MEETING OF OCTOBER 23, 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 18, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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C.
TO:
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UBJECT: Meti of october 23 19?2
At
18, 1%2
23, 1962, the
ett ched paper krobleras of .louthe arica dated
oetober 4, 1962 will be discussed.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Problems of Southern Africa
The attached paper provides a general description of the problems
in the white dominated areas of southern Africa and sets forth the
nature of the policy issues and contingencies we face in that area.
HAs such, the paper is designed to facilitate a discussion of the general
approach we should adopt in meeting these problems on a long-range basis.
The operative section, entitled Avenues of Approach, is designed prima-
rily to sharpen discussion of the issues since many of the specific short
term actions set forth may require reconsideration in the light of fast
breaking developments in the area and at the UN General Assembly. In
addition, much depends on the evolution of the UK's policies in Africa.
In light of the general policy decisions which may arise out of
a further exploration of the issues presented in the paper, it will be
possible to consider a more concrete program of action related to
forthcoming developments in Africa and the United Nations.
AF:AFI:RCFoulon:mjk
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WINLVIAMNIIHJA
Revised Draft
October 4, 1962
PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
Background
The most striking political phenomenonin Africa over the
last ten years is the southward sweep of independence. Where-
as in 1950 only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of South
Africa were independent, there are now thirty-three independent
African States in the northern three quarters of the continent.
Other than South Africa, however, no African state has come to
independence below the Congo-Tanganyikan line, and none is likely
to do so soon except for Nyasaland where 9,000 whites are not
expected to oppose the imminent move toward independence of its
three million blacks. In Southern Africa, the revolution of
colonial liberation which has swept Asia and Africa since the
war has finally rolled up against the last remaining redoubts
of control by European settlers, investors and administrators.
Furthermore, there is growing evidence of cooperation and tentative
joint planning among white military, business and even government
groups in that area. This is sure to lead to greater tension;
it may lead to violence, and even local warfare--all of which
can seriously compromise our relations with Afro-Asian nations.
The
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The Geopolitics of Africa
A quick review of geopolitical factors will explain to a
considerable extent why the movement for independence came to
a virtual halt in Southern Africa. Northern Africa, an Arab-
Berber Mediterranean minded area, has looked north or east
since classical times. During the last 100 years its contacts
with Europe, and particularly with France, havoe made it rela-
tively advanced in thinking as well as development. It is not
surprising that the peoples of North Africa should have jumped
early on the bandwagon of independence. Except for the white
settlers and businessmen of Algeria, the transition has been
smooth.
The strip of desert, gravel and savannah states running
across the bottom of the Sahara from Senegal to Chad also had
a certain amount of French influence, while at the same time
they had virtually no white settlers and relatively few large
white investors. Once the small African elites in these tribal
areas were struck by the fever of independence, there were few
European groups on the ground to oppose them.
Still further down the West African coast lie the rain
forests which run from just below Dakar to a little below the
mouth of the Congo. Until the last thirty years this area was
too
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too unhealthful for white penetration and western colonial
activity was limited to its surf-swept beaches and malarial
lagoons, with a scattering of trading post towns in which
the white man rarely felt himself a permanent settler. Thus,
no European groups of any size existed to stem the southern
sweep of independence along Africa's west coast.
Lastly, the inhospitable climate of the scorching Somali-
Kenya-Tanganyika littoral occupied the attention of Italian
and British officials, but offered little inducement to them
to stay on permanently. And the mountain ranges and high
plateaus of Ethiopia, independent except for short periods
over the last 1500 years, repelled such white invaders as
were tempted to take them over.
In simple terms, the great land mass of Western and Central
Africa was not "White Man's Country" and during the 100 years
during which Africa has been opened up it has not attracted
many white settlers.
The physical map of Africa shows that the Highlands of
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika are basically attractive to
white settlers. However, such settlement was barred after
World War I by British decree, except for certain areas in the
so-called White Highlands of Kenya, and this island is being
swept away by the black tide and its political power has al-
ready been greatly reduced.
The
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The White White South
When we look at an elevated map of Africa, however, we
* find that the southern quarter of the continent presents a
different picture. This stretches from the Cape of Good
Hope northward to approximately the line of Luanda, Malange,
Luso, Kolwezi, Elizabethville, MUfuliria, Ndola, Lusaka,
Kariba, Salisbury and Beira. It is true that within this
region there are waterless deserts, inhospitable swamps and
bare and rugged mountains. Large areas, however, have a
climate comparable with Central or Southern Europe with suf-
ficient altitude to be stimulating as well as healthful.
Great stretches of fertile and well-watered soil abound, and
beneath the surface lie an incredible variety of minerals.
In Katanga, in the Copper Belt, in parts of Southern Rhodesia
and a central strip of South Africa are to be found a sub-
stantial percentage of the world's diamonds, gold, copper and
a score of other valuable minerals. In essence, this southern
quarter of Africa is healthful, fertile and immensely rich,
and is an area well-suited to European settlement and European
exploitation. It is "White Man's Country' and to it the white
man has gone in numbers, liked what he found, and has settled
down to stay.
In
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In southern Africa we find 1,800,000 Afrikaners of Dutch
descent, 1,200,000 Europeans of English descent, and almost a
million and a half persons of mixed blood. South West Africa
is sparsely settled, but its 70,000 whites make up about 1/8
of the population. In Southern Rhodesia the European settlers
now number about 25,000 out of approximately 3,000,000. Northern
Rhodesia has about 72,000 European settlers out of a poplu,lation
of 2,300,000. In Angola there are approximately 190,000
Europeans (excluding military) centered in the coastal cities
and the central part of the country out of a total population
of 4,550,000. In Mozambique, there are about 75,000 Europeans
largely living in the southern part of the country out of a total
population of 6,310,000; And in Katanga, we find about 20,000
Europeans largely living in the southern part of the country
out of a total population of 1,500,000.
This adds up to a white population of about 3.5 million
versus 35 million Africans. Although the whites constitute
only 107, their influence in Southern Africa is completely dis-
proportionate to their numbers. In general, the Africans there
have neither the education, the wealth nor the know-how to per-
form more than manual labor, so that almost all positions on the
lower-middle, middle, or upper range of the wage scale are held
by whites.
White Attitudes
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White Attitudes
4 The attitude of the whites towards the Africans through-
out this area of Africa differs substantially. In Southern
and Southwestern Africa, the Boers believe in a policy of
separate development which they say is intended to preserve
the cultural heritage of both races. As presently practiced,
however, it results in the Afrikaners or British holding
all important or lucrative positions while the Africans supply
manual labor. The Government of South Africa is immensely rich
and powerful and is operating under a series of extreme laws'
which have greatly reduced freedoms as they are known in the
West. The chances that these white leaders will be overthrown
in the next five years are remote. However, civil disobedience,
violence and sabotage are likely at almost any time. The same
factors govern the over-all situation in South West Africa.
In Southern Rhodesia a more liberal-minded white government
is giving the Africans the possibility of obtaining 18 mit of
65 seats, which is as far as Prime Minister Whitehead can push
his white settlers. It is, however, not far enough to gain the
support of the increasingly politically conscious African Nationalists
who have refused to take part in the elections. Unless a compromise
can
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can be worked out under which the Africans will agree to vote
in the Ap il elections, growing tension and eventual violence
can be expected.
In Northern Rhodesia, an area still controlled by the
Colonial Office, the Africans have, in general, shown a
willingness to go along with the British proposal for elections
to be held in October, and are reasonably hopeful of obtaining
a majority in the new Legislative Council if they can obtain
the help of some of the white candidates. There is still
sporadic violence in Northern Rhodesia, largely between members
of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress led by
Harry Nkumbula and the United National Independence party
which is led by Kenneth Kaunda. In the copper belt the
Rhodesia Selection Trust, which has much American money in it,
quietly supports Kaunda, as does the British Rana/Corporation.
There is, however, in Rhodesia a firm known as the British
South African Company which holds wide mineral concession rights
until 1985 and receives about fifteen million pounds a year
for them. This organization has been playing with the African
? National Congress and the conservative elements and would
probably favor a strong white stand in a showdown.
In
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In spite of its geographic location, Nyasaland is not part
of the White South since it lacks enough white settlers or white
businessmen to stand out against Dr. Banda's African nationalism.
It should be noted, however, that De. Banda seems disposed to make
a deal with the Portuguese for railroad access to the Indian
Ocean, which is of great importance to him.
Angola and Mozambique have non-racial policies in theory,
but the social patterns are such that the African, with a few
exceptions, is beyond the pale. The Portuguese have recently
issued a series of reforms within the Portuguese State dealing
with education, labor, franchise, etc., but they exist largely
on paper and would require more money than now appears available.
Although the revolt which broke out in Northern Angola in
March of 1961 is only simmering at present, it may flare up
again at any time, and may also break out in Northern Mozambique.
,In order to prevent this, Lisbon has more than 55,000 Portuguese
,troops in these two overseas territories and has made it clear
that it intends to remain in the dominant position. Recent
- oi a:ra v- n 4re
Portuguese statements about ?evettt-tba-1- iftelependonoc must be taken
with great caution.
Lastly, in Katanga, the influence of the European mining
interests is such that Tshombe has broken away from the rest of
the Congo. Herculean efforts by the United Nations and the U.S.
have
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have so far been unable to bring him back into the Central
Government fold. Although Katanga cannot strictly be con-
sidered a part of the white dominated south, the struggle
between Leopoldville and Elisabethville has represented in
many minds the opening round in the battle over Southern
Africa,
Intensified Conflict Likely
There is an outside chance that Tshombe's troubles with
Adoula will be settled amicably, that Northern and Southern
Rhodesia will move in comparative peace into the position of
multi-racial states, that a change of Government, or of heart,
in Lisbon will turn Angola and Mozambique into genuine multi-
racial states, and that eventually the evolution of attitudes
in South Africa will lead to some formula for racial peace.
It is more probable, however, that none or few of these things
will happen, and that, instead, the southern quarter of Africa
will, over the next few years, see a great intensification of
the white versus black conflict. Armed revolt may flare up
again at any time in the Portuguese areas. And civil disobedience,
sabotage and guerrilla action may soon appear in the Rhodesias
and South and South West Africa,
The
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The white inhabitants of this part of Africa speak different
languages, come from different cultural backgrounds, have different
patterns of government and different philosophies of dealing with
the Africans; however, they have in common a realization that the
southern part of Africa is a rich and fertile area which they and
their children would like to occupy forever. They agree that the
African is most useful as a field hand, an unschooled or semi-
skilled laborer or a low-level clerk. In other words the whites
are on top and they see no reason to turn over the great cities,
rich mines and fertile farms which they have built to the un-
lettered blacks who most of the whites believe incapable of
maintaining a high degree of civilization.
We have already had reports of visits by army officers from
South Africa to Rhodesia, the Portuguese areas and Katanga. No
formalized arrangements are believed to exist, but it is hard to
escape the conclusion that these and other talks in Luanda,
Lisbon, Salisbury and Pretoria have touched on ways and means
of defending the white dominated areas again4t the further south-
ward sweep of African nationalism. If they should choose to pool
their armaments, their wealth, their know-how and their white
troops, the Europeans have the ability to hold the southern
quarter of Africa--as a veritable white bastion against any mili-
tary offensive or insurgency which the black Africans might stage.
It
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It is true that Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Casablanca Powers
have considerable military force between them, but they do
not have the logistical ability to bring that force to bear
south of the Luanda-Elisabethville-Zambesi line without help
from outside Africa.
However, whether the confrontation of white and black
in Southern Africa resulted in major hostilities or more likely
in guerrilla action and widespread sabotage, it would have a
direct impact on two of the major axes of tension in the world:
the latent division between North and South along racial lines
and the active East-West competition for world influence. Con-
tinuation and aggravation of existing white-black relations
will embarrass the position of the West throughout the Afro-
Asian world; and it could fatally compromise our over-all
strategy of fostering a cooperative community of free nations
if the new African nations feel they are forced to choose between
achieving their aspirations for the liberation of their brethren
in southern Africa and continuing cooperation with the West in
their development.
Any serious impact on North-South tensions would greatly en-
hance Bloc opportunities in Africa. Black Africans are perfectly
capable of playing one group of whites off against the other with-
out realizing the danger this might represent to their own aspirations.
Russia
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Russia, China and their allies would seize the opportunity,
probably through "volunteer operations" by the Casablanca
Powers, to place substantial military strength in the heart
of Africa. If the Russians did this, and if the West did not
actively intervene, Bloc influence in Africa would climb
rapidly and large segments of the continent north of the
White South would move from neutrality into active pro-Com-
munist positions.
If events are allowed to drift in these dangerous directions,
it is apparent that they would have a profound effect on the over-
all balance of forces in the world. Not only would the credit
gained by the wise decolonization policy of most Western powers
be lost to the hopeless cause of the few remaining "hard-nuts"
in Southern Africa, but the beneficial economic interchange
between Europe and Africa might be disrupted. More seriously,
the huge African land mass represents a net strategic plus of
considerable dimensions to us now. If this is erased it can
compromise our defense (and space) posture; and if equivalent
advantage were gained by the Bloc it could compromise our position
in other areas closer to the heart of our defense. These con-
tingencies make it necessary to find some way through this last,
but most difficult "crunch" of decolonization--and they well
illustrate
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illustrate the desirability of devising a policy which recognizes
that apparent conflicts between our short run policy interests
in Europe and those in Africa may be entirely consistent with
and necessary to a good policy for the long pull in both areas.
In short, a good European policy is incomplete without a good
African policy--as exemplified by our present understanding with
the Belgians in regard to the Congo.
General Approach to the Problem
The intractable nature of the human emotions in-volved in
southern Africa make it very difficult for us to devise ready
measures of heading off the ugly contingencies involved. The
problem is further complicated by the conflicting interests and
objectives we have in the area. We are caught between competing
interests in maintaining the good will of the new nations of
Africa and our direct security interest in South Africa, in-
cluding the need to avoid conflict in the area which would open
avenues of exploitation by the Bloc. On the level of principle,
similar dilemmas exist. Suppression of the popular will in
South Africa or Angola is as repugnant to us as the aggression,
direct or indirect, which might be mounted by outsiders to remedy
such
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such suppression; and in South West Africa, for example, armed
intervention to enforce the mandate might be as dangerous to
the future of international organizations as continued South
African violation of the mandate would be to the principle
of the rule of law.
However, it is possible to discern a general strategy
which has a chance of gradually whittling the problem down to
manageable size. Special factors, not present in the core
area represented by South Africa, exist in Southern Rhodesia,
South West Africa, the High Commission Territories, and possibly
even the Portuguese territories; and they present opportunities
to reduce the possibilities of any joint action by white domi-
nated governments and to make progress which may have a chance
of bringing about a change of attitudes in South Africa.
Southern Rhodesia is perhaps the key to such a strategy
and it illustrates best of all how desirable it will be for us
to work out a joint US-UK approach to the problems of Southern
Africa. Despite Sir Roy and the serious racial problems in
Southern Rhodesia, the attitudes of the white population and
the Southern Rhodesia Government toward the development of a
non-(or multi) racial society are far more constructive than the
apartheid
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apartheid policy in South Africa or the anachronistic outlook
of the Portuguese. Patient handling offers some hope that
the opposing racial groups there can learn to work and govern
together; and, without Southern Rhodesia, there is little
chance that South Africa could seriously envisage any form
of joint action with other white elements to stave off com-
plete isolation in Africa. The effect of this isolation and
of the eventual good example in Southern Rhodesia would have
some hope of bringing about a change in South African thinking.
Concerted action with the British could provide the most
effective means of dealing with the problems in the Rhodes ias
and also in the other areas in Southern Africa. In addition
to the fact that the British have a preponderance of interest,
responsibility and influence in the Rhodetsias and South Africa,
we have learned, notably in the Congo, that close US-UK cooper-
ation is a key to success and effective action. Coordination
with the British may impose certain undesirable limitations
on our policy and entail liabilities in our relations with the
Africans. However, knowledge among the new African nations
that the U.S. and the U.K. are seriously working together to
achieve self-determination in Southern Africa will tend to give
them the confidence in eventual success needed for the moderate
Africans
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Africans to resist the strident urgings of the radicals whose
actions would bring about the disasters and bitterness we hope
to avoid.
As presented below there are certain influences which the
British might be able to exercise in Southern Rhodesia under
cover of a joint US-UK strategy for dealing with pressures from
elsewhere in Africa and with economic problems in Southern
Rhodesia. Similar possibilities for joint action in regard
to other territories in Southern Africa are also explored in
the following section. There is a good possibility of making
these actions mutually supporting. Resolution of Katanga
separation should reduce the counterproductive influence Tshombe
0
has had in Northern Rhodesian politics and on Federation policy.
Progress in implementing the mandate in South West Africa could
provide the first crack in the armor of apartheid in South
Africa; while African political progress in the long neglected
Swaziland or Basutoland protectorates will at least show South
Africans what can be done close to home by other races. As for
Angola and Mozambique, they present an opportunity primarily be-
cause joint US-UK action, if achieved, is bound to have a great
influence on Portugal, especially if it helps us to reduce Portu-
guese bargaining power in regard to the Azores. For a number of
reasons
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reasons the British may be prepared to move more vigorously
on Angola than elsewhere. This possibility should be fully
explored since the chances of a violent turn of events else-
where in Southern Africa would be greatly reduced if some
pacification of African feelings on Angola could be achieved.
There is also a good chance of French and German support on
this issue.
Accordingly, the various possibilities outlined in the
following section should be explored at the earliest possible
date with the British with a view toward arriving at a joint
strategy for dealing with the many interrelated policy issues
arising from the knotty problems in Southern Africa. The
imminence of painful decisions regarding South West Africa and
Angola, among others, imposes urgent handling. The difficulty
and gravity of the issues and the need for a long-range strategy
indicate that discussion at high levels will be required.
Avenues of Approach
As outlined above, it will probably prove more productive,
as a general strategy, to chip away at the edges of the white
redoubt--with especial attention being given to the Rhodesias--
than to make a frontal assault on the hard rock of South African
apartheid.
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apartheid. Although we cannot plan in detail the specific
tactics in each case, we should a) recognize the ultimate
objectives of liberation from colonial or racial domination,
b) continuously explore all means of bringing constructive
influences to bear on the separate aspects of the problem
and c) understand that steady progress--sufficient to give
the moderate majority of Africans confidence in ultimate
success -- will be essential if violence, bitterness and the
many resultant contingencies they will entail are to be averted.
Working with the British: At present, the root of our
problems in working with the British is that they do not have
any over-all African policy. Although British performance in
decolonization has been one of the most positive aspects of
Western relations with the underdeveloped nations, the UK has
now come up against the tough cases and is basing its action
largely on the exigencies of the moment as imposed by the
different national or private British interests in the many
different situations in Africa. Accordingly, in discussing
Southern Africa with the UK, we should attempt to alert the
higher levels of the British government to the need we see to
bring
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bring to bear on Western policy the wider implications of the
various problems and contingencies presented by the area and
to stimulate them to develop their thinking on area-wide
strategy. This general approach -- coupled with an expression
of our desire to arrive at a joint approach -- is likely to be
more productive than any attempt to address first or in detail
the individual problem situations in Southern Africa. On the
basis of whatever general understanding is reached on over-all
African policy, we can then proceed to details and try to work
out joint or mutually supporting lines of policy on the different
territories or problems.
There is no great assurance that we can reach a satisfactory
agreement on general strategy. The UK is absorbed with many other
international problems and has to contend with many serious in-
ternal political problems in dealing with Africa--not to mention
the severe financial limitations which the Treasury seems to
impose in most instances. However, the effort will be worth-
while even if only to gain a greater appreciation at higher
levels of our policy motivations and a greater receptivity to
cooperation in individual instances such as the Portuguese problem.
This limited objective is nevertheless important since we should
in
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in any case maintain our policy lead in regard to Africa.
Our policy lead has enabled us not only to maintain our
moderating influence on African nationalism but to provide
a basis for the constructive action of the elements of the
British and other west European governments which are trying
to bring broader considerations to bear on the African
policies of their governments.
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: The advent of
African led governments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
is expected to lead to the early demise of the Federation as
presently constituted. Accordingly, the situation in the
individual territories, along with the politics of recon-
structing the economic ties among them, is of more direct
interest in considering the problems of the area than the
current attitudes of Sir Roy Welensky's government.
In Northern Rhodesia the move toward African independence
is much further advanced than in Southern Rhodesia, although
less advanced than in Nyasaland. Elections on October 30 are
expected to give the African nationalists under Kenneth Kaunda
a slight majority in the legislature. The African led govern-
ments in the two northern territories may be able to bring
great
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great influence to bear on the white government oftNorther,
Rhodesia in the process of negotiating the restructuring of
the relations among the three territories. In addition, the
two northern territories may be able to facilitate resumption
of the constitutional dialogue between Africans and Europeans
in Southern Rhodesia. The possibilities for stimulating and
assisting action along these lines by the new government should
be explored with the British and possibly with American mining
interests in the territory.
Until recently there was general feeling in Washington
that Southern Rhodesia, under the guidance of Prime Minister
Whitehead, was moving satisfactorily along the path towards
being a multi-racial society. Recently, however, the Africans
of Southern Rhodesia have taken the bit in their teeth and have
refused to take part in the elections scheduled this sp;.ing
unless they can look forward to gaining enough seats (one-third,
plus one) to obtain, under the terms of the new territorial con-
stitution, sufficient power to block any attempt by the whites
to reverse the trend of constitutional progress. On the Other
hand, Whitehead apparently feels he can gain no more concessions
from the white settlers and businessmen of Southern Rhodesia. In
addition, the Prime Minister recently felt it necessary to outlaw
the
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the dominant African nationalist party in order to suppress its
use of physical intimidation in imposing its will. Unless the
deadlock is broken, further progress towards multi-racialdom
will be checked and serious violence will probably occur within
a year or two.
The British appear inclined to play a passive role in
Southern Rhodesia until next spring when the new territorial
constitutions are fully implemented in all three territories
and negotiations over the future of the Federation are expected
to occur. These negotiations will involve the break-up of the
Federation as presently constituted and an attempt to put it
back together as an economic grouping of individual states. The
British probably expect to hale more leverage to influence
Southern Rhodesia at this time than before or after. Southern
Rhodesia may have to make political concessions in order to ob-
tain both the economic cooperation of its financially stronger
sister territory (then under African leadership) and the general
support and protection of the British in dealing with the financial
problems (Federal debt, currency, etc.) and international pressures
which the Federation's demise will entail for it.
All this is hopeful, but the problem lies in the fact that
weak African leadership in Southern Rhodesia is under great pressure
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to resort to violence if not satisfied in regard to the franchise,
since their minimum conditions constitute, in their minds, their
only chance of advancing African political progress by legal
means. Such violence would not only spoil the thin chance of
achieving a multi-racial society in Southern Rhodesia but,
coupled with existing UN pressures on the Southern Rhodesia
problem, would inflame Afro-Asian opinion and convince it that
foreceful measures were required throughout Southern Africa.
This problem is compounded by the fact that radical pressures
in the UN strongly stimulate local Africans to look for irre-
sponsible solutions rather than demonstrating the local respon-
sibility needed to convince the whites they can be trusted in
government.
We need to ascertain from the British their estimate of
the prospects for (a) achieving a promising settlement of these
issues during the forthcoming constitutional review and (b)
averting the immediate contingencies which could spoil any
chance of success at that time. Some formula for obtaining
from the whites a guarantee of African political progress follow-
ing the next elections might be scouted and we could explore the
chances for bringing about more responsible leadership by the
African nationalists, possibly through the influence of the
African
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African leaders of the other two Federal territories or of
some intermediary who could stimulate a meaningful dialogue
(now lacking) between white and black leaders.
Our cooperation might be offered (a) in providing some
of the economic or financial support needed by the whites
to ensure that they can survive the transitional crisis of
confidence involved in African political progress, (b) in
attenuating the pressures in the UN--possibly on the basis
of a U.S. proposal to establish a committee to examine the
problems of transition towards a more representative society
and make recommendations which might assist the constitutional
review, (c) in consulting other African nations about the
need to allow time for the fruition of the constitutional
processes of the British, and (d) possibly in finding a
useful intermediary to stimulate the proposed dialogue and
other responsible action by the African leaders.
In effect, these suggestions constitute a policy of help-
ing the British to maintain a situation in which their policy
of patiently bringing along a basically hopeful situation can
succeed--both in the Rhodesias and in the context of reducing
the white redoubt pattern to size.
Angola and Mozambique:
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Angola and Mozambique: If for the moment matters are to
move rather slowly in the Rhodesias, the need for progress else-
where is increased in the psychological scale of priorities
Africans apply in pursuit of their aspirations for a liberated
Africa. Since British interests are not so directly involved
in the Portuguese situation, and as part of a joint over-all
strategy, we might be able to look for more active British
support in dealing with the Portuguese. This opportunity to
exert greater influence on Portuguese policy may be needed not
only in dealing with the Azores problem but in handling the
repercussions of the anticipated resurgence of rebel activity
in Angola.
Except for the possibilities of a political shake-up in
Portugal, the avenues most likely to influence a change of
colonial policy in Portugal are, first, to reduce the bar-
gaining valve the Portuguese place on the Azores for use in the
African situation and, second, to exert the combined piersuasive-
ness of important Western powers. While we must continue to deal
reasonably with the Portuguese and maintain, certainly, our
offers of assistance, there is a need to disabuse them of over-
estimating their bargaining power and its resultant intransigence.
The British and other European allies can help us do this by
impressing upon the Portuguese Government that the Alliance iscin
no
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no position either to allow the Azores matter to ruin its
relations in Africa or to accept lightly any loss of the
use of the facilities on the islands. In addition to diplo-
matic support of this nature, we should probably discuss
with the British, and possibly other allies, the contingent
possibility of dealing with the Azores matter in some form
of NATO framework in the event that the Portuguese try to
hold out too long on renewal.
As for Portuguese colonial policy, any attempt to change
it significantly by persuasiveness may seem hopeless enough
in the face of current intransigence. However, a combined
effort among Western powers is bound to have some effect in
making the Portuguese realize that the Lusitanian community
can be preserved only by more positive measures and more
rapid action. The Germans and French are as concerned as
we are over the danger which Portugal's policy creates for the
Western position in Africa. We must enlist their help along
with that of the British. At the very least a strong expression
of Western concern will put the Portuguese on warning in the
event it becomes necessary for us, individually or jointly,
to take measures to forestall heavy Bloc influence with and
support for the Angolan and Mozambique nationalists and their
African allies.
South West Africa:
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South West Africa: Although this large territory is
sparsely settled and its Africans are not very far advanced,
it is now in the forefront of Afro-Asian attention because
of South Africa's persistent disregard of its obligations
under the old League of Nations mandate. Extreme measures,
such as sanctions or revocation of the mandate, are being
recommended by various UN committees for consideration by
the 17th General Assembly. Although the International Court
has yet to rule that South Africa has violated the mandate
or .that the UN can unilaterally revoke the mandate, it will
probably do so by the end of next year pursuant to current
and proposed proceedings. In addition to devising tactics
for dealing with the immediate issues before the UN, we need
to think through the issues regarding the eventual future of
this territory.
Although it is difficult to believe that South Africa
will bow compliantly to the force of ICJ rulings and UN
pressures and seek a trust agreement with racial policies
satisfactory to the UN, it appears even more unlikely that
South Africa will accept peacefully UN action to detach the
territory
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territory and place it under some form of UN trust adminis-
tration leading to early independence. Any test of strength
over control of the territory would almost certainly lead
either to hostilities of some sort--ideal for mischief-makers
in Africa--or to results which would place severe strains on,
and possibly discredit and undermine, the UN. Even if it
proves possible for the UN to assume administration of the
territory, there remains the question of whether the UN has
the support and the administrative and financial capacity
needed to undertake this responsibility.
Although both we and the British have frequently tried to
prevail upon the South African government to be less intransi-
gent on this issue, we should explore with the British the
advisability of a joint approach--possibly using special repre-
sentatives--designed to set forth to the South Africans a)
the serious contingencies we see on the horizon and b) the
necessity we will find, in the final analysis, to support the
application of international law against South Africa unless
it can work out some form of UN presence in South West Africa
acceptable to both sides. (For example, we can explain that
we can hardly propose trade sanctions against Cuba and oppose
their
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their application against a nation which disregards openly
its international agreements and UN authority over a mandate.)
If South Africa understands that the US and UK are together
on these points and that further recalcitrance on its part
will seriously risk the worst of the alternative it faces,
it may be led to see some reason on the matter.
In any event, Afro-Asian opinion will be favorably in-
fluenced by knowledge that the US and UK are getting down to
brass tacks with the SAG and this result could materially
assist our current tactics in the UN. Also the fact that
the SAG invited the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Special
Committee on South West Africa to visit the territories last
year offers some hope that the government might be persuaded
to invite the committee officially this year. Such a move
would not only reduce pressures at the General Assembly but
it might offer some chance of setting the stage for a permanent
UN presence in South West Africa.
The approach suggested above is designed to avoid for the
moment a serious confrontation with South Africa over South
West Africa but it offers, in addition, some prospect that the
application of apartheid in South West Africa can be gradually
humanized and affect thereby its application in South Africa
as well.
High Commission Territories:
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High Commission Territories: These territories have long
been neglected but offer a real opportunity to further African
progress and multi-racialism right in South Africa's backyard
since they are entirely subject to British control and have
few settler problems. More rapid development and political
progress in these areas offers the hope of demonstrating for
South African benefit a more fruitful approach to South Africa's
future. Swaziland is especially important since the attitudes
of its white settlers are quite constructive. Because of this
prospect we should probably revise our aid--and Peace Corps--
priorities in Africa in order to devote more attention to the
High Commission Territories than in the past. The University
in Basutoland and education in general should receive priority
attention.
In addition to discussing these prospects with the British,
we should also explore their thinking on the future of these
territories. Their eventual separate independence seems some-
what unrealistic while it is possible that the prospect of
future incorporation in a revised form of South African federation
might eventually provide some incentive for improvements in
South Africans racial policy. This prospect might be especially
appealing
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appealing as a catalytic factor if the blacks in South Africa
proceed to exploit the Bantustan idea in practical ways which
might help strengthen the position of white South Africans
who oppose the government's present rigidity on racial issues.
South Africa: Although there is little chance for con-
structive action in South Africa, the possible implementation
of the Bantustan proposals deserves more analysis.
We should continue to recognize that they fail to repre-
sent an acceptable long-run solution to South African problems.
Aside from the basic principles involved, Bantustans will
fail to meet the major aspect of the problem, represented by
the urban black, and will require more material and adminis-
trative resources than the South African Government can afford
if it implements the proposals in good faith. In addition,
we have been informed that the government is not really serious
about extending the franchise in the proposed African areas.
Although there is little likelihood that the blacks will
ever accept the Bantustan concept, partial implementation of
the policy may actually give the blacks a practical means, and
probably the only legal avenue available, for improving their
political leverage in South Africa's internal politics. The
areas
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areas set aside may allow the blacks enough of a basis for
legal activity to improve their bargaining power in fight-
ing the application of apartheid. Such action might also
lead to a split within the governing Nationalist Party over
the wisdom of applying the Bantustan policy consistently
with resultant effects upon its power further to impede
racial progress in South Africa. We should watch this
situation carefully for the possible development of oppor-
tunities for constructive action along lines which would not
derogate from our opposition in principle to apartheid. Our
posture should at all times be opposed to the principle of
apartheid.
British opinion on these matters and their relation to
the other aspects of the Southern Africa problem would be
valuable; and their influence on the Anglo-Saxon elements
in South Africa might be useful in getting South Africa to
implement the Bantustan idea in the most acceptable form.
Refugees from Southern Africa: The Congo and Tanganyika
have become the chief asylums for refugees from southern Africa.
The refugee groups represent a potential rather than immediate
threat to stability in the area. American voluntary agencies
and
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and a UNOC feeding program using American foodstuffs have
helped meet the needs of Angolan refugees now in the Congo.
An equally important problem is raised by the student refu-
gee groups in Dar-es-Salaam and Leopoldville, who now appear
to be principal targets of the Communist Bloc. Our own aid
to the student group has been very limited, although the
recently approved AID/African American Institute Program in
Dar-es-Salaam may be able to help as many as 75 African refu-
gee students annually to further their education in other
parts of Africa and the Near East. The U.S.-sponsored Lincoln
University program has offered scholarships for a limited
number of qualified refugee students from Southern Africa to
complete their studies in the United States. However, our
program clearly must be expanded--particularly to include
medical assistance and "in Africa" pre-university training
in the Congo--if we are to meet the political challenge repre-
sented by the large Communist scholarship program directed
toward the refugee groups.
RFoulon/RSanger/ebd
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