AN ADEQUACY SURVEY OF THE 'THE ADEQUACY SURVEY OF THE CIG DAILY AND WEEKLY SUMMARIES' AS IT WAS PREPARED BY OCD ON 9 DECEMBER 1946

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01731R003600030019-4
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 1, 2003
Sequence Number: 
19
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 2, 1947
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01731R003600030019-4.pdf406.11 KB
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CONFIDENT Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003600030019-4 CONFIDENTIAL 2 January 1947 MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR: Subject: An Adequacy Survey of the The Adequacy Survey of the CIG Daily and Weekly Summaries" as it was Prepared by OCD on 9 December 1946. 1. A reading of the OCD document shows: a. The daily was variously criticized for the selections, the fullness of detail,. the lack of proper identification of persons mentioned, the lack of high-lighting, etc, b. The weekly was.variously criticized for the selections, its overlong items, lack of synopses, etc. c. The CIG Special Reports were unanimously complimented. Despite a and b, the general tenor of the paper is that the situation is good. 2. The Aide to Admiral Leahy makes a very significant comment: "It appears that the concept of the summaries has changed somewhat since their beginning. Originally they were intended primarily to keep the President informed and secondarily for the information of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. Now, in view of the dissemination given to the summaries, it seems they are designed as much for the information of planners as for the President." 3. I believe that what all those persons interviewed, or almost all, are trying to say, without in some instances knowing it themselves, is that CIG is making an unsuccessful attempt to meet with one series of intelligence papers the intelligence requirements of officials, ranking from the President of the United States of America down to minor officers on pertinent area desks in State, G-2, ONI9 and A-2. 4.. The art of writing to meet most successfully the requirements of a specific individual is exacting and demands'an intimate knowledge of that person+s reading habits, his interests, intellectual capacity and background, his activity in the field related to the manuscript, and his need for (1) operational data,, and (2) informational or collateral data. 5. Obviously, it is impossible even for the competent drafters in ORE to meet these demands in one paper destined to so diversified a subscriber list. Approved For Release 2003/05/23: CIA-RDP80R0l731 RO WEATIAL CONFIDENTIAL CQNvIDENTlived Foelease 2003/05/23: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003600030019-4 6. In his capacity as G-2 to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence should present current intelligence in a form to meet the President's personal requirements. It should be so succint and vital that it is automatically and without hesitation placed before the President by his Aides as delivered by CIG. To insure this it must not be overwritten: only those abbreviations should be used rich he will recognize instantly; only those proper names should be used which he will identify readily. The President cannot be expected to identify an unidentified "Heath" (see No. 236, item 3); or "Irgun Zuai Leuni responsibility" (see No. 237, item 5);, or "ITO and PICAO" (see No. 238, item la.); or "Manuilsky" (see No. 239, item 4). (These are from the first four dailies I picked up.) Only when he is personally handling a subject should more than trends be reported. The exceptions, of course, are "fire alarm developments." 7. The President's own intelligence paper cannot be underwritten. The President's time for the reading of intelligence is too limited to expect him to wade through even one of the items of the several in any given weekly paper unless it is presented to him in the "must category" by the DCI. Presented in the present manner is, in my opinion, a guarantee that he will read none. 8. The same considerations are present in drafting intelligence for NIA members, IAB members, and all down the line. In the field of personal briefing sauce for the gooseis not sauce for the gander. In fact, no epicure ever agreed to the adage even in the culinary field. 9. CIG, to justify its existence, must establish a reputation of doing outstanding work in at least one intelligence field. That field has been indicated by the NIA as the supplying of strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the NIA members. 10. CIG should prepare a daily statement of current intelligence for the President, written for the President and for the President alone. It should contain the foreign intelligence he should have to meet his responsibilities as President of the United States of America. It should be written in a form to make it distinctly the President's and it should vary as the President's interests and activities vary. A careful analysis of the official and press reports of the White House and State Department press conferences will give good guidance for determining these interests and activities. If the President is personally active, such as he was in the Palestine problem, the daily summary should be heavily weighted in that subject and in all subjects bearing thereon. If there is a knovin disagreement between Cabinent officers and/or high ranking officers on a subject which may eventually require presidential solution, material related thereto should be included. Needless to say in these cases the greatest objectivity is vital. _2- Approved For Release 2003/05/23: CIA-RDP80R0l731 RMR M i IAL. CONFIDENTIAL CONFID flved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003600030019-4 11. Nothing should be included which cannot be classified as. Ihnust reading" for the President personally. 12. It should always be remembered that any policy paper being submitted by one of the departments for presidential consideration is fully supported by written arguments setting forth the originating department's reasons for recommending the proposed action. CIG intelligence reports should, therefore,, be designed, not to duplicate nor overlap this type of material, but to supply the President in advance with the broadest background so that he will. not feel that he is approaching an unknown problem. To accomplish this, great selectivity is necessary, Great selectivity is dangerous, but the danger must be run. 13. In addition to his responsibilities to the President, the DCI has a responsibility to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. In fulfilling this responsibility he should insure that all intelli- gence affecting the operations or development of policies by those Cabinent members is made available to them whether it comes from State, War or Navy sources or not. The sane exacting standard of presentation, i.e., direct writing YLthout overwriting and without underwriting should obtain at this the Cabinent level. And it is possible that eventually a special service for the directors of intelligence of the four agencies should also be developed. In addition, the directors should receive for their information -oh at their Secretaries have received and the Secretaries should receive for their information what .the President has received. 14. In view of the recently expressed determination by the War and Navy Departments that they must be free to develop their own evaluations in the production of their departmental or staff intelli- gence, CIG should insure the receipt by liar and Navy of correlated intelligence information to facilitate their work. I believe that CIG could best serve in this field by discontinuing its present weekly paper which serves all men and therefore none, and substi- tuting for it a weekly paper which is a correlation and summation of developments of the past week with a minimum of interpretation: a weekly history. 15. This might well be supplemented by periodic revision of situation reports on the various strategic areas of the world. If these were reviewed, corrected and brought up to date periodically, possibly monthly, and were supplied for reference purposes to the pertinent agencies a long felt need would be met. They could be as full as the requirements of the several agencies might indicate and would probably vary as the strategic importance of areas varied. This series might include situation reports on specialized subjects as well as areas. To develop some sort of production program in ORE which might overcome the complaints of the working levels there, each branch might be required to produce a situation report.on its area or subject each month in the expectation that such reports would be read regularly only by specialists in the Approved For Release 2003/05/23_3CIA-RDP80ROl731 R0036M jENTjAL CONFIDEN'rIRL ed FdP' Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003600030019-4 several departments but that they would be available to the higher levels for ready reference as and when required either to check against departmental intelligence or to supplant it. Special supplements should, of course,. be written as required. 16. The above, in my opinion, covers the fields of current intelligence and what might be described as national policy intelli- gence, the former perhaps being also one form of national policy intelligence. 17. To complete its mission, CIG should maintain up-to-date fact books on all strategic areas of the vaorld. A proposed program in this field (the development of national intelligence digests) has been discussed by the IAB and need not be treated in detail here. Our internal problem in meeting what will apparently be our re- sponsibility is the development of an administrative program of approach which might be as follows step by step: a. The development of an outline which will insure the meeting of the requirements of the several agencies. b. The collection of all basic intelligence handbooks whether prepared by the American Government, by the British, the Germans,. the Japs, or others. c. The breaking down of these extant handbooks and the reallocation of the material thus obtained to the American outline. d. The determination of those sections of the outline which `are not thus fleshed out and the preparation of collection requests to fill these blanks. e. A constant review of newly acquired intelligence information to determine whether the handbook material should be revised, corrected,or brought up-to-date. This is a continuing process and no handbook should be considered as a finished product. Therefore, handbooks should have a loose leaf design permitting easy revision of small sections. This design also permits the easy creation and distribution of small operational handbooks on special subjects merely by assembling selected pages, f. Upon determination by CIG of the need for revision, agreement should be reached with the pertinent agency as to whether revision will be made by CIG or by the agency. -L - coWmEnruit Approved For Release 2003/05/23: CIA-RDP80R01731 R00 Q'4N1~~T~ CONFIDENTIAL Approved FWRelease 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003600030019-4 CONFIDENTIAL 1$. If properly selected personnel is available to do the above three primary tasks, i.e., (1) current intelligence; (2) situation reports, and; (3) basic intelligence, they should be sufficiently conversant with their specialized fields to be available for such specialized oral briefings as might be required from-time to time for any and all purposes. 25X1 Cooraa + . g--4-zPlafa ng .Sta fi Approved For Release 2003/05/23-:5CIA-RDP80R01731 90MOM TOP ? SFn ed FFC Ja a CONFIUiNT A-RR~STRIaTEU ROO 7~A (Sender will ircle ssification Top and Bottom) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP (Revised 10 Sept 1946) FROM TO INITIALS DATE D TOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ADVISORY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION CENTRAL RECORDS SECRETARY, NIA CHIEF, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF rs Y"' ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH APPROVAL ACTION RECOMMENDATION SIGNATURE CONCURRENCE REMARKS: AAAAL , 0 L Gt- A44%44y A-V TOP g;ed F1~ I~a f 25X1 DIRECT REPLY /i1 TOP S ved F eas -R~ 1 1 R00 ~ ~ (Sender will cir"Ie cT s ification Top and Bottom) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP Revised 10 Sept 194 FROM TO INITIALS DATE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ADVISORY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION CENTRAL RECORDS SECRETARY, NIA CHIEF, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH APPROVAL INFORMATION DIRECT REPLY ACTION RETURN COMMENT RECOMMENDATION PREPARATION OF REPLY FILE SIGNATURE CONCURRENCE DISPATCH REMARKS: This has not been prepared Aith the idea it will have general circulation within CIG, and it is requested that it not be referred in this form to OCD or ORE. 25X1 TOP ~6PSved Fdsr ke easeL:ili1; 1I RDP80F:Yfi4i~,003 bN60360 I sII