US/POW CAMPS (CAMPS AND CONDITIONS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01540R001200160003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 18, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPOR
us
(GeV* 0WAMOM
Sae attadWunt
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
50X1-HUM
DATE DISTR. 10 Ji'g' 1
39
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE' APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
Famarftli bardwdt+h for , ' Informtlan emd ratenU Ii the
tand=1 t CAW. :-,,.'read16 J 190.
Air (8 08PUO) (Attn: PsyWarfare Div.)
AaW (k ) (Attn: C&D Div Op Br, Returnee Section)
3 erro r) (Attn: OP 322-Y4)
STATE
ARMY NAVY (AIR
~;46\WON I?
FBI
6N
(Note: Washington Distribution ledico7.u By "X"; Field Disir.Lo.on By "#".) For:' No. 51-6l, Januarzr 19.41-1
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15 January 1954
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
This project was begun as a quarterly report in November
1951 primarily for the purpose of collecting available informa-
tion on POW camp locations and conditions. Since that time
there have been seven supplementary issues, the last published
1 May 1953, on the eve of repatriation proceedings.
The purposes for which these reports were designed have,
of course, now ceased to exist. It was thought useful, however,
to publish a terminal issue on the basis of information gathered
from US returnees, and from ROKs repatriated since April 1953,
so that, through comparison with previous reports, some idea
might be gained of relative accuracy and value of our earlier
efforts.
Information is herewith presented first in a camp-by-camp
breakdown, then as an over-all survey of POW treatment and
organization, and of interrogation and indoctrination methods,
including propaganda lines.
Attached to this report is a map plotted in July 1953,
intended as an attachment to a projected August supplement,
Operation Big Switch made publication unnecessary. Also
attached is a map errata sheet, making corrections based on
returnee information.
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I. CAMPS FOR UN POWs OTHER THAN ROK
Camp 1
At Changson was first reported 18 December 1951 as Camp 5, which was
deactivated January 1952 and reactivated (with POWs moved here from Kanggye
in April 1952.) As of March 1952, camp personnel consisted of US, British
and a few Turkish POWs. Since then camp had become known variously as 41,
#2, branch 3, #3 (at nearby Kumjon-n.) (#1 was originally for EM "incorrigibles'
160 of whom were moved S. to start #J.) Markers were set at XE 8779, 8690 anc5OX1-H U M
8488 in October 1952.
June 1952, at which tirhe 672 of the o47 Big#tiah P(.LJc i?
As of January 1953, Changson Camp in three
villages at XE 8583, 8483, 8423. Interpreter from camp said 2,000 POWs there,
but source saw only 800 Caucasians in three compounds.
A June 1953 interview with a Little Switch returnee who was sent to
Changson in April 1951 reveals that the camp was formed in a village which had
been emptied of civilians and fenced with barbed wire. Source said conditions
were bad until the truce talks began. He received indoctrination through
special Chinese commissars who spoke fluent English. In August 1952, source
was moved to Wiwon (#4) with a number of other reactionary sergeants.
According to another returnee, reactionaries were mistreated at Changson.
He himself spent a large part of his time there in jail, from which he emerged
periodically when he wrote "self-criticism'," He also reports being subjected
to cigarette-burn torture, four months ?f solitary confinement. According to
his testimony, the Progressives were all in 1st Company, and "Rats" and Pro-
gressives were repatriated before the rest. There were several covert POW
organizations here (including the "KKK") during his confinement.
Another returnee states there were approximately 35 Progressives in #1, and
that 1,000 POWs died here mf malnutrition in the winter of 1951-52.
Frrn edhe* Phme III debriefings, a 40q.50 bed hospital in this camp;
"Progressive" POWs allowed to write undictated letters three times a month;
1,200 - 1,700 POWs from all UN (except ROK) units here, scattered all through
Changson.
general Znfs r tion re #1
Changson a permanent camp. Peaceful Valley, Dean Camp, Xining Camp, or
Death Valley and the Schoolhouse were normal stops on march to #1. Labor camps
in general area of Changson. Camp near mai* supply points and subject to
occasional bombings.
The Platoon and Company trganizational setup was used at A. Camp had no
fences but was surrounded by ditch. 800 US and over 600 British POWs here,
SECRET
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Camp 1 had seven companies: Cos. 1,-2, 3, 4 were Caucasian US (approximately
1,000), Cos. 5, 6 and 7 were British (approximately 500).
POWs of higher rank and age soon removed to officers' camp (#2), and
younger, uneducated men used as leaders, along with progressives. British
POWs received better treatment in their compound, possibly because of a
higher number of progressives. On the other hand, British POWs had an escape
organization within their compound. Returnees had no details on same.
Camps ?1 and 5 had an anti-Communist unit called KKK which attempted
to keep progressives in line. They also contained such pro-Communist committees
as the Peace Comm., at both camp and company levels, and a Camp Club, sponsored
and approved by the ChiComs, at camp level.
POWs who were openly hostile were harshly treated, denied medical care.
Men from broken or poor homes were prime indoctrination targets. Indoctrination
possibilities separated for special treatment. Al]. Negroes, officers and
sergeants removed from camp in 1952. Compulsory lectures slacked off in mid 52,
and only progressives continued studies. They were rewarded for informing, for
being members of the Peace Committee, and for study with money, jobs, girls, no
work details, medical aid.
On the other hand, "incorrigibles" (reactionary corporals and below for
whom this camp was primarily designed) were punished for resistance by long
hours at attention, hard labor outside camp, constant re-interrogation, the
"dungeon", self-criticisms and confessions. There were even cases of maggots
being placed in the ears of sick POWs. A Slave Labor Unit (SLU) detention camp
for violent Reactionaries(who were kept in"cages") is reported to have been-
outside #1.
During interrogations, the Communists were interested in anything concern-
ing US radio, in Alaska and Okinawa airfields, and in the life, financial condi-
tions and education of the POWs in particular. The CCF interrogators finally
realized these POWs were poor subjects with limited knowledge and that they
could eventually be forced to answer yes to anything.
Territory arolidd #1 was mountainous and full of enemy soldiers, capture was
certain and escape past perimeter guards was seldom attempted.
Camp 2
Also at a s (XE 8680), 7 mi. south of village near Song-ni, first
reported in April 1952 as located in a school building and civilian houses on
a river near a bridge, and in hilly terrain. Camp was originally known as #1,
Branch 2 became officers camp when other POWs were segregated. Some civil
Political prisoners were this area. Sketch of Camp 50X1 -HU M
marks October n still part of #1. 5uA'i-huivi
this camp was
organIzed In u 1951 note conflict with report on #1) as part of #1. Al].
sergeants were segregated in special squad as considered "bad influence." In
August 1952 they were moved to #4*'and Puerto Ricans were moved to #5.
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A Peace Committee was organized under the leadership of a British private
until he was transferred to Wiwon. Security depended on guards, camp not wired.
There were seven companies in camp, no communication between except during
athletic meets which were run by "Progressives."
Accordin to one Little Switch returnee, at the time of his confinement in
#2, Branch 1 (from October 1951 to April 1953), the camp had three branches:
Branch 1 at Pyongoe-dong, with 165 officers; Branch 2 at Pingehon-ni or Parun-
dong with 170-180 men; Branch 3 at Chang-ni for "incorrigible" officers, who had
fewer privileges than men in the other branches. Branch 3 originally listed at
Changson, XE 7485 in Communist report October 1952.
Branches 1 and 2 were located side-by-side with a common ration center in
tile-roofed buildings surrounded by barbed wire. POWs were divided into nine
squads, with 17-18 officers in each squad. Billets were inadequately heated
and POWs had no beds until Easter 1953. No indoctrination was given after
November 1952. No forced labor, but POWs were paid if they worked.
POWs were guarded in proportion to their state of health. No leniency
was shown hostile attitudes and while POWs were punished by a choice of
informing on their fellow-prisoners or solitary, there were no mass punishments.
POWs were segregated from point of time, i.e. those interned in 1951,
1952 and 1953 were kept apart.
Officer internees in 12, Branch 1 built a radio which was disassembled
when not in use. Returnee source received 20-30 letters in 1952 (none in 1951
or 1953) and noted a 3-4 month lapse between postmark and delivery dates. He
stated that all men in camp except two got mail, some received as many as 150
letters. All mail was processed through Peking to Pyoktong and on to camps.
POWs couldn't write for three months after capture, then allowed one letter
every three weeks, the contents of which were sometimes dictated. POWs couldn't
write if undergoing punishment. This letter writing policy was begun by blanket
authority in June 1951,
All POWs in this branch were approached frequently to make propaganda
broadcasts. They were punished for refusal by food cut-offs, solitary, etc*
20-30% reluctantly made recordings and were given better food. All of broad-
casts were dictated.
POWs forced to attend indoctrination classes for eighteen months, a
minimum of six hours daily. The study program was "tortuous, arduous and
mentally depressing." POWs forced to go along with the program or spend most
of their time in solitary. Source didn't believe any officers were successfully
indoctrinated, but thought that a number of enlisted men were. Indoctrinated
POWs were placed in a preferential camp (#5) where food was much better than
in #2. Indoctrination lecturers were civilians, all highly educated.
Another returnee was interned in #2 from December 1951 to May 1953. He
was interrogated six times but was given no indoctrination, He reported in his
debriefing that there had been some atrocities committed against POWs when the
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NKA was guarding the camp. After the truce talks began, POWs were allowed
mail and given recreation facilities, but were isolated from NK civilians.
Five of the Bacteriological Warfare (BW) "confessors" captured in July 1950
were kept in a house outside #2 until they were removed to Pyoktong?
Other Phase III debriefings substantiate the above by saying that BW
indoctrination sessions were held in this camp branch. Also that camp
consisted of mud huts in a village which housed 750-800 POWs.
Only information obtainable on Camp 2, Branch 2 was that a mine operated
near Camp 3 as an annex.to Branch 2, 42, possibly a staging area, Called "Gold
Mine Camp."
Camp 2, Branch 3 (XE 8779) was the "incorrigible" camp for the overflow
from Camp 2, Branch 1. Returnee source said groups in camp were segregated
into companies and not allowed to communicate. Branch had a dispensary hospital
where medical treatment was adequate. POWs lived in Korean houses with civilians
and other POWs. Punishment in this camp was solitary in 5' x 3' x 6' hole, er
standing at attention for hours at a time. POWs here participated in inter-camp
"Olympics".
Camp 3
At "Black Valley" was apparently organized in June 1951 when 160 British
reactionaries were sent to build it. British were here until moved to F4 in
July 1952. Camp was first reported in July 1952 as an enclosure for US Negro
and ROK POWs. In October 1952, the camp was officially reported by the Com-
munists as having two marked branches. Branch 1 at Sinp'yong (Kumjom-ni)
XE 8588 and Branch 2 at Songp'yong-ni, XE 9795, 7 miles south of Changson. At
first camp contained separate companies of officers and sergeants, then all
officers were moved to #2 and all sergeants to i4, As of April 1953, only
reactionary corporals and British EM remained.
British returnee source moved to Branch 1 in August 1952 and was told he
had come "to further his studies" but received no indoctrination until September
when he attended a BW lecture.
According to another British returnee, the camp was called "3rd Regiment
Reactionary Camp." There was no POW administrative organization as the camp
held relatively few internees (by April 1953 all POWs .sr. Waft t'eoent1y capture
The cook-house was the center of clandestine activity where those planning
escape got supplies. Reason for the small number of POTS is unknown, except
that all had refused political cooperation and personal data.
Mail had haphazard distribution and mail forms had to be requested Source
received 8 of 15 letters written to him, none of his went out.
Source transferred to this camp from #5 when escape plans discovered.
Internees segregated by nationality, rank, color. Punishment for infractions:
hard labor, "hole", self-criticism.
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One US returnee said that approximately thirty-three Progressives were
planted in #3.
Came 4
At w1won (BA 4953) was reported in November 1951 by Int huh 3341, in May
1951 by Air FEAF (when camp also held ROK POWs), and officially by the Com-
munists as marked camp #12 east of Unsanni in July 1952. In August 1952
#12 was apparently relocated at BA 7854 and its old site became #4, first
reported by the Communists in October 1952 as Ku'up-tong. First photo coverage
of camp was made in November 1952.
This camp was used for reactionary US POWs, mostly sergeants,
Returnee information re #4: POWs at first not allowed mail because they
refused to use "Against American Aggression" phrase on envelopes, but by the
third Christmas there, lenient treatment policy in force and on repatriation
trip to Panmunjom, POWs were lavishly treated. Camp was fully organized,
published propaganda paper, and had many POW committees. The only indoctrination
in #4 was in the form of BW lectures. Camp 4 was 60 miles east of Camp 5.
Escape was impossible. Air raid shelters in and around camp.
No political commissars 50X1-HUM
in r 4. When mail, policy was relaxes, POWs received clippings, photos, gum,
soap, cigarettes through mail. Some of British POWs cooperated with ChiComs
and were rewarded by being sent to "Peace Fighters" school at Camp 12.
Camp 5
At F-Yoktoniz (YE 0699) was originally reported as #4 and #5 in November 1951.
Camp 4 was moved to Wiwon in October 1952 when the reactionary sergeants were
segregated from the other POWs. Camp 5 had been in use since December 1950.
Markers were posted at YE 059995 and YE 064991. #5 was the model camp and
indoctrination "University", as well as the site of the ChiCom POW Camp General
Command and NKA General HQ. The camp was for enlisted men (corporals and lower)
many of them with little education and from backgrounds of poverty, whom the
ChiComs considered good indoctrination material.
General Returnee Informations Able city of Pyoktong was called #5 since
the city ran down the middle of the compound, the compound itself consisted
of approximately 200 mud houses of two and three rooms. The Camp was located
on dammed lake (from backwaters of the Yalu), enclosed with barbed wire, and
guarded by roving patrols. Telephone exchange and NKA HQ in south corner of
compound. POWs were not allowed near these buildings. 1,400 - 1,500 POWs
died here in the early days from exposure, poor food, lack of medicine. In
the beginning, interrogators threatened POWs with "cage," rope treatment.
In August 1952, the ChiComs took group of reactionary POWs to "Bad Camp," 80
miles NE Pyoktong in mountains' between #4 and #5 (no number). After the camp
came under ChiCom control and some of POWs had signed peace petition, food
improved.
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Officers (two of whom tried to escape) were in separate company in #5 until
October 1951 when they were moved to #2, Branch 1. Mail didn't go in or out of
camp until 1952. All letters were censored and werentt allowed to go out
unless they contained some favorable propaganda. All mail registered. POWs
were allowed three outgoing letters per month.
Camp organization: #5 had six companies, 1 US Negro, 2 Turkish, 3 US Cau-
casian, 4 mixed UN (included Spanish-speaking US POWs), 5 British, 6 political
training company located outside compound, deactivated at unknown date. Co. 1
(Negro) was reportedly favored by officials, got better treatment, not forced
to attend lectures. From the foregoing, it can be seen that POWs were segregated
by nationality and race. Peace Committee members were regular attendants at
indoctrination classes. Men volunteering to work around camp also got
preferential treatment. Companies were broken dawn into four platoons, platoons
broken down into four to six squads, which were made up of roommates. POWs
chose their own squad leaders with ChiCom OK. If anything went wrong, the
squad leader was blamed and usually landed in jail. Assistant squad leaders
were usually planted informers, called monitors,
There were several anti-Communist and anti-Progressive organizations in
#5. The Black Diamond, Negro members, was mainly social but most of the
members were either neutral or leaned toward reactionary. Golden Cross was
purely fraternal but was disbanded by ChiComs as subversive, Ku Klux Klan
used threats and force to keep "Pros" in line. Tattoo Club was originally
formed to harrass ChiComs, but was infiltrated by Pros and was soon disbanded.
Escape Committee (in both #1 and #5) was formed by British POWs, loosely
organized but instrumental in planning a number of unsuccessful escapes. All
groups failed to do much since organization was loose and soon infiltrated,
disbanded and discipline applied to leaders.
Pro-Communist, Progressive group in #], and #5 which had the ChiCom blessing
was the Peace Committee at camp and company level (see p. 3.)
Indoctrination was rigid at first. In May 1951, POWs were given day-long
lectures and were punished for lack of attention or objections to subject
matter. Lectures were discontinued when peace talks began in 1952. Two
British POWs defying indoctrination were sent to reactionary camp in September
1952. Even doctors in #5 hospital were used as political instructors.
Indoctrination was accompanied by mental subjugation of POWs through self-
criticism. Younger POWs were especially segregated for intensive indoctrination.
In general, there seem to have been three phases of indoctrination in this and
other camps: the death march, when Pads walked 35 miles nightly for two months
to got from place of capture to camp and 30 POWs died daily; lenient policy
through interrogation period when liquor and other bribes were offered for
information; indoctrination period through lectures, movies and self-criticism.
One returnee estimated that, at the time he was there in the early period,
there were approximately 65 progressives in camp. The number undoubtedly
increased at a later date as the efficiency of the self-discipline, self-study,
self-criticism routine over formal lectures proved itself and stress was placed
on exploiting the individual POW in his autobiography.
All POWs in #5 appear to have been forced to collaborate to a greater or
lesser extent through either writing or signing peace petitions, making
propaganda broadcasts, writing articles for the camp newspaper, taking part in
propaganda movies, or turning outright informer.
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Propaganda. As the model camp 5 was much used for propaganda purposes:
POWs were allowed extensive Christmas celebrations, POWs there were main
participants in inter-camp athletics, pictures were taken of staged pep meetings.
In February 1951, 10 officers and 10 EM were sent from #5 to Pyongyang to make
propaganda recordings. According to one returnee, indoctrination and propaganda
had little effect on officers, but he felt that 10-15% of the younger EM had
been affected.
Treatment. After ChiComs took over camp, treatment in general'was not bad
except when POWs were punished for rule violations by solitary confinement (two
jails in compound), standing at attention for hours, writing self-criticisms,
hard labor, withholding medical attention, etc. Medical care was adequate,
though the drug supply was not. Clothes were adequate, bedding was not.
Informers had special privileges, reportedly including women,
Se curity, Guards were uneducated, looked on POWs as criminals, unbribable,
but it was easy to get out of camp and many escapes were attempted, However,
due to terrain, lack of preparation, and civilian informers, all were recaptured.
Guards themselves were jailed when escapes were made.
The BW intqrrogation center, where 24 USAF and 2 USMC officers were held
preparatory to making "confessions" at one phase or another of the Korean war,
was reported to be a village on the Yalu near Pyoktong.
Camp 9 and Camp 10
At Pongnyong-dong (BA 7367) was known as "Starvation Camp" and contained
mostly reactionary British POWs. Ironically, it was located not far from #12,
the progressive"luxury"camp where the "Peace Fighters" held forth, Both #9 and
#12 were apparently originally parts of the Manpo Camp complex then known as
the "infamous" camp where 536 of its original 750 POWs died in the early days
of the war. Of this number, 72 were reportedly shot by guards, Manpo camp was
first reported in November 1951 as located at BA 7259-7637, and was first used
to hold ROK POWs, interspersed with a few US. The camp was apparently split into
#9 and #12 after an air raid which killed 60 and wounded 80 POWs in Manpojin
In March 1953? The ChiComs took over 100 small adobe houses in Pongnyong village,
evicting inhabitants, and moved the remaining 280 POWs from Manpo,'cn foot.
Camp was in a congested farm area at the foot of a mountain range. A road
down .the middle cut camp in half and the west half was sometimes called Camp 10.
POWs in the two halves of the camp were forbidden to associate or. ever to leave
their own compounds. Camp was first reported by Communists in March 1953?
Treatment was generally bad. There was not enough food, clothes or bedding.
No medical facilities. General conditions were below the level to sustain life.
TB was prevalent.
POWs in camp were mainly violent reactionaries. There was an active under-
ground known as "Revival of the Korean People," which pitted itself against the
"Anti-American National Salvation Strife League," ChiCom-sponsored organization.
As it was impossible for members of the underground to hold meetings, they
substituted a system of secret messages,
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? S E C R E T
Indoctrination was mandatory, lectures were held which the healthy were
forced to attend for three and one-half hours daily.
50X1-HUM
Camp 32
Konha-dons at Nampo (BA 7854) has been partially discussed in connection
with Camp 9 and Camp 10. This camp was apparently founded in 1950 and was
first used for influential ROK prisoners, both military and civilian. The 50X1-HUM
Chinese closed original #12 eighteen miles from Pyongyang in December 1951,
Camp was first reported in November 1951 and again in new location in March 3 .952
as a camp for ROK POWs at the base of a mountain near Konha-don
First reference to camp as #12 in January 1953 ource said
camp marked. Sketches of camp, hospital and administrative set-up are attached
to this report.
US returnees reported #12 as headquarters of the "American-British POW
Organization for Peace," which was headed by Ambrose Nugent and put out a
regular news sheet. POWs in #12 also ordered to make propaganda broadcasts
for which they were transported to Pyongyang in pairs. Those refusing were
sent to "cave." POWs were billeted in civilian houses under 50-75 guards.
A British returnee claimed "progressive" POWs in camp cooperated because
they were threatened with return to #9 (Starvation Camp). Also that #12 was
under NKA jurisdiction and had been open as such since March 1951 when the
original 12 British POWs were taken there. POWs in #12 were given intensive
indoctrination under an English-speaking supervisor of political activities
at the time returnee was there. British POWs were moved to #5 and #2, Branch 1
in December 1951.
II. CAMPS FOR ROK POWs
Camp 6
Uha Done (YF 2506). First reported November 1951, officially listed at
other coordinates December 1951, corrected to this site as #7 in January 1952,
renumbered #6, same site, October 1952. Never reported abolished by Communists,
but no intelligence reports on camp in over a year so probably not in existence
at time of truce. This thought is based on ATIS KT 2814 report, reading as
follows: Of the 2,000 ROK POWs originally reported in this camp, 34)00 were
integrated into NKA units, 500-600 died of malnutrition, and the 400 remaining
at the time source left in April 1951 were awaiting transfer to Chonma-dong (#8).
The camp may have held civilian prisoners at the time of the truce however.
One US returnee reported such a camp northeast of the town of Uha Ri (YF 1603)
complete with log-covered holes which were used as air-raid shelters.
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Camp 7 and Camp 8
Qqd (XE 6244) and WMM-dong (XE 5644). #7 was originally reported by
AIIR,.33-'5 May 1952 and agar in u 1952 by the Communists.as camp 16, which
wag, as of that date, renumbered #7.' As of November 195 t7 was reported to hfli
approximately 150 90 and aoproxitnately 1 000 ROK POWs. was originally
repo Cc.r t1t E eta.. RO ~oW* un ilaeem It *hen $ober~ed #10. It was
reporte closed in July 1952, reopened and correcte o present coordinates in
October 1952. As of November 1952, intelligence reports listed 2,000 POWs in
this camp, nationality unknown, For a short while after official reports, camps
were known as Branches 1 and 2 of #7.
Pusanc-ni #7. ROK returnee source interned here from October 1951 to
April 1953 when repatriated. Stated camp in an E-W valley 6 kms. long and
consisted of three separate compounds, billets in former miners' houses. Main
camp was surrounded by wood fence and contained the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th POW
Companies. Also had underground detention cells for resistors, and a hospital
with 230 beds, There were originally over 1,000 ROK POWs here but half were
transferred to Sinanju in August 1952, leaving the POWs who organized into these
six companies. The 4th Co, contained reactionaries and the 5th Cop, wounded.
There was a shortage of medicine in camp. Food rations were increased in
1953. Some mistreatment of POWs. 80% of POWs were members of underground
movement, the "Save-the-Nation League." Camp was guarded by a personnel of 150,
of whom 70 were officers.
Chonma-done #8. ROK returnee source interned in this camp from January to
April 1953? said original POWs transferred here from Kangdong in January 1951.
Before that time, camp buildings were used as non-military vehicle training
school. There was an annex to #8 at XE 6587, in valley at Tangsang-ni,
administered by 19 NKA officers and 6 NCO where susceptible Pis received
indoctrination.
Other ROK returnees reported billets as cement houses, barbwired; receiving
intensive indoctrination; forced labor; medicine insufficient; personnel of
approximately 1,200 ROK POWs; 473 POWs dying of TB; of a mine E of camp where
ROK officers were held; poor food; escapees being recaptured and put to work
in surrounding rice fields; of 20 US POWs being here in April 1952; of pro-
gressive POWs bein selected for Little Switch repatriation; of a mail
situation where 60% of the POWs wrote home and only 3 ever received answers;
and of generally bad living conditions.
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Camr) 10
Ch~(CA 0392) was first reported in August 1951. ROK POWs had been seen
in this area as early as May 1951. Camp was officially listed and marked in
March 1953. Camp apparently at one time also held 1,800 US Negro and white
POWs (as of February 1952 - SO 84492.) In April 1952. an NKA newspaper story
told of UN planes bombing a POW camp at Chasong.
ROK returnee sourcess Buildings formerly a school. Camp administered by
NKA. POWs divided into two sections of six companies each, subdivided into
four platoons of 40-50 each. POWs had NKA-approved Self-Government Committee
and "League to Struggle for Liberty of Our Nation from the US" at camp and
company levels, as of March 1953. As of April 1953, 20 of the 1,100 - 1,200
POWs in this camp were repatriated after swearing not to rejoin ROKs.
Indoctrination lectures were given 8:00 - 12:00 every morning.. POWs were
not mistreated but guards werentt friendly. All outgoing mail required to
contain propaganda. No incoming mail.. Food insufficient, no bathing facilities,
medicine insufficient. Violations of rules reported by POW spies, punished by
interrogations, cells, etc. No underground movement in camp though a number of
POWs were anti-Communist.
Came 11
Original #11, the Pyongyang camp complex (YD 3822-4020 and vicinity) was
reported eliminated by the ConIImmists in March 19539 Branch 3 of the complex
at.Taesong..ni vas at'that time reported retained as a transient camp, The new
Camp 11, with four branches (Branch l at Stun o , BA 9983, location of other
three branches unknown) was first reported by the Communists in March 1953? It
is probably the same camp as Kan gye (BA 9837) first reported in August 1951
as a camp for UN (other than ROK) POWs. Reports of the camp persisted through
1951. By November 1951. camp had apparently been transformed into a ROK
enclosure One returnee reported the propaganda camp sheet 50X1-HUM
"New Life" as being published in this camp.
Internees were all ROK PCWs(?60-80) who were billethd in a former primary
school, converted to this use in January 1953 when a new building was added to
be used as a food warehouse.. PO RO marker was on side of this roof. ROK PCW
source interned here from January to April 1953 when repatriated. The camp
site was surrounded by wire, with an electric guard post at the main gate.
Compound contained a dirty and badly-equipped hospital. The POWs were organized
into six companies, five in the main camp, one in the sub-camp, 400 m. to the
south, and worked gathering wood under strict guard. POWs were given political
indoctrination. There was some underground activity but no attempt at escape.
Another source brought to #11 from Pyongyang in January 1953, stayed until
repatriated in April 1953. Camp under NKA, camp officers lived in Sampong city.
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50X1-HUM
Camp 10
C (CA 0392) was first reported in August 1951, ROK POWs had been seen
in this area as early as May 1951, Camp was officially listed and marked in
March 1953. Camp apparent at one time also held 1,800 US Negro and white
POWs (as of February 1952 In April 1952, an NKA newspaper story 50X1 -HU M
told of UN planes bombing a POW camp at Chasong.
ROK ret, rnee sources: Buildings formerly a school. Camp administered by
NKA. POWs divided into two sections of six companies each, subdivided into
four platoons of 40-50 each. POWs had NKA-approved Self-Government Committee
and "League to Struggle for Liberty of Our Nation from the US" at camp and
company levels, as of March 1953. As of April 1953, 20 of the 1,100 - 1,200
POWs in this camp were repatriated after swearing not to rejoin ROKs.
Indoctrination lectures were given 8;00 - 12:00 every morning. POWs were
not mistreated but guards werentt friendly. Al]. outgoing mail required to
contain propaganda. No incoming mail. Food insufficient, no bathing facilities,
medicine insufficient. Violations of rules reported by POW spies, punished by
interrogations, cells, etc. No underground movement in camp though a number of
POWs were anti-Communist.
Came 11
Original #31, the Pyongyang camp complex (YD 3822-4020 and vicinity) was
reported eliminated by the Communists in March 1953. Branch 3 of the complex
at.Taesorrg*ni iris at'that time reported-retained as at transient camp. The new
Camp 11, with four branches (Branch 1 at Samuone, BA 9983, location of other
three branches unknown) was first reported by the Communists in March 1953i It
is probably the same camp as Kan gye (BA 9837) first reported in August 1951
as a camp for UN (other than ROK) POWs. Reports of the camp persisted through
1951. By November 1951, camp had apparently been transformed into a ROK
enclosure One returnee reported the propaganda camp sheet 50X1-HUM
"New Life" as being published in this camp.
Internees were all ROK POWs(760-80) who were billeted in a former primary
school, converted to this use in January 1953 when a new building was added to
be used as a food warehouse. PO RO marker was on side of this roof. ROK POW
source interned here from January to April 1953 when repatriated, The camp
site was surrounded by wire, with an electric guard post at the main gate,
Compound contained a dirty and badly-equipped hospital, The POWs were organized
into six companies, five in the main camp, one in the sub-camp, 400 m, to the
south, and worked gathering wood under strict guard. POWs were given political
indoctrination. There was some underground activity but no attempt at escape.
Another source brought to #11 from Pyongyang in January 1953, stayed until
repatriated in April 1953. Camp under NKA, camp officers lived in Sampong city,
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POWs had 700 gre food allowance daily, no clean clothing or bedding issued,
inadequate medical treatment, received indoctrination. Four POWs formed
"Nation-Saving League" here, purportedly anti-Communist but actually an
informer group.
Camp 14
Siiuna-myon was first reported as a separate camp for ROK POWs in March
1953. Before this date it evidently had functioned as Branch 4 of #11 (see
p. 11). According to three sourced interned in hospital here from March-April
1953, Branch 4 of #11 had been 4 km. NW (BA 8250) and they were transferred to
#14 (BA 7949 - site marked) with 800 other POWs after a bombing raid. Branch
4 of #11 was unmarked when bombed, but NKA used incident for propaganda.
Ir'14 was located in an area 350 m. x 300 m., enclosed by wire. There were
no civilians in the vicinity, Camp had a self-government committee which was
abolished in April 1953, Political indoctrination was given POWs but not
stressed. Approximately 600 ROK POWs were in the main camp, 100 more in a small
camp 300 m, N of main area. They were divided into six companies which were at
times sent out for construction work. Food and clothing insufficient, medical
treatment very poor, no recreation allowed. Poor relations existed between
160 guards and POWs. No escapes attempted while sources interned here.
III. TRANSIENT, LABOR AND INTERROGATION CA1,1PS
Transient camps were normally stops en route to the various permanent POW
Camps (most of which were in the far north, near the Yalu River on the Manchurian
border.) The majority of information about such camps comes from returnee sources
as only a few, Hol Gol (BU 7803), Kangdong-Taesong (YD 5524), and Kaesong
(BT8504), were ever announced by the Communists. After capture, POWs were
evacuated to the rear area in groups of 50 - 100 during the night, and joined
others at major collecting points where they were interrogated at regimental
and division level. POlls were usually held at such points only a few days,
after which they began their long marches to permanent camps, generally mustering
in groups of approximately 110, guarded along the road by platoons armed with
PPShs. Many POWs died during marches from time of capture to and beyond these
camps, especially in the winter of 1950-1951. In general, POWs had little
opportunity to judge conditions in these camps, but what they did find was
"wanting in every detail."
Hol Gol
Hol Gol was first reported in July 1952 when markers were noted at two
points. In December 1952 CCRAK reported 100-150 US, 50 Turkish, 180-200 ROK
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POWs were confined in Mal Gol. ROK POWs seed is be permanently there and were
used to work in the mines at Sian (BT 7186?) As of March 1953, Hol Qol was
used as a screening eontcr for before er:t to peragent camps, Omp
was very often crowded. 50X1-HUM
1engd" (qt tae)
Kangdcmg (or Taesong) camip Was first reported In November 19%. Since that
date, it served as a varirously-mmnbered permanent camp (*8 and *9). In March
195). it was officially redesignated as a transient camp by the Commnists. As
the POW Camp Control Bureau was in Pyongyang, it was obvious that a camp would
be maintained nearby where PC, s could be confined during the period of inter-
rogation and assignment to permanent camps.
As of May 1953, the population of this camp was ROK. According to sources,
the camp was Separated into two wired compounds, one for the healthy, the other
containing a hospital off the main road to Pyongyang for'the sick where ten
patients died daily. Healthy POWs farmed vegetables, underwent preliminary
Indoctrination, and lived in what were quarters for gold mine workers.
Uesong was used as an exchange point for repatriates and as early as
,January 1952,reports indicated that the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang was making
preparations to establish a political screening center there, using the
facilities of the Soviet Red Gross Hospital, where treatment was planned for
returning ROK and other UN POWs. English-spcaking Russians, posing as doctors
Were to give US POWs political indoctrination immediately prior to exchange.
Now clothing was to be furnished returning POWs as part of program. (30 92518,
17 July 1952.) (NB: It is interesting to note how closely, judging from
returnee reports, this program was followed during Little and Big Switches.)
ilnanno iced Transient Camps
Unannounced transient camps, reported by returnees wore: MgC
or Death Valley (so-called because approximately 1,200 POWs died there) was a
atop-over for Camp 5 at Pyoktong, located 40 miles NW of Kohu-ri and 70 miles
SW of Camp 5 (at approximately YE 1060). Camp consisted of five or six acres
-of land in a valley where POWs were billeted in 1/4 sqj mile of mud huts.
400 POWs were reported here in December 1950, 150 US POWs in January 1951, and
as many as 1,200 In 1953. The normal contingent was 800-900 of mixed nationali?
ties under NK guards. Only Turkish POWs were segregated.
Bean Camp
Bean Camp (YD 3545) 15 miles W of Pyongyang on a one-acre site 'was really,
more of a labor than a transient camp. From January - March 1951, approximately
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1,000 UN POWs were reportedly held here, British, Negro and white US being
segregated. 600 POWs are reported to have died at Bean Camp.
Other Labor Camps
Five other labor camps for ROK POWs were reported in and around Pyongyang,
located in school buildings in the vicinities of YD 3623, 3823, 3722, 4121 and
5423. Approximately 500 PC*Ws,for the most part consistently anti-Communist,
were held in each camp.
Interrogation and Indoctrination Centers
Interrogation and indoctrination centers were reported by returnees as
The Barn, in Pyongy^ng, Peaceful. V, --112X and The Schoolhouse (locations unknown)
and the infamous P 'F}k s Palace 18 miles NE of Pyongyang near Yonsong (probably
YD 4830) located in a former brickyard. It was at this interrogation center
that POWs were tortured to extract information.
IV. UNREPORTED CAMP POSSIBLY STILL IN EXISTENCE
Ciosan Camp
Chosan Camp (YF 3624) was first reported as located in Cholma, a small
mining town in November 1951. Reports on the camp continued until December 1952,
after which nothing was heard of it until the parents of a US corporal POW were
notified by a New York paper in June 1953 that their son was reported on the
unofficial lists of POWs in Chosen Camp. Said newspaper said it got the
corporal's name from Corporal Raymond Medina.
GENERAL SURVEY
I
1. POW TRW-MT :-ND ORGJ IZnTION
A. Capture The majority of returnees had been captured in 1950 and early
1951. Search on capture was cursory in most cases. Preliminary interrogation
generally took place immediately. Evacuation to the rear took place within a
few hours. All POWs marched to holding camps during the night and under guard,
generally one guard to every 10-15 men. A number of escapes were made during
this period. Due to the general confusion of withdrawal and lack of stringent
security measures, escape was not difficult. Successful evasion and return to
UN lines was another story, Most of the POWs were weak from inadequate food
and forced marches. Korean civilians were either afraid to or unwilling to aid
escapees; in many cases they reported escapes.
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POWs captured in the early part of the war report gross mistreatment by
the NK.'A guards. During the "death marches" to permanent camps, between 7,500
and 8,000 POWs are believed to have died from short rations, long marches,
improper clothes and shelter, abandoning of wounded along the roads, and com-
plete lack of medical care, or in many oases, to have been deliberately killed
by the guards.
The situation improved somewhat after the ChiComs entered the war in the
spring of 1951. While there were many violations of Geneva Convention rules,
in gezieral the CCF was not markedly brutal.
B. In Camps Camp conditions improved greatly under CCF control. Ncdical
care was sti71 extremely inadequate and sanitation was primitive but there was
some attempt at a cleans-up movement, and diets increased. Conditions improved
even more after the truce talks began, and treatment often reflected how well
the talks were going. Reactionaries got the worst of it, being punished for
rebellious or subversive acts by solitary confinement, exposure to cold,
beatings, withholding medical attention, mental coercion and labor camps.
However, those POWs who either went along, or pretended to go along the Party
line received reasonably good treatment on the whole. The ChiComs were
obviously more concerned with making converts than in vindictive breaking
down of morale.
Medical care in most camps presents the blackest picture. Generally
inadequate in quantity and quality, what there was, was reportedly used as a
coercive device -- a "recruiting tool" which was the prerogative of the pro-
gressives and was withheld from reactionaries. During the first nine months
of the war, there was not only almost no medical care, but the sick were mis-
treated as well. After this time, improvement was negligible. The only real
addition was crude surgery. Thousands still died from freezing, starvation,
and dysentery. It was not materially improved (cxc-pt in a few camps) until
the truce, when UN POWs were treated with CorIaunist wounded before repatriation.
Innoculations were given only favored POW groups or during BW propaganda cam-
paigns in the various camps. Camp hospitals were either non-existent or were
known as "morgues" or "death houses". Only progressive POWs got anything like
adequate medical care. UN doctor POWs were not allowed to treat the sick.
(DAIR 2880-53, 25 August 1953)
Outside of the foregoing, the ma ority of returnee atrocity stories (after
the CCF took over UN L non-R0 camps) center around Camp 1 where there was
reported to be a separate confinement area where resistance was punished by
enrolling resistors (POWs who tried escape, stole, spread rumors, attacked the
guards, or smoked marijuana) in a slave labor unit (called SLU). There were
rumors among the PO Js of resistors' confinement in ca:-,es until "confessions"
were written, when resistors were given from one month to three years at hard
labor. Forms filled out by repatriates aboard the USKS General Hase in
August 1953 indicate that 32 listed US POW were not expected to be repatriated
because of sentences imposed by enemy courts-martial, These men, and other
MIA's whose names never appeared on Communist lists, could well be confined in
similar slave labor caps.
Attempted escape of POWs while being marched to the rear has already been
discussed. Once POWs reached permanent camps, it became evident (especially at
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#5 that a POW could easily leave the compound unnoticed after dark. A number
procured crude escape aids, sometimes through a central camp POW escape committee,
but none were completely successful in escaping, due to isolated and mountainous
terrain, POW informers, and reports by civilian population. Punishment for
attempted escapes varied from jail sentences to writing of self-criticism.
Clandestine POW Organizations have already been discussed in connection with
Camps 1 and 59 Leadership and organization of these groups is unknown and in
general they were soon rendered ineffective through informant penetration. It
is possible, however, that the KKK may have held kangaroo courts and have dealt
out physical punishment to progressives and/or informers. In general, it appears
the ChiComs spent a lot of time searching for organizations that existed in no
more dangerous a form than that of a fraternal organization, or only as figments
of imagination of POWs who wanted to heckle their captors.
All camps were organized along military lines: primarily in companies, with
companies divided into platoons, and platoons divided into squads. Platoon,
squad, and assistant squad leaders (who were usually stool pigeons) were appointed
by the ChiComs. Each company had a Club to which members were elected by POWs.
Club leaders were always progressives and appointed to their specific key position:
by ChiComs after elections were held.
The Peace Committee and the Voluntary Self-Study Grows in various camps were
almost entirely progressive in membership, although a few sit-tights" joined as
a method of self-protection.
Informant nets were apparently well-established in permanent camps. Informa-
tion was extracted either voluntarily from progressives or under duress from
other POWs.. The ChiComs were evidently extremely clever in playing one
interrogatee against another by indicating they already were in possession of
desired information but just wanted to further substantiate it.
II. INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION AND PROPAG.L;DA
capture: First interrogation generally took place-right after capture
and was usually aimed at getting tactical information, personal backgrounds,
economic and welfare conditions in US, etc. The enemy in many cases seemed
already aware of the captured man's outfit. ROK POWs were asked about loyalty
to their government and family background. Similar interrogations were held
during POW evacuation to the rear and in holding camps where POWs were questioned
from one to three hours on UN Force potential over a broad front. Interrogations
weren't stressed by the NKA, but began in earnest with ChiCom entry into the war.
There seemed to be no fixed policy regarding number of questions asked. Inter-
rogators were English-speaking Chinese and North Koreans. A few POWs reported
being questioned by men they suspected of being English-speaking Russians.
In permanent Camps: Questioning was both direct and indirect. POWs were
required to write autobiographies covering their whole life histories after they
had been in camp anywhere from two days to two weeks. POWs giving noticeably
falsified or absurd information were required to rewrite these. Anyone refusing
to answer questions in autobiography guide book was reinterrogated. There seem
to have been few instances of reward promised or coercion used to obtain such
information. In general it is believed that many of the POWs did not confine
themselves to Geneva Convention rules -- many talked of their families, and it is
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also possible that they gave (wittingly or unwittingly) a good deal of valuable
tactical information to the enemy, In all camps, each group of interrogators
always began all over again. There was no real evidence that the groups
exchanged information already gained, or were in any way systematic about in-
terrogation, although they were often familiar with previous statements issued
by PCMs. Some returnees said they were repeatedly questioned about the US part
in the Korean war, questions being slanted toward admission that America had
started the war, and was waging biological warfare during it.
Indoctrination. All P04s were exposed to indoctrination in varying degrees,
It was particularly emphasized at Camp 5. Degree of POW susceptibility was in-
dicated by group designation -.. "Progressives" readily accepted indoctrination
and were used by the enemy as informers and collaborators. "Intermediates" (the
majority of POWs) were passive; they did not overtly accept indoctrination but
didn't fight it either. "Reactionaries" were openly against Communism, resisted
indoctrination, fought control, and even sometimes abused guards and progressive
POWs.
Indoctrination began right after capture and continued in the form of
slanted interrogations enroute to camp. Methods varied, widest variance being
in #5. Once in permanent camps, POWs were classified by rank and race. In this
way, young and Impressionable POWs who were separated from officers and older men
were transformed into leaderless masses and racial groups played against each
gther were prevented from forming solid fronts.
Indoctrination was achieved by personal contact, lectures, reading, daily
discussion gr, self-discipline, self-study, self-criticism (many POWs were
required to keep diaries of daily thought-and deed), written teats, propaganda
sheets printed by progressive POWs themselves (ex. "Toward Truth and Peace,"
published at i'5), movies, radio programs, and organized "Peace Commissions."
Lectures were repeated if unsatisfactory progress was shown. Progressives were
often segregated and given special instruction. Hopeless reactionaries were
segregated and punished in various ways for their attitude.
In the majority of the camps, POWs apparently worked hard and got substantial
indoctrination as well,. In #5 there was little work done, and POWs were indoetri.?
nated extensively. Lectures on UN Germ Warfare and the Geneva Convention were
continuous until January 1953? Other lecture topics included race prejudice, the
lot of the US share-cropper, and big city "skid rows." In the lectures, ChiCons
were careful to emphasize that they were civilized and cultured people, shocked
by US methods and conditions, and by officers' exploitation of GIs. According
to one returnee, they "degraded all phases of US life, with the exception of
Roosevelt, openly ridiculed the Geneva Convention, praised the USSR for its
medical aid in China, bragged that the CCF would eventually control Formosa, and
called themselves the 'People's Liberation Army'."
Library material, available in the camps was reportedly most effective, since
POWs reading to pass the time could not help but absorb some of the Marxist slant
of the selected material.
The general returnee consensus was that it was very difficult to resist
indoctrination because of difficulties encountered in running against the
established mission of the camp officials. Only a few POWs seemed to have been
really sold the party line. Some were impressed by different aspects of
indoctrination propaganda (especially BW), and most were simply confused. PCMe
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definitely against indoctrination said little during lectures, and talked about
home and food during compulsory study periods in their quarters. Many of the
men who wrote "confessions" claimed they did so only to let their families know
they were alive. Many who made taped broadcasts did so for the same reason and
because, although the broadcast material was largely dictated, they could add
short personal messages.
Mail was a great propadanda-indoctrination factor. Letters telling of good
treatment, food, camp conditions, etc., had a good chance of passing the censor.
Reactionaries were often punished by having mail privileges withheld. Mail was
sometimes used as a bribe to induce POWs to sign various petitions and manifestos.
Progressives who went along with indoctrination and took active part in programs
had practically no restrictions on mail. All mail was apparently opened. Censor-
ship usually consisted simply of confiscation of an unsatisfactory letter, coming
or going. Some POWs got as few as two letters, others as many as three hundred
during their confinement. Some received mail weekly, others went six months
without a letter,
Propaganda. Use of taped POW broadcasts as a propaganda vehicle has already
been mentioned. It is interesting to note that 30% of first day US Little Switch
returnees (returned 20 April 1953), 16 had previously been named by the Peking
radio as authors of messages attesting in varying degrees to the good treatment
given them by their capturs. Nine of the 32 released the second day had made
similar statements, but none of the 14 released. the third day had been mentioned
before. Of the 40 repatriated on the fifth day, 10 had written laudatory messages,
most of them as far back as 1951. (FE Survey, Vol. IV9 i9, 7 May 1953)
The "plea for peace" line as being used as late as May 1953 when the POWs
not yet repatriated vrere still broadcasting their interest in getting home and
working for world peace. (FBIS 14, 25, 27 May 1953)
Much was made propaganda wise of POW rcn