a three-week visit to Yugoslavia and Albania,
contributed to the atmosphere of crisis by echoing in his
public speeches of 24 and 25 October the harsher tones of
Soviet propaganda.
The USSR's efforts to get the Arabs themselves to
take a stronger line against the West failed, despite
Moscow's great pains to depict the projected intervention
as an anti-Arab rather than an anti-Soviet move. Despite
Moscow's alleged proof of Western intentions--copies of
some of the "documentary evidence" reportedly were shown
to Arab officials--Soviet sabre-rattling did not rally
the Arabs behind Moscow's diplomatic campaign. Seeing
the danger of becoming pawns in an East-West conflict,
they turned toward Saudi mediation with renewed hopes.
At the end, even Syria's enthusiasm for the campaign
waned, and the Damascus press on 28 October quoted "Syri-
an political circles" as being in favor of any UN meas-
ures to ease the crisis. This of course left Moscow in
a diplomatically exposed position.
The Soviet leaders quickly recognized that they had
overplayed their hand and began an immediate strategic re-
treat.* Propaganda began to moderate its tone and volume,
and attention to Syria and Middle Eastern developments
tailed off rapidly. Gromyko on 29 October spoke briefly
in the General Assembly in support of Syria, but he
failed to repeat the threat of Soviet action against
Turkey. In a dramatic move to demonstrate that Moscow
viewed the crisis over, Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan
appeared at a reception on 29 October in the Turkish Em-
bassy. Khrushchev described their attendance as a "ges-
ture of peace" and expressed the opinion that prospects
It is notable that Moscow has made sporadic attempts
to lay'blame for the military pressures on Turkey on
the "adventurism" of the then Soviet Defense Minister,
Marshal Zhukov. It is quite clear, however, that this
was not the cause of Zhukov's dismissal; in fact, he was
junketing abroad during the final three weeks of the
crisis.
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for peace seemed a little better. Neither Syria's 30
October resolution in the General Assembly calling for
the creation of a "fact-finding commission" nor a West-
ern counterproposal for Secretary General Hammarskj old
to use his good offices was brought to a vote, and the
Syrian issue was in effect shelved.
Postlude and Conclusions
With General Assembly consideration of the crisis
having ended indecisively, Gromyko made the expected
effort to claim that action by the USSR had saved the
world from war. The Soviet press throughout November
continued a limited effort to maintain world alarm
over the Syrian-Turkish situation, but Moscow's efforts
both to keep the issue alive and to depict the lengthy
crisis as a victory for Syria and its friends over the
"Dulles-Eisenhower Doctrine" were halfhearted and obvi-
ously for the record. While nothing had been resolved
formally, it was clear that, for the time being at least,
the "threat to Syria" was over.
The USSR did not use the widespread public and pri-
vate threats of "volunteers" which characterized its ex-
ploitation of the Suez crisis, probably viewing this as
too provocative and too vulnerable a tactic to use twice.
Many of the Soviet moves looked beyond the immediate
crisis toward building an impression of irresistible).,So-
viet power rather than at resolving the immediate dispute.
Even as it experimented with the use of bolder cold
war tactics, Moscow was limited by an unwillingness to
precipitate hostilities in the Middle East for fear they
would get out of hand. The USSR's various "warnings"
were purposely vague in order to cloak Soviet intentions
and to maintain as wide an area for maneuver as possible.
Both public and private statements of Soviet willingness
to partake, if necessary, in military action in support
of Syria fell short of committing the USSR to unilateral
counteraction, and Moscow's pledge that Syria would be
supported by the world's "peace-loving" forces was at
best equivocal. Behind the facade of an exaggerated
Soviet security interest in Syrian developments, Moscow
sought to test Western reactions and Western resolution
in the face of intensive psychological pressures.
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ANNEX D: WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
This annex describes in some detail the machinery
used by the USSR in the selection, development, and
putting into production of weapons systems. In the
USSR this process involves an interaction of the cen-
tral organs* with the military, scientific, and eco-
nomic machinery.
Initial Formulation of Strategic Goals
Soviet policy operates within the framework of stra-
tegic goals worked out by the party Presidium. The Pre-
sidium begins by specifying the major internal and ex-
ternal political goals it wishes to achieve and believes
feasible within the limits of the available resources,
and then it proceeds to work out the major guidelines
for the economic, military, and scientific capabilities
necessary to achieve the political goals.
In working out the strategic goals for the next decade
or so the Presidium specifies, for example, the rate of
investment, the levels of output for various key heavy in-
dustries, the required capabilities to deliver nuclear
weapons on US military bases and population centers, and
to firovide-for the defense of the Soviet Union, and the
targets for housing and consumer goods. At the same time,
the share of national product to be devoted to investment,
defense, and consumption is also decided upon in gross
terms. Consideration of these programs concomitantly
yields a relatively high degree of integration. A high
degree of integration of means and ends is also fostered
by the fact that the Soviet leaders not only determine
the ends but also participate in programming the means
on paper, and then actually administer or supervise the
day-to-day implementation of the program.
Selection and Approval of Specific Military Weapons
Programs
After the major guidelines have been set, specific
programs must be formulated and the decision made as to
which of several alternatives to pursue. In the case of?
* In this annex the'top decision-making authority is
referred to as the party Presidfum, or occasionally as
the "regime." While the Presidium of the USSR Council
of Ministers plays a significant role in formulating de-
cisions, the party Presidium is clearly the ultimate
voice in major policy decisions.
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military programs, the Soviet Ministry of Defense has
the primary responsibility for providing capabilities
consistent with the regime's strategic goals. Although
in carrying out this responsibility the ministry does
not have a blank check to draw upon the economic resources
of the USSR, it can make its long-range plans with con-
siderable assurance that the means of fulfillment will
be available.*
Decisions related to the choice and acquisition of
advanced weapons systems are handled somewhat differently
from those related to the expansion and modernization of
?established systems. Major advanced weapons systems re-
quire considerable basic research, experimentation, and
development, much of which may prove abortive and involve
costs which are large and difficult to predict. On the
other hand, the expansion and improvement of established
systems involve much less technical risk and much more
readily predicted costs. Accordingly, proposals for es-
tablished systems are considered more or less routinely
and in general terms by the Presidium, while proposals
for advanced systems are given a good deal of individual
and personal attention.
Because of the complexity of problems involved in
introducing advanced weapons systems such as radar, jet
engines, nuclear weapons, and guided missiles, the regime
forms special ad hoc committees to supervise the research,
development, testing, and early production and deployment
phases of each weapons system. Such committees appar-
ently are headed, or supervised, by a member of either the
party or government Presidium and include a number of
high officials involved or interested in the develop-
ment of the new weapons system--Ministers, Chairmen of:State
Committees, :and the Deputy Ministers of Defense whose
areas of responsibility involve the operational weapons
system. Special ad hoc committees of this type have
* It should be noted that historically the con-
straints on military research and development in
the Soviet Union have differed from the constraints
on the production and deployment of weapons systems.
The principal limitations on military research, devel-
opment, and testing activities in the USSR during the
postwar period have been in the availability of skilled
manpower and some types of laboratory facilities and
special equipment. At the present time, these bottle-
necks are being eased rapidly. In general, gross re-
sources available have been large enough to make money
no object, as far as military research and development
work is concerned.
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extensive powers to override normal bureaucratic proce-
dures, to marshal human and material resources for the
program, and to assign specific responsibilities to
lower organizations. These committees apparently op-
erate until production problems of the new weapons have
become more or less routine.
The second stage in the decision-making process may
be divided broadly into four phases: a) the selection of
the specific military research, development, and produc-
tion programs; b) the establishment of the scientific
and technical feasibility of new weapons systems; c) the
consideration of the cost of individual programs and of
the effort as a whole; and d) incorporation and final
approval of the programs as parts of the detailed plans
for scientific research, production, investment, and the
allocation of physical and financial resources.
The General Staff in the Ministry of Defense is the
principal group which works out the proposals for those
specific programs and force levels--and the associated
bill of equipment and materials--which will provide mil-
itary capabilities consistent with the guidelines and
strategic goals laid down by the party Presidium. Mem-
bers of the General Staff are military generalists who
apparently are able to provide the Presidium with the
staff work necessary to make a clear choice from among
the alternative ways of achieving a desired capability.
Proposals may also originate in the Academy of
Sciences and research institutes or in other parts of
the government such as the Ministry of Medium Machine
Building (nuclear energy) and the State Committees for
Aviation Technology, Defense Technology, Shipbuilding
Technology, and Radio Electronics. Moreover, in the
course of working out the strategic goals and indicat-
ing the general limits for military expenditures, the
Presidium itself lays down on occasion the specific char-
acteristics of certain weapons systems it desires to have
developed and deployed. It is able to do this because
its members have a long and continuous acquaintance with
both the existing and laboratory state of the art.
In the initial stage the Presidium's decisions are
somewhat tentative, and the scientific and technical
feasibility of most major advanced weapons systems must
be established before a final decision to proceed can
be reached. The problems may be related either to the
establishment of certain more or less fundamental prin-
ciples or to the incorporation of known principles in a
product, weapon, or weapons system, with specified per-
formance characteristics. In either case the solution
which is ultimately advanced must be tested.
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Testing .
In general, the more fundamental work is done in
"research institutes" under the aegis of the Academy of
Sciences; While the development of the actual operational
weapon:, is accomplished in."deSign bureaus" under the
supervision ofi-A ministry (e.g,, Medium Machine Build-
ing)-or-aAechnological.committee (e.g.; the State Com-
mitteefer AViation?TechnOlogy). Considerable flex-
ibility in handling inter-related problems is achieved
by having a top. leader responsible fOr:Over7all progress
of each advanced system.
?
An outline of the steps :involved in designing a
high-Performance aitcraftby-ftdeeign.bdreau co-located
with a Soviet "developmental factory": provides a good
example Of the MadhigetyofdeciSiOn.v The requirement
for a high-petformince aircraft as proposed by the Min-
istry:of Defense and modified and approved by the Pre-
sididm'iOttfinsMitted to a?Seletted design bUreau sub-
'ordinate to the. State Committee for Aviation Technology.
The folleWing:specifications Are included:. 1) the com-
bat mission, Of the aircraft; ,2). theaOnditions under
whieh it Will operiteandthe:tactical:doCtrine govern-
ing its use.; 3). the epeedroeiling,: rateofOlimb' load
Carrying capacity,- and arialenty? 4). thetype and power
of theongine; 5)Anteichangeability of parts;. and 6)
other specifications. . The requirement_ also may state
that the designer's attention-1A to berOentered primarily
on attaining* maximum speed indtrateOf climb for the
aircraft,'Oki on the other handi-that the requirements
with respect to range And loadearryingoapacity must be
met first.
On the hisis of this.directive.a design team headed
by a senior designer prepares a preliminary layout de-
sign and mock-711p. The preliminary layout design includes
the following taSic documentshand models; 1)..general
view of the Aircraft in three projections 2) layout
drawings; 3). scale and winttUnitel Models; 4) outline,
control equipment; and lead diStribution diagrams; 5)
aerodynamic characteristics of the airdtaft; 6) prin-
cipal data on strength and flying weight of the aircraft
with various combat loads;. 7) calculation of the center
of gravitY:of-'the aitcraft-Vith:reepeet:to the mean
aerodynamic wing chord 'Or various combat loads; 8)
schedule- of emergency rescue facilitieS;.:9) outline dia-
grams; 10) description of the*taCticaltechnical char-
acteristics of the aircraft, with.an/illustration of
its design features in tables And diagrams;. 11) tech-
nological characteristics Of the -aircraft with respect
to series production; 12) economic justification of the
design with an estimate of unit costs and principal ma-
terials inputs; and 13) an explanatory mote justifying
each modification of the original specifications.
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A "mock-up commission," which usually includes at
least one Deputy Minister of Defense in addition to
technical specialists and the Chairman of the State Com-
mittee for Aviation Technology, then inspects the mock-up
and examines the preliminary layout design. The commis-
sion may reject the design and/or lay down additional_spec-
ifications. Approval results in a formal directive to
the design bureau or experimental plant to build three
prototypes by a specified date. The directive may fur-
ther order one or more production plants to begin tool-
ing for quantity production.
Following construction of these three prototypes,
normal static, taxiing, and flight tests are conducted
to determine the rigidity and durability of the aircraft.
The results of these tests are reviewed by the commis-
sion, and the design bureau receives an official approval
or disapproval for its project. If the project is ap-
proved, the Soviet Air Force is advised that the new
aircraft is ready for state trials, which are carried out
by an organization known as the Scientific Testing In-
stitute of the Soviet Air Force. The trials are ex-
haustive, covering all aspects of performance and com-
bat suitability. The special commission then reviews
the findings of the state trials and renders its final
evaluation. If the new aircraft proves to be satisfac-
tory, the results are forwarded to the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers through the General Staff and the
Ministry of Defense, and thence to the party Presidium.
In the meantime, the USSR Gosplan uses the estimates
of unit costs and materials inputs in the preliminary lay-
out deeign to compute the cost of the number of aircraft
proposed by the Ministry of Defense. Gosplan also ascer-
tains if sufficient productive capacity exists or if ad-
ditional capital investment is required. These results
are forwarded to the party Presidium.
Nuclear weapons design follows the same basic pattern,
except that the Presidium takes a more direct and personal
interest in specifying the capabilities, dimensions, and
mode of delivery of the weapon and issues a formal direc-
tive for each new weapon.
Inasmuch as the Soviet leaders usually are straining
their economic resources, they are under considerable pres-
sure to halt an unpromising program at an early stage in
its development and to use its facilities and manpower
for some other high-priority program. These circumstances,
coupled with a system of strict centralized control, make
for prompt and drastic decisions by the Presidium, but of
course these decisions may not always prove correct. Pro-
posals may never reach the Presidium through any of the
few established channels, or the Presidium] may reject them
out of handle. In any event, the research institute,'de-
sign bureau, plant, or ministry cannot proceed with any
considerable amount of developmental activity in the hope
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or expectation that future events will demonstrate the
desirability of the project. There is no other market
for the project. The controls over resources and man-
power are so strict that the most a Minister, for ex-
ample, could do would be to keep a handful of people
working on purely theoretical problems, provided he was
willing to resort to a good deal of subterfuge.
-Cost8-2?
Once a proposed weapons system is found to be tech-
nically feasible, its estimated cost must be compared
with its effectiveness in accomplishing the desired mis-
sion. Particular weapon systems are then considered in
relation to one another and to over-all military objec-
tives. The proposed military program as a whole is next
examined in the context of the resource demands of the
investment and consumption programs in order to identify
the areas of serious conflict.
The detailed staff support needed to cope with these
economic problems,is supplied primarily by the USSR Gos-
plan and the Ministry of Finance. At the present time
the Chairman of USSR Gosplan and the Minister of Finance
are members of the Council of Ministers Presidium and
probably also of the special ad hoc committees respon-
sible for implementing the highest priority military
projects. In contrast with certain other members of the
special committees, the effectiveness of these two offi-
cials is enhanced by the fact that they have little if
any vested interest in particular military, economic, or
social programs. Instead they are concerned primarily
with the means by which the over-all strategic goals of
the regime can be implemented.
Gosplan in particular must strike a balance between
the capital, material, and manpower resources available,
on the one hand, and on the other hand, the demands made
on these resources by all the proposed programs, military
and otherwise.
For those weapons already in production or well along
in the research and developmental process, Gosplan can
give the Presidium a fairly accurate estimate of cost over
the next five years. Gosplan has very complete informa-
tion on unit costs, plant capacity, 4ftuimanpower require-
ments for production items, the cost estimates worked out
by the research institutes and design bureaus, the plan
schedules for future production of materials and capital
equipment, and the estimates of future manpower avail-
-abilities and training.
. The Chairman of Gosplan reports the results of a
tentative trial balance, highlighting the areas of con-
flict between the various programs. .Serious conflicts
between the military, investment, and consumption pro-
grams almost always arise, because the demands of the
Soviet leaders for the growth of the economic base and
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of the military potential are, for all practical purposes,
insatiable. Not to drive 'the economy at a pace which
stretches the available resources to the limit and a lit-
tle beyond is unthinkable. Hence, when Gosplan and the
Ministry of Financereport back to the Presidium on the
estimated cost: Of the over-all military program in con-
junction with other programs, the party Presidium may be
faced with choices only it can resolve.
.The pattern of Soviet actions in the past indicates
no routine solution to this squeeze. . More often than not
the Soviet leaders first.reduce.thetplanned rate of growth
of living standards and then proceed to cut back the less
essential parts of the.military and investment programs.
The downward modification of Malenkov's? consumer goods
policy at the end of 1954 is one example; another is the
reduction in military manpower over the past few years.
Both actions were designed to bolster the investment pro-
gram and thus continue the rapid expansion of the heavy
industrial base.
Shiite of priority between investment, defense, and
consumption do net exhaust the alternatives open to the
leadership. .A great deal of attention is paid at the high-
est levels to finding ways to do things more cheaply. It
is one of the primary functions of the staff agencies and
the ministries to come up with ways to reduce costs:
For example, largely as a result of the pressure ex-
erted by the top planning authorities, the cost of produc-
ing industrial goods declined very rapidly between 1950
and 1955, so that a ruble spent for weapons procurement in
1955 probably was worth between 25 and 40 percent more than
one spent five years before.
.Comparison of the original surface-to-air guided mis-
sile system installed around Moscow in 1953-56 with the.
cheaper and simpler system currently being deployed in
many areas of the uspit shows that Soviet planners found
a lower cost solution when the extremely high cost of the
earlier system appeared to be a factor limiting its de-
ployment.. .The original Moscow system was not duplicated
around 20 to 30 other major Soviet cities, in all prob-
ability because of the sizable construction costs of the
concrete hardstands and extensive, road network. Extended
deployment of this system would have forced a re-examina-
tion and curtailment of the whole investment and housing
construction program, with negative implications for eco-
nomic growth.- .
After the party Presidium has decided on a set of
military, investment, and consumption-social welfare pro-
grams which appear to be internally consistent in terms
of their demands upon resources and which will provide
the basis for achieving the strategic political goals,
these programs are translated into a detailed set of plans
specifying what will be produced by whom, when, and at
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what unit cost. For production of end items and construc-
tion of facilities, Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance are
the principal organizations responsible for working out the
detailed plans and schedules.
?
Final Directives
Together with the special ad hoc committees, Gosplan
and the Ministry of Finance draft for the Presidium spe-
cial directives* which specify when and where the system
is to become operational; the quantity of missiles, elec-
tronics equipment, and other components to be produced;
the technological characteristics and combat capabilities
of the missiles and equipment; the type and quantity of
fixed installations required; the manpower and special
skills required; and the advanced technological processes
and techniques to be incorporated in the production and
construction process.
The directive also specifies the priority which pro-
duction and construction will be accorded relative to other
high-priority defense and investment projects. Further,
the directive sets the timing for the initiation of series
production relative to pilot-line production. Whether
the Presidium decides to prepare for series (or mass) pro-
duction almost simultaneously with initiation of pilot-line
production depends primarily on the urgency of acquiring an
operational system and on the seriousness of the problems
which can be anticipated on the basis of prototype test-
ing. In the case of the heavy jet bomber (BISON) the
USSR telescoped series production and prototype production
to a, remarkable degree.
Gosplan's function at this point is to translate the
directive into detailed production schedules, stipulating
the plants involved and their responsibilities, capital in-
vestment schedules for each production facility and opera-
tional installation, unit construction cost plans and a
schedule for reducing these construction costs, a bill of
materials inputs for production and of capital equipment
inputs for new investment, a manpower utilization plan.
and labor productivity goals, unit production cost plans
for all components and a schedule for reduction in these
Unit costs, detailed plans for technological innovation
in the form of schedules for new kinds of capital equip-
ment for production and construction and schedules for
the introduction of advanced processes, and the appro-
priate adjustments in the production and investment plans
* The type of directive described in the following
discussion assumes the completion of research and devel-
opment and the initiation of prototype testing. Soviet
planning for production and deployment usually begins
very early in the testing stage.
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of all industries contributing to the program in order to
ensure the timelyiprovision of the requisite quantities of
materials and capital equipment. Gosplan also must see to
it that each .plant and facility involved has its individual
microcosmic versions of these-plans setting forth the out-
put targets, unit costs, capital construction, labor force,
and labor productivity, and so forth..*.
After these very detailed plans are integrated into
the national economic plans, the plans go back to the party
Presidium for final approval, which in this detailed form
is largely formal: The approved plans. become legallrbind-
ing on all concerned.
* For the lower priority weapons systems and for most
civilian production, the plant plans are Consolidated at
the level of the. Council. of the National Economy to which
the plant is subordinate. For advanced weapons systems,
however, copies of the. plant plans--or detailed extracts
therefrom are forwarded to the committee directing the pro-
gram and to the appropriate section of Gosplan USSR.
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ANNEX E: PRESIDIUM GUIDANCE AT THE PLANT LEVEL
In the final analysis, all plans worked out by the
central authorities must be translated into reality by.
'a plant which produces the.end items and by the construc-
tion 'organizations which build the necessary facilities.
It is the purpose of this Annex to outline briefly the
multiple-command relationships and indirect controls
which tightly link the plant or construction organization
manager to the Presidium.
.Cbains'of Command
The direct chain of command to the Plant runs from
the Presidium of the Council of Ministers through the USSR
Council of Ministers, the Union Republic Council of Minis-
ters, and finally the Councils of National Economy (love
narkhozes). The Communist Party provides both a means
of control and a supplelentary chain of command over eco-
nomic activities, running from the Presidium of the
Communist Party through the regional and local Soviets,
to the. primary party organizations in eadh plant, shop,
and workers brigade. The party not only is responsible
for guiding the activities of the factories but also
monitors the work of the financial and planning organi-
zations whose function it is to control the plants'
activities.*
In addition :to the direct chain of administrative
subordination, plant activities, are monitored through an
elaborate control mechanism in the form of the staff
planning, financial, and statistical organs: the USSR
and Republic dosplans, the Ministry of Finance, the
State Bank, and the Central Statistical Administration.
These organizations have positive as well as negative
control functions in the sense that the Construction Bank
of the Ministry of Finance disburses the capital invest-
ment grants, and the supply directorates subordinate to
the USSR and Republic dosplans are responsible for planning
the supply flows to the plants.
* In Stalin's time the circle of those who checked up
on the checkers was much wider, including the Ministry
Of State Control, the Secret police, and the personal
secretariat of the party boss. These bodies no longer
have the range of functions and prerogatives they once
had. The role of the professional party machine, on the
other hand,. has been greatly enhanced by Xbrushchev, and
further expansion of party participation in guiding plant
activities is under way.
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Assignment of Production Targets, Priorities, and Resources
to Plants
. . .
, The quantity. and kind of item to be produced by each
plant,. as Well as the material, capital, and manpower re-
sources_aesigne4 to the plant for its construction targets,
are spelled out in the plant's microcosmic version of the
national economid.plan: the "technical-industrial-financial
plan" of the enterprise. This plan covers the following
areas of activity;- production, capital construction, labor
force and labor productivity, wages, production costs, new
technology, and supplies of raw materials and capital
equipment. Each production item is assigned a priority
according to.a standard classification of priorities.
The "technical-in4Istrial-financial plan" provides the
standard for. measuring-the performance of the plant.
Reporting of Plan Fulfillment
Statistical report's on the fulfillment of the targets
set forth in the, enterprise plan, are submitted through
the direct.chain.of command, usually for ten-day, Monthly,
quarterlysvand annual periods. Plants engaged In produc-
tion of components for advanced weapons systems may submit
daily reports. The ten-day reports give only the high-
lights.of plan fulfillment .for most aspects of the enter-
priee'technical-industrial-financial plan, while the
monthly, quarterly, and annual reports provide immense
detail on:all.aspects of plant performance with respect
to the plan. All such reports are made on standard forms
according to.standard'accounting procedures set forth by
the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical Ad-
ministration.
Control by Financial and Statistical Organizations
The essence of the control function performed by the
State Bank--which is subordinate to the USSR Council of
Ministers--is that the local branch can perform a com-
plete, up-to-date audit of a plant's activities on the
basis of the documents in the plant's account at the Bank.
All transactions of the enterprise, purchase of materials,
wage payments, transfer of finished products, and the
like are handled through its account with the local branch
of the State Bank. The Bank is responsible for ensuring
that the plant's activities correspond, in detail, to
those specified in the plan, and that the procedures
employed conform to the detailed regulations set forth
by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical
Administration.
The Construction Bank, through which investment
funds are made available to the individual enterprise,
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maintains a set of capital accounts for the plant, in-
cluding.the plant's-amortization account, a small amount
of profits retained for new investment purposes, and the
capital investment grant from the State Budget. All
purcha4es-of:kuiPMenC*nd.Materials., as well as wage
and otherPntlaYs'fOr Capital construction purposes,
are made.threugh the Construction Bank so that it can
perform the 'same -sort of control function over the
plant's investment activities that the State Bank per-
forms for 'production activities.
Lodil offices of the. Ministry of Finance constantly
check the fininCial.status of the plants and research
institutes in -the area? Aside from periodic audits,
the local off ice of the Ministry of Finance maintains
a constant check on the payMent of profit and turnover
tax by eacij plant as compared to the plan, and on the
actual as compared to the planned subventions to the
research institutes.
Duplicates, of the statistical reports sent up
through the direct chain Of command, plus other detailed
reports of * special 'nature, are furnished to the local
office of the USSR Central:Statistical Administration
which cheats the report against its copy of the plant
plan and informs the appropriate higher authorities
of any discrepancies or illegal procedures. The Central
Statistical AdMiniStration, the final repository of
most detailed reports, provides a statistical reference
library service, complete with research and special'
report services', to the appropriate higher echelons.
. .
The monitoring functions make it diffiCult for
the enterprises to deviate from planned targets, pro-
cedures, and regulations of the Banks and the Central
Statistical AdMinistrition. In addition, the chief
bookkeeper at each enterprise haS the right--and duty--
to inform higher authority directly of anylltiolation.:...
the manager commits more than once.
Resolution of Current. Problems.
When the manager runs into difficulties in meeting
'his production schedules he can appeal for assistance
through 'the 'direct command channels. The first appeal
normally is to the next higher echelon in the direct
chain of command--the sovnarkhoz, for most enterprises.
Research institutes can appeal directly to the Ministry
or State CoMmittee to which they are subordinate. If
the sovnarkhoz is unable or unwilling to help, the
manager may bypass all intermediate echelons and appeal
directly to Moscow, usually to the Presidium member
who is directly responsible for his particular area
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of activity. A manager engaged in production of missiles
systems components, for example, probably would send a
telegram directly to Dimitri Ustinov, Deputy Chairman
of. the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the Presi-
dium thereof, who--as noted above--is believed to head
a sPecial...ad -hoc ? CoMmittee for guided missiles. Such direct ap-
peals occur most frequently when. materials and capital equipment ?
-Ishottages.develOp Or when bUreauCtatic stumbling blocks; are inter-
posed, and tbey'usually.result in immediate and effective action.
:.? ? . . ? .
tParttichannels ilSoHprOVide an *effective channel
? of cOm.niunications .froth the. plant to the .top decision-
making group-in Moscow, quite independent of the di-
rect chain 6Vcoinnisirid... The ? party organization in the
plant is 'obligated hot only to ensure that the plant per-
form's .the ?taskS?assigned to it by the plan but also is
responsible' for .lending the Plant.management every pos-
sible assistance in.' fulf illing? the plan. Party channels
charaCteriltically. are-utilized ?tor chronic difficulties,
while the type'nf immediate emergency occasioned by the
failure of supplies to arrive ? on schedule usually is
handled thrthigh".the direct -Chain of: command or by a tele-
gram to the .appropriate member of the ? Presidium if nec-
essary. ? ?
Resource-Reserves
In order to prevent this elaborate machinery from
breaking, down because of planning errors and failures
of individual plants to ship the requisite materials,
a large inventory is maintained at the exclusive dis-
posal of the USSR Council of Ministers. This inventory,
designated as "State Reserves," includes ,a wide range
of commodities; coal, petroleum products, nonferrous
metals, cotton, grain, and the like. State Reserves
may be likened to ,a surge tank, which keeps the economy
going despite temporary deficiencies.* In addition,
State Reserves, supplemented by mobilization reserves,
also provide a strategic stockpile because the amount
*Plant inventories are kept as low as possible in
the drive to maximize. output. Individual managers, of
course, do not like this policy in the least, and they
do what they can to build up their inventories, often
resorting to semilegal and illegal means. Limited in-
ventories of materials are placed at the disposal of
the Councils of the National Economy and the Union
Republic Councils of Ministers for emergency use.
Machine-building plants also have "mobilization reserves"
of materials and machine tools stored at the plant for
conversion to armaments production in an emergency. Sup-
ply shortages may be temporarily solved by Moscow's
granting authorization for the plant to "borrow" from
the mobilization reserves. Most loans from reserves--
State or mobilization--subsequently must be repaid from
the plant's quarterly or yearly materials allocation.
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held for a number of commodities is well in excess of
normal emergency requirements of the economy. State
Reserves may be drawn upon for a variety of strategic
emergencies short of war; the Malenkov consumer-goods
program in 1953-54 and the Satellite disturbances of
1956 are noteworthy examples.
A somewhat longer range problem requiring a re-
source reserve arises because it is very difficult to
estimate at the beginning ofs five- or seven-year plan
either the unit cost or the precise quantity required
for new types of machinery--civilian or military--to
be produced toward the end of the plan period. In
order to deal with this exigency--and to facilitate
overfulfillment of the multiyear plans--Gosplan signif-
icantly underestimates the economy's capability to ex-
pand machinery and equipment output on the beets of the
planned increases in materials inputs. These uncommit-
ted resources are available in the event the estimated
cost of advanced types of machinery prove too low, or
the quantity required grossly underestimated, or because
progress has been sufficiently satisfactory to permit a
program larger than that originally envisaged.
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