REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003500100007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 3, 1953
• Content Type: MF

DOE Review
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IVEYORANDUIT FOR:
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
NSC Review Complete as
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR Redacted.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
3 August 195'3
SUBJECT: Report on the Status of the foreign
Intelliance Program as of 30 June 1953
1. In accordance with your request of 29 Maen1953, I
submit to the President, with the concurrence of the Intelligence:
Advisory Committee, the attached report on the status of thf
Foreign Intelligence Program as of 30 June ,1953.'
2. In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies fist, to
point out that the effects of recent budget cuts on intellitence
activities cannot be assessed at this time, and are therefore
not reflected in bh's renort.
3. Inasmuch ae intelligence programs by their very nature
-
are not subject to rapid change, I propose, withethe con-
currence of the IAC, that hereafter a complete ravisianeef this
status report be prepered only on an annual basis (as of 30;
June or such other date-a the National Securityouncil nal-
desire), and that semi-annually there be submitted-a brief
supplementary statement,ef the most significant changes AeiCh
have occurred since the last annual report.
4. I recormene that paragraph 5 of Section= be made
available only to the President, the Secretary of State andithe
Secretary of Defense.
5. In lieu of a iinancial statement, not included in tee
attached report, I :ee71. make an cral report to the Natienal
Security Council] on CTAls exnenditures. This oral report will
pertain only to CIA data and will not include expenditures cn
intelligence male by the other members of the intelligence
community.
State Dept. review completed
ALLIN VI. DULLS
Oirector
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NO. 9 ? THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred
in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
CONTENTS
Page
Back of
Objective divider
I. Coordination 1
II. National Estimates 1
III. Political, Social, and Cultural Intelligence 2
IV. Armed Forces Intelligence 3
V. Economic Intelligence 4
VI. Scientific and Technical Intelligence 5
VII. Psychological Intelligence 7
VIII. Geographic Intelligence 7
IX. Basic Intelligence 8
X. Warning of Attack 8
XI. Collection 9
XII. Support and Collation Facilities 12
49411111111.11111111111111111,
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CONFTTWNTT A T.
OBJECTIVE
For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national secu-
rity, it shall be the duty of CIA, under the direction of the National
Security Council ?
(1) to advise the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activi-
ties of departments and agencies as relate to the national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of
such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies as relate
to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intel-
ligence within the Government using where appropriate existing
agencies and facilities: provided, that CIA shall have no police, sub-
poena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions: pro-
vided further, that the departments and other agencies shall continue
to eollect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence: and provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies,
such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines
can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to
time direct.
? National Security Act of 1947,
as Amended
CONFIDENTIAL
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3, Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on tee one
hand and the intelligence community on the other is continually being
pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both useful' -aid
timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished with
a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy
is fixed. This is being done with increasing frequency and directress
of application to the policy issues.
4. Special efforts are being made to get greater
clarity in estimates generally. As a particular case,
progress was made in NIE-65, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities
(16 June 1953), over NIEe64, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities
(12 November 1952):
precision ard
considerable
through 1957",
through Mid-1954!',
a. Greater analytical precision in the section on political wa
fare capabilities, which concentrates upon the critical areas of the
world, and which distinguishes between the capability to overt tiro
governments and the capability to influence governments and peoples,
b. Greater emphasis on scientific and technical factors, wtich
occupy about a quarter of the discussion in NIE-65.
c. Greater clarity in the military strengths and capabilities
sections, with fewer figures, more emphasis on military progrems,
and a more specific analysis of Bloc air defenses and of Soviet
capabilities to deliver atomic weapons in/the U.S.
III. P0LITICAL,1 SOCIAL AM CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE
1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence has
been very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of informetion
on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities
for the production of such intelligence, however, have been adequate
only for the needs of the NSC and the most urgent needs of the IAC
agencies. Less pressing demands have been met only partially and in-
adequately.
2. The principal deficiency in this field, which varies from
slight to serious, has been in the resources devoted to the exhaustive
coverage and research on which sound estimates and analyses depend.
Coverage of the USSR, the Eastern European Satellite comple4, and China,
has been most nearly adequate. Relatively lower priority has been given
to research on other areas, with and Southeast
Asia at the upper end of the scale, graduating downward to Latin Amer-
ica and Africa. The inadequacy of resources has been reflected chiefly
in an inability to prosecute sustained research programs at all desired
points. Nonetheless, there has remained sufficient flexibility to pro-
duce individual studies of considerable depth on selected major preblems.
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World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, has been satisfactorily .7a)vered
with respect to party strength, political maneuverings and reationahips
to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research into matters of organization,
financial support and infiltration into political and social organiaations
has been less satisfactory.
IV. ARMED FORCFS INTELLIGENCE
1. Operational Intelligence
Intelligence covering the combat zone area for the support cf
current military operations in Korea is generally adequete. Mere still
remains a serious deficiency in our ability to obtain timely identifica-
tion of or information on the movements or locations of Chinese forces
in all areas behind the immediate front line armies in Korea back thraugh
Manchuria into China. Information on installations and on developTents
in Manchuria, such as types and extent of training, reorganization ani
resupply of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean units north of
the Yalu River is inadequate. This deficiency remains substantially an-
changed. Reliable information of the enemy's long-range plans and in:en-
tions is practically non-existent.
The extent of our information on Chinese Communist ae;ivIt in
South China is inadequate. /
The present level of informa-
tion would be inadequate for support of operations by U.S. forces, however;
inherent in any commitment of U.S. forces would be the rapid 'development
of combat and operational intelligence efforts.
A possible early augmentation of U.S. intelligence personnel in
Indochina should improve present U.S. coverage in that area. Eowever,
the picture for the major target area in Asia, I.e., Communist Chine_
is very dark.
The achievement of any major improvement must depend on the in-
crease in scope and efficiency of clandestine operations against military
targets.
2. Order of Battle and Equipment
.Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR, Communtst
China and -- to a lesser degree -- the European Elatllites is partial and
inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of collection.
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Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment in most areas wit n which
the United States or notions friendly to the United States are in eontact
is more nearly complete and reliable
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Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment 13 generally
adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain, except in the
case of some neutral nations whose national policy restricts our access to
such information.
3. Targeting
The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on economic
and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet Orbit and is
in intermediate research stages for the Far Eaat; in-
creasing research emphasis continues on military targets. Current target
systems studies are reasonably adequate to support joint operational
planning but more vigorous data collection efforts will be required eo
maintain these studies on a current basis and to support extended evatems
analysis to meet detailed service requirements.
Initial production of dossiers for priority combat targets es
almost complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for tee
satellite and approach areas. Extensive tactical target coverage ees
been completed on areas adjoining Korean theater but on other areas es
In various stages of completion.
4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Ouanization (NATO)
NATO requests have been filled with the best available inteeligence
consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence studies and
Intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files
are provided, to the NATO Standing Group and NATO major commanas. Reeeas.
able current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the mission
of the NATO major commands are continuously provided.
V-, ECONOMIC INTELLIGEME
1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents fey
serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of material of
variable ualit and from the multi licit of sources.
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Aire.
3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in Sectipn
IV, Armed Forces Intelligence, continue to involve the large-scal:! pr.)cess-
ing of foreigneconomic and technological dnta.
4. The heavy research requirements in the economic field maKe it
imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute minimum. Closer
integration of research programming among the various agencies coacerned
with economic research for intelligence is being developed througa the
Economic Intelligence Committee.
VI. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSF an
Satellities continued to make some progress during the first half of
1953. However, in the last analysis, production of realistic estimatel
is still dependent upon securing information on Soviet objectives and
progress. There continues to be improvement in the analysis and evaluf-.-
tion of available information; however, the flow of information Cf a
scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is becoming
increasingly inadequate. As n consequence, there is an urgent need frr
the further development and utilization of new and improved methcds ena
techniques for the collection of scientific and technical intelligencL
information. Efforts along these lines have progressed slowly Ir thE
past six months, notwithstanding present potential in the fields of/
photographic reconnaissance.
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2. A review of the effects- afDCID 3/4 (which allocated rriMeTy
production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of thE DE-
partment of Defense and established the Scientific Estimates CommittEe
(SEC)) was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order to Irovido more
time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive, the reviev hs
been postponed until August 1953.
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5. Industrial Information
Specialized data to meet departmental needs are maintaineA by
the Defense Agencies. CIA collates all other types of foreign indastriel
information, including research establishments doing industrial researct7
and development work. The material is maintained by individual estab-
lishment and is controlled by a tabulating card indexing system. Ref-
erences to industrial end-products are being indexed by tabulating
machine methods to speed the analysis of data being supplied to all IAC
agencies.
6. Photographs and Motion Picture Films
The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photographee
and related documentary libraries, including motion picture films, con-
sistent with their requirements and responsibilities. Except for post-
war coverage of Soviet and Satellite Areas, the photographic suppert is
nearly adequate for present needs.
7. Map Procurement and Reference Service
Procurement of foreign-published maps and information on magpini
abroad is coordinated by serving an interagency map
committee. Results during the past three years have proved the erfectiva-
ness of overt collection of maps and related information through the
Foreign Service Geographic Attache program. Increased emphasis is beitg
placed on the collection of maps and engineering drawings from domestic
sources. Service Attache channels are also being used. The currently
published foreign maps required for intelligence activities are received
on a continuing basis through exchange arrangements between the Eepart-
ment of State and many foreign official mapping agencies. These exchanges
are in addition to those of an operational character maintained ty the
Military Service. Excellent map reference cerviee in support of inte1.1-
gence requirements are maintained by close working arrangements letween
the map libraries.
8. Foreign Language Publications
Approval of NSCID 16 has given new impetus to cooperatiee 'ate
activity in this field, and definite progress is being made towaed im-
plementation of the directive. An interagency advisory committei= and
its subcommittees are working on methos of improving the coordttation
of procurement and exploitation of foreign language publications for
intelligence purposes. CIA is taking action to centralize its librar
reference, and indexing services for foreign language books and perieAeals,
and to facilitate the use of such services by other agencies. Erforts
are being made to coordinate operations, apportion the workload, and
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reduce duplication between the following activities; overseas aostraet7eng
by US missions to satisfy the local and departmental needs; exploitatim
by various agencies of technical and other publications to fulfil spefic
requirements; and exploitation by CIA of foreign language publications fer
information of interest to more than one intelligence agency. A cent. a:..
index of translations, maintained by CIA, prevents duplication botweon
the translating activities carried on by each agency, and Makes the trans-
lated product accessible to other intelligence consumers.
Good coverage of foreign publications needed for the intelligence
effort is now being obtained, although further intensive collecteon act:J:n
should be undertaken with regard to Soviet Bloc and Communist Chenese
publications.
9. External Research
Flans for developing further coordination of external and con-
tractual research in the social sciences (i.e., non-governmental of in rest
to intelligence suffered modification when the Department of State fele
obli ed o cut b I ? A- xternal Research staff.
will permit continua-
don o he existing program, but by no means full realization of the scale
of operation which seemed to be in sight before the current budgetary
allocations were determined. For the foreseeable future, thereftre, there
will continue to be imperfections in the efforts to minimize duplication
in external research, to insure community benefit from such reseerch ant.
to facilitate the rational letting of external research contracte.
Positive recommendations for a better balanced and intepratet
program of research in the fields of psychological and unconventional
warfare within the Department of Defense have been made by an advison
group to the B. Action on the report has been deferred pendirw re-
organization of the research end development program of the Deferse
Department.
The Economic Intelligence Committee plans to compile a report
of all government sponsored economic external research on the Soviet Elcc
classified through Secret. The report would include completed research,
research in progress, and contemplated research.
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25 J?ugusl 1453
Copy No _II
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
NSC STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
1. Attached for the information of the IAC agencier;
is a copy of subject report as reproduced by the National
Security Council Secretariat.
2. In view of the fact that this final issue is the
same as IAC-D-55/4 (Revised), it is only being issued
to members of the IAC in the form of a single copy for the
record.
RICHARD D. DRAIN
Secretary
IAC -D- /4
(Final)
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August 4, 1953
No. 9 - THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies wish to point out tnat
the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities canret te
assessed at this time, and are therefore not reflected in this report.)
I. COORDINATION
1. Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so eseentiae to,
producing adequete intelligence for national security purposes and le
reducing cost by avoiding duplication, is improving. There is ste.1 some
duplication of effort which adds to the cost of intelligence, but steps
are being taken continually to reduce this to a minimum.
2. On March 7, at the recommendation of the Director of Cent:ae
Intelligence, with the concurrence of the members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, the NSC issued NSCTD No. 16, directing tie DC1 to
ensure coordination of procurement and processing of foreign language
publications. No other recommendations for coordination have been made
to the NSC during the past six months; however, several improvements in
Intelligence coordination have been accomplished by mutual agreehe;
among the intelligence agencies and others. There are at present, -01
addition to the Intelligence Advisory Committee established by WICID No.
1, nine interdepartmental committees to coordinate important intelligence
programs in atomic energy, domestic exploitation, defection, waten .j.feo-
cedures, economic intelligence, economic warfare intelligence, seieltific
Intelligence, clandestine intelligence priorities and foreign laneuaee
publications.
II. NATIONAL ESTIMATES
1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950
for the production of national intelligence estimates contirue to operate
satisfactorily. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence com-
munity is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and they
can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates
derive authority,from the manner of their preparation and from thE, active
participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heeds in their
final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where estimates
would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.
2. A production program for national intelligence estimatee is pre-
pared annually and reviewed quarterly at which time obligatcry charges
are made. This program provides for a re-examination of existing EEti.
mates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of nce
estimates designed to improve the coverage arimportant topics. Coetinued
emphasis is placed on the completion of basic estimates on tae USSR in
advance of the review of US budget estimates and NATO plans,
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6. Some progress has been made in the exploitation of open selLntific
literature and in research in depth on institutions, but knowledge ot basic
scientific research and development behind the Iron Curtain rcmaire trade-
quate. Information on Soviet long-range scientific development programs
is similarly poor. Information on the quantity of Soviet scientifie and
engineering manpower is reasonably adequate, but estimates of its itneity
remain less satisfactory. In view of the increasing importance o h
basic scientific information to the predIction of future Sovi-t
a concentrated effort to improve intelligence in this field 13 plinn-t for
the coming months.
VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE
1. Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare pregems
have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two yecrs.
intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the framewcfk
of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation and organiza-
tion of the material for the psychological warfare user calls for un-
accustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and a anni:Ynis.
2. The Department of State has created a Psychological Intelltgence
Research Staff designed to increase coordination of governmental an4
private research in this field.
3. The final report of the Advisory Group on Psychological exu
Unconventional Warfare to the Research and Development Board recommended
methods by Which research in these fields might be better bulancee and
Integrated within the Department of Defense. Because of thc petedirE
reorganization of the research and development structure in the DoTert-
ment of Defense, the report has not been acted upon.
4. A major deficiency in this field is the lack of in3ormte3ion and
of coordinated effort nmong intelligence agencies in deterimeain4 reeist-
ante ?Totential, psychological vulnerabilities, and of our propaanna
erfectiveness with respect to target audiences behind the Curenin.
Encouraging progress has been made individually by intelligence agencies
In the development of an intelligence basis for the support of psycnolog-
ical warfare activities. The results produced thus far do not meet
operational requirements, in part because of the difficulty of defining
those needs.
VIII. GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, unuding
evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing (a: regional
studies, (b) objective and area analyses in support of covert upeeations,
and (c) staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coorde.nated
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geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken in suppert of
the National Intelligence Suevey program.
2. Current geographic and mapping information on the Seviet Bice
and adjacent aeeas is inadequate. Geographic intelligence research aives
particular attention to the regional analysis of those geographic. P.,-ts
that are required in support of planning and operational intellicen((
for these areas. Emphasis has been placed on the exploitation and utiliza-
tion of available Russian technical literature in filling crtical f;aps.
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IX. BASIC INTELLIGENCE
1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), whieh Iras
begun in 1948 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was iateaded
to meet with U. S. Government's demands for encyclopedic faceual
gence. on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program Was began 1,72')
individual sections have been produced on 66 of the 108 NIS areas, gaich
is the equivalent of approximately 26 complete NIS. Of this nutter,
1,224 have been published. For the first time during the history of the
program, the rate of production by contributing agencies equivalent to
8 NIS, as established by the JCS, was attained in fiscal year 195q.
Based. on this performance, a similar production program has been estab-
lished for fiscal year 1954.
2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCSJ3ricr ties
and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the lattei Lave pre-
cluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and made t neees-
sary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. However, HIE
production on the group of 19 areas and 4 ocean areas of hiehest p-iority
is approximately 54% complete, whereas the entire program if about
complete. NIS on twelve individual areas are over 75% complete, arc five
of these are in the JCS high piorivy list. Geographic res-arch aaport
for NIS has been excellent.
3. In general the uality of the NIS is good, and can be exoc(ted to
improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are pab,ished
under the Maintenance Program which was started in fiscal year 1.95;!. How-
ever, the time lag between production and publication still remnant; a prob-
lem. Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC agencie3 engaged
in the NIS program is excellent and suitable liaison is maintaine3 with
the JCS.
X. WARNING OF ATTACK
1. Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentions to initiate
hostilities et any given time must be tentative generalizations trawn from
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inadequate evidence. They must usually be based on estimates of tha mrer-
all situation, adjusted to available current factual' informatien...
2. The IAC Watch Committee provides an interagency mechanism fr:,r
assuring that new, detailed information is quickly pooled and evaluetel.
Maximum use is thus made of partial and inadequate information. In sueeort-
ing the work of the committee, the intelligence agencies make carefai eross-
checks of information from all sources against an elaborate analysie of
possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This method ia not reliei
exclusively; other approaches are constantly being tried.
3. In general there has been improvement during the past two and ene
half years in the ability of intelligence to provide prompt notice and pre-
liminary evaluations of events and developments in the Soviet a3 well as
in the neutral and friendly areas.
4. Intelligence cannot assure adequate warning of attack -prior to
actual detection of hostile formations.j
Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrangements to
handle any information that is received.
Nor XI. COLLECTION
1. The Foreign Service
In general, the collection activities of the Foreign S,rvi': itve
been satisfactory. Intelligence needs have been met most ade(uatell la
the political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic fiet-, end
least satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and psychological i.ids.
These deficiencies have been generally attributable to a lack of spa-Iii-
ized personnel in those fields which are not closely related to the 5a31c
diplomatic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action hs baEn
taken by establishing a comprehensive economic reporting program ani e
continuing program of providing Foreign Service posts witi more comoi::
and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional remedial meas-
ures in progress concern;
a. the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational
programs in collecting basic intelligence information, pareicularLy
in the psychological and sociological fields, and,
b. the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in
national intelligence effort through the revision of the Forein
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Service Manual to include for the first time specific and detailed
intelligence instructions.
As a result of a recent study, measures to meet the needs for basic
scientific information are being carried out.
2. Service Attache System
The Service Attache System furnishes extensive useful militaey
information on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attaches in the Soviet
Bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of valuable infor-
mation, although under the restrictions imposed on them by Communist
governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be considered adeuate.
The Service Attache System has been strengthened since the beginnine ef the
Korean conflict through the opening of new offices and the assignment )f
additional officers to important posts. Constant efforts are being made
to improve the collection capabilities of Service Attaches by the devslop-
ment of new collection guides and techniques.
3. Overseas Commands
Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring extensive iafoe-
mation, While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is
partial and made uate it is good in the Eastern Zone of Germany end
Austria.
Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adeeuate on friendly
and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist China end
Eastern Siberia.
4.. Aerial Reconnaissance
Because of the overriding considerations of other than in I. -
gence nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited ful-_y t1 1-
overflight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaisedeee
capabilities have incieased, with a resulting improvement in contrLb...
tions in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are -n y
fair as compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Pr;o
interpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Serv!sn
corrective measures are underway. The use of photo intelligence in the
analysis of economic and scientific developments in respect of the Soleet
Orbit is being strengthened. Research and development effort es beel,r
expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles ("gu:ded
missiles" and satellites) to overcome a lack of special reconnaissane
vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of various delectene
devices.
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5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distrt.butiol for
security reasons.)
b. Propaganda Analysis
Requirements of estimating offices and psycholOgial 4!arfAre
activities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the -.Dropaalia
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analysis effort, leading away from the preparation of weekly reviewl of
the whole propaganda field and towards the production of more nutrter:Dul
specialized propaganda studies on substantive intelligence problems.
8. Foreign Materials and Equipment
Collection of Soviet bloc itets from overt sources has ine sed
appreciably during the past six months and has provided useful data Ic
economic and scientific intelligence and to the provram.
While military operations in Korea have not led to the capture of many
important military end-items since January, plans are under consideration
for more intensive exploitation and analysis of captured explosives, pro-
pellants and other material available in the Far Eastern theater.
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The Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommil ,! of
the JIC has absorbed the functions of the former Joint Materiel It '31.gence
Agency in the collection and exploitation of foreign material:-
XII. SUPPORT AND COLLATION FACILITIES
Availability of Materials
With few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive inteniFence
is distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In additior to thE
distribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to locate
and extract pertinent information from the large volume of intelligerce
material that was collected during and after the war, both in the United
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!:States and overseas. The sheer volume of these materials present difficult
problems of storage, analysis, and collation before they can be math readily
available for research analysts and current intelligence purpo3es. Th e Use
of microfilm and machine techniques is providing assistance in dea1in7-:with
these problems.
2. Reference Facilities
CIA provides a central reference facility for the IAC agenciee
through its collection of basic intelligence documents receive:[ fr-D17. aLl
sources. In addition, separate files of specialized intelligeace dnt3_ and
materials are maintained to supplement the basic collection of the 1A:
agencies. These include biographic data, industrial data, photographs and
motion picture films.
3. Library Facilities
Library services in the IAC agencies should become inreasinzLy
effective as a result of new measures for interlibrary cooperation in
publications procurement, indexing and. reference service.
4. Biographic Information
Each IAC agency maintains a file of biographic data oi fo-eltra
personalities in the categories for which they have been assigned basc
responsibility, and makes such data available to the other agencies
upon request. Excellent data can be made available on political, m1.1_-
tacy, economic, and scientific personalities. The depth of ccrrera
varies with the intelligence interest, and with availability of sou. 'Q
material. In those Iron Curtain areas where information is not eas,PT
obtained, the IAC agencies provide for more comprehensive cove:age -)f
the press, radio, and scientific and technical literature. There an
extensive programs for the exploitation of displaced persons,return-
ing PW's, and defectors, as well as other personnel having a knowle:Lze
of personalities in various areas. Every effort is made to include
in dossiers that biographic information which is needed by intelligenct
researchers, such as political orientation, ability,
probable course of action, past career, reltci,
marital status, associates, membership in cliques, location, etc.
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