(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S00003A000100060003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 26, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
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~,ti .t~h ~. ..
~~ ~pUaHTS ON UNI'THD STATES pOL.ICY TpM1ARflS
LATIN AMERICA
I believe we are at the end of as era in our
relations with Latin Aaerica. Mle stand on the thres-
hold of ? new period; we face new problems; new tactics
are required.
Cuba is the product rather than the cause of the
factors which have brought shout the change. To most
qualified observers it has been all too apparent since
1945 that United States influence and prestige in the
heaisphere has been in a state of steady and.progreasi~e
erosion. I pick 1945 as the turning point because the
"honeymoon" period in our relations was retched in
1932-1944 when Latin America was still grateful fOr the
concessions to Latin Aeierican juridical doctrines which
we hsd made in the 30's and early 40's~ for United
States sacrif ices in blood and treasure to def end the
heeisphere against the Axis powers and for'sailant
1 Latia Americw ecouowies
sacrifices in order tb soPP r
with their esseatiai c#silisa wart:tse' requlxessots.
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CONEInFXTI~L
Hut hewan eeaory is short arcf the first signs of resent-
wee~t began to appear when, wit} t}:e 'ar;}jai i Plan, we
?ceosded European reconstructic:n priority over Latin
Awerican econaaic development.
She Adze-r-se: F ac for a~
There are a r~utptrer of factors which have contributed
~ the decline of United States influence in Lati?
ll~etica during the last 15 years. I list only four of
the p!i>acipal ones here witiYOUt extensive discusaiont
Tee!enological ac'vances c+ur i nR anc+ of ter the Seeonci
Mos1Q flat waAe the U?ited States vulnerable for the
#sst tiee to attack by extra-continental powers. This,
~EOV-pled with the rise of Russia as a military giant,
_~~~ oitt' Ailitaty position from one of pre?etnineACe
ie tb+e heir,ispt-ere to that of a mere competitor. In
+idi~~to?-, in the 3~'s and ~!(?'s wa ra,n sevPrPly restricted
` ~ ab;lity to nse our military anti economic strewth
at+ceptin~ doctrines of non-intervention, self-
d#ttrhti?ation and others xhich, while noble in concept,
metre bees in pretties applie,l t~~ the United States but
#@# to the Side-SoviFt bloc r,- #~~?~^ to othrr A,~ericaa
sia#;_.~ . Fot
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~ ~
states. Por examples Non-intervention is app~.ied to
the United States for assisting Cubans to fight for
Cuban freedom; it is not generally applied to the fall
of Cuba into the Sino-Soviet orbit or to ~7exiran
assistance to Castro in organizing and launching his
invasion of Cuba from this country. Self determination
is def fined not as the right of the Cuban people to
determine their destiny but as the right of a dictator
to destroy freedom in Cuba and alin that country with
the Sino-Soviet bloc in defiance of principles which
constitute the very cornerstones of the inter-American
system. And finally on the topic of power, the birth
and growth of the. inf luence of international organi-
zations, with their doctrine of juridical equality
(meaning an equal vote for everyone regardless of size
or responsibility) has given rise to a false sense of
power on the part of Latin Americans based on the notion
that a "rule , of law" now prevails in the world with the
iaw c~eterwined by siajority vote in whi'th, for e~sple,
on?-half of Awericana ace free to uae their ZO wote
bi,Oc to i~pos a the c~3 nios os th a o that ' , Nh,~,
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~ ~
OONPIDENTIAL
because they reside in one country, have only one vote.
The end result of ali this is that the Sino-Soviet bloc,
with whom weA~aged in a fateful struggle enjoys
virtual immunity from non-intervention and other inter-
American agreements which, on the other hand, severely
restrict our freedom of action.
A second factor is the astonishing growth of
population throughout Latin America coupled with rising
expectations for rapid increase in per capita income
and an unwillinsness on the part of Latin American
governments to lead their people, by word and deed, in
~~ the direction of the sacrifices which are clearly
;.essential if these aspirations are to be met. Latin
America, in spite of having squandered its large gold
? and dollar reserves accumulated during the war, has,
~- except for the- last year or two, enjoyed s satisfactory
~~~ rate of economic growth. With a relatively static
population and even a minimal effort equitably to dia-
tribute ita growing national product, the averagt
citizen .would-have already experienced a better life
.under: existing eronos3c aystess. 'But the PoPu1~~~D~`;
.~b~ ..
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CCU I L~ ?TY A~,
gro~,vth, t
resources
e inability of Latin America
to meet the challenge, Latin
willingness to move fast enough in the
social justice and its failure even to
to marshall its
America?~ un-
direction of
require broad
public servants
scale honesty and efficiency from their
grow
which will
created social and political pressures
rather than diminish in the future.
In the third place, Latin Americans
have a decided
tendency to rationalize their failure to progress
rapidly as the United States by blaming us. Just
t
++e
O1~r sOUtz1 sa.,u .._ -- -
's a rarian economy was exploited by the industrial
South $
Communist
Elaborate
assert, for example,
between industrial
s
there
roducts and manufactured goods. Latin American dis-
P
criminati~n against U.S. e~pprts are widespread.
Neversheless, United States subsidies of our agri-
iturai products are resented as are United States'
cu
tariffs and quotas, the f ailure of the United States
to accept even
are the exploiters.
doctrines have been developed which
hould be "parity" in Prices
suggestions that we
North, so Latin America readily accepts
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to accept e~,+en more discriminatory treatment against
its exports while giving preferential treatment to
Latin American exports, and so on. These complaints
are justified to the extent we preach free trade but
protect uneconomic domestic production. Some of the
criticisms of our agricultural policies are justified.
gu~~1:~' are in t~e main unwary nted.
Pinaily, there are old cultural and historical
prejudices which Latin American politicians have ex-
ploited so often to gain votes that many of them are
prisoners of their own propaganda, unable to discuss
issues on their merits even with their own people.
And there are cultural weaknesses as well. Among
these are the traditional reluctance of the elite in
Latin America to participate in the democratic
processes for fear of exposing themselves 'and their .
property to attack. The Iberian custom of building
political p-rtiea araune per~soAalitiea rather than
pa;nciplea and of rontr~buting to tht campaign chests
of ~ candidates in the vain bops of buying the
"friendship" At the sat pce~4eot is ? ~tR,stl~ag
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' CD~IF I~~I~TIAL
weakness in the context of the Sino-Soviet campaign to
dominate the hemisphere. For example, the campaigns
of Arbenz in Guatemala anc~ Castro in Cuba were not
financed by Cot~nis ~?~oreign or ~ indigenous; they
were f inanced~by the `mi ilionaire coffee anc~ sugar
growers in the vain hope that they as individuals would
be spared regardless of what happened to their class.
To all of this must be added the absence of a sense of
social respor_sibility on the part of the wealthy - a
resistance to change of any kind, a failure to organize
and unite in opposition to small, Communist-led
minorities, and a tendency to feel that they need do
nothing to save their countries from Communist domi-
nation because Latin Americans are "too religious and
individualistic" to accept Communism and because they
believe that, in any case, the United States in a show-
down would not permit the Communists to take over.
Some Favorable Pactors
~~~ ~r
Nany of these Latin American notions have ce~e
under re-examination slate the ~saR~o-rtvolutioa. ~~.
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' CCMF I D ~'~ E Rf.
appealing to Latin American masses by making Cuba into
a "showcase" for Communism, there are also signs that
the middle and upper classes are awakening to a reali-
2ation of the danger which they face.
In Colombia an anti-Communist organization exists
which attracts both Liberals and Conservatives and
which, like Action Democratica and the Communist parties,
has cells reaching into classrooms and factories. They
do not seek to offer candidates for public office but
they do seek to resist Communist infiltration. Other
nascent organizations are understood to exist in
Venezuela and Peru.
Here in 1~lexico at least 5 separate and uncoordinated
private organizations have been formed on the premise
that Cuba demonstrates it is up to Mexicans to save
Mexico. These groups represent nearly all shades of
the non-Communist political spectrum. If they can
succeed in uniting under good, libereti,.entirelq
I-lexican leadership acceptable to the Mexican Goverment,
we will for the first time have sn organized, non-
official group capable of acting as a counterforce to
the organized
OONFID~IAL
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OpNF IDEKT I AL
the organized Communist minority. This would be a
great step f orwarc~ especially if such a group could
undertake to encourage liberal reforms so needed in
this and otter Latin American countries.
In spite of the problems already ref erred to,
there is a reservoir of good will towards us in Latin
America and a very widespread anti-Communist feeling.
If we lead boldly, conf idently and consistently we can
regain our pre-eminent position in the hemisphere.
An Outline of a Program
There is no need for any change in strategy. Still
sound are our old objectives of achieving a strong,
prosperous, stable Latin America united in defense of
Western values and willing and able to discharse its
responsibilities in international affairs. But it is
clear that new tactics are required. I list here
principal tactical chances which it seews to ^e orght
we lust accept that, in tltAe ~wwediats ii ~
_M
~he.politieal arw of .the ERAS tt~ Qonatii, they
_. _ _
i.
to be made - again, for brevity's sake. without
.~
~~___:..~ A; ~acnssiont
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~:
?rga.n of Consultation a~,,~ ~a,s o;~) are i ' ~~ _:
taking effective action to protect the 31~;:)'s~.~~~sere
against Communist subversion. Quac~ros' apparent
enchantment with the idea of a neutralist "third force"
has strengthened traditional Mexican isolation and
split the hemisphere. To continue, as we have for
nearly two years, to seek collective hemisphere action
is only to invite further loss of prestige and to blow
up Latin America's already exaggerated conception of
its bargaining power.
. This does not mean we need permanently abandon
our hope that existing inter-American machinery can
at some tide in the indefinite future, be made into
an effective instrument for dealing with Communist
subversion. Indeed, I believe there is a good chance
that Latin America, once it is convinced by our deeds
(not worts) that we intend to follow the course herein-
? after proposed, will realize that their interests, even
sore than ours, are beat serveQ by using inter-Aa-ericaa
pcoeedures.
Neither does
..,.
:~~:" ~~~~ - ~~ ~ 1
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E~,'.3?~'!a 4t~c'd.17f~' b~?+`-~~~`~.~RS;~,~".a.~c?3ail ~~".3t.~3.:.,.^,~ fi (7r w~~.~
,.
abandon our policy ~o use the ~s-.~~SOC as tie principal
instrument for formulating hemisphere plans ~"or aeon is
development and for obtaining institutional, social
and other types of change. It does mean that we should
adjust ourselves promptly to the reality that the inter-
American system is incapable at this time of coping
with Communist subversion. It does mean that we should
in quiet, private conversations (not in official,
public statements) let it be known to both United States
and Latin ~erican public that we have reluctantly
reached this firm conclusion after two years of vain
efforts to C~~?`""'` C~.tG~,w,. ;cG~?'n`. a ~ a.~+,-r<
2. As a second step, I propose - again
~witfiout either threats or apologies but with dignity*
confide~ace and friendliaesa -that we quietly go about
~Otisting a series of bilateral agreements having as
their aspiicit objective the building of positioeu of
strength so that constitutional deaocracy based on
econor3c peoprest
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CONF ID~ITIAL
~~and social justice may be preserved.
Priority in their negotiatio:: should be given
to the Central American Republics, Panama, Colombia
and Venezuela. Hut it should he made clear that the
United States is bound by strong ties to all the
American democracies anc' that we would consider
similiar agreements with ot!~ers of a like mind. Tre
door should not be closed to anyone except Castro's
Cuba and, for the time being, the Dominican Republic.
It should be made clear to all who inquire that
we have ro plans for submitting tre bilaterals to t?~e
OAS for approval .either now or later although their
texts will be filed with international organizations
as required by charters or agreements. We would add
that we consider the bilaterals consistent with the
letter and spirit of the Charter of the OAS and of the
u.r~.
ties to theme; in othes rwrda,
aoe~e or ail of the par
,,
The door should also be left open for making
bilateral agree~en#s ignitilaterai in nature as between
_
~
~~~~
C~s-til't~
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GOAtF I D 3NT IAL
existing within and consistent with the inter-A~eerican
system, should be envisaged. The eventual muiti-
laterization of the bilaterals might becase desirable
far a number of reasons, for example, there are
advantages to treating four or five Central American
Republics as an economic unit, as already envisaged in
the Central American common market agreements. The
possible multilaterization of the bilaterals can in
any case best be decided in the ligrt of subsequent
developments; I only suggest now that the bilaterals
be so draf ted as to permit this to develop if this
subsequently appears to be desirable.
The agreements should avoid mention of protection
of other American states or of &iropean,colonies or of
the. emerging west Indies FcAeration. Any provisions
of this kind would be bitterly resented as a revival
of the patronizing attitude Mhich characterized Drat
policies under the Monroe Doctrine ~i-ith its Roosevelt
corollary. we derive eo corresponding ac+vaotages. I!
it isa necessary, at. i# stay tell be, to isR? opts'
Caribbean ~-ain couatsles ,~ svc~ assas~ert>Mia,~ !~~`
era be b'a'd.::
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CpNFIDBNTIAL
better cone by negotiating separate bilaterals
can be
wits the metropoles anc~ others concernec'? hese
The bilateral agreements s'~.oulc' cover t
reciting a common
late after, of course, .
specif is po
iction of t*~e need for taking effective measures
cony
to combat subversion: ted overthrow of
a) A provision that an attemp
ai overnments in America by force exercised
constitution g s acting under
Communist group
through indigenous
? uctions and with aid from Communist countries,
instr
nstitutes an "armed attack" within the meaning o
co The rpose
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter? ~ tion
this would be to build up a bo~Y of interprets
of whic.~ would enable us to act with armed
Char ter ~
of the Sudden and successful
force in the event of a when the constitutional
Communist cov that is to say.
ent which is party to a bilateral is overthror+n
governor
before it is able to request assistance.
mote traditional type,~ovision that each
b) A
will cos-e to tie military assistance of the
country - ----_.,
~ ty is tht
n
,
6
?trjecti~e of att>II-et.
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c ~ :.~, ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~'fI ~ iPl i ~.1 ~ dJ's b;% a c: ~, : s
a provision regarding the re???orienta~tiion of a~ilita~ry
policies, in terms of both equipment and training,
away from the concept of repelling attaek from abroad
and toward the need for maintaining order without
bloodshed and for frustrating Communist subversion.
This means less emphasis on aircraft carriers. modern
jet aircraft and the like which are expensive to
acquire anc~ r-aintain and hence an impediment to
economic c'evelopment. It means .more emphasis on trans-
portatior_ and communications equipment assistance in
developing better political intelligence and the
training of armed forces and police in methods of
controlling mobs. Amendment of United States statu-
tory law and executive policy may be necessary. A
flexible attitude on our part Mill certainly be
required both itt
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~? L ~~+'
f
required both in drafting agreements and in implementing
them if we are, as we must, to carry the armed forces
of these countries with us instead of alienating them.
Flaking a "cop" out of a "colonel" is a task requiring
tact, flexibility and an acceptance of reality.
d) Since an acceptable military posture is, in
our society, only one element of strength, a provision
to the effect that the two nations will cooperate with
each other in finding practicable and effective means
rapidly to increase economic growth, achieve a more
equitable distribution of national income, reduce
unemployment and underemployment, promote the settle-
ment of people on the land and seek the effective
exercise of representative c!emocracy - in a wor~+, to
promote rapid economic progress within a system of
government respecting the dignity of man. There are
some general observations that nee0 to be wade about
an undertaking of this kinds
First, it would imply that we propose to give
priority to countries which are parties to bilsteral~
in the a~l~ocation of our sesoarces= that is to std,
that we w3ai
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~rJF lOEI~ITIAL
t`~at we will quit the practice of c+ispensing our Latin
American aid on the basis of need and without,regarc~
to the attitudes of the recipient country towards
Communism and t*~e struggle of the Free ~~orld for
survival.
This does not mean that we engage in counter
productive threats or sar_ctions or other unfrienc+ly
acts against countries which have adopted equivocal
attitudes. On tie contrary we have everything to gain
by exercising a friendly patience, giving them tir-e to
learn that capitalistic societies pay a high price
(e,g. flights of domestic capital, cessation of new in-
vestments, drop in tourism receipts, etc.) for policies
whicfl~ destroy confidence and add up to a slower rate
of economic growth which, given the population
pressure, they can ill afford from their own political
point of view.
Governr+ents in the end act ir. accordance with
their estimate of their own national interests. we
have within our hands the power to bring these countries
along with us if only we can develop the tactics to
to make our
a4~'I1~~MTIAL `.
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i
to make our exercise of this power productive instead
of counter productive; if only we can use our power
with consistency and subtlety such as, for example,
by never publicly or in writing presenting our aid
programs as if we were trying to purchase poll tical
policies; if only we can marshall our resources so
that they can support our foreign policy objectives;
if only the press and all other opinion forming sectors
of our national life can cease speaking as if we are
solely responsible for the ills of the world and demand
the same fair treatment ane+ respect that other nations
do .
For example, in the case of t4exico~ everything I
have seen since my arrival convinces me that the time
is not far distant when our help will be needed on a
large scale, principally to settle an estimated one
million landless farmers on fertile lowlanc+s in
southern liexico. If we can conserve our leverage
not by turning down their supplications for n+ore.trade
and aid or by showing contempt for their attitudes and
problems but by expressing sympathy while politely
delaYia~-ac*fdnr
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w~vrIDFNI'IAL i
delaying actions on their requests - just as they do
to us - we have an excellent chance of getting the PRI
party to use its power to curb Communism as a parr t of
- a "package c+eal" worked out in private, oral, secret
conversations with the people w~+o count it this
country.
Secondly, such a policy implies a larger aicf
program for the covntri~s w~+o cooperate with us and
complete flexibility so as to achieve the greatest
progress in the shortest period of time with the least
amount of money. I stress flexibility rather than
uniformity in aid policy because it is obvious that
needs and opportunities vary from country to country
and even within some countries. In Central America
the emphasis ought to be on the rapid achievement of a
common market. The free movement of capital goods
and labor within t-+e area would make it possible to
settle the surplus population of SalvaAor and the
Indians in the eroded highlan~ts of Guatenals ;n
~!onduras, Nicaragua and in t~+e Zora Reina; to, put to
use Salvadorar. capital and know row in Honc+uras; to
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f-. ~ L . f
'd,.~~a F1q~~ ~.~Yuct3~'~. -4 s..X~o ,
attract capital which neec~L ~dl~ assured do~vae~~~c mart~~t,
and so forth. 'The necessary social e.nd gaol-r'~io~~l
charge will come much more quickly and with. less danger
to us?after these basic needs of the people have been
met. We need to push for social reform and free
elections. But if we do this too soon - before the
ground work has been laid so that liberal democracy
can triumph - we will be getting the cart before the
horse.
In Venezuela the problem is largely a fiscal one.
I*~ Colombia, torn by a civil war already ten years old,
still ~~iff Brent programs with p;~rhaps road buildin;
into the unsettl:;d parts of the country where bandits
thrive in isolation. shotilc' ~~ave priority. But the
common denominator t!~roughout Latin ,~nerica is land
settlement. We cannot expect the in~ustriai base to
grow fast enough to provide enoug!? jobs to take care
of such a f ast growing population, Caf ~~ ~PQ far
social peace a~ pe~itieal st~ilit~r ire" ~-sett3e-
isY~ ..numbers of people ~on the ~tstAd~.
Third, this
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v~g~
'Tharc?, this anger tabca n~ wi 11 imp~.y a c~~g~?rm~ of
intervention into internal affs.irs of othe~?s m?~ch
greater .than recent policy permits. ire alre~d'~ have
the responsibility; let us accept that we need more
authority to go with the responsibility and concentrate
on improving our tactics so that the exercise of
authority will not injure Latin American sensibilities.
r my r
ref' ~is memorandum in spite of its .length, is
only an incomplete list of ideas rather than a complete
exposition or. the very complex subject of pow to
survive in a hemisphere being rapic+ly infiltrates' by
the Communists. This tnbassy is preparing additional
suggestions on various facets of the same general
problem - how to improve the quality of our information
program any' to make. it more responsive to the issues
being debated in Latin America; how to establish a
fruitful exchange of ideas with .University students
anc' professors Mho have a f else image of the United
States aid its revolutionary and i~+eaiistic p~rineipies;
how to improve understanding between organized lobos
in the UnitM ~#s!
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CONFIDEt~f IAL
in the Unites' States and the non-Communist unions in
r~texico~ and so forth. All of these prorlems anc~ ethers
require urgent attention.
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notes on the Mexican Scene
President Lopez Aiateos currently exercises great political power
in Mexico, He controls the PP,I party machinery and through it the Mexican
Corigress, Ht; co~itrols she country': mili~ary forces which are loyal to
him. He controls the Mexican press, T:.~ recent suppression of a popular
candidate f'or PRI nomination as bovernor in Sonora is another demonstration
of this power when he chooses to exercise it. Why then does he take such
an equivocal stand as regards Communism? ~~7~y does he continue to appoint
pro-CommunistF to officia.~ positions in the 1~~exican Government? Why does
he take such ati equivocal ~,ublic position regarding the United States as,
for example, his public statement, on returning from an official visit to
Washington in October 1959 than "The flag crossing my breast has returned
unblemished"?
Hia tactics are easy to identify and to retianalise. They are to ride
the fence, Lo adhere do traditional Mexican foreigi policy regarding quasi-
isolation low hriaphere affalra; to play the Mexican left and r1~L off
against each ether; to pose as the aha~ian Of ttHD Muciaan Re~rolutias Mith
the ipltea~t4R-
.,
.}~~?'??..k~tS'aSc4v;~~5~.nt ,.;~-.e:~,~., -,~.,~; ...;.:;. ,;::!,~ .... ?;. - "~,s .>wU.,-~. ~.~1,:
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 ~~,~i~~~~y~~riar
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the implication that this was a unique politioal phenomenon which iri no
way conflicts with the ideologies of either East or West; to avoid
dissention within the PRI party machine; to avoid any statements or action
which will offend the United States to the point of reducing United States
'rode or aid; and above all t,o prevent ar,y serious threat to his personal
power or':,o his country's internal stability
His basic doctrLne, his ultimate objectives, his strategy remain arl
enlgtna. ~;x-President Abelardo Rodriguez has told me he doesn't really
know v;iiat Lopez ~:ateos' i:rtentionti ~.re. Er,-President Aleman has implied
:,he same thin?,. The r:exjc~in i,uulic is uncertain and confused. The President
aF~;,arer;tl;; ~u,~esr:' ; confi~?e ilis retl :hou~rts ir. even his closest advisors.
Lombardo Toleuano, a Commmunist, processes to sPe in ;^.im a kindred spirit
but so do many right-wing capitalists.
A majority oP N,e~icans think he is anti-Communist. A winority claim
he is pro-Communist. I suspeot the truth is sgne~n ~ ~t~ ~yt
believe him to be muoh ntrther to the left than ~wst peo le think. Heiag
? 1~a'aotioal Polidvian, h~ev~ar, he underst,~ e~.early that the ,,qq~
,.~~ .rllil~
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-3-
economy, and hence the ~,olitical stability of his regime, depends in
large measure on trade with and aid from the United States and the
developed European countries which are its NATO allies. If this is
correct, one might say he is shrewd rather than weak, calculating rather
than uncertain. Certainly my conversation with him left me with the
feelinE that he is astute and intelligent. He talks freely about
generalities but is evasive on specifics. Of course, these opinions
are Lentative and sub,~ec;; to chanPe.
During my iirs~ month here I gave, :~rhen asked, expressed the personal
(not official) opinion that the problems which immediately concern me
the Host are:
a) tlexico's need to correct a misappre}iension (misapprehension is a
~~olite Lerm), at home and abr:~ad, that N,exico is veerinE toward a neutralist
polioy in the oold war. In this connection I have said that the united..
States has no choice but to defend its liberty ~d its revolutionary
ariaaipht and tlsat I hapsd Miszioo oould atsnd tb~t its 1AdspsndM~o~,;-
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 `, 4 ~ao.t'c 1
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country has the unquestioned right to serve its own national interests
as it sees diem, if the United States and Mexico follow iaeparate policies,
it was impossible for me to see clearly how difficulties could be avoided
lr. s~,i:e of the evident desire to the contrary on the part of both
Eovernments.
t;) Thy, relationship of confidence in a capitalistic society to
flit of domestic capital, a tailing off of new investments and tourism
receipts needs to ~~e ;.aken into acco~u~t, as do the effect of these
phenomena on the rate of economic growth in a society experiencing such
rapid ,~o:;ulation ~?%~wth and the eventual creation of social pressures and
}.olitieal unrest.
from abroad.
c) The nee;: for the non-Communists to unite a~ui organize themselves
wider liberal leadership acceptable and loyal to the Mexico (}overnment so
that there ~+ould exist an effective, purely indigenous eounterforee to
the small but droll-organized Communist minority dominated dad dlreoted
Ail of this is, of ooze, akaLing aq lbrLn ice as far .as M~stee~
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sensibilities are concerned even though I have taken great care to stress
United States' :rien7ship i'or the Govei?riment of P7exico and our determination
not to intervene iii h`~exico's internal affair:. I believe, however, that
this line thus far has been beneficial. There are the following reoent
developments on the encouraging side:
a) The Catholic Church has carried out its plans for large anti-
. Coatmu~ist rallies in Puebla and Leon. These ra111es have, on the minus
side, probably annoyed President Lopez Mateos whose pre~udiee toward the
Church is stron6 and well-known. But they have served to give the anti-
Communists courage, hope and a rallying point.
b) Ex-President Abelardo Rodriguez, in a now public letter to various
prominent Mexicans, has called for a strong anti-Communist stand.
c) The Government of Mexico has declined, however equivocally, the
invitation to tend a representative to the Cairo meeting in preparation
for the "neutralist" oonference.
d) There are in existence at least five separata private groups ~ieh
htv~- 3 for~aed to oomlxt Cort~suniat influenoe in Mexico. T!-eY art
atte~titu to
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- ~; _
~~temptinr, ~o unify on ' he Colombian pati;,ern.
e) Finally, Lopez Mateo on June 7 made a speech which, while
disappointini; from the i1~S. viewpoint and full of the usual verbiage,
ni3 warn that t is ?overnment would repress excesses from the r:i(~'lt or
the left. Although his statement cuts both ways and has been construed
by leftists as a :yarning to reactionaries, it has also been reoeived
with great acclaim by anti-Communist elements.
In effect, Lopes T;ateos' tactic is to ~o or to drift as far to the
_.
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left as possible w.Ltho~_ic 3amai;in, ralatiens with to United States to
the point of endP.ni;erin~ tra~?e, tourism, investments and governmental
as~istarice from the Ur;itec States.
I t,ave recently been informed unofficially that the Government of
Mexioo plans to present to Mr. Dillon at the Montevideo IA-ECA90C meeting
a ten year plan and to request a $400 million loan t~aa the United States.
Alao, there are ir~dioations that Mexioo rishea to proaote a peting betreen
Lopez Mateoa aid President John F. Kennedy is the nsu ll~ture~
It the t1.8, aooedes to these reQuests, it rill lessen the pswgsT!
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ran Impez Mateos acad. his Government i.o facra up to the at wYiit3h
ComQauiia~t subversion offers to this hemisphere. p Presidential
s
meeting especially would give the Mexicein government the opportunity
to publicly proclaim that'tt~e U.S? approves of the neutralist course
taken by Lopez M,ateos, thus weakening the position of those gt'oLtDa
which are organizaing to combat the Comnninist influence in Mexico.
Ttn~a it is not in the interest of the United States to aooede to
requests of this nature at this time. Nor would it be wise to tuna
them down. The most appropriate tactic would be to adopt the Mexiaaa
method and drag our feet until such time as Lopez 1~',ateos understands
that cooperation is a two-way street.
To follow such a course requires great tact, sensitivity and
patience but can, appropriately used, have the effect of encouraging
Mexico to take a stronger stand on Communism?
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