REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE - THE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003600020017-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 24, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRE~'
U#' OF TAM AD C GCVWI
covert an % he fWWro status at poydtologloal
k ae tlrr o r t.atiaor for kespift
oioics1
ttot billa.tla. status$
A Wwtbw pgyoholoolawl str*tsgy orrat4satia s
ssisatdov. to be wrslg.d su.h dlr.stl iv.a as will
Lagwo, srt.*tivs p1s t . o.ordtilw-tiau an 14160 u3.tion,
ps r%1.ularly with respect to ter Lat. t1a at national p.ysh-
0100wt1 sts'sts y uit# adUtary plan..
> t AIM fIS8
(Dsft*tt isa) .
't and Disou"Iae., as* App en
C Ic B
It to + 1ud d tbats
P G1 1O# 1 stratt.a is an 1"rtwat Auxin
Vw ashlova tt of uatisn al alas and adlitary objectives.
BLEW. D.part.sut baa tbs primary sspo isibility for
oaf policy d.t.r*iuation in
rh-Bt.al IL L E G I B
1 AM and the Navy have t~~l+l~t'iait 5.ntarast is p wab>
.io oal swa r palls dart. Lz tiou. p.rtioularly insofar as
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 this policy atleots the military soouriipi of the United states.
+i1,t sro is seed for a permannt sub-cc tteo of sw*W
to serve as a plasndug boaro to eantinuously steady the problems of
psyahologisal strategy, to formulate and present plans for ooordin-
ot' p.yoholegieal strttea in time , and for ooordis-
ated dir on of psyohologial strategy in time of war.
10
implementation of approved poyaholegioal 1Y
strategy pk as.
s Implementation of pgahologlal strategy plans and
_
diroetivos in a military theater of operations or rv~ooted opera-
hould be an aetive roeponsibility of rho ?heater Co er
eneerad,
11t r for those speolal Fu n , peyahols~g:ars
+o forces ?&srt'yaed to the Olfios of 5trateGio so
10 agenotes of the government should be required to I
it is reaammondod thats
The MWC approve the C41 CL ISIt & in paragraph 4, shei..
SECRET
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SBMw
b, ? AN= transmit this report by Newwandun (Appendix *A*)
N/A
to t for approval of Annex *A" to Appendix "A" (an 4026~A7
,vowTi
I td to iaple t the oomolwien in paragraph 4 ks above) and
#a t "3" to- Appendix "A" (a shorter for the money proposed An
pu%gr 4 d* above).
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d
tea. # %sr fsr is sa uum by the id.*t b, P"O" mg?
'1 -!r? fw'r b bit i tt+sd, to 1i ` sO t I*v t rpo tss
Us Dtrsottrr? ir*1 Yftelli r ara . for gut Rase
Say"Pr -U Mari"* of iw#]Lwwmutim.
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ILLEGIB
104
z, te of the Effectivenose of Allied
Paphelotiaal irfars in
World war II
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teats of the 15ffsetimne43 of Allied Psychological
arfsre in world War II
objectives of Allied Ps bologieal larfars in
'rrld War TI mere:
ftainish the will of that s to fight
b) to aus taain the morale of )AiW-dj~ "countries
poeupied by the enemy,
oonvinca n utrn.1 countries of the ultimate victory
of the Allies.
Psycholoai*al Warfare was wakes in many different formes, and,
keeping with the character of the war, was world-wide, in
scope.
An q$ ate of the effeoti ess of this Invisible arm
quires the painsta'ciZ study of treat quantities of evidence,
ssstd a esreful appraisal of this material ccoordi to preeise
criteria wb ish 1a-we not yet been defined,
It is however possible to Indicate certain results which,
by eon consent, -were achieved by psychological Warfare in the
last war.
This oo tttee has reviewed such a .denes as it had at its
disposal, and has drawn on the experience of i*.s netbers i ner
to arrive at the oonalusiols set forth at the end of this
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Itinte Justification of Psychological Warfare is that it
to robe wars, To what extent our use of Psychological W".
tare in the last war may be said to have contributed to victory
nay still be open to question, but there is no doubt whatsoever
that each of the na jor participants in World War IZ wadele use of
in all the varied forms to Atteh it le?rcls itself.
s taco essential points of difference beiaeeam the use
S MO by the eneeay end by the allies of psychological warfares
et} The enemy started exploiting the psychological pessibili-
of political warfare and subversion long before the
011
shooting eras started in 19399 By ceorainate4 overt action
through the public "die. of inaformatice, and by coordinated
covert action, involving subvrersiov m d et'?er secret
activities designed to impair and prepare the ru,rale of
intended victims of argressien, the ini.t1el execution of
the enemy's military plans was greatly tceilitet.d. It
may therefore be said that the effectiveness or psychological
warfare, as practiced by the on.eny in tiAS3 or den urn
peace, may be measured in terms of military rains in times
of de '"
>r. On she other hand, the ccttx'fes which
leagued thesseives only gra tunny a alnst the ofgresision
of Germany, Italy anti Japan, devsloped coordinated
Psyohologisal Warfare after they became the victims of ag-
gr"sion. The intimate dovetailing, therefore, of
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am=
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political and psychological warfare wh oh is only pos-
sible on tba, condition that the two form part of a pre-
concerted plan of aggression, was the pt'ero at ve of the
aggressor nations*
b)- Chile the teohnical means used by the Allies during the war
were similar to those used by the enemy, the basic strategy
entirely different. The enemy becerze increasingly un-
able to relate its peych.olo ;ical -warfare to facts, because;
the p3 etnre which facts painted i uld have been discouraging
enemy** ova morale. we, on the other ,,and, strove by
every means see could to publioise facts, because the realisa-
tion of those facts was discouraging to the ealmty and en-
eoaragiaf; to our friends. his distinction has been de-
fined as the "strategy of truth", versus the "strategy of
falsehood". if the ethical faster is abstracted,. the defini-
tion will stand, Yron the spring and sun*er of 1941 Ord,
the enemy Wis. forced, ",-eeause of the "f is of the s tuettion"
to dis~iisPlate or contest these facts, and su'etitute other
"pseudo-facts", 'which became the loss plausible (hence the
here Ineffectual) as the 's r were on, and as the "strategy
of truth" of the Allies verified itself.
ical ' srftre is only sus-
cbolo
id that Fs
b
f o
g
y
e am
re
a. It may thAre
esssful if waged by a country, or a group of countries, that dis-
pose of ultinrtely superior military resources.
S
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UCRET
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To ocncede this is not to diminish the value of the role
Warfare. it is, however, necessary to ste
eel " arfe re in its eorreat perspective sad to realise,
edtbaut- exaggerating them, its pot rnt{alities and liaitatieas, in
view of the often irresponsible claims and oondemnattons of which
has at. tines boon roads the objecat.
fasyehola,iaal Warfare directed against enemy civilian
e greatly a.asisted by the efforts of sasmy leaders to
he Allies were, in feet, going to prove. 8.L. s absn
stated, publicly tint no Allied bomb would ever drop on
Ge n soil, he stror tF.ened the roreie of the German people.
When it became evident that he h-d bean, mistaken in his forecast,
Liss took the opportunity of reminding the German people of
what Goering had said. Vanhasis on this theme, by radio and leaf-
lets, aonstiU:ted PPyohological Werfhrer in that it sought to
diminish the onemy'e will to fight by impairing; the faith of the
rs poop e in its leaders.
*on Ritler, in Ootober 1941 and on other ooaasions,
oolai ed that the Reid Army was destroyed, lie gave the f er
people a. moral lift which made subsequent disillusionment all the
more bitter. From Stalingrad onward, Axis and Japanese troops,
as the peoples of those countries, were suitably
of the false claims of the Fuehrer. Front line enemy troops at
the Russians were soarer to Berlin
ten they were, and Iea lets quoted the phrases of the German
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leaders of two years before.
How can sou estimate the net military effectiveness of
such invisible warfare? The surrender of an enemy unit at a
critical moment may have been determined by the realis;ttion of
the hopelessness of-the situationcreated in part by our radio,
leaflets and subversive rumors. This surrender may have meant
the saving of"Pinerioan lives, a gain in time, and the success of
settee other, intatn,,~ibly related military operation.
For the purpose of this summiLry report? the subject under disaus-
'lion may be ocmreniently ooneidered under the following headings t
Psychological Warfare directed a oinst eneeaay troops
tions.
Other Psychological Warfare achieeveanents
b) Psychological warfare directed against enemy civilians,
a) Psychological Warfare in its relation to occupied popul
Front line troops ` do not have easy access to radio, and
are the refore prin .pallylvulneralile to leaflets disseminated
illery. This form of dissemination provides pinpoint
accuracy of distribution,, and up to the minute content of the
leaflet. The first larger-scale use of leaflets a:?ainst front-
line troops by the rican Army was in Tunisia and Sicily,
in the late spring and summer of 1943. Deserters frequently
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aa^ee- a*r.u lines balding tbesw
*ad to tds the and of the a pei in h
t surrtrAere d in the manner d at
lArss
s ee tf'ied in tie leaflet., file there is ro v, *y of tw"ing
t extent the + i*ice eit the deserters, or of the sur-
,tes intlned
teet of t o Uanote
r, ',, it 3s *vide: t that they st a v.
portamm to th+rst,, a belied that tbej ropm"
Ctea-*r of WO trope t1.-V7 we fain,
r+eloped. Be t ho role of front-line l Fl
troops
tome. Loth the 5th and the $th srs le in Italy 00 1194
sddltiorel l stlot eotivitiess and siso used
Thhe best taUmmW to the efFectiveneea of these OpgM.t
is Chet the combat fa e* in all theaters seked for t %4m a
let s of ano es both d FP in. ' or t s Swope
the ffa-dtterrne= ereated large psychalogleal
Waex `asrer i to to aeo pe
teoem.l resesh ,
iounet op ere tf orrm direct
trommud"s c*&I* aM "None d tbo
etrar:>,r .rrts r preeog-
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Us* psyshologiaal Warfare. Accurate droppings of leafl
on iltargslian., lra ian and Sian divisiocas in the Ow"M
I,
Jr sought to influenoe those el.ars*ts in their .is
uZzAks.
Explicit ins otions in the event of Invasion tiers
dissainated for the benefit of the local population, both
order to facilitate 'our ovmU&l landings, and to keep
t e enaagr garris is an tenterhooks.
In both the European end the Pacific theaters, .ddsnos
to increasing utilisation and flexibility of tbo
leaflet directed hard nftW troops. with valuable results.
holagioal warfare direoted seas __!e- ly'Mew-
nho day to day radio output in enemy languages aver more
than two dose* abort-wavO traasai.tt*rs was supple ed by
periodical leaflet ca mpai giro whieeh h ereed home a theses
intended to impair the will to fight end the general morale
of snag ai liens. Safer tion of this nature was dir *tad
th thoreasing sslssti'ity toward siv'ilian areas and sertaia
groups of the population. !A. s feo ocorkers were 1s
sa-sitiws to past and Mure batbin,g i allies of the
were impressed with defeat* of German troops, the use m's by
an Eigh Cony' d of the nationals of their allies, and
ooitiois* of their allies by German troops. Ehsu thousands
Ian soldiers wens abandoned by the Germans in the
'fan desert in Jownbor 1042, this fact
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'mere is svtdendo that this haunt a deep effect an Italism
eaflets a*d broadcast interviews with Italian prisms
s tier of the Italian people, and dramatized through
closing da