NIS PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003400150009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 10, 1950
• Content Type: MF

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1. alelosed is the Annual I:tort of the TIZI,ren f
the fUoal Aver 1.950?
4. the comaeo or this pest year* thc a-if:trial require-
for NA.), prochsAlan of the equiveleat or 15 a year we
`cod to the equivalent of C year in 'Via/ of the insufficimt
cepabll.itlesof the /trued Per3015 Intellicenee Agenoism.vert this
reduced was not ettained durim? ;_4`lacal roar V_ ;5 ). 3,:orooverj,
the quality of the oantaoibutices ma deficient in Listr instances.
More exoe also many t7aps irk the basic intenicenceir ich will
require oodoLierAhlo etalection effort to fill.
3. Cj..14-Wo 1?nd or Fines]. Tear 1950, the Al oro
Intollizenco Acelcioa !Ave tiivertad moat of their calabilitiaa to
mooting the requirmsante of the curront eitueticn. ?trice of
?lava Int alligenoe ws Avec forma notice that, bocause of the
current al:watt:11 in the 744'ar Lasts work cin navy oetelltzwints to the
Procrsawill IA suspended aitil further notice. lho 11:14:
representatives fral Army and Air Form hest infortallv indietatad
sladlor decistime rrardin,-. work on Arm' anti Air. .7orrio (2:merit:amts.
Althouch the Office of Intellilenoe fiamarrh has YI44 indicated
that the. current eituetion will adversely affect work on ITspartment
of Ante cmraitmentes Ulf.) action of tl-le Ar red Forms Intelltomee
Afinclogs will seriously affect pro7rese tai: the !II:, Pro!,7cri.
4* The lir. ero7rem is a. lair ronr-e project us lertekenii
accent:ince with NIZIT1 1(3. 3 =A is riesillod to pro(42ne all hasie
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Intali:g0100 Waded \ br tisto Gtoraranauto ;filch a ilratVor, catba*
to prodaw adequate basic intolliccross roaltdres womitti Istchincri
i'or control and coordiosUcrls satasusive analytical roams:Cho twid
tat:noir/or' Ccalection and collation* Owe these activitifvo are
tot,ormkpLetd thoy aro eiffieult to set in notion again* 7:olaccs
1,7 the prtnrou is to cover the nricrity countrice. In a
mos*. lable Um* Prev-uetwion -aunt proccul in an. az.ticrizi- arci
tumour -lamer.
l'satic titallizoree is so vita to ;1=atirt,T 'hats if planters
cannot obtain such intellimmee tmei the lilt4 taw tL cfitain it
by nears or a Wei= roltne of ad hoe relatirtss reellt is a
ti of .the NZ Programs atZ?Ze-we are nos ca,sziencir4
which, if continued, sill wan tho ',worst= of basic intellizenee
to its hichly ansuatiefactory state a:14.tim at tbc teqlortina or
'3.d1Lar
Ers A1thouf2 comp:salami/11f; Pal.Iy the enal':"Stieit 3 viti by*
requirtrents or the carrent situatims it is h*z that the
iI Proaal will receive a bich irriority arsi a 11141. &col* or
interest frac all tho Almcies In order that It say rr,t clic co the
vttnik
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'Return to wk..
Ceatt,e1 'Accords
Miarti-10 A 19
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ER 1-1702A
ITANDARD FORM go. 64 '
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Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : The Director
FROM Acting Executive
SUBJECT. NIS Program
DATE: 2 August 1950
1. The attached memorandum from Chief, COAPS, appears
to be negative in approach to a problem which I believe at
this time requires more positive action.
2. The primary problem to be solved now appears to be:
Is or is not the NIS program considered essential by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and, if it is, what is considered by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to be the minimum effort essential to meet the
current situationjand thereafterx their estimates by priority
.what may be needed to meet future developments.
3. In view of the attitude and lack of action of the IAC
agencies in the NIS field, it is not believed that we can ex-
pect any real assistance from them either in determining what
the problem is or in meeting the problem once it has been deter-
minedwithout a strong positive direction from the Joint Chiefs
which may be used by CIA as a basis for insisting on results.
4. Recommend:
a. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff be immediately
requested to inform CIA
(1) whether or not the NIS program is
essential to defense needs,
(2) if it is essential, what portions
are needed immediately and -what priorities
should apply to further NIS production, and
(3) what action has been taken by the
Joint Chiefs to require necessary support
and production on the part of the individual
military intelligence agencies to meet the
established JCS requirements.
b. Upon receipt of the above-requested information
from the Joint Chiefs, CIA should
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(1) ascertain immediately both the willing-
ness and the capability of the intelligence agencies
concerned to meet the requirements prescribed by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
(2) present whatever recommendations may be
necessary to the National Security Council in
order to insure fi11 implementation of whatever
program has been de+.prminpri tO 11P PSqential.
Copy to:
Chief, COAPS
1 Att
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31 July 1950
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Acting Executive
SUBJECT: NIS Program and Annual Report
1. We agree with just about all of the substance in the AD/ORE's
memorandum on the above subject dated 21 July 1950, but think the
NIS Report is too detailed and too long. We cannot, however, agree
with all of AD/ORE's recommendations because they are too unrealistic
under present conditions. In time of war many other items take
precedence over basic intelligence.
a. The Joint Staff gave us a reduced list earlier this
year after cogitating on the matter for 4 to 6 months. If they-
decided to base it on capabilities rather than on supposedly real
National Security needs, that was their affair. They probably realized
they couldn't get funds and personnel for everything. We, however,
should report that the participating agencies are not living up to
even these lowered requirements and that is what this fiscal year
report does.
b. The Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies did determine their
capabilities a few months ago to do the 8 instead of 15 per year, but
apparently' Korea has now changed that. If they prefer current intelli-
gence to basic intelligence, we don't see haw we can make them stick
to basic production. Even -with the new NSCID, I doUbt if they would.
d. Here again if the Service Agencies say they are dropping
their share of the NIS work, we cannot make them agree to resume it.
2. When we tried to talk over the 1949 fiscal year NIS Report
in the IAC, it AMS never done because something else came up. We might
try it again with this 1950 Report and tell them strongly that they are
undermining the whole project; or try to make them declare themselves
on whether they will discontinue the whole NIS program or whether they
will really go along at its reduced pace. A paper agreement apparently
is of no use, so probably an oral one would be no more significant.
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3. We recommend that
(1) The 1950 NIS Report go to the participating IAC agencies
with a covering memorandum quoting from the AD/ORE memorandum of
21 July 1950 paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. A closing paragraph
could ask what they propose to do about the NIS at this time -- continue
it as established (8 per year) or kill it. An information copy
should go to the Executive Secretary of the NSC.
(2) Then we can consider an alternative to the present
system which might be to have the EIS prepared by. State, Commerce,
Library of Commerce, Universities, the Geographic Societies, etc. on
a contract basis omitting the Pentagon altogether.
4. The military are the chief users and if they won't produce
it nowadays, maybe it should be considered a peacetime backlog,rather
than a more urgent matter. So maybe the alternative suggestion should
be actively supported to make it a civilian research project. As the
1950 Report points out, it has never been a really satisfactory project,
as now established; so, with the military situation what it is, it may
now be the time to change it to a more or less private research project.
25X1
PRESCOTT CHILDS, Chief
Coordination, Operations
and Policy Staff
CO2 Assistant Director, ORE
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FOR: THE LffEECTOR OF CENTRAL DITELLIGEME
: The Assistant Director, ORE
SUBJECT : Status of the NIS Program
1. There are submitted herewith "Annual Report of the NIS Program
Fiscal Year 1950", and six copies thereof for the Executive Secretarb
NSG; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; and the
Chiefs of Intelligence of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and
Air Force.
2. During the course of this past year, the original requirements
for EIS production of the equivalent of 15 NIS a year were reduced to
the equivalent of 8 NIS a year in view of the insufficient capabilities
of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies. Even this reduced goal was
not attained during Fiscal Year 19500 MoTeover, the vality of the
contributions was seriously deficient in far too many instances. There
were also many gaps in the basic intelligence which will require
considerable collection effort to fill.
3. Since the end of Fiscal Year 19500 the Armed Forces Intelligence
Agencies have diverted most of their capabilities to meeting the
requirements of the current situation. The Office of Naval Intelligence
has given formal notice that, because of the current situation in the
Far East, work on Navy commitments to the NIS Program will be suspended
until further notice. The NIS representatives from Army and Air Force
have informally indicated similar decisions regarding work on Army and
Air Force commitments. Although the Office of Intelligence Research has
not indicated that the current situation will adversely affect work on
Department of State commitments, the action of the Armed Forces Intelli?
gence Agencies will seriously affect progress of the NIS Program.
4. This is not the first occasion when an emergency has interfered
with Armed Forces commitments to the EIS Program. When preparation was
being made to implement the Military Defense Aid Program, demands on the
Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies, while not causing a complete stoppage
of NIS production, were such as to effect drastic curtailment thereof.
Hence, judging from this and the current instances, it is valid to
conclude that, even if the Armed Forces Agencies event:I:01y resume NIS
production, this production will be curtailed or halted again as soon as
the next emergency arises.
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5. The NIS Program is a long range project undertaken in accordance
with NSCID NO. 3 and is designed to produce all basic intelligence needed
by the Government. Such a program, in order to produce adequate basic
intelligence, requires special machinery for control and coordination,
extensive analytical research, and intensified collection and collation.
Once these activities are interrupted they are difficult to set in motion
again. Bence, if the program is to cover the high priority countries in
a reasonable time, production must proceed in an orderly and continuous
nmnner.
h. Basic intelligence is so vital to planning that, if planners
cannot obtain such intelligence from the NIS, they will obtain it by
means of a swollen volume of fa hoc requests. The result is a disruption
of the NIS Program, such as we are now experiencing which, if continued,
will mean the reversion of basic intelligence to its highly unsatisfactory
state of World War II.
7. The Armed Forces Intelligence neies have never, even in
ordinary times, fully met their NIS c tments either quantitatively or
qualitatively. They have been repeatedly urged to realign their effort
so as to remedy this default. This urging has, however, had little
salutary effect. In these agencies, the NIS effort is so intermingled
with other efforts that extrication of the former has been impossible;
and, When the NIS effort has collided with some other effort, the latter
has frequently taken precedence.
8. Because the NIS Program is a joint undertaking, unilateral action
on the part of a major contributor leading to a diminution of his cepa,
bilities has immediate and serious effect upon other contributors, upon
commitments of CIA, and upon an integrated production schedule. It also
vitiates existing commitments under the NIS Program as approved by the
National Security Council. The Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies,
however, have repeatedly taken such unilateral action in spite of existing
agreements. The continuation of this state of affairs can only mean the
emasculation and eventual demise of the NIS Program.
9. Essentially, there are two conditions which must be satisfied
before the NIS Program is fully consonant with the provisions of NSCID
No, 3:
a. The determination of NIS production requirements whict
are necessary to meet the minimum fundamental interests of
national security.
While the Joint Staff have concurred in the
reduction of NIS production from 15 NIS to 8 NIS a
MET
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year, they have not indicated whether this reduction
is prejudicial to the national security. In conse-
quence, NIS requirements are being determined by
current agency capabilities rather than by fundamental
considerations of national security.
b. The augmentation of agency capabilities necessary to
satisfy on a continuing, long-range basis the requirements
of (a) above.
The augmentation of agency capabilities has
been the subject of such correspondence and discussion
between CIA and the IAL) Agencies. The Intelligence
Agency of the Department of State has sat un a
special staff solely for NIS Wcyrl
10. The NIS Program provides a comprehensive end logical means for
developing the basic intelligence required by the Government. If this
program is to be effectively implemented, however, the Intelligence
Agencies must consistently support it to the extent required by the
national security. This support cannot be intermittently diverted to
other activities without serious dislocation, unbalance, and marked
impairment of NIS production. Current demands for such NIS and JANIS
as are available on the Far East, especially Korea, are inOicative of
the vital nature of basic intelligence to the national security. Only
seven years ago, the JANIS Program was initiated in the midst of a
shooting war to produce basic intelligence which should have been
available before hostilities had commenced. The NIS Program was set up
to correct that situation. Yet, the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies
appear to have lost sight of this fundamental consideration. It is
therefore recommended that:
a. reconsideration be given to obtaining statement from the
Joint Staff as to their minimum requirements for basic intelli-
gence contained in the NIS without prejudice to the national
security (Enclosure A);
b. determination be made by the And Forces Intelligence
Agencies of the capabilities which they and the Technical
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Services' contributors need to meet the minfmlim requirements
of the Joint Staff;
0. appropriate action be initiated to obtain the
requisite funds for the continuing support of these capap.
bilities;
d. pending action on the foregoing, that agreements be
reached with the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies to
re-assign such capabilities to NIS work as will maintain
NIS production in accordance with existing schedules.
Enclosure (A)
Attached:
7 copies of "Annual Report
of the BIS Program Fiscal
Year 1950"
I THEMORrEIMITT
SEMET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
MEMORANDUM TO: DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGEME,
THE JOINT STAFF
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Survey Program.
REFERENCES: (a) Memorandum of Director of Central Intelligence
. to Rear Admiral John P. Womble, Jr., Deputy
Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff,
1 December 1949, Subject: National Intelligence
Survey Program.
(b) Memorandum of Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The joint Staff, to Director of Central
Intelligence, 20 March 1950, Subject: Priority
List and Production Rate for National Intelligence
Surveys.
1. The intent of reference (a) was to obtain a statement
of mirrivmm requirements of the Joint Staff for basic intelligence
contained in the National Intelligence Surveys without prejudice
to the national security. However, reference (b) states that the
Joint Staff requirements must conform to the reduced agency
capabilities, but leaves unsaid whether or not such new
requirements will be prejudicial to the national security.
24 The National Security Council authorized and directed the
establishment of the NIS Program to provide the basic intelligence
requirements of this Government. In my responsibility as
coordinator for the NIS Program, I au concerned with the extent
of those requirements in order to determine and to ensure the
adequacy of related production capabilities.
3. In view of these considerations, I Should appreciate an
early indication by the Joint Staff Whether or not a rate of
production of the approximate equivalent of eight (3) NIS per
year does in fact represent the minimum Joint Staff requirement
without prejudice to the national security and, if not, What the
minimum requirement should be.
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Enclosure (A)
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ANNUAL REPORT OF TBE IS PROGRAM
lineal Year 1950
9s4ecutive Regish7
1. This report covers the second year of operations of the NIS
Program. It consists of the leLt7 REPORT", covering the Signifies/et
developments during the year, and three Anneress "I PRODUCTION
REPORT", "Il EDITORIAL REPORT", and "III ? PUBLICATION REPORT",
Reference should be made to the "Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1949?
for the background and significant aspects of the NIS Program which_
will not be dealt with so extensively in the present report.
2. Considerably more progress was attained in the production
of NIS during FY 1950 than that realized during FY 1949. There uore
398 BIS sections sent to CIA by contributors during this fiscal year
which represent the equivalent of &I RIS. These sections mere on 40
individual BIS Areas, with the largest block, 34 sections, relating
to the USSR. During this fiscal year there were 287 sections reviewed
and cleared for publication by CIA, and 216 sections printed and
disseminated. In addition to the contributions tranemitted to CIA,
the Intelligence Agencies now have 445 EIS sections in various stages
of preparation ubiah represent the equivalent of about NIS. The
percentage of NIS contributions, by agencies, received by =during
the year, was as fellows: State 27%, Amy 43%, Navy 10%, Air Force
9%, C/A 11%. While this year's production effort is commendable, and
roughly doubled that attained lest year, it still falls short of
cement production requirements by approximately the equivalent of
licvaplete
3. The main defect in NIS contributions received during this
year was not a quantitative deficiency, however, but a qualitative
deficiency. This resulted in much wasted effort on the part of all
.processing and reviewing components; and continues to be the largest
single factor in holding back produotion. Less than 351 of all
oonteibutione reviewed by the BIS Division (CIA) during?! 1950 were
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adequate:, ulth reasonable editing, to meet the present mini= NIS
requirements. More than 40% of all contributions =Tired extensive
review and coordination with contributors. The remainder, about 2$%
of all contributions, required major reeworking by the contributors
before they could meet :minimum requirements. This distribution
pattern is generally applicable to contributions from each of the
tour intelligence Agencies - State, Army, Navy, and Airlbree. The
nature of the defects, however, varied someahat with the sabjeot
matter and with the individual agencies.
4. The principal reasons for the qualitative deficiencies in
the NIS contributions are attributable to the following: a) unrealistic
production schedules which over-extended agency capabilities to the
point where quality was sacrificed to quantity; b) inadequate review
and coordination at the working and control levels in the Intelligenee
Agencies; c) inexperience and incompetence of many working level
analysts. The first of these factors, a) above, has been dealt with
by reducing the production effort from the equivalent of 15 complete
NIS per year to the approximate equivalent of 8 NIS per year. In
respect to the second factor, above, the NIS Coordinator has
emphasized throughout the past year the need for more adequate review
and coordination of NIS contributions by the Intelligence Agencies,
and steps have already been taken by each agency to improve the
situation. It is still too early to determine the adequacy of this
corrective action. The third factor, c) above, is not amenable to
inmediate improvement. In some cases contributors ara saddled with
personnel who are not competent analysts, but the inertia of civil
service procedure makes it difficult to transfer or discharge such
individuals. The Intelligence Agencies are fully aware of this matter
and no doubt will find ways and means to improve personnel qualifica-
tions gradually over the years. The quality of NIS contributions,
however, will suffer so long as there are incompetent analysts
producing them.
5. The overeall delays between completion of first drafts of
NIS contributions and their final publication are still excessive.
In addition to the Aforementioned deficiencies in quality of contri-
butions, which require a disproportionate amount of time in review,
coordination, and reeworking, the principal factors contributing to
delays in EIS production are: a) delays in coordination and review
of subcontributions by the section and chapter coordinators within
the Intelligence Agencies; b) submission to CIA of incomplete
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contributions (i.e., text without accompanying maps and graphics) by
the Intelligence Agencies; c) bottlenecks in the printing process
within the GPO special unit, particularly with regard to collation
and binding; and d) small but cumulative delays within the NIS Division
itself, which are gradually being reduced as the T/0 is brought up
to strength and a more balanced production flow is attained. In
respect to a) above, the problem is mainly one of balancing production
by the various subcontributors to ensure a reasonable fulfillment of
working level schedules, and the assigning of adequate full time
personnel to the reviewing and coordinating functions within each
Intelligence Agency. The situation respecting b) above, is gm:11101y
improving and Should not be too serious in the future. The bottleneeks
in the GPO special unit, c) above, are due mainly to lack of space
for efficient prOduction layout and probably cannot be corrected until
more space can be made available. The delays in printing, however,
are serious and require corrective action before the over-all period
between the preparation of contributions and their final printing can
be acceptably Shortened.
-6. The production aChedule Ter_FTeliminary NIS Gazetteers was
fully met for Fr 1950. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN)
processed 150,950 geographic names, which comprised 22 Preliminary
Gazetteers. In addition, BGN edited the geographic names on 20 NIS
base maps and 358 NIS sections. The standardization of geographic
names has been of inestimable value to the Intelligence Agencies in
the production of NIS. The Preliminary Gazetteers have been, used
solely by the producers of the NIS up to the present; but it is
intended to extend their use, as security permits, to other departments
of the government, using reserve stock for this purpose. Eventually,
it is intended to release all geographic names produced under the NIS
Program so that the BGN may take them available to the public under
direct appropriations from the Congress for that purpose. For security
reasons this release must wait until such a sufficient time interval
has elapsed that these geographic names will no longer be associated
with the NIS production schedule.
7. The NIS base map schedule has genernPy been net for this
year. The Map Division (CIA) has produced 28 NIS base maps, 22 NIS
page-size maps, and 40 NIS section cover maps. In addition, the Map
Division completed 112 final NIS base maps and 240 color proofs of
NIS maps. Moreover, the Map Division contributed to and served as
chapter coordinator of NIS Chapter IX, ',Map and Chart Appraisal".
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Eight Chapters /X (45 sections) were completed during the year.
While this represents only 70% of the production requirements
originallY set for FY 1950, it fully meets the revised production
requirements. It is noteworthy that none of the Chapter IX contri-
butions of the Map Division required major re-working or revision.
Like the Preliminary NIS Gazetteers, the NIS base maps have served
their purpose admirably, not only in terms of efficient centralization
of mapping services whereby all NIS contributors are supplied with
necessary base maps, but also in the general cartographic excellence
of the finished maps which are produced by Map Division.
8. The NIS Committee held 40 meetings during FY 1950. The
efficacy and fundamental soundness of the NIS Committee type of
organization for directing the NIS Program was well proved during
the past year's operations. The "two.hat" system used in the BIS
Committee, whereby the representatives of the Intelligence Agencies
also directed the implementation of the NIS Program within their
respective egencies, is growing increasingly effective in strengthening
the control and coordination of the program. There was continued in
committee actions the principle of unanimity, which has characterized
dons ran cement inter-agency atiOni and to make the NIS Program
its prozel;:::::7-the_inoftPtIt
:te_g7IS Program, and which has
?erre sot. Itireieellence of representation from the
Intelligence Agencies, and the gratifying spirit of understanding
and cooperation which prevailed within the Committee, greatly assisted
the Chairman in the carrying out of his responsibilities. There are
also increasing indications that the members of the NIS Committee are
being accorded more support by their agencies in implementing the NIS
Program within their agencies. This does not necessarily mean that
such support is sufficient. The greatest weakness still lies in the
coordinating and reviewing functions of Chapter and section coordinators
within the Agencies. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the
failure of these levels results in material being received in CIA
which never should have been cleared by the agencies responsible for
its initial review and coordination.
9. During the year, the NIS Committee took a number of steps
leading to over-all improvement in policies requirements and procedures
relating to the NIS Program: "
a. Revision of "Standard Instructions" - During the fall
of 1949 the NIS Committee appointed inte.agency subcommittees
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to review and revise all NIS chapter and supplement
outline guides based on the experience gained since
the original ones were formulated. All outline guides
have been so revised, with the exception of that for
Chapter VII (Scientific). The latter has been delayed
because of the organization of a Scientific Intelligence
Committee of which the Assistant Director, Office Of
Scientific Intelligence (CIA), is chairman, and the
concomitant requirement that he serve as the chairman
of NIS Chapter VII Committee.
b. Chapter VII Production - Rather than producing
necrosis the board" Surveys on Chapter VII (Scientific),
the NIS Committee decided to restrict production to
those countries Which have actual and significant
scientific potential. Moreover, the Committee took the
view that the production of Chapters VII should not be
geared to the same rate as other NIS chapters, but
should reflect the peculiar difficulties of this field
of intelligence and the limited capabilities of the
contributors. With the active participation of OSI/CIA
in the coordinating and oontributike apoota of Chapter
VII production beginning with Fr 1951, it is fat that
the contributions to Chapter VII viii be strengthened
and improved.
c. Revision of NIS Priorities and Production when
it became apparent that the NIS production requirements
of 15 IS per year were beyond the capabilities Of the
Intelligence Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff mere
requested to review their requirements and priorities.
The reply from the JCS, dated 20 March 1950, advised the
Director of Central Intelligence that the JCS concurred in
reduced production femn the equivalent of 15 NIS to the
equivalent of 8 NIS a year. SdbmittedAdeb ehe jCs;epply
was a revised list of priorities to guide NIS production.
In consequence, the EIS Production Schedule for the last
quarter of FY 1950 vas revised to meet these nev requirements.
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d. Petroleum Intelligence e. At the beginning of
FY 1950 the NIS Committee recommended to the Director
of Central Intelligence that the allocation of production
responsibility for petroleum intelligence (Section 62C)
be changed from the Bureau of Mines, Department of the 11
Interior, to the Mations Board Petroleum Committee,
which haderecentlyen constituted by_geseeeecre_Itseeeeef
Defense to provide petroleum intelligence for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and other Armed Forces Agencies. The NIS
eleeee yeti
Committee also recommended the addition of AIS
ment V (Petroleum) to fulfill additional requirements of
the Government for petroleum intelligence. These
recommendations were approved by the IAC and the production
responsibility was accepted by the Executive Secretary,
Munitions Board Petroleum Committee, to take effect
beginning with Fr 1951.iotl7e?4,1..
e. Special NIS e? Problems arising out of new reqpiroe
ments by Navy respecting intelligence on. Maxim Climate
and Oceanography led to a decision by the NIS Committee
to produce this interligence in five special NIS covering
the ocean areas of the world. The allocation of production
responsibility was assigned to Navy with assistance by the
Air Fore* on marine climate sectiens.
10. The NIS Coordinator has been greatly aided in keeping his
"finger on the pulse" of the complex production situation inherent
in the NIS Program through a system of production reporting which
has been developed during the year. It extends from the initial
phased of contributions all the way through the processing, review
and publication phases. Departing from the previous methods of agency tee-1e
reporting by percentages of completion, which relied upon personal
estimates and other variables, there was devised a system of "phase x? cee
reporting" by agencies. There are five production phew involved, 'el,
the first three of which indicate 0, 2,6, and-completion Of first
drafts of contributions at the working level. The 4th and 5th pheses
indicate completion of review and coordination steps in the parent
agency. After contributions are received in CIA, there is a second
set of phase reports to indicate the progress through final printing. 4
In addition, contributions are assigned categories according to their ",,e, ee
qualitative adequacy as determined by the editorial review within CIA.ce- -(e
From these reports the NIS Coordinator as well as the agency
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representatives can determine the NIS production situation for each
areney as uell as for the over-all situation.
11. The maimterance aspects of the NIS Program will becone of
increasing concern as the publication of initial Surveys attains
significant proportions. Directly related to the maintenance program
is the collection effort needed to fill the gaps and to refine the
? basic intelligence contained in the original Surveys. These latter
provide a precise guide to field collection by indicating in the
adbsections, "Comments an Principal Sources", the extent and nature
of the source material and of the categories of intelligence needing
collection effort. Each Intelligence Agency is responsible for
initiating collection of basic intelligence in those categories for
which it has primary production allocation under the NIS Program.
The contributing agencies have taken steps to implement this
responsibility. As this new information flow in from the field,
the Intelligence Agencies will have to aesign a commensurate amount
of their capabilities to maintaining it in their files and, when
warranted, in revising sections of the NIS already published. The
NIS Coordinator attaches primary importance to the collection and
maintenance programa in view of the many gaps in basic intelligence
which have been revealed in NIS contributions reviewed to date. It
.is this phase of the NIS Program, only now emerging, which can
produce basic intelligence necessary to fulfill national security
requirenents.
12. In a broad view of this year's efforts, definite progress
in the NIS Program is apparent. Also apparent are major deficiencies
which by now Should have been overcome. Moreover, these deficiencies
are of a fundamental nature, extending as they do down to the
intelligence analysts Uho prepare the NIS contributions. 'Finally, it
does not appear that the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies are
adequately supporting the NIS Program even at the present reduced
level of production. All too frequently departmental and ether
requirements take precedence over NIS work With the result that :
production schedules are unbalanced and a disproportionate amount of
tine and effort is required before the situation can be rectified.
This difficulty exists because the same personnel used 'for NIS work
are also used for departmental activities. While it is realized that
economy measure? and long-established practices have necessitated
this arrangement, the fact remains that the NIS Program must proceed
in at orderly and continuous manner if the vital basic intelligence
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requirements of this Government are to be met in a reasonable time.
The assignment of a full time staff in OTR/State solely to NIS work
is an effective solution to this problem, and has been made possible
through financial support by CIA.
13. The following observations are based on the progress of the
VIS Program attained at the end of FY 1950. They are intended to be
reasonable and to indicate feesible objectives based on justifiable -
support of the Intelligence Agencies and of the CIA. It is the
opinion of the EIS Coordinators that insufficient support is being
accorded to basic intelligence collection, maintenance and production;
that the Intelligence Agencies are still devoting too Much time and
effort to other intelligence activities considering the serious gaps
and inadequacies existing in basic intelligence; and that the present
rate of production of NIS is geared too low to satisfy national
security requirements. So fer the -equivalent of some 10 EIS have been
produced, although not all have yet been published. At the rate of
8 ras per year, which represents the present capabilities of the
Intelligence Agencies, it will take about 7 more years to complete
&
anpublish initial Surveys on the JCS high priority areas. In
addition, there must be aesigned capabi7ities sufficient to ensure
adequate collection and maintenance to revise the original Surveys.
The Ad Hoc Committee which developed the fundamental aspects of the
NIS Program recommended thLt NIS on all areas of high priority should
be completed and placed on a maintenance basis by 30 June 1952. This
date was concurred in by the Joint Staff and the NSC. The present
rate of production will attain this objective some 5 years later, or
1957. Perhaps that is the best me can do under the circumstances but,
in view of the present world situation, this matter deserves maims
consideration at the eoliey level.
14. In closing the report of the MS Program for FY 1950, it is
appropriate to quote a significant paraeraph of last year's report
which is still relevant and bears repeating:
"In emphasizing the defects and difficulties of the present
situation, the progress already attained Should not be over
looked. A concept, a'plan, and an organization have been
developed which are fundamentally sound and practicable, and
which provide a means for the eventual acquisition, production
and maintenance of adequate basic intelligence to meet the
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requirements of this government. Valuable training,
experience, and understanding have been gained over the
past year. A series of excellent base maps and gazetteers
are being produced which will eventually result in world.
wide coverage in these two fields. Many of the defects
noted herein have been due to unfamiliarity with this type
of production. Increased efficiency of !Producing components
will inevitably result from more experience and under.
standing of requirements. Moreover, the improvements made
in the field of basic intelligence will be felt throughout
the whole intelligence framework. These factors give
balance and perspective to other considerations and should
result in a more complete understanding of the NIS Program
and to the part it can play in the general intelligence
plan.*
15. In view of the foregoing, we conclude thats
a. The NIS Program provides a comprehensive and logical
means for developing the basic intelligence required by
this government.
b. The over-all organization which has been set up to
implement this program is adequate. There is pressing need
Within the Intelligence Agencies of the Armed Forces, however,
to provide full time staffs capable of fulfilling NIS
commitments in an orderly and continuous manner.
a. The functioning of this organization is still
imperfect, melnly in coordination and review functions within
the Agencies, but definite improvement has been noted during
the past year.
d. -The NIS production during FY 1950 has been deficient
in quantity and seriously deficient in quality.
e. The disparity between production requirements and
agency capabilities has been adjusted by reducing production
requirements from 15 BIS to 8 NIS per year.
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to The serious deficiencies in quality of NIS contri-
butions are due mainly to inexperience and incompetence of
working level analysts, and to ineffectual coordination and
review by chapter and section coordinators.
go The allocation of production responsibilities is
generally sound. Some changes in allocation have been mode
during the year, and others may be necessary as the program
develops.
h. The Outline Guide has been found inadequate and has
been completely revised during the current year, except for
Chapter VI/ which is to be revised shortly. Principal
additions to the Outline Guide include Supplement V (Petroleum)
and 5 Special NIS on 'Marine Climate and Oceanography".
i. Increasing effort will be needed in field collection
to fill the many gaps existing in basic intelligence so fax
produced. In turn, this will necessitate augmentation of
agency capabilities for the proper maintenance of published
NIS.
? 4, Lack of space for the special GPOlunit is causing
delays in printing Which will become increasingly serious
as full production of NIS is attained.
?:k. IThe base map and gazetteer programs have been fully
satiefactory during the year.
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ANNEX I4. PROMTION WORT
1. This report considers the BIS Production Program for 11'1950
in four stages:
a. Material in process in the Intelligence Agencies.
b. Production requirements and samission of Agency
approved draft material.
c. CIA processing of Agency approved draft material.
d. Publication of NIS material.
2. NIS Material in Process in the Intelligence Agencies
a. The BIS material in process in the Intelligence
Agencies is in varying stages of preparation, coordination,
and review. Month3I reports sdbmitted by the producing
agencies show the state of preparation of all NIS material
in process. The attached graph (A), based upon the progress
reports, shows the total number of Elections in process at
the end of each month, and the number of sections in each of
the following five processing phases:
Phase 1 ? Drafts approximately 1/3 complete.
Phase 2 Drafts approximately 2/13 complete.
Phase 3 Drafts complete and being reviewed by
producing component.
Phase 4 In process of review and coordination
by Chapter Coordinator.
Phase 5? Contributions being prepared for
submission to CIA.
The average number of sections in process for all agencies in
FY 1950 was approximately 4/1 sections, which is the approxi?
mate number of sections required for the production of the
equivalent of 8 NIS, or one yearos production requirement.
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b. An annlysis of the progress reports, however,
disclosed that no progress was made on 12LAy of the
sections after they had been reported in a 1/3, or
better, stage of completion. Following is a tabu-
lation Showing, by Agency, the number of elections
reported in the same prooesving phase for six or more
months:
6
Months
7
Months
8
Months
9
Months
10
Months
11
:-Ionths
Totals
State
13
24
38
14
39
22
349
Army
6
9
12
7
7
6
47
rim
1
o
o
o
o
o
1
4ir Fbree
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
CIA - Map Branch
o
0
o
o
o
o
0.
CIA - OSO
2
4
7
o
1
o
14
23
37
57
21
47
27
212
C . The apparent complete stoppage of work on the
considerable number of sections noted above can be
attributed generally to the following:
(1) The opening of many new sections in the
first half of FY 1950 under the approved schedule
for this period, and the subsequent discontinuance
of work on many sections when it was tentatively
screed (VIS Committee Meeting no. 48) that the
FY 1950 schedule would have to be revised downward
from 15 to 8 EIS per year, unless the capabilities
of the Intelligence t?gencies could be considerably
augmented.
(2) The diverstm of production efrort from
regularly scheduled material to partial and in
some cases complete revisions of submissions which
had barn found deficient in D/NIS. dith specific
regard to State, mLny of the sections reported in
the same phase for long 7eriods were held up in
the s-Iptantive review end final !rocessing of
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finished first drafts (Phase 3). Improvement
of this situation was noted in recent month.
3. Production Reqeirements and Submiseions of Agency Approved
Draft Material
a, The production schedule for Fr 1950 was formulated
by the IS Committee in May 1949 and the approved tentative
schedule was issued on 7 June 1949, approximately one month
before the start of IT 1950. This ached-ale was determined
by Joint Staff requirenents in accordance with agency
capabilities believed to exist at that time. It provided
for the production of the approximate equivalent of 15 NIS
in FY 1950, which was consonant with the original long
range production plan providing for the production of all
NIS in areas of high priority by June 1952. However, it
soon became evident that some of the agencies had over-
estimated their capabilities and, further, that the
capabilities of the Armed Forms Intelligence Agencies
would be reduced to an even greater extent by economy cuts.
b. A survey of agency capabilities resulted in a
decision by the NIS Committee (Meeting No. 48* 15 Nov 49)
which tentatively provided for future NIS schedules to
accomplish approximately the equivalent of 8 NIS per year,
and it was agreed that the Fr 1950 schedule would be
revieed to conform with the new production objective.
Revision of the 1950 schedule could not be done, however,
until the Joint Staff hod indicated whether or not there
were any changes. in requirements or in the JCS Priority
List. joint Staff views were requested in a remorandum
dated 1 Deeember 1949. In a reply dated Z) March 1950,
the Director of Central Intelligence was advised that the
Joint Staff concurred in the curtailment of the NIS Program
from a production of 15 to 8. NIS per year. Submitted with
the joint Staff reply was a revised list of priorities to
guide NIS production. On 18 April 1950 a revised production
schedule was issued covering requirements for the last
quarter of FY 1950.
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c. While MIS Committee action on 15 November 1949
indioated informal approval of production on an 8 NIS
per year besis for FY 1950, the original 1950 schedule
proviiiine for 15 NIS per year remained as the official
production schedule until 18 April 1950. As a comae
queries the Intelligence Agencies were charged with a
total of 344 defections as of 1 April 1950. In order
to dhow accomplishments against scheduled requirements,
however, only the official schedules in force during
the year have been considered in the folloving tabulation
%Allah Shows the relative performance of the Intellirenee
Agencies,
Total
Sections
Due CIA
Total
Sections
Delivered
to CIA
Total
Defections
FY 1950
(Sections)
Average
Monthly.
Requirenents
(Sections)
Average
Monthly
Production
(Sections)
Accomplishments
(% of Require..
yenta Actosily
Produced)
State
293
107
186
245/12
83/4
)6.5%
Army
329
170
159
275/32
34 1/6
51.6%
Navy
60
40
20
5
3 2/3
66.6%
Air Force
46
38
3 5/6
31/6
82.6%
CIA e Map Br.
54
12
43/2
31/2
77.7%
CIA.. OSO
33
1
12
1 1/12
0 1/12
7.7%
CIA e OS/
X/12
0
0%
398
398
661/3
331/6
d. Since no schedule based on a production of 8 NIS
per year was issued for the entire FY 1950, no records
are available for a comparative performance tabulation
on that basis. However, the attached graph (B) dhows
the number of sections submitted each month by each
agency; the average monthly requirements for all
.agencies for production of the approximate equivalent of
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8 NIS per year; and the actual average production per
month of all agencies, It will be noted that against
an average monthly requirement of 40 sections per nonth?
the agencies acten117 produced an average of 33 sections.
per month, which is the approximate equivalent of 6 lA
NIS per year. Therefore, quantitative production by the
Agencies during /1 1950 fell approximately 1 1/2 NIS
short of the revised objective.
4. CIA Processing of Agency Approved Draft Material
a, The average time of processing NIS material frmn
date of receipt in CIA to date of publication was 7 months
and 13 days for the 216 sections that were published in
FY 1950.
be Delays in processing NIS material in CIA can be
attributed in the first instance to qualitative inadequacies
of the agency approved material, text and graphic's, sub-
mitted to CIA.
o. A second major time lag has occurred in the GPO..
State Services Office. Usually, two to three months have
elapsed between the date page proofs were approvelifor
final printing and the date of actual publication.
d. Delay in DAUS processing also resulted from
failure of agencies to submit all required copies of text
or graphics. The irregularity occurring most frequent/7
was the submission of an NIS section with the notice that
the originals of certain figures had been sent to Map
Division or Army Map Service and that color proofs would
be delivered directly to D/NIS from one or the other of
these agencies in a specified number of days, and it was
seldom that the missing material was received in D/NIS
in the time specified. All agencies had been notified
that only complete NIS units would be accepted in DAIS.
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5. Publications of NIS Material Approved for Printing by DAIS
a. The attached graph (C) shows the month by month
publication of NIS, and the monthly backlog of material
in the GPO-State Services Office which had been approved
for final printing.
b. The average monthly publication of NIS dvring
FY 1950 was anproxinately 18 sections. The average
monthly backlog of NIS material anproved for final
printing, which was in Services Office, was
52 sections. At the average production rate maintained
in FY 1950 (18 sections) it would take about 3 months
to elirlimite the backlog. If the sections are printed
Lu the order in which final approve/ for printing is
given to GPO it is obvious that there will be a continuation
of the 2 to 3 months time lag before publication.
o. Annexes. II and III, which follow, &mil with the Wm
processing in further detail.
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ANNEX EDITORIAL REPORT
1. During PT 1950 the Editorial Branch, EIS Division, received
from contributors 398 NIS sections, and cleared to Publication Branch
311 sections. This compared with approximately 130 sections received
and 70 sections cleared to Publication Branch in the seven months
between receipt of initial NIS contributions and the end of FT 1949.
2. The 311 sections actually processed by the Editorial Branch
during FY 1950 were on 36 individual NIS Areass 40 sections on the
USSR were the largest block; next in order were 27 sections on Sweden,
19 on Lenmark, and 17 each on Libya and Turkey, The largest total
by topic was 17 ;action 37's (Civil Air); next in order were 13
section 38's (Telecommunications) and 11 section 251s (Towns); there
were 9 each section 8314 (Air Forces) and section 36's (Merchant
Marine). Individual sections ranged in size from less than 10
manuscript pages for several to over 1500 maeuscript pages for the
siltation on Coasts and Landing Beaches for one of the four USSR regions.
Of the 311 sections sent to Publication Branch, Army contributed 30,
State 27%, Air Force 13%, CIA Map Division 11%, Navy 11%.
3. Incoming and outgoing flow of material during FT 1950*
monthly, is shim by graph (D). Sections cleared to the Publication
Branch included some material received during the preceding fiscal
year, and did not include roughly 50 sections received during FY 1950
but at the end of the year not returned from contributor revision, in
various stages of editorial processing* or awaiting processing.
Including 29 sections awaiting contributor re-working (after editorial
work at least equivalent to average completed processing), the
Editorial Branch completed an average of approximately 28 sections
per month. This was an average of slightly more than one section per
working der, and approximately 3 sections per month per editor on
duty. Editorial completions in March were abnormally high becanee .
of moving a number of sections previously largely edited but held for
various reasons. Completions for the last six months of FT 1950 gave
a practical indication of editorial capability under present conditions
of around 33 sections per month. The comparison of the 1950 incoming
and outgoing flow with a 40-per-month line (graph D) indicates the
considerable improvement which will be required to meet the projected
YY 1951 schedule of apprpximately 40 sections per month.
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4. The basic Yr 1950 pattera of NIS contributions is indicated
by the following recapitulation of sections processed by the
Editorial Branch:
Sactionv % of
attE9M-14)1a*del re!reeftla4 Tda.
I Requiring only reasonable 105 31%
editing and liaieln with
contributors
II Requiring extended Editorial 149 44%
checking plus exteneive
coordination with contributors
and major cumulative delay
(Including 10 sections awaiting
contributor re...working following
initial editing)
III Returned to contributors as 86 25%
requiring major re.working, or
requiring an equivalent extent
of joint correction and
re-working (Including 19 sections
awaiting contributor reworking
following initial editing)
???.......amaaraasamaar IOW
340
100%
5. The distribution of the same categories, in terms of the four
agencies of primary responsibility and CIA Map Division, was:
Sections Category
NP...M Processed I____-LE____ILL
Army 135
State 92
CIA 36
Air Yore. 38
Navy
??????MOILEPICCD
340
40
55
40
25
39
28
24
12
0
8
Zi.
9
8
22
9
105
149
84
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6. Of the 311 sections cleared to the Publication Branch, less
than 35% were adequate, with reasonable editing, to meet firstophese
minim= NIS requirements. The relative term "reasonablen does not
imply that sections in Category I generally met longer..term NIS
qualitative standards in presentation and particularly sdbstance.
The results of Categories II and III processing were singleely
relative in view of the practical limitations on the improvement
possible without seriously delaying NIS production.
7. The above qualitative evaluation and processing aspects were
generally comparable to FY 1949 experience, although qualitative
evaluation was somewhat more lenient on the initial contributions
processed during FY 1949. There was improvement in some types of
material during FY 1950, not only in reduced errors but in sdbstance
and presentation. This was counter-balanced, however, by at best
nominal improvement in other types of material, particularly for
Chapter III (Transportation and Telecommunications), and by qualitative
deficiencies in types of material received in quantity for the first
time in FY 1950, notably for Chapters IV (Sociological), V (Political),
and VI (Economic). Qualitative category distribution of sections
approved for publication, indicates some improvement in category
relationships over the course of FY 1950.
.$.;? As in 1949, deficiencies in material were only nominally.
Ohargeable to contributor unferimarity with NIS format and general
content concepts. No sections wore returned to contributors on the
beide of Writing style or failure to conform in detail to the NIS
outline. NO sections were classified in Categories II or III'onfthe
basis of mutual rearrangement of material, or When contributors took
the initiative for revision.
9. Continuing experience from receipt of the initial NIS
contributions, the 1950 deficiency which was principal, pervasive,
and unacceptably time-conedming for both the Editorial Branch and
contributors, was elementary and essentially careless errors in
text, tabular data, and graphic material. Many of these were
significant. Others were of a type which, while not necessarily
of individual significant magnitude, were cumulatively capable of
jeopardizing general credibility of NIS material. Editorial
detection of such deficiencies in line-by-line examinationpuhich
proved to be the only adequate procedure for the bulk of contributions?
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and the Editorial Branch and contributor time consumed in
correction -- with such time rising in geometrical proportion to
cumulative time-lag after material left the original authors not
only seriously delayed over-all movement of NIS material to Publi-
cation Branch but precluded more fundamental Improvement in the
substance and adequacy of the NIS.
10. Another continued deficiency was excessive contributor
reliance on relatively old material, much of which had previously
been published. Frequently no reference was made to more recently
available issues of official yearbooks or similar material used as
principal sources. There was an evident related tendency to accord
priority to material because it was "intelligence", even if fragmentary
and uncoordinated, without making reasonable and constructive use of
commercial sources such as well-established trade journals. Appropriate
use of the latter often would have given a more professional level
of treatment to NIS contributions than ones Which have boon prepared
hymen-technical authors. There was limited evidence of information
from World War II experience, Service reports, photography, and
historical material. With a few and encouraging exceptions, this
was particularly noticeable with respect to photography. There was
a pervasive contributor tendency to pee existing tabular and graphic
notarial without appropriate adaptation for the NIS. There was a
general predilection tO 100 large and elaborate maps which detracted
from graphic value. Chapters IV (Sociological) and V (Political)
material presented editorial difficulties in obtaining leas emotional
phraseology and more objectivity and perspective in presentation.
In certain Chapter III (Transportation and Teleconaunicationsi)
sections, Editorial Branch has had to guard consistently against a
tendency toward too brief and generalised treatment even when
considerable data were available to the contributor.
11. While the Editorial Branch is not sufficiently informed to
determine the factors responsible for deficiencies in contributions,
such factors have been indicated in processing of the material and
working-level conferences with author and coordinating personnel.
weeelegalevel personnel have almost unanimously cited as a prime
factor unrealistic assigned production schedules and insistence on
their being met. On the basis of the effective manpoaer and the
inherent difficulty in preparing basic intelligence material, the
initial production schedules were highly unrealistic and in any
0.20.
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event must have largely precluded even nominal additional research
to incorporate more recent and more comprehensive theta. Even so,
Editorial Branch saw many instances where, in terms of total time
involved in a contribution, a negligible additional amouat of time
would have considerably iaproved photographic material. There were
other instances where preliminary reference to trade-journals or
comparable types of available well-organized presentations would
actually have saved time and produced better NIS matelial. There
was indication that, on the one hand, certain material requiring
relatively mature author experience and capability halc. been
prepared by around GS-7 level personnel, without effective subsequent
review. Certain other material appeared, on the other hand, to have
been prepared by more mature authors, but not subjected to lower-
echelon detailed examination which Editorial Branch was forced to
perform. When Editorial Branch found maw significant errors in
one section, the originating office stated that relatively inexperienced
personnel had prepared the material. The section, however, had been
forwarded without appropriate additional review provisions, and
without informing the Editorial Branch of the situation. Generally
speaking, by more or less recognized default Editorial Branch was
delegated detailed checking and substantive responsibilities of NIS
author and coordinator echelons.
12; Contributor as well as editorial problems were increased by
the above circumstances. In many cases the process of correcting
errors and deficiencies some time after author completion, involving
identification of and efforts to re-obtain original source material,
undoubtedly required more contributor min-hours than the time
necessary for adequate original preparation. These multiple problems
affected all contributors to varying extents, but converged on the
Editorial Branch. Experience demonstrated that, even with the
Category I contributions, it was necessary for the Editorial Branch
to make line-by-line and item-by-item check of submitted material.
In most cases, significant factual inconsistencies and errors were
not obvious from the mans of meterial concerned, and required at
least summary cross-check with other NIS or other material. Experience
further showed that nearly comparable checking was required on
re-submitted Categories II and III material. An estimated 400
editorial hours were required to demonstrate the deficiencies which
led the agency concerned to recommend complete revision of one major
section after the section presumably had been once revised. A number
of re-submissions were returned to contributors a second time. It
was consistent editorial policy to avoid 122e extensive re-writing of
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material which would have been the more expeditious means of raising
the qualitative level of material. The alternative procedure of
providing detailed guidance but not Alminiabing the responsibility
of the contributors for aatmelly preparing acceptable material was
more time-consuming and demAndieg of Editorial Branch manpoialr but
was in the long-range interest of fundamental improvement in beide
intelligential. Within the limitations on time imposed by the
necessity for getting material into published form, editorial
personnel not only conferred with contributors on individual sections
but participated in a aeries of more generalized conferences with
author and coordinator personnel which proved effective in resolving
detailed problems and concurrently in developing practical working-
level understanding of NIS concepts.
13. Contributor-eoordinator-Editorial Branch relationship has
been generally good and, in view of the extent and nature of the
problems cited above, remarkably so. Although there have been
instances of initial contributor misunderstanding of necessarily
brief and non-exhaustive editorial comments on submitted material,
there has been general acceptance of this procedure. Various
contributors have recently shown initiative in developing improve-
meats, notably in obiteielne excellent photography for certain RIB
sections.
U. Incorporating EON recommendations has continued to present
major and shifting problems. EON working-Ievel personnel have Shown
willing cooperation in developing practical solutions, however, and
the problems should not get out of hand.
15. GPO aspects, as channeled through Publication Branch, have
shown gradual improvement. General pressure on Editorial Brawl has
resulted in GPO receiving copy deficient in consistency and not as
clean as it _should be. On the other hand, GPO proof-reading has
varied considerably in adequacy, and BIB appearance has suffered
from GPO lack of adaptability in make-cp. In response to consistent
pressure, it now appears that GPO has adopted procedures which
Should produce better multi-photograph insert pages.
?22
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ANNEX III 4.. PUBLICATION REPORT
10 Printing
a, Production
During FY 1950g Publication Branch, DiNISs processed
and forwarded to the printer 287 sections of which 216 sections
were published? This compared with 42 sections processed and
forwarded to the printer between receipt of initial HIS contri....
butions and the end of
on the following table:
Month
FY 19490 The flow of material is shown
Sections sent Sections
t_2_printer ?
july 1949
20
....02?1i9hed
3
August
15
6
September
25
15
October
13.
11
November
6
17
December
21
9
January 1950
36
13
February
9
21
March
41*
20
April
49*
20
May
36
40*
June
18
141*
1.101A1???????L ,A?FAMe
Total 287 216
Monthly Average 24 18
*These figures reflect the movement of a large number of
short sections released by Editorial Branch during March?
b, Defects
The backlog at the State Service Office/CPO of sections
cleared and awaiting printing increased through April when it
totaled 87 sections, ?Reduction of this backlog was effected during
May and June with a total of 49 remaining in the backlog at the
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close of the fiscal year, This production la e occurs
in the oollating and binding processes where lack of space and
adequate equipment retard the production rate.)
Co Quality
Inadequacies in half-tone reproduction, page makeeup,
table makeieup and figure placement, which were evident at the start
of the NIS program, have been largely overcome by educational
conferences and close cooperation between Publication Branch,
State Service Office/GPO and CIA Services Division. Editorial
. corrections and changes on page proofs have diminished but still
exist as an obstacle to smooth production flaa.
2. Preliminary NIS Gazetteers
a, Production
Twenty-two Preliminary NIS Gazetteer manuscripts enly
received and 20 Preliminary NIS Gazetteers were published during
FY 1950. The production rate averaged 12,250 names processed per
month, This exceeded the anticipated production rate by 2,250
names per month, Contributor defections made it possible to proceed
on the gazetteer program with a minimum of conflict with manuscript
editing, This would not have been possible if the original NIS
Production Schedule for FY 1950 had been maintained for the
gazetteer schedule was secondary to the demands of manuscript
editing. This advance in the gazetteer schedule places the Board
on Geograehio Names in a better position for name processing
during FY 1951,
Production of Preliminary NIS Gazetteers
Date Manuscript
Date
Area
No. of Names
Received
Published
26 USSR Fart III
20,000
FY 1949
September
10 Norway and Svalbard
17,500
FY 1949
4Taly
33 Iran
13,300
August
October
17 Italy
7,150
August
October
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Preliminary NIS Gazetteers (Cont.)
.Production of
Area
No. of Names
Date Manuscript
Received
Date
Published
32
Arabian Peninsula
6,250
August
September
54
Anglo?Egyptian Sudan
5,200
September
November
49
Libya
2,100
September
October
68
Iceland
1,500
October
November
7
Denmark9 Faeroe
4,150
October
November
Islands
27
Turkey
5,800
October
January
86
Venezuela
69700
November
January
8
Portugal, Azores,
Cape Verde Islands,
Madeira Islands
3,320
November
January
65
Alaska
9,850
December
February
4
Netherlands
59550
January
March
53
Egypt
4,500
January
February
67
Greenland
3,700
February
March
94
21
Brazil
7Ugos1avia
11,350
8,050
February
March
May
June
12
Finland
6,920
March
June
15
Switzerland
3,140
March
14Y
41
Korea
11,580
April
11
Sweden
4,940
May
23
Bulgaria
6,800
MAY
55
Ethiopia, Eritrea
19,100
june
French Somaliland,
British SOmaliland?
Italian Somaliland
Areal coverage
The attached map shows Areal coverage by Preliminary
NIS Gazetteers for Fr 1949 and FY 1950.
00 Quality
The coverage by the name listings has met the major
requirements of contributors and the volumes have shown continuing
improvement in the quality of reproduction.
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30 Standard NIS Base Maps
a. Production
Twentr.eight of the 32 NIS Standard Base Maps and 22
of the 28 NIS Page Size Base Maps scheduled for FY 1950 were
published? Although these were not published on the dates scheduled
contributor requirements in general were met. This was due to
contributor defections in the maintenance of the NIS Production
Schedule for FT 19500 The production rate VAS approximately 203
base maps per month? Requirements for name editing on NIS Base Maps
were mat and name editing on 20 NIS Base Maps was completed at a
production rate of 1.6 base maize per month?
Production of Btandard NIS Base Maps
NIS #
Title
Okinawa
Netherlands? Belgium and
Luxembourg
Distribution Date
Standard Size Page Size
545
4-6
28 July 1949
27 Sept. 1949
Not Sehed.
Not Sehed,
13
Germany
27 Sept.
1949
FY 1949
30
Iraq
29 Sept,
1949
16 Aug,
1949
41
Korea
29 Sept.
1949
FX 1949
49
Libya
17 Oct.
1949
16 Aug.
1949
86
Venezuela
17 Oct.
1949
11 July
1949
3
Portugal
24 Oct.
1949
16 Aug.
1949
4
Netherlands
18 Nov.
1949
12 Dec.
1149
39
China
18 Nov.
1949
FY 1949
21
Yugoslavia
25 Nov.
1949
16 Sept, 1949
55
Ethiopia
28 Dec.
12t9
20 Oct.
1949
15
Switzerland
5 Jan.
3.950
27 Feb.
1950
T
Denmark.
16 Jan.
3.950
20 Oct.
1949
65
Alaska
16 Jan.
1950
16 Jan.
1950
68
Iceland
16 Jan.
1950
12 Dec.
1949
94
Brazil
16 Jan.
3.950
16 Aug.
1949
40
Mongolian Peoples Republio
24 jan.
1950
24 Jan.
1950
12
Finland
15 Feb.
1950
12 Dec.
1949
67
Greenikal
15 Feb.
1950
18 Nov.
1949
39-111
North China
12 May
1950
Not Sched.
24
Greece
6 June
1950
24 Jan,
1950
17
Italy
29 June
1950
16 Jan.
1950
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NIS #
Production of Standard NIS Base Maps (Cont.)
Title Standard Size
Page Size
Poland
In distribution
In distribution
20
Albania
In distribution
In distribution
23
Bulgaria
In distribution
27 Jan. 1950
18
Czechoslavakia
b, Areal Coverage
Incomplete
In distribution
The attached map shows Areal coverage by NIS Base Maps
for FY 1949 and FY 1950.
c, Quality,
The techniques (separation plates on plastic, non
photographic inks, etc.) developed to adapt the NIS Standard Base
Maps to the wide variety of requirements of NIS contributors have
been most successful and the selection of basic geographic data
have generally been adequate for the majority of users.
d, Additional requirements
The preparation of a terrain plate (shaded relief) to
complete the Standard NIS Base Map requirements was not initiated
because of pressure of time and lack of qualified personnel. This
basic topographic information is essential to give complete graphic
presentation of such data as transportation, military regions,
meteorological stations, availability and sources of materials.
The addition of this terrain plate will, therefore, greatly enhance
the value of the final NIS maps which are constructed on the FIS
standard base maps.
4, Graphic Material
a, Submission
FrequentlyipsUbmissions of graphics by contributors have
been incomplete and have caused a delay of from one to three weeks
per seotion in the processing by the Publication Branch, D/NIS,
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This was due in large part to the production lag in color proofing
and in duroseal printing,'
1,0 Production and Quality
Of the graphic material submitted during FT 19509
that included in 108 sections required extensive corrections or
complete redrafting; 45 sections required special treatment and
substantive corrections, and 96 sections were suitable for
normal processing, The primary cause for the poor quality or
_inadequacy of material is believed to be due to the lack of
professional cartographic personnel in contributing agencies,
Another factor is the lack of thoroughness in checking and review
procedures in originating offices.
Qualitative adequacy of graphic material processed by
Publication Branch, DiNIS during FT 1950 is shown (by sections) in
the following table:
Category Category Category
1 2 3
State 61 4 4
Army 27 5 57
Navy 3 0 17
CIA 0 36 0
Air Force
.....L.... 0 ?A__
Total 96 45 108
Category 1 ? Norma/ processing including minor corrections,
Category 2 ? Special problems, including substantive corrections,
Category 3 ? Major corrections, including redrafting,
co Adequacy of Coverage
Graphic coverage varied throughout the NIS with continuing
deficiencies noted in many sections, Major deficiencies noted:
(1) The inadequacy of photographic coverage, both in
quality and in subject matter, is marked.
(2) Beach maps submitted to date for Section 229
"Coasts and Landing Beaches", have not been up to NIS
?213.
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standards and requirements because of the fact that
available published maps (usually aeronautical charts
at a scale of 1:500,000) are utilized as the bases
upon which pertinent coastal information is drafted.
To obtain beach maps to present NIS material adequately,
it is essential that specially prepared base maps be
drafted? These bases should be at an appreximate scale
of 1:5009000? designed for reduction to NIS page
height, and to portray the following basic information:
(a) Coverage of approximately 200 miles of coast.
line, extending 50 miles inland?
(b) Detailed and accurate coastline with all coastal
urban areas; ports being classified according to the
categories of principal, secondary, and minor?
(a) Selected inland cities and transportation routes
(d) Contour lines
Utilizing these speciAlly prepared bases, pertinent beach
and landing information may be construnted in the form
of overlays and thus maks bases available for other uses
and for swift and economic revisions as anticipated under
the maintenance program.
Name editing
a. Production
The Board on Geographic Names edited geographic names
on a total of 358 sections during FY 1950.
No. of Sections
No. Of Pages
No. of Figures
Month
V.J.LST2excents
(includin tables)
(aufLand_aIotos.)
july
37
2,071
349
Aug.
25
3,952
753
Sept.
42
2,523
512
Oct.
27
29186
326
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No. of Sections No. of Pages No. of Figures
Mon*
or_ftpleitatit.
iri. jp3_,..___,....tel..21911
mai_m_and photos)_.
Ncv.
38
2,055
246
Dec.
a
1,027
229
Jan.
34
2,024
243
Feb.
16
758
110
Mar.
30
2,422
411
Apr.
23
1,467
238
MaY
26
2,972
723
June
52
4,246
700
Total:
358
27,703
4,920
Average per month: 19.8
2,308
410
b. Continuing requirements
Close scheduling checked by weekly conferences between
D/NIS and DON remain necessary to ensure coordination of the flow
of textual material with that of the Editorial Branch and to
permit use of name cards for the preliminary NIS Gazetteers, for
preliminary name lists from contributors, and for NIS tem map.
requirements. Problems of interpretation andIvactical application
are discussed and cleared at these weekly meetings.
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NIS MATERIAL IN PROCESS IN THE AGENCIES
July
1949
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec Jan
1950
Feb
Mar
April
May June
Graph A
_ Number of Sections Required
to Produce the Approximate
Equivalent of 8 NIS per year.
Legend
Phase 5. Contributions being prepared for submission to CIA.
IVESI Phase 4. In process of review and coordination by the Chapter Coordinator.
/, Phase 1 Draft complete and in process of substantive review by producing component.
WEVI Phase 2. Draft approximately 2/3 complete.
Phase 1. Draft approximately 1/3 complete.
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50
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AGENCY SUBMISSIONS OF NIS SECTIONS TO CIA
0
30
20
10
?
July
1949
Aug
Sept
Oct
I 1111111
Nov Dec
Jan
1950
Feb Mar
Legend
Department of State
MEM Department of the Army
NM Department of the Navy
April May
June
Graph B
Average Monthly Requirement for
Production of the Approximate
Equivalent of 8 NIS per year.
_Average Monthly Submissions to
CIA in F.Y. 1950
Department of the Air Force
IONE CIA?Map Division
CIA-OSO
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10
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
July
1949
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MONTHLY PUBLICATION OF NIS, AND BACKLOG OF
FULLY PROCESSED MATERIAL APPROVED
FOR FINAL PRINTING
?
?
?
?
?
_
_
_
i ?
.
_
_
-
_
-
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
il_
,..?
-
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
fl
!:...1.',..
?? ?.' '
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
i_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
..$..
144--
(1
3.
40
A
...
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
3
0
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
0
.S

4?
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
k 1
L.
_
ie
'..;,A?
111111111,
?3
.:,.
. . .
..
-...
?I.
--4;
?? ,
-..4
,
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec Jan
1950
Feb
Mar
April
May June
Graph C
Average Monthly Requirement for
? Publication of the Approximate
Equivalent of 8 NIS per year.
Legend
Backlog of Processed Material Approved for Final Printing. (In GPO)
Sections Published.
Monthly Average of Sections
Published in F.Y. 1950.
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EDITORIAL BRANCH PROCESSING OF NIS MATERIAL
Graph D
Editorial Requirement, in Sections
? per month, to meet Production
Objective of 8 NIS per year.
Monthly Average of Sections
? Received in Editorial Branch in
F.Y. 1950.
Monthly Average of Sections
Edited and Cleared to the
Publication Branch
July
1949
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec Jan
1950
Feb
Mar
April
May June
Legend
Sections Received in Editorial Branch in F.Y. 1950.
. Sections Edited and Cleared to the Publication Branch
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