II. POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003500130004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 28, 1952
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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ecizrit;I InYor Kati ~~?:
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IS. Political, Social, and Cultural
1. The intelligence organization of the Aepa,rtment of State,
which i.s responsible for work in tris area, i3 meeting tyre most
urgent derlands of its own policy -makers anct is producing iritelliq~ ~tce
reports to meet other-agency needs where these are spec,if'ically
identified. and are of h:i~;h priority. Geographic coverage i~ compl_~te,
although nearly all countries; are covered with only marginally
adequate personnel strength. On Yiighest priority areas current
developments are covered fairly adequately: On tl~e USSR,
development of capabilities and indications of intentions im the
propaganda output, in domestic organization, and in diplomatic
maneuvering are analyzed, and tti~re is review of the Ni.tuation in.
Europe. the strength of parties, political prospects, and iikeliho~~l
of a.ccommedations to tJ. S, policies are gauged, and, as resources.
permit, there is anal;;sis of long-teem prospects for stability,
hc~iltliy morale and will to fight. In medium priority peript?~.eral
areas coverage is less intensive, and, with respect to Iran, Indo~-
china and Sndia,, far. example, the l.ag between production. of immedz.ite
ini;erpretations a;1d anal;,uses of lon.~,er term factors is grea~:er.
In law priority areas, such as Afric& and South America., the sittiox
i;~ largely one of
depth to relate currezit developments to historical treads.
-3- (Revised)
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dvalin{3 with crises as they arise, but witY~ limited resources devoted
to trend, , the rapidly changing; ba3.ance of social forces, a.nd the
identification of future prospects. World Communi3M, outside the
Qrbit, is treated with respect to pat?ty strength, political maneirrer-
ings, and relationship to the Moscow propo,ganda line, but witl:
fewer resourc~;s for identifyin{; details of organ~..zation., sources
of financial support and extent of infiltration into politica:L
and sccis,l orge.nizations.
2. The deficiencies suggested above stem in part. from :~
lack of raw information, inevitable with respect to Russia aizd
China or due to the need for unavailF~ble specialized observers oz'
additional reporting staff. Ir part, however, ttie deficiencies are
also due to sheer lack of resources ~-.o analyze available information.
The latter factor has been ag~avated by (a) the steadily increasing
demands of U. S. policy officials for more numerous intelligence
researc:n studies of constantly greater depth and breadth requir-
ing the devclvpment of new techniques in both the collection and
pr. oduction processes ~ s,nd (b) the pressure of demands front new
departmental anal other_agency prograrus especially in economic and
psychological f ield.s (which az~e treated elaewhero -in this papE:r) .
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The:;e increased demands a..?e well beyond the staff resources of the
State intelligence organization. For these reasons, alt~.augh
the quality of State intelligence output has constantl~~ imp. ovc,d .
its adequacy in terms of +.he needs cif the community may be s~.id
to l~.ve diminished in the last two years and the present si~tua,tioh
is considered unsatisfactory.
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2S Jule- a.y~i?_
IV. Economic Intell:i~ence
1. Basic Eronornic Research
a. USSR and Eastern Lur~ean Satellites: Intelligence ar
industrial production is reasone.bly adequate althou~;ii Here are
important gaps such s,s the quantities and location of stockpiles of
strategic items. The 2ac:t of raw data ~~a: made it difi'iculL to bu~_i.d
up satisfactory basic intclli,7ence on ina.ny aspects of Soviet Bloc
incluetry.
Intelli~Tence on clandestine trade is vary spott;~.
Inforr2ation on international fir~zr,ce is scarce s,nd the rese.~,r. ch
effort inadequate, partic~.larly on Soviet $1oc as sets j..n the Jnitea
States, Soviet balance of payme~lt, ~xnd Soviet gold and foreign
exchan?-;e availabilit9.es and dispositioY~s. ?
In tt7.e field of transportation, data. on ship movements
iG rels;~tzvely good, althou~;ra information on the car~oec c~,ri.?i#~d is
vague anu ir~complr.t;e. Intelligence on rail transportation s relit:-vel;~
~~.c3cquate but riore coni~l.ex questions sucti; BLS the composition o~' frei;1t
._ ?,
tx?ai'fic wi?trin t:le USSR and tie c..,prt
IA.C -D-55
28 July. 1952
a, Economic Warfare: Implementation of N5C 104~2''and t~ e
Battle Act programs is requiring increased economic intelligence
support, It is expected the,t the newly established coordinating
committee will assist in bringing available intelligence more fuLl~~
and immediately to bear on questions arising under this program. How-
ever, the potential demands for detailed operational intelligence. in
this field are virtually unlimited, and are and will continue to be wF11~
beyond the capacity of the intelligence agencies to satisfy.
b, Target research: 3`he target intelligence activities
outlined in Section III (Armed :Forces) involve detailed assessment of
ecor~omie and structural vulnerabilities. In general economic intEi-
ligence on the Soviet Orbit now provides a valid basis for developing
detailed vulnerability studies and target systems, but the ntell--
Bence gaps previously described forecast growing handicaps for thy.;
type of specialized research in the absence of fresh data.
c. Soviet Bloc Capability Studies: Among the highest
priority tasks of the economic intelligence community is the conti~u-
ing study of Sovj.et Bloc economic capabilities for war. This stud;
currently employs for the first time a modified form of input-outpxt
analysis which is expected to lead to more accurate and mear~irgful
estimates.
-11- (Revised).
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V. Scientific and Technical
1. Scientific and technical intelligence against t~ze USSR and
the satellites has made important progress since the beginning of
Fiscal Year 1951. Current knowledge, however, is scanty and }_nade7uate
ire terms of national security ni:eds. Coordination and liaison wit ,
many of the specir~,lized collection activities required to develop
krrowledGe of foreign scientific and technical activities comiucted
undex? high security safe~;uard:> have been radically improved 1~u+, ar~~
not yet considered generally satisfactory.
radical changes in the future.
In biological and chemical warfare,
the knowledge of the Soviet programs is extremely limited acid large
s,ree,s of complete uncertainty with z?espect; to the intent and r~apa-
bj.lities for exploitation of these very dangerous fields still rema:~~.x,.
Wit~:i respect to ~:lectronies and telecommunications, a number of
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important intelligence "finds" with respect to Soviet activities
have been made within the last ,year. Knowledge of their capabilities
in air defense as determined b.y their electronics and telec?mmuni~:~-
tions systems is much irirproved, al.tliough there are still ena:?~cous
voids with respect to the developments which lead to radical7.,y
improved systems, Bone of t~rhich mig,~t be diffExent from thos:5 with
which. the West is familis.r. Knowledge of Soviet guided missiles
program is in general quite limited although certain projects base
an German developments are fairly well known.
3? Scientific and technical intelligence on conventional
military weapons and equipment of all types is reasonably gaol so i'.r
as standarized items in current use are concerned. However, the
security safegus,rds aroun~3 researr_h and development and tr.sting
insts,llations are such that little knowledge of important weapons
improvements is available until the weapon is employed for. Service
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ecurifiy Infox+s~~~.tic~r~
!+. Progress is bei~ig made toward better understanding; of tl~e
basic scientific research of the countries behind the Iron Curtain
and of their resources in scien+,ific manpower, institutions, e.nd
organizations.
5. The division of respon,ibilities and the methods of
coordination for scientific and technical intelligence activi+ies
have been under study by a special a,d hoc committee appointed by
the L4C. A draft report is novr before the committee and a f final
report is expected sheltly.
-14- (Revised)
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5e~?~'ity Informat~ ~n
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28 July 1952
VI? Psych~olo~ical Intelligence
1. Overt propa{~anda and psychological warfare programs have level-?
oped to an unprecedented degree in t2'ae past two years. The growir~
awareness of political and economic planners that their program aetivit~~s
have Important psychological effects, has also outlined new requirements
far intelligence. These fall largely within the work of political
and sociological intelligence, but the orientation and organizaticSn of
the material for the psychological warfare user calls for unaccustomed
depth and detail both in field reporting and in analysis.
2. The primary responsibility for psychological intelligence, now
in State, ha,s not been adequately met, largely because vigorous efforts
tp secure budgetary resources have failed. An initial effort to develop
interagency coord~.nation has not as yet been successful, but another
attempt to accomplish such coordination is being ~.de.
3. Efforts to eliminate duplication and to improve consultatiar~
between agencies in the area of .research performed under governmen=t
contract by privets institutions have been encouraging; but much resins
to be done. The overlap between the intelligence-research responsibility
and the operational responsibilities of the propaganda and psycholo~;ical
wari'are agencies complicates the problem.
~+. Covert propaganda and psychological programs are also grow3n~
rapidly. The intelligence support they need is in n~8.ny r~:spec#s the
same as that required in ?the overt fielii, but in significant aspc,ets i t
is in addition and much more detailed. Even less than in the overt
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field, therefore, have the intelligence needs of the covert p~ychole-
gical program; been sat3.sfi ed. T1ha'? intelli~erce they have received
has been partly supplied by normal production of the intelligence
agencies, partly '~:>y specia.l_ effox?~ts to answer particular requests, end
partly by the development oi' intelligenc:e units next to the o~~erato~ s
or by perform~.ng intelligence worlf in operational units. flr~:nizatj ons
and responsibilities in intelligence of this kind are sca~tter~:d an$
subject to no clear pattez?n or caordination.
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~+S~.tri'ty Inform~~ion
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28 July 1952
VII. Basic Intelli ence
1, The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NISj, which wgi.:=
begun in 19+9 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, zres 3esi~rn~=d
to meet the U.S. Governments needs for baste factual intelligence on a
world-wi&e basis. Since the NIS program was begun 1,252 individual
sections have been produced on 57 of the 108 NIS areas, which is the
equivalent of approximately 20 complete NIS. Based upon the ra#.e of
production established during the last quarter of FY 1952, s production
goal of the equivalent of approximately 10 complete NIS has been set f7r
FY 1953? In addition, base maps have been prepared for 80 NIS areas, ~ci
preliminary gazetteers for $0 NIS areas with 14 more base maps and ,~az~t-
teens scheduled for completion in F't 1953.
2. 1VIS production is sehvgduled fn aeccsrdaMCe zrith.~YC3 ?~~iorities and
intelligence agency capabilities. I,imi.tations of the latter have precu_udec
across-the-board production of NIS on s.ll JCS high priority areaf> and ~~ade
i.t nece.sary to undertake partial surveys on a considerable number of ~`tS
areas. I3owever, agency capabilities have been utilized to the maximum
extent possible on the high prl.arity areas with the result that Initial
NIS production on the group of 2~ areas of highest priority is approxi~~telc
~-5/ complete, whereas the entire prot3ram is about 22~ complete. MIS on
eight individual areas are over 75~ complete, and five of these a_^P in --.he
JCS high prioity list.
3. Specifically the USSR is 77, completed anti is expected tc) be
finished in FY 195. China, Mongolia, and Korea ~,re on the average ~i$~
completed and will be finished in FY 1955. The Eastern European sateil~tes
average 37~/o completed and will be finished in I'Y 1956 along with SoutheF=:~t
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Asia and. Indonesia which. are now on:Ly 1~;~'o done. Western Europe, Scan-
dinavia, the Near East, Sout_z Asia, apprb-ache
are now'betweer~ 20 and 50;~ done and are expected to be finia)~ed in rY i957.
It is hoped that NIS on alJ. areas will be completed in FY 195f~ and the
program wi1.l then be continued an a full rm.inte~,z~cs 1?aaf.a, if the ca~s_.-
bilities of each producin;; aenc;~ be ma3_ncained at the present level.
if
`.?'he Standard Instructions for National Intelligence Surve;,~s
(revised in June J.951) prescribe outlines which cover the requireinen .s
of the U. S. Governme.zt for basic intelligence and are so draftEd as t7
apply to t'c~e most complex i'oreign country or area. iaux?tlier modificat~~n
of the outline guides for sever~,1, chap'~ers i anticip~.ted in order to
meet more precisely the requirements o~ psychological opere,tions.
5. 2'he quality of the 1dI5 is relatively gaol and can be expected
to improve as the gap:x in information are filled and revisions are pubiisY.ec.
under the Maintenance FroRrarl w~~ich vm_s started in FY J.g52. This z~ai1' terz-
ante aspect is regarded as the cru:c of the NIS Program as it asr;ures ~re-
sentati.on of up??to-dale basic i.rrt.~elligence. Coordina~ian wi~chir and
between alJ. IAC and non-I11C s,,enries engaged in the T?dT,S Program is e~e'.-
lent and suitable 7_iaison :i_ ma:i.n'cainF:d w~.th the JCS.
6. ^he geoL;rap?iic researe? required for basic iil'tolligence on
foreign areas ?xas been canductec? with varyi_zg degrees of intensity ncrtt
only to provide con'Lributions to tl?e 11Ia program i~idt also to lend res~ _3rc1
support for other intelligence 1?roduction and ogE:rationul pJ_ann~+.n{;.
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28 Ju. y :1952
Consid,erabl.y more effort iw needed ti. tl?~e regiarial s,pproach 'to ~;he
ana]_y~.is of areas to meet irrcelligence requirements. Geo~ra.pl:c: research
suppor.?-~ for plannii~ and carrying out CIA field operations 1~,~,s cxpanc~~ci
grea~cly during' the past: year. Tlie coordination in tl~e prod~.~ctir~n of`
ixztelli~;ence on mapping activ-i.ties in fore~.gn areas, ps.r~~icularly in
the USSR, its Se.telli ~e: , and nei~*}aboring countries, i.s i~eing 8eve] opr=~l
I'0~' SECI~':['
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VIII. Warning of Attac}c -Current Intelligence
1. Factual information on activities in the Soviet W~~rld i
fragmentary. Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentib~s
to initiate hostilities at any given time ~.3.s~e therefore tentative
inductions or generalizations drawn from ine,dequate evidence and s~e
often based on broad esti.n~,tes rather than on facual information.
2. The IAC Watclr Committee provides a good foundation for
extr~~.cting the maximum benefit from limited information. The terhliqu~
used ~aritllin the IAC invo=Eves elaborate and careful cross-cze~.:king t o,n exhaustive anal;ysi:~ of
possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This method is nat foo3-
proof and t~Ze proUlem of estimating Soviet ini~crrtions is cori:, c~,ntl
being addressed fr. am man;; different angles.
~, The ability of :intelligence to give adequate warn3_rr~ of
attack is w:icertain. Specific warning of dir~rct e,ttack against th-~
U. S. (tTK) may well not be available prior to actual detection of ,he
hostile formation. Certain last-minute defensive and offf_nsive
preparations on the Soviet periphery, However, mr~,y be detected.
Opportunity for detection of indications of Soviet or Satellite
attack on other areas varies from fair in the two border aret~.s
of Germany and Korea to extreme:~y poor in the Trarzscaucas:zs e1r~d
Southeast Asia. Each a@;sncy maintains its owrz 2~+-hour Watch arran~e-
menu to handle any information that is received.
-~p~ (.Revised)
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~.~azrity It~~forma-tion
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~. In general there has been improvement durin;; the past two
years in the ability of current intelligence to provide prompt notir~
and. preliminary evaluations of events and developments ir_ t1~e soviet'
s,s well as in the neutral and friendly areas . This irnprovei~ient is
attributable to the increased skill and know.led~*e of intelligence
analysts which he,s come from experience and to the deepenin{; sense
of corrnnan purpose among the IAC agencies.
1. Z~ie Foreign Service
In general, ?the collection activities of thc~ Foreign Service
are satisfactory. Intelligence needs are met most adequate3_y in the
political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field,
and least satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and p:,ycholo-
gical fields . Ta.ese deficiencies a~,re generally attributable to a
lack: of specialized competence in -those fields which are not closely
related to the bt~sic diplonk~,tic functionr> of the Foreign Service.
Remedial action has been taken. by establishing a comprehens:t_ve economic
reporting progr~tim and a conti.nuin~; program of prf~viding I'orE:ign
Service posts with more complete and effective guidance on inte~.li-
Bence needs. Additional remedial measures in progress concc~.rn the
greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational progr~ns in
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collecting basic intelligence information, particularly in the
psychological. and sociological fields; the recognition of the role
of the Foreign Service in the national intelligence effort through
the revision of the 1~'oreibn Service Manual to include for the first.
time specific and detailed intelligence instructions; and finally,
by studying possible measures to meet needs for basic scientific
inf. ormat ion ,
2. Service Attache arstem
The Service Attache System furnishes extensivE~ use:f'ul
military information on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attac~~~~s
irl the Soviet-bloc countries obt,~,in anti transmit a considerable
volume of valuable informs,tio.i although, under the restrictions imposed
on them by Communist governments, the coverage which they provide E~nnQt
bc: considered adequate. The Service Attache System has been strengj,h-
ened since the beginning of the Korean conflict throu;h the opening of
new offices and the assignment o:E' additional officers to important
posts. Constant efforts are being made to improve the collection
capabilities of Service Attaches by the development of neTa collection
guides grid techniques .
3. Overseas Commands
Armed Farces Commands in Europe are active and moderately.
successful in collecting information. While intelligence collectio~i
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on the Soviet Union itself is far from adequate, it is generell~-
successful in the Eastern Zones of Germany and Austria. Consideratle
information is gathered by European Commands from returned Pk`'s,
escapees, and refugees.
Collection of ~.ntellis~ence in the Far East is adequate on
friendly and neutral arias but is scanty and def~.cient on Co~snunis
China and Eastern Siberia. Tripartite Agreements for cxclian~e of
intelligence on Southeast Asia have considerably enhanced collection
capabilities in the area aild will prove beneficial.
~+. Aerial Reconnaissance
The Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully their
overflif~ht capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Because off' its
current capability the contributions of photo reconnaissance are
increasing. The contributions o:e radar reconnaissance are only fai~?
as compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo
interpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed 5erv es.
Corrective measures underway i.ncludc a research program t,o improve
interpretation tecnniques, the establishment of new schools, .s,nd
improved training methods. Rec~e~~,rcn and development effort is bein,r
expended an free balloor_s, guided missiles, and satellites tv over
come a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles.
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~,,ySecurity Inforrlatic~re
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2$ July x.952
The collection ~,y various mes.nE and the technical aaialys~?~
of manufactured items ai~1. raw mz~terials from the Soviet Urfi~i:,
although undertaken relatively recently, is providing useful
scientific and economic information.. Notwithstanding other ~r~eans :cif
collection, to date the most lurrative source of Soviet Ir2ariu.='actt~e~.
material Y.as been in ~iorca. ThF~ variety of this equipment; Yh~.s
enebled the intelligence agencic;s, through coordination with the Jt;int
Materiel Intelligence Agency, to assess USSR tec~inics.l capab ilitid,=
in a wide range of field:, . Collection in other areas is so~~~what _
less productive, although procui?emcnt through covert channels is
e~cpected to mitigate this deficiency.
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~. Monitoring of Re,~.io Ja~~~
Under NSC 661 the agencies undertook the construc~~ion
and organization of a monitoring system to obtain informe.tion art
Soviet jamming; and related activities in tree radio frequency
spectrum. A pilot operation involving a very limited number of
stations is being established. Adequate informe,tion as to the=
extent of Soviet jamming, concecitration of the jamming stations
and relt~ted information must await the implemen~t.a,tion of a n!uch-
expanded program.
-~28-
TOP SEC`~~ET
IAC-D-S`~
28 July 1952
Approved For Release 2006/09121 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8003500130004-0
 36251Approved For Release 2006/09121 :CIA-RDP80R01731 ~~004-0
~.r' security InformF.tioi
IAC-D-55
28 ~Tul.y 1952
X. Support and Collation Facilities
1. Availabili~ of Materials
With a few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive int~E~l-
ligence, both raw and finished, is distributed among all interested
IAC agencies. In addition to the distribution of current material,
there is a continuing effort to locate and extract pertinent infor~n5
2B July 1~~52
Approved For Release 2006/09121 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8003500130004-0
 36267 Approved For Release 2006/09121 :CIA-RDP80R01731 F~,~3~~004-0
`security informs 1ior
IAC-n-55
28 Jul,; 1~y52
Within the Unite3 States the main effort in the exploita-
tion of foreign publications is cond.uc~ed by CiA for the benefit of
the community. Impoxtant work is also being done by private
institutions, some of t~rhich are an contrc3ct with th.e Deferl.;e Departt?
ment. 't'ranslation facilities for all necessary languages :ire avail-
able, although the volt~rie of material which can be handled Iiag fallE _i
short of greatly increasing demands. It is clear that at the, preset
time the intelligence community is not fully utilizing the in#'orma-.
Lion potentially available in foreign publications, and ths,t additi~:nal
measures are needed to ensure that suefi inform,+.ion is system~ticrzl~:r _
supplied to analysts.
Overseas Comilands, particularly the Ffl.r East Comms,nd,
cr>ploit all captured er_emy documents and all of;her s~zch foreign
l.aii~;ua~;e material tha. ma.y be designated by thf: thea'tcr c:oiiu~iand as
fallix~ within their interest. F`~4iC also accepts request;; .from
Department of Defense Agencies far translation and e;tploit~~.tim of
foreign 1s,nguage material which could be performed more ecar~on3icallt~
in 7'EC than in the Zone of Interior.
AlthougY~ the situation varies with the agency and the=
language involved, thei e are inacegl~.a.te number. of ixitellip~enc:c. off._cer>;
c,nd researchers who are able to read the langu~~ge of the forc~.gn arcs.
with which they work. Training programs are iri effect Which Will
TOP SECI
IAC-D-~~`
28 July l~j2
Approved Far Release 2006109!21:CIA-RDP80R01731 8003500130004-0
 ? ~~G~lApproved For Release 2006/09121 :CIA-RDP80R01731 R~g3~ 04-0
`'Security Infor~~.tio