POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S00003A000100100005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 12, 1961
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/27: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100100005-4 `
? ~ r~
NSC BACKGROUND PAPER 12 October 1961
~~
I. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Poland to maintain
its special status in Eastern Europe.
A. In the present international situation Warsaw's political
ties with the Soviet Union and other Communist Bloc
states tend to override more heavily than previously
its desire to maintain at least the most profitable
political and economic ties with the West.
B. Poland's "raison d'etat" and its common ideology with
the bloc have forced the Polish regime, in respect to
the crisis over Berlin and Germany, to support com-
pletely the policies of the USSR in any way it can.
1. Since 1956, Khrushchev's relationship with Gomulka
has changed from one of open distrust to one of
mutual cooperation based on personal confidence.
Today Gomulka seems to enjoy a special influence
on Khrushchev, and has on occasion--as at the 15th
session of the U.N. General Assembly--acted for
the Soviet leader as a spokesman for Eastern
Europe .
C. The Polish government's studied efforts to maintain a
business-as-usual attitude toward the West despite the
crisis are indicative, however,. of a desire to moderate
any possibly serious effects on future relations with
the West.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/27: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100100005-4
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/27: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100100005-4
- ? SECRET -
1. Poles still cling to the Rapacki Plan, which calls
for the neutralization of central Europe, as the
best guarantee of their security and their con-
tinued existence as a national entity.
D. Polish wavering between soft and hard approaches to the
problems of Berlin and Germany--both internally and
internationally--may reflect both acquiescence to Soviet
directives as well as the activities of hard-line forces
in the regime who consistently have sought to diminish
relations with the West. At the moment, barring a sharp
and lengthy deterioration in the international situation,
these forces have only small chances of success.
II. Although their opinions apparently are taken into account,
the hard-line forces do not control the formulation of
internal policies. They do, however, have a greater role
in the implementation of the regime's policies than at any
time since Gomulka's return to power.
A. Despite increases in censorship, intensification of
controls on foreign t~?avel, more aggressive moves against
the Roman Catholic Church, and, a notable increase in
the ubiquitous activities of the Secret Police, there
still exists in Poland more personal freedoms and more
observed guarantees of ~a-~violability of person and
property than in any othe~? Communist country.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/27: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100100005-4
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/27: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100100005-4
? SECRET
1. Although the tigh.te~xing? of comae control measures are
commonly ascribed to trile influence of hard-line
elements within the regime, there is no evidence
to suggest that party ~:~~ief Gomulka is not in com-
plete control.
2. Since 195? his regime has increased its stability
and has even been partially successful in its efforts
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of both
the party and government.
TII. The Polish people now are economically better off than at
any time since World War II; they have been asked in the
interests of industrial development to wait until 1964 for
any substantial further improvement in their living con-
d~.tions, but the present levels apparently will be maintained.
A. Economy, however, is susceptible to outside pressures,
especially with regard to its plans for growth.
1. Although the regime could dip into its reserves
or alter its p~?esent or projected plans to make
up for the loss of those basic commodities which
it had previously received from the US through PL-
480 agreements, it co^.a~ld not do so without some
dislocation of its plans for immediate or long term
economic growth in those a~?eas affected by the
loss.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/27: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100100005-4