PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 30, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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March 30, 1951
25X1
TO Assistant Director, OCU
Central Intellirunce Agency
SUBJECT t Psychological Warfare Intelligence Estirate
Reference issade to your mmorandum of March 19, 1951.
We .fie forwarding directly to the Joint I lltgtnee
six copies of OIR Report C.S. 5.5, "Eatiatte of Psycbologtc
art-are vulnerabilities in Certain Countri.a* dated March t2, 19 1.
Your copies of this publication are enclosed Pc
information,
Chic , GIA at_ eon Tana,
Acquisition and Distribution
artment of State
Enclosure
As stated above.
25X1
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Estimate ni Psychologi~ il
Warfare Viilnerahiliffr!5
in Certain Countries
OIR REPORT CS 5.5
This is an, / j , rennrt; not.htn4
in it is to bF: r. ' tried as n st0too Rif, nt
of US or De r,ar?tme ntaz i r)o7 ici/ or as a
re commendat 1, on of ran-1! 4i.rven pczl tcu
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
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ERRATA --- OIR Report No. CS 5
-traate of Pscholica
ITarfare Vulnerabilities in
Certain Countries
On page 24., insert the following:
2. Conclusion
While from the viewpoint of active resistance Hungarians
are traditionally passive, they are by national characteristics
pro-disposed to side with any adversary of the Soviet Union.
In addition, they are traditionally pro-US. Beyond these basic
facts the effectiveness of psychological warfare largely de-
pends on convincing the Hungarians that postwar plans of the
Western liberators are well devised,, amoun to more than high-
sounding slogans and will be e rried out with firmness,
On page 38, substitute the following for the tabulation
of linguistic groups under the heading "b) Languages":
Mandarin
334,276,000
Wu
28,092,000
Cantonese
20,881,000
Amoy-Swatow
13:'15,000
Foochow
10;017,000
Hakka
10,744,000
Anhuei
1,074,000
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TABLE OE CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . .
II, Western Europe ? ? S , 4 ? . . ? . , . a ? ? . ? . e r 1-11
A. France . ? . . . . . . . a . . . . . . ? . . . . .2-6
B. Austria e . ? ? a ? ? e ? a ? e c ? . . c e 6-8
C. Germany ... s r . c s e 8-11
III. Eastern Europe . . . ? r ? ? ? ? ? . e ? ? ? ? ? a ? 12-31
A. USSR a . ? . 12-15
B. Poland ? ? ? 16-18
C. Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? . ? 19-21
D. Hungary . . . 0 22-24
.t. Rumania ? ? ? ? . . . . ? 25-27
F. Bulgaria . . . . ? . . . . . a ? ? ? ? . . . . . 28-31
IV. Yugoslavia . . . . . a e ? ? ? . . ? ? o . ? ? ? ? 0 32-35
V. China ? ? e ? ? . ? a ? ? ? a ? e ? ? ? a . ? ? e 36-40
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ESTIMATE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE VUINERAABILITIES
IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES
I, INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to. estimate vulnerabilities of
certain countries to psychological warfare. The countries covered are
the following= in Western 6urope -- France, Austria, Germany; in
Eastern Europe - USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, bulgaria,
and Yugoslavia; in the Far East -. Chinas
The estimates are based on the following assumptions;.
(a) The USSR has embarked upon open military operations and
the United States has declared war.
(b) The Soviet Army?is occupying the country concerned, or
the country is under the control of a C=ommunist regime
subservient to ,losebw or pursuing a policy parallel to
Soviet policy.
(c) The United States is actively engaged not only in military
operations but in psychological warfare operations intended
to soften up the countries concerned for the purpose of
ultimately.liberating them from Communist rule,
For each of the countries certain factors relevant to psychological
warfare operations are discussed. These include (a) traditional
structure, crientation,.and stability of the governments (b) a brief
characterization of the population, stressing the main qualities of
their national character, their linguistic and physical accessibility
to psychological warfare, and an estimate of their national morale
under the given assumptions; and (c) an estimate of the susceptibility
of the country concerned to psychological warfare and vulnerability
to subversion by the United States under the given assumptions.
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II. HEST-ERll EUROPE
A. France
1. Basic Factors=
a. Government
(1) Traditional structure, France has had, unin-
terruptedly, a republican form of government of the parliamentary
type since September 4, 1870, except for-the short Vichy
period in 1940r43 and the succeodinginterim provisional-
governments which led up to the .prese~rit Fourth Republic,
established. on January 16,,,:1947, Although two Empires and
the Bourbon Restoration inter vened.between the.First and
Second Republics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the pertinacity with which the population.has turned to demo-
cratic government since the French Revolution fixes the
traditional-structure as that of a constitutional republic,
based on democratically elected, parliamentary institutions,
(2) Traditional orientation. In internal politics,
prewar as well as postwar .government in .France has been by
coalition, as no single political party has enjoyed an ab-
solute majority owing to the multiplicity of parties. During
the 15 years immediately preceding World War II, the coalitions
alternated in a fairly regular pattorn. Moderate Left govern-
ments were succeeded by Center-Right cabinets until these.
were overthrown by the 1!Font Po>aizlai:p" (a combination of
Socialists and Radicals ocialists, with Communist cooperation
outside the government), which, in turn, dwindled to Radical
Socialist,govornrients without participation by other Leftist
Parties, Leftist orientation connoted social reforms such as
full trade union rights,, old age pensions, and the like--
the breaking up.of the power belonging to the greae'combines
in industry and bank*--through partial nationalization, as
'well as dissolution of the foreign-inspired Fascist Leagues
and their paramilitary formation's, Prior to World War II,
Center and Right government domostic programs were associated
with "orthodox" finance systems and were more negations of
leftist programs than distinctive platforms in thcnsalves.
Postwar French Governments have continued the tra-
dition of coalition;;. With the exception of the period from
the end of 1945 to May 1947, when the Communists held-ii
first genuinely, and then only nominally---important cabinet
posts, the coalitions have represented "Third Force" combin-
ations. By "Third Force" is meant groupings of the Left
'Center (Socialists and liberal Catholic Popular Republican
Movement-MRP), Right Center (Radical.-Socialists and the
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smaller Union DAbsc tatiquo at Socialists de: la Rdsistance),
and Right parties (Independent Republicans, Peasant Party,
Republican Liberty Party, etc.), with a few minor formations,
which oxclu4Q both the Communists on the Strome Left and the
Gaullis"ts on the Extrcrne Right. The internal political
orientation of the,"Third Force" has been increasingly anti-
Communist and increasingly in favor of a strong national
defense prograt, Its approach to social and economic prob-
lems represents a compromise between planned economy and social
welfare programs advocated by Socialists and the MRP and the
rightist platforms of few if any governmental controls, cur-
tailed social security, and a balanced budget. Because the
Left Center pa ies are outvoted in the cabinet and cannot
ally thenselvewith the Communists in Parliament, the com-
promise is weighted on the side of conservatism, which has
resulted in a sizeable defection in support of the government
on the part of even the non-Communist working-classes.
French foreign policy from the latter part of the
nineteenth century to the present has been one of "providing
security" for the national territory, by a system of
military alliances and peace treaties which varied according
to the fluctuating balance of power in Eur.opeo Since the coming
into being of the League of Nations and the United Nations,
such covenants have fallen within the framework of these intEr-
national organizations. The era covered nay be divided into
two parts, the first dealing with the German bid for hegemony
and the second with Soviet-Russian expansionism. Concern
over German preponderance led France into the Franco-Russian
Pact of 1896, the Entente Cordiale with England, and the Triple.:
Entente (France, England.. Russia). After World War I, the
Locarno Treaties of 1925 between France, England, Germany,
Italy, and Belgium sought to guarantee the French frontiers
established by the Versailles Peace Treaty. The rise of
Hitler, coupled with the Polish-German nonaggression pact
and the decline of the League of Nations, spurred France to
attempt an unsuccessful series of nonaggression pacts with the
Eastern European powers of the Danubian Basin, In 1936 a
military assistance. treaty was signed with the Soviet Union.
After the liberation of France interest in another Frnco-
Russian Ppct revived, and the De Gaulle Provisional Government
.signed an agreement between the two countries in 1944. However,
after the Moscow Conference in 1947, French hopes to mediate
US-USSR differences waned. France is now solidly linked
with the US and theWestern European powers against the Soviet
Union; under the Brussels Pact and North Atlantic Treaty,
France is the pivotal nation of the US-inspired defense system
for the European Continent.
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(3) Traditional stabilit . The stability of French
governments cannot be measured solely In terms of the life
span. of cabinets. Under the parliamentary system of the
Fourth Republic, the government is responsible,,o the National
Assembly, whose refusal of a vote of confidence necessitates
collective resignation, How'ever,.a suc,cess.or government may
include nearly all the members of the outgoing cabinet, while
basic government policy remains virtually identical. Under
the Third Republic, the average life .of a coalition was about
seven months.. Although the "Third Force" has boon continually
in office since November 1947, seven varied groupings have
governed during that period-and there have been 10 French
governments since the liberation"
b0 The People
(1) Characteristics of the population, The French
character is a blend of many essences md, like the climate
of the country, is civilized in the sense that it is temperate.
This fundamental moderation, however, does not denote passivity
or servility vis-t:vis a national enony. The average French
man or woman is courageous to. the point of temerity, Throughout
World Wars I- and, II,..the quality of endue, exhibited by
the majority of the population showed -what patient constancy,,
rather than the volatility superficially, .attributed to Latin
races, is a cardinal French characteristic,. The average
Frenchmn.n.is-ingenious, contriving much with very little.
He is. also individualistic, literate, and witty, Intel-
lectually receptive to insurgent ideas,, the French are socially
conservative,, The family as: an institution is perhaps more
inviolable in France, where there aro-relativoly few,divorces,
than in the US. 0wior.ship of property. is a,deep-seated
instinct among all classes. Church influence Is another active
element in cementing a highlystratified.society, although
less than- one third of the Catholic population are practicing
Catholics.
Among the handicaps, from the viewpoint of psycholog-
ical warfare, are the. qualities of general skepticism and
.cynicism, as well as quarrelsomeness and lack of discipline..
reflected in the frantation of political parties. However,
these haii&tc~ipe are more prgva.lent in peacetime than under
ener r occupation, when tdley ..arse lar ely: off eat i * peL'tribtisrs
above 'polls i:ictl . party t nd elL as quarrels.' In adC i_tion, the Ftrench rein insular,. having a "eelir. of superiority over
most forei :~nors an, falsely ima-:inin ' that they are universally
admired for their unieue contributioh to western culture, are
lesentful when they discover that forc_i. ners admire themsolvep
still more.
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Key aspirations are probably reduced to a longing
for relief from war and tirte to recover from two devastating
world conflicts, with a modicum of security and well-being.
There are evidences that the general public views with repug-
nance the use of the atomic bomb. A 1950 survey found a
substantial increase over 1949 in the percentage of persons
who would have disapproved the use of the A-Bomb even against
the Germans in 1940 to prevent the occupation of Fiance.
While the reaction is primarily due to fear that its use
would extend thu war to Europe, it also reflects a moral
aversion to the use of this weapon.
(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. The
very high degree of literacy renders the population very
accessible to any :lodia of psychological warfare employing
the written or spoken word, As to diversity and distribution
of languages, numerically large colonies of non-French
Europeans, Africans, and Asiatics are scattered throughout
France, but with few exceptions they speak, road, and under-
stand French. Only a small percentage of the French populatio',,
or foreigners on French soil., know English.
It is estimated that nearly half the total popul