AN ADEQUACY SURVEY OF THE 'THE ADEQUACY SURVEY OF THE CIG DAILY AND WEEKLY SUMMARIES' AS IT WAS PREPARED BY OCD ON 9 DECEMBER 1946
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01731R003600030019-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 1, 2003
Sequence Number:
19
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 2, 1947
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80R01731R003600030019-4.pdf | 406.11 KB |
Body:
CONFIDENT
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 January 1947
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR:
Subject: An Adequacy Survey of the The Adequacy Survey of the CIG
Daily and Weekly Summaries" as it was Prepared by OCD on
9 December 1946.
1. A reading of the OCD document shows:
a. The daily was variously criticized for the selections,
the fullness of detail,. the lack of proper identification of
persons mentioned, the lack of high-lighting, etc,
b. The weekly was.variously criticized for the selections,
its overlong items, lack of synopses, etc.
c. The CIG Special Reports were unanimously complimented.
Despite a and b, the general tenor of the paper is that the
situation is good.
2. The Aide to Admiral Leahy makes a very significant comment:
"It appears that the concept of the summaries has changed somewhat
since their beginning. Originally they were intended primarily to
keep the President informed and secondarily for the information of the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy. Now, in view of the dissemination
given to the summaries, it seems they are designed as much for the
information of planners as for the President."
3. I believe that what all those persons interviewed, or almost
all, are trying to say, without in some instances knowing it themselves,
is that CIG is making an unsuccessful attempt to meet with one series
of intelligence papers the intelligence requirements of officials,
ranking from the President of the United States of America down to
minor officers on pertinent area desks in State, G-2, ONI9 and A-2.
4.. The art of writing to meet most successfully the requirements
of a specific individual is exacting and demands'an intimate knowledge
of that person+s reading habits, his interests, intellectual capacity
and background, his activity in the field related to the manuscript,
and his need for (1) operational data,, and (2) informational or
collateral data.
5. Obviously, it is impossible even for the competent drafters
in ORE to meet these demands in one paper destined to so diversified
a subscriber list.
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6. In his capacity as G-2 to the President, the Director of
Central Intelligence should present current intelligence in a form to
meet the President's personal requirements. It should be so succint
and vital that it is automatically and without hesitation placed before
the President by his Aides as delivered by CIG. To insure this it must
not be overwritten: only those abbreviations should be used rich he
will recognize instantly; only those proper names should be used which
he will identify readily. The President cannot be expected to identify
an unidentified "Heath" (see No. 236, item 3); or "Irgun Zuai Leuni
responsibility" (see No. 237, item 5);, or "ITO and PICAO" (see No. 238,
item la.); or "Manuilsky" (see No. 239, item 4). (These are from the
first four dailies I picked up.) Only when he is personally handling
a subject should more than trends be reported. The exceptions, of
course, are "fire alarm developments."
7. The President's own intelligence paper cannot be underwritten.
The President's time for the reading of intelligence is too limited to
expect him to wade through even one of the items of the several in any
given weekly paper unless it is presented to him in the "must category"
by the DCI. Presented in the present manner is, in my opinion, a
guarantee that he will read none.
8. The same considerations are present in drafting intelligence
for NIA members, IAB members, and all down the line. In the field of
personal briefing sauce for the gooseis not sauce for the gander. In
fact, no epicure ever agreed to the adage even in the culinary field.
9. CIG, to justify its existence, must establish a reputation of
doing outstanding work in at least one intelligence field. That field
has been indicated by the NIA as the supplying of strategic and national
policy intelligence to the President and the NIA members.
10. CIG should prepare a daily statement of current intelligence
for the President, written for the President and for the President
alone. It should contain the foreign intelligence he should have to
meet his responsibilities as President of the United States of America.
It should be written in a form to make it distinctly the President's
and it should vary as the President's interests and activities vary.
A careful analysis of the official and press reports of the White House
and State Department press conferences will give good guidance for
determining these interests and activities. If the President is
personally active, such as he was in the Palestine problem, the daily
summary should be heavily weighted in that subject and in all subjects
bearing thereon. If there is a knovin disagreement between Cabinent
officers and/or high ranking officers on a subject which may eventually
require presidential solution, material related thereto should be
included. Needless to say in these cases the greatest objectivity is
vital.
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11. Nothing should be included which cannot be classified as.
Ihnust reading" for the President personally.
12. It should always be remembered that any policy paper being
submitted by one of the departments for presidential consideration
is fully supported by written arguments setting forth the originating
department's reasons for recommending the proposed action. CIG
intelligence reports should, therefore,, be designed, not to duplicate
nor overlap this type of material, but to supply the President in
advance with the broadest background so that he will. not feel that
he is approaching an unknown problem. To accomplish this, great
selectivity is necessary, Great selectivity is dangerous, but the
danger must be run.
13. In addition to his responsibilities to the President, the
DCI has a responsibility to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.
In fulfilling this responsibility he should insure that all intelli-
gence affecting the operations or development of policies by those
Cabinent members is made available to them whether it comes from
State, War or Navy sources or not. The sane exacting standard of
presentation, i.e., direct writing YLthout overwriting and without
underwriting should obtain at this the Cabinent level. And it is
possible that eventually a special service for the directors of
intelligence of the four agencies should also be developed. In
addition, the directors should receive for their information -oh at their
Secretaries have received and the Secretaries should receive for their
information what .the President has received.
14. In view of the recently expressed determination by the War
and Navy Departments that they must be free to develop their own
evaluations in the production of their departmental or staff intelli-
gence, CIG should insure the receipt by liar and Navy of correlated
intelligence information to facilitate their work. I believe that
CIG could best serve in this field by discontinuing its present
weekly paper which serves all men and therefore none, and substi-
tuting for it a weekly paper which is a correlation and summation
of developments of the past week with a minimum of interpretation:
a weekly history.
15. This might well be supplemented by periodic revision of
situation reports on the various strategic areas of the world. If
these were reviewed, corrected and brought up to date periodically,
possibly monthly, and were supplied for reference purposes to the
pertinent agencies a long felt need would be met. They could be
as full as the requirements of the several agencies might indicate
and would probably vary as the strategic importance of areas
varied. This series might include situation reports on specialized
subjects as well as areas. To develop some sort of production
program in ORE which might overcome the complaints of the working
levels there, each branch might be required to produce a situation
report.on its area or subject each month in the expectation that
such reports would be read regularly only by specialists in the
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several departments but that they would be available to the higher
levels for ready reference as and when required either to check
against departmental intelligence or to supplant it. Special
supplements should, of course,. be written as required.
16. The above, in my opinion, covers the fields of current
intelligence and what might be described as national policy intelli-
gence, the former perhaps being also one form of national policy
intelligence.
17. To complete its mission, CIG should maintain up-to-date
fact books on all strategic areas of the vaorld. A proposed program
in this field (the development of national intelligence digests) has
been discussed by the IAB and need not be treated in detail here.
Our internal problem in meeting what will apparently be our re-
sponsibility is the development of an administrative program of
approach which might be as follows step by step:
a. The development of an outline which will insure the
meeting of the requirements of the several agencies.
b. The collection of all basic intelligence handbooks
whether prepared by the American Government, by the British,
the Germans,. the Japs, or others.
c. The breaking down of these extant handbooks and the
reallocation of the material thus obtained to the American
outline.
d. The determination of those sections of the outline
which `are not thus fleshed out and the preparation of collection
requests to fill these blanks.
e. A constant review of newly acquired intelligence
information to determine whether the handbook material should be
revised, corrected,or brought up-to-date. This is a continuing
process and no handbook should be considered as a finished
product. Therefore, handbooks should have a loose leaf design
permitting easy revision of small sections. This design also
permits the easy creation and distribution of small operational
handbooks on special subjects merely by assembling selected
pages,
f. Upon determination by CIG of the need for revision,
agreement should be reached with the pertinent agency as to whether
revision will be made by CIG or by the agency.
-L -
coWmEnruit
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1$. If properly selected personnel is available to do the above
three primary tasks, i.e., (1) current intelligence; (2) situation
reports, and; (3) basic intelligence, they should be sufficiently
conversant with their specialized fields to be available for such
specialized oral briefings as might be required from-time to time
for any and all purposes.
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TOP ? SFn ed FFC Ja a CONFIUiNT A-RR~STRIaTEU ROO 7~A
(Sender will ircle ssification Top and Bottom)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
(Revised 10 Sept 1946)
FROM
TO
INITIALS
DATE
D TOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR
SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ADVISORY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION
CENTRAL RECORDS
SECRETARY, NIA
CHIEF, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF rs
Y"'
ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION
ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION
CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH
APPROVAL
ACTION
RECOMMENDATION
SIGNATURE CONCURRENCE
REMARKS:
AAAAL , 0 L
Gt- A44%44y A-V
TOP g;ed F1~ I~a f
25X1
DIRECT REPLY
/i1
TOP S ved F eas -R~ 1 1 R00 ~ ~
(Sender will cir"Ie cT s ification Top and Bottom)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
Revised 10 Sept 194
FROM
TO
INITIALS
DATE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR
SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ADVISORY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION
CENTRAL RECORDS
SECRETARY, NIA
CHIEF, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF
ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION
ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION
CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH
APPROVAL INFORMATION DIRECT REPLY
ACTION RETURN COMMENT
RECOMMENDATION PREPARATION OF REPLY FILE
SIGNATURE CONCURRENCE DISPATCH
REMARKS: This has not been prepared Aith the idea it will have
general circulation within CIG, and it is requested that
it not be referred in this form to OCD or ORE.
25X1
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