PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD (PSB)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010025-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: May 22, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM OF COIWERSATION held in the CIA Conference Room,
Administration Building, 22 May 1951, at 1130 hours
SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Allen Dulles, CIA
Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, JCS
General John L. Magruder, OSD
Mr. Frank G. Wisner, CIA
Mr. James Q. Reber, CIA
Mr. Phillip Davison, State
Mr. Leon Crutcher, State
Mr. Howland Sargeant, State
Mr. Joseph Phillips, State
Lieut. Colonel P. C. Davis, Army
1. The working party (established at the last meeting df the
above on 16 May 1951) submitted its proposals with respect to the
functions and organization of the Director and Staff of the PSB
and immediate steps for action. There was also submitted a pro-
posal for possible agenda items for an early meeting of the Board.
2. Suggested changes will now be incorporated in redrafted
papers which will be redistributed for concurrence prior to sub-
mission to General Smith and in the form proposed for subsequent
transmittal to the Board itself.
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION held in the CIA Conference Room,
Administration Building, 16 May 1951, at 1+00 hours
SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Allen Dulles, CIA
Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, JCS
General John L. Magruder, OSD
Mr. Frank G. Wisner, CIA
Mr. James Q. Reber, CIA
Mr. Philip Davison, State
Mr. Leon Crutcher, State
Lieut. Colonel T. R. Philbin, JCS
Lieut. Colonel P. C. Davis, Army
1. Action: An interdepartmental working group under the
chairmanship of Mr. Reber was appointed to develop a paper on
the organization and functions of the Psychological Strategy Board..
2. The matter of the relationship of the PSB to the NSC was
mentioned and it was agreed that the Board should discuss this
problem at an early meeting. There is a possible confusion because
the PSB was set up by Presidential directive although it will report
to the NSC. There may also be some conflict with NSC-10/2.
3. Discussion: It was understood that the new PSB should not
get into overly detailed planning. It will approve ideas proposed
by existing agencies and will advance its own original proposals.
It will probably not meet very much but will still be able to give
valuable and needed guidance to the operating agencies. It was
thought that there would still be a big job to be done by IFIO.
4. General Magruder presented his conception of the organiza-
tion and function of the PSB and distributed a draft paper which
set forth his tentative views in detail.
5. Mr. Davison commented that he saw four functions for the
Board: (a) National planning, (b) "Wheel-greasing," (c) Evaluation,
and (d) Coordination at a high level. To this list Colonel Davis
suggested the addition of an item on the application. of the best
techniques.
6. Mr. Dulles stated that he had not conceived that the Board
would be set up with regional specialists, since they would be in
competition with the existing agencies.
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7. General Magruder acknowledged that the organization could
not start full grown and that in the beginning many of the functions
of the Board would have to be performed within the operating agencies.
8. Admiral Stevens suggested that since the eventual size and
duties of the Staff are in dispute we should bypass some of the
arguments for the present and try to get a practical, paper on what
can be done now with the two or three people actually available.
He further stated his disagreement with the planning concept in
General Magruder's paper. He felt that the functions referred to
by General Magruder are already placed squarely on the shoulders
of responsible officials. He did not see any need to interpret NSC
papers into guidances for the departments. In his conception the
PSB could give top direction by setting priorities and needling
departments to do what needs to be done. He also looked to the
PSB as having decision-making powers, referring matters where neces-
sary to the NSC.
9. It was suggested also that the Board could help get quali-
fied personnel from industry and elsewhere and put them to the best
use in psychological operations.
10. It was agreed that the functions of the staff should be
those that are not being done elsewhere and cannot be delegated.
There was some disagreement as to whether or not the working group
should attempt to sketch the organization of the Staff as it might
ultimately develop.
11. Mr. Wisner suggested that the working group should shy
away from any thought of a "Charter" which would require formal
departmental concurrence. Rather they should develop a paper which
would be informally accepted by the Board as indicating the general
lines which they would probably follow. Mr. Wisner also suggested
that the working group discuss the role of a group of senior con-
sultants or deputies to the Board members. The thought also was
advanced that the Board should screen public and Congressional
inquiries and suggestions and act as a focal point and figurehead
for the national psychological effort.
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This paper has been sent to Mr. Wisner
and Mr. Houston for their comments.
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 SECRET
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24 May 1951
RELATIONSHIP OF THE PSB TO THE NSC
1. The President's directive of April 4, 1951, establishing the
Psychological Strategy Board states that "The Board will report to the
NSC on the Board's activities and on its evaluation of the national
psychological operations..."
2. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1949, states
that "The function of the Council (NSC) shall be to advise the President
with respect to..." The Council shall also make certain "recommenda-
tions" and "reports" to the President.
3. The suggestion has been made that the NSC should formally adopt
the President's directive of April 4 in order legally and clearly to
establish the NSC-PSB relationship envisaged in that directive.
In view of the fact that the NSC can merely "advise" the
President and "make recommendations," which are inoperative until approved
by him, it is apparent that the Council has no decision-making authority
apart from the President (whether that authority is retained by the
President personally or delegated to the NSC or to the individual
members thereof). It does not appear necessary therefore for the NSC
to confirm any directive of the President even where its own functions
are involved.
4. The question was also raised as to whether there might not be
some conflict between the President's directive and NSC 1O/2.
A large part of the possible area of conflict was specifically
dealt with in the April 4 directive, which stated that "... the operational
planning and execution of fall activities (other than overt types of
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subject to this directive, as therein assigned."
Insofar as any conflict may arise that is separate from the
"operational planning and execution" of these activities, it is dealt
with only by implication and would be resolved in favor of the April 4
directive on the theory that a subsequent issuance by the same authority
is controlling.
5. The PSB was established and derives its authority from the
President, who has directed that its reports be made to the INC. It is
presumed that the PSB will operate independently of the NSC Senior Staff
although informal liaison and coordination with that Staff would be
very helpful, if not essential.
6. The relationship of the work of the PSB to that of the NSC will
be of two kinds. First, the PSB will reach agreements on the solution
of problems within the field of their responsibilities, and, recognizing
problems in that field on which they disagree or on which Presidential
approval is required, PSB will refer them to the NSC.
Second, the PSB will act on the basis of policies and papers
approved by the INC. They will see that the psychological weapons at
their disposal are employed to maximum effectiveness in pursuance of
NSC policies.
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To insure that the psychological policies, objectives
and programs promulgated by the Board or within the capabilities
of execution of the operating agencies, or, if not, to make
provision for such specific administrative, personnel and
logistical support as may be required from an appropriate depart-
ment or agency.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Agenda for Psychological Strategy Board
1. The draft memorandum, dated 23 May 1951, from you to the DCI
(copy attached) has been circulated for comment to Mr. Barrett, Admiral
Stevens, General Magruder and Mr. Wisner. This memorandum contained
the results of our discussions on Tuesday, 22 May 1951.
2. The suggested agenda that emerged from those discussions, in
my opinion, can be considerably improved. Although I do not believe
we are at liberty to keep the present proposals from General Smith, I
do understand that he has complete freedom to accept, reject or modify
them, and therefore that we are obligated to express our views in that
regard.
3. I heartily endorse the first item on the proposed agenda:
"To note the proposed functions and organization of the Staff (TAB A,
1-5)." I do not conceive that this should take more than a few minutes
of the Board's time, and any lengthy discussion or formal action should
be avoided.
4. With regard to the second item: "To discuss the .relationship
of the PSB to the NSC." I believe the Board should have the benefit of
a staff paper outlining the problem. My office has attempted to pro-
duce such a paper (first draft attached). If, after coordination, the
substance of this paper proves correct, I would raise a question as to
whether in fact the Board needs to discuss the matter.
5. With respect to the third item on the agenda: "To consider
future business of the Board (TAB B)," I suggest that the Chairman
select the half dozen most important and urgent items and ask the Board
members to direct their staffs to expedite the preparation of papers
on them for PSB consideration. The Board should not be burdened with
the remainder of TAB B, the main value of which is to the Staff level.
I would propose the following as the half dozen problems and would hope
that they not be discussed substantively at the first meeting:
b. Subversion, demoralization and defection of Soviet
troops in East Germany
c. Psychological policies on public statements with regard
to the Atomic Bomb
d. A psychological plan for
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e. Psychological strategy with regard to the universal
desire for Peace
f. Implementation of
6. It is recommended that an additional item be placed on the
agenda: _"A brief oral presentation of psychological measures being
taken with respect to A senior assistant to each member of
the Board should make this presentation with regard to his own kind
of activity. The State Department might well call on Mr. McGhee for
the political and economic side and Mr. Barrett for the propaganda
aspects. It is assumed that a discussion would follow which would
probe what further measures, if any, the United States could take in
JAMES Q. REBER
ssistant Director
I elligence Coordination
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