INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 14, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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~finem~?nts
may be possible it is hoped that this will clarify and stabi:Lize exis-
ting arrangements, focus attention on any important disagreements, an~i
isolate component problems requiring further adjustments. R~~cipie~its
are not asked. to indicate their formal concurrence but their comma:?ts
and suggestions will be welcome and appropriate revisions will be
issued.. In the event that an a~~ency disagree:~ with a basic point; _n
the paper, it is requested to discuss the matter with this oE'fice ~,nd,
~if agreement cannot be reached, the issue sho~zld be framed for dis-
cussion and decision at a higher level.
2. The general principles of the paper, which have been appr wed
in CIA., are briefly as follows
a. Intelligence support for psychological operations is ?iot
a job to be undertaken by any single agency but s}.~n7~ln. be a c.~oper-
ative effort of State, CIA and the Military Servic:e~.(Pp. 1-,
section B, 1-12)
b. In making this cooperative effort each IAC agency sho~.iLd
call on the others for intelligence which does not fall with~i
its own field of dominant interest. (p. 6, para. 2)
c. The coordination of a particular paper in the psycho_~giex
field, just as in other fields, should be done by the agency
primarily responsible for producing that paper. (p. 7, para. 4)
d. CIA (O~IC) will assist in making arrangements s.nd ircnin~
out difficulties that may arise. (Pp.7~ ~, para. ~)
e. The Director of the new Psychological Strategy Board shoe
look directly to the producing agencies i'or his intelligence sup-
port, but he may call on CIA (O~IC) for assistance as require d.
(P . 8, Para . `T )
JAMES ~~,. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination
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Analysis of the Intelligence Needs of Psychological
0 er' atioas to ether with an Indication of I3ow The
Shoul Be Met
For the purposes of this paper the term "psychological op~r-
a~tions" is defined much more narrowly than in the President's
directive of ~+ April 1951, setting up the Psychological Strate~.y
Board. The field of that Board's activities is so broad that ats
intelligence support must draw on the total funds of intelligence
available to the Government. This paper, however, confines itself
to the particular intelligence needs of the policy officers, t
planners and the operators in the specialized field of propagat3a
and information. The State Department, the Military Services and
CIA are all concerned with this type of activity as well as wi#.h
the provision of intelligence to support it.
For convenience sake research performed on contract by nar=-
governmental organizations is excluded from this paper since it
presents a somewhat different problem and will be dealt with e:~se-
where.
The following types of intelligence are needed at one time or
another to support psychological operations. It is recognized that
these categories are not always distinct and that a certain amGZnt
of overlapping is inevitable. The purpose of the breakdown is ~:o
show the extent and the principal kinds of work that are neede
and where it is being done. This will enable us to address, in
section C, the problem of coordination.
1. General Social, Cultural Political and Anthropological Res arc::
Examples: Level of education, standard of living, political
views or cultural ties of various groups such :~s
French labor, Uzbek tribesmen, etc.
This kind of intelligence is clearly the responsibility of -,he
Sts,te Department. Finished intelligence of this sort, howe?rer,
is of great use to the other agencies; for example, G-2 mig?~t,
on the basis of State's analysis of the area as a whole or ;~f
certain civilian groups, produce a paper on the level of ed~zca-
tion of the French Army, or the political reliability of Ua~~ek
soldiers.
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2. Identification and Elaboration of Psychological Vulnerabilities
a. Strategic, basic or long-range vulnerabilities:
Examples: Aspirations of social groups, e.g., of peasants
for redistribution of land; oppression of re'_i-
gious, nationalist and other groups; d,Epriva~.ion
of liberties; fears and conflicts between g~c,ups
and. countries.
This kind of intelligence job would appear to fall on
the State Department insofar as the vulnerabilities are in
the social, political and cultural fields and the group
under study are non-military. The identification and
elaboration of a vulnerability within the Soviet Air Force,
based for example on unfair discrimination between flying
and ground personnel, would of course be the responsibility
of Air Intelligence. The proper identification of psycho-
logical vulnerabilities is of such importance, however, and
a coordinated attack on the targets selected is ~o vitSl
that these targets should be agreed upon interdepartme~tall~
and, therefore, the finished intelligence that identif+?es
them should be more than the work of any single agency.
Tactical, short-range, current vulnerabilities or themes:
Examples: Failure to reach goals of 5 year plan; Chinese
wheat shortage occasioned by shipments to ~~dia
obstructionism of Gromyko at Paris Deputies
Meeting.
These vulnerabilities are in support of those men-.ion!~'
in 2 (a ), whether the particular strategic vulnerabili~y
has been specifically listed and studied or not. The role
of intelligence in identifying and elaborating these ":act'i.~~.~
vulnerabilities is a different one largely because of~he
speed necessary. Although the basic division of resp4asibl
between departments still applies, each intelligence snit
should feel free to call this kind of vulnerability t~ the
attention of its operating counterparts. Interdepart~ental
coordination is not required on the ntelligenceeoelel ork-
can be handled satisfactorily by the operating p p
ing, for example, through the PCFi.
3. Estimates - predictions with respect to possible future d veld
'""- ments .
Examples: How would the Russian people react to an Aiomic
bombing of Moscow? How strong would be tY~? Frf~r~ ?t.
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will to fight if war came in 195?_? What would
be the effect on the Chinese Army of a props ganQa
attack on the political reliability of the m
officers?
The first example is a national estimate and should be proc~ucee
much like other NIE's. The second example is either a national
estimate or, if produced in some other way, should be coordinated:.
between the intelligence agencies. The last example is the
responsibility of G-2.
~~. Factual Studies on Particular Subjects or Groups
These studies are of use to the psychological operators,
but not exclusively so, nor are they prepared by special psycho-
logical intelligence support units.
I Examples: Land tenure in Iran, economic position of the
Chinese in Malaya, slave labor in Bulgaria, etc.
The above reports would ~be produced by the State Department
whereas a paper discussing recruitment methods in the Soviet;
Navy would of course be done in ONI.
minion and Attitudes of Key Groins
Examples; General -attitudes of French labor, morale in
the Soviet Army, etc.
Specific - Czech attitude on the A-bomb, Dut::h
opinion on trade with the East,
Yugoslav peasants' attitude towar?.
Tito, etc.
In this category also much of the work falls on the State Depart-~
went. Where the group studied is a military one, however, the
job is for the military intelligence organizations.
6. Accessibility of Various Groups
Examples: Distribution of radios among Italian workers,
literacy of Chinese soldiers (ref. "level of
education"' under paragraph l), the influenti~~l
press in Shanghai, etc.
The criterion here is the same as elsewYiere: What group is
being considered?
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'~..r
Current Intelligence
General information on recent events including i.ndica~ion~
of stress in the regime:
Examples: Assassination or defection of a prominent Cam-
. monist, new decrees and control measures, U 8.
and foreign policy statements, etc.
This kind of general information should be paart oS tiie equ'.p~n~-
of all psychological operators as well as other aa~{cbal~h~Jon-
cerned with foreign affairs. It is supplied in p y
newspapers and in part by the current intelligence un9a in each
of the agencies.
8. Biographic Intelli~en~
,a~.,u,~a.es : The career, character and weaknesses of var i.ous
leaders, the general characteristics of present
leadership.
Papers giving the information mentioned in the first exampte
should be produced in the biographic sections of each of the
intelligence agencies. In cases where two organizations }~avc
files on the same individual, the finished paper should. b
coordinated. A study on the general characteristics of p3reser-
leadership would also need to be coordinated.
g. Script Material
Unclassified or de-classified information for -zse by the
operators in writing scripts.
Examples: (a) simple biographic information
(b) current raw intelligence
(c) "magazine-type" research
The vast majority of this type of material should be acc-uaula,-
and used by the operators without reference to intelligence
support. In cases where the operating people do not have the
information, they shouad make specific requests on their
supporting intelligence units. In such cases the request;
would fall in ono or another of the categories of intelli;enc=
already listed in this paper.
10. Propaganda Analysis and Analysis of Psychological Operatlans:
Examples: What is the Soviet line this month? How much
emphasis is being given to Iran? What are the
psychological facilities of the Soviets fcr use
in Iran.? Report on new techniques ~.nd PW
equipment.
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Much of th f this f'f=1d
is .done by Thc=
rest is up to the State Department, although t e i i ry wi;_1
naturally analyze propaganda directed specifically at the Arced
Forces, whether in a Theai;er of Operations or nat. Responsil~ili?,
for reports on foreign organizational arrangements for psych~~io-
gical warfare and on PW techniques and equipment falls on StrLte
or the appropriate military department depending on what aspect
of the problem is being considered. Initiative for]su{~h rep~~rts
may come from anywhere, and the actual production will in ma:~y
cases be an interdepartmental undertaking.
11. Evaluations of U.S. Psychological Operations
Analyzing both the audience reached and their rea~~tions.
Examples: How effective is the VOA in Egypt3 PW lessons
learned in the Korean war. VOA reception in thf~
Ukraine.
The major burden of evaluating a U. S. psychological operati,.n
should fall on the operating side of the agency concerned. `Whey
are in the best position to know what they are doing and are
vitally concerned with its effectiveness. This does not meat:
that their findings should be accepted without question. Th..
~ intelligence specialists :in the same department should occasion-
ally examine the results :independently, and at intervals pri?rate
organizations should be asked to check these evaluations, fo_~
example, by conductinga pllbliC opinion survey where this is
passible.
12. Technical Communications (Jamming} Information
.._.~.~_
This subject has been taken up by NSC. CIA's Office of
Scientific Intelligence was given primary responsibility and is
working out arrangements for the necessary coordination witl~i
other agencies.
C. COORDINATION
1. A large proportion of a1:1 the foreign intelligence coliectpd
or produced by the U.S. agencies is of value in planning or
executing psycholagical operations. Most of this info:rrrsa.tip~.
was being produced for military or political purposes long
before there was general recognition of the importance of ps_1-
crc~logi~cal warfare and propaganda. It would be unrc~alistie,
therefore, to attempt to coordinate the pro