PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE TARGETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003600060071-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: March 25, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2003/05/05: CIA-RDP80ROl 731 R003 0
hR
25 March 1946
MEMORARDUMs
SSUBJSCTs Priority Iatelligenae Targets
TO I Chief, SI
10 An estimate of the prevailing world situation leads inevitably
to the conclusion that the primary object of national concern in the foreign
sphere arises today and in the foreseeable future from the activities of
the Soviet Union, and of other governments and political organ izations which
tend to assist in the fulfillment of its purposes. No other threat to our
national security and interests, or to the international legal order which
we are committed to uphold, approaches in dimension or in iaminenoe that
which is latent in the policies and actions of the USSR and its assorted
allies, The obvious corollary is that the intelligence-procurement resources
of this agency should be directed with unequivocal emphasis towards uncover.
ing the intentions proclivities, capabilities and activities of (a) the Soviet
government,, and (b) of all other governments and organisations whose actions
would have strategic importance either in support of,, or in opposition top
Soviet policies and Soviet foreign adventures.
20 The large design of Soviet policies would be illuminated if we
could fix with certainty the basic motivations of the creators. For want
of clinching evidence, speculation in regard to motivation has ranged from
that of Marxist-Leninist ideology, to the inner compulsions of dictatorship,
to a Russian-national fear.. or power-cosaplex, No one of these elsmants should
be excluded from a realistic appraisal of the dynamics of Soviet policy.
(a) The sense of a need, derived from Mars, to carry out the
course of historic evolutionary destiny, ooupled with the fanatical revolu-
tionary and crusading seal of Lenin, continues to animate the high prophite
and possibly the rulers of the Soviets, The goal is the establishment of
the supremacy of Communist dictatorships and the elimination of the power
of bourgeois capitalist democracies, with the ultimate professed intention
of preparing the way for the emergence of a world-wide classless communist
society., The followers of this faith and mission look upon Soviet Russia
as the spearhead of revolution and social progress? and regard the Soviet
Union as the "Model League of Co7mnunist Nations",,, into which other Communist..
governed states may be admitted progressively, until the entire world is ripe
for "the state to wither away' before the evolution of cooperative society,
in so far as this view or faith prevails, several consequences highly signi.y
ficant for the American national interest (and an American Intelligence Ser-
vice) follows
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 CIA-RDP80R01731R003600060071-3
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600060071-3
(1) all states and societies (including the United States) which
are not comomunist-governed must be considered by the Soviet
Union as enemies, with whom peaceful relations are only a
temporary expedients
(2) the torch-bearers of oouanunism in every country of the world
must hold a loyalty to the Soviet Union above that of any nation.
al patriotism; and
(3) since, in the communist view the supreme goal justifies any
means, every form of open and concealed warfare, trickery,
deception and propaganda may be expected from Communist-
controlled governments and organizations*
(b) The present rulers of the USSR are a small, more-or.-loss
tightly.4mit band of politicians and soldiers whose motivation to remain in
office consists of - depending upon the point of view - the compulsions pf
their historic mission, the ever-present fear of being "purged", or an intoxi.
cating sense of power and the glory of privileged positions Given either
interpretation, they can continue to control a mass of people within a regime
devoted to a fifteen-year program of strengthening the industrial sinews of
military power, only by (1) providing satisfactory evidence that this aonoon.-
tration on production rather than oonsumers' goods is absolutely essential;
or (2) by devising "circuses", or? perhaps, "crusades", to distract attention
from personal wants. The "evidence" consists of "capitalist warmongers",,
bent on the destruction of the Soviet Union, who may conveniently be goaded
into vociferous outbursts by some militant act or utterance which the Soviet
rulers can readily provide? The "crusades" or "circuses" can be engineered
anywhere from the Adriatic to the Pacific, (3) Despite ideologies, the Russians
remain Russian, and as such, reflect the social inheritance of the people and
the political inheritance of former rulerse To some extent, therefore,, the
pattern of Soviet policies must be viewed within the framework of Russia's
strategic position, of the historic Russian outlook upon the outside worlds,
and of the traditions of Russian expansionist dreams. The great territorial
mass of Russia is fringed, for the most part, with small, weak and industrially..
tn-advanced tammunities. Whether from a fear of the occupation of these areas
by a hostile foreign power, or from the desire for aggrasdissomt, the Russian
propulsion eastward, southward and westward was well mtkid long before the
Soviets same to power, and has not shown any signs of diminishing momentum
since,,
(o) "Security" and "expansionist" motives may very readily be out
from the same cloth, or, at least, may depend upon which side of the cloth
you are looking at. In a very real sense,, security-d rends resulting from
deeply-rooted fear might only be satisfied with the establishment of world
dominion - of course, by one's own states The Russian who has lived for
centuries under tome form of despotisms and frequently of foreign invaders,
has never known freedom from fears Suspicion of the foreigner tAless a
Coimaunist), so assiduously stimulated by Communist propagandists, blends
easily with fear of lyrants and invaders, and with a native provincialism
of the mesas which the Soviet rulers have not wished to disturbs Security
and expansionist and ves have intermingled in the traditional drive of Russia
he
to obtain control of outlets to the sea - the Pacific,, the Yellow Sa t
Ulf
Baltid~pptlefeit~~D0~d~15/p~~~-RO~RI~I! r
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05: CIA-RDP80R01731 R0036
1111 14w ikwo?WET
$,o All of the above motivations may be detected in the form and
substance of Soviet action. It matters little in what proportion the ingre-
dients are compounded, for a curious logic of events has decreed their blend-
ing into a perfect working harmony Assuming for the argument that Soviet
rulers are no longer Communists;: it is nevertheless necessary for them to
adopt the pretension in order to avail themselves of an indispensable ally in
the form of hundreds of thousands of the "faithful" the world over - W& far
more numerous, better disciplined, and hence more powerful than?any Masi
Fifth Columno In addition, the moral appeal of communism aids in the reten-
tion of public support, and the orusading purpose assists in the furtherance
of national expansionist policies abroad, especially where down-trodden
peoples must be "rescued" from capitalist tyrants. Or, on the other band,,
if the Soviet governing oligne still fervently believes in the Comasunist
mission, they have fertile national soil at home in which to sow the seeds
of ineluctable hostility to, and by, capitalist-bourgeois states, and there-
upon may reap a harvest of supp rt for any action designed to strengthen the
security of Russia by rearmament, by "strategic" annexations, or by promot.
ing friendly revolutions in neighboring states,
4,, The above considerations have been presented in order to delineate
briefly the complex character of the phenomena which American Secret Intelli-
gence must seek to understand in all its romifioationsd The broad sweep
of essential intelligence targets has been adumbrated, and may now be indi-
oated more precisely under the categories below. It is to be borne firmly
in mind that the province of SI is that portion of intelligence on the subw
jeots below which can only be obtained by clandestine means.
(a)
First and inmost, the Soviet Unions its intentions,
capabilities and activities in their bearing on its external
relations;
(b) Comunist-controlled, or Soviet-oriented,, governments:
their intentions, capabilities and activities;
(o) Communist political parties and Conmtunist-influenced
orgsa isations abroad;
(d) Other foreign countries and governments whose dispositions
pro or con would have an important bearing on Soviet
decisions and actions in the foreign field, or which are
territorially adjacent to the Soviet Union, or its satel-
lites, or which are possible objects of Soviet designs,
The Soviet Uision
(a) Soviet intentions in fore,, relations and milit oli
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/05/06: tlA-RDP80R01731 R0036O( (
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600060071-3
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600060071-3
 25X1
Approv
106 This a raisal of priority intelligence targets has been devel-
oped within the I I office without consultation with the major
customer and action agencies o e government whioh SSU is bound to serves
It is Impracticable at the present time to obtain the benefit of a considered
statement of their intelligence requirements, or their estimate of the rela-
tive strategic importance of various countries and areas. Obviously, such
advioe is not only highly desirable, but is a condition of an effectively*
functioning SSU, It is moreover necessary that the specific secret inteili?
genoe targets within a given area be formulated in the light of knowledge
of the total intelligence-procurement potentialities of other agencies
of government abroad, Otherwise, duplication and wasted effort is inevitable.
It is impossible to lay down a hard and fast delineation (applicable to all
countries) of the field of oliadestine intelligence, in view of the widely-
varying conditions under which orthodox information agenoies must operate,,
It need hardly be added that this paper has been developed on
the plane of the ideal objectives, without reference to the degree of
Approved For Release 2003/05/05: CIA-RDP80R01731R003600060071-3
00 9 -
 Flfll~
Approved For Release 2003/05/05: CIA-RDP80RO1731IZ5
operational difficulties which might be involved in the fulfillment of
any of its parts.
11, It should also be clear from the context that no effort was
made to develop a hard-end-fast sequence of priorities. or to define
precisely the primary intelligence targets in any given area. The pur-
pose was rather to lay out a systematic pattern of subjects, intelligence
about which is essential to the national interest, and to indicate the
countries wherein the pattern prominently manifests itself. More specific
intelligence directives, and a more exact arrangement of area priorities,,
would serve no useful purpose at this stage of ideal plarnninge
It is evident that any evaluation of important targets
projected od'er a period of several years into the future can only be re-
garded as provisional? Unpredictable shifts in the balance of political
forces, factors and opinions in a number of countries may modify the focus
of American national concern. It will, therefore, be necessary periodically
to reassess the current situation and to develop new projections into the
future. Como equently, planning should remain imaginative and flexible, and
operations must perforce retain a oegaaoity for sympathetic responsiveness.
12? The findings of this paper may be sunned up in a very simple
formula: The most important tasks for a clandestine intelligence agency
in the next fewysars are: (a) the penetration of the Soviet Union and its
border satellites, and (b) the penetration of. Communist parties in other
important countries. additional and ancillary objectives exist and have
been indicated, but they represent a less provocative challenge to Secret
Intelligences Compelling reasons can be adduced to show that an effective
assault on these targets would most certainly benefit from a coordination,
and perhaps an integration, of SI and X-2 energies.
25X1
Chief, "P" Branch
Approved For Release 2003/05105 -CIA-RDP80R01731R003600fW1 -, " `ir