LETTER TO THE HONORABLE GORDON GRAY FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300130025-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: November 1, 1951
• Content Type: LETTER

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1 November 191
The Honorable Cordon Gray
Director, Psychological Strategy 9oaard
708 Jackson Place, R. W.
Washington, D. co
I have your letter with regard to the
It is quite correct
that we are very suc er as this group and are
considering ways and means t which we can be of help to
it. I understand that you we shortly to have a triefing
on the work of the Center and I should like to talk with
you further about it after the briefing and before the
16th of November as I plan to meet with sabers of the
Center in Boston on that day for a general review of
their plans.
Is there any likelihood that you could be present
in baton on the 16th?
Faithfully yours,
Allen W. Dulles
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Army review(s) completed.
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l November 19%
The Honorable Gordon Gray
Director, Psychological. Strategy Board
708 Jackson Place, 71. W.
Washington, D. C.
I return herewith the material from C1t Ginsberg
which you sent me with your note of 26 October 1951.
1 have taken a copy of it in order to have an opportunity
to give it further study. I those aranduns
he encloses, worked with as in Nov York during the early
days of the war. I have a most favorable icreesion of
him*
Sincsrelys
Alan W. Dulles
Encl.
AWDs at
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
20 October 1951
Mr. Gordon Gray, Director
Psychological Strategy Board
708 Jackson Place
Washington, D.C.
Dear ~?Ir , Gray:
I appreciate the fact that I had an opportunity to talk with
you yesterday about my recent trip to :;Iii? PB ! EITCOM, and England.
My only regret is that in so doing I added to your already tight
schedule.
In accordance with our conversation I am putting down on paper
the major points which I reviewed with you. I am dividing my
comments into three parts,- diagnosis, conclusions, and recom-
cne n&l tions .
He diagnosis:
b. FrancC -- The whop of French life, political, economic,
and social? is frozen. Despite our post-war assistance s
we have failed to really win the middle third to our
side. All that one can say is that we have not lost
them as-yet. We did very little for the working classes'
when we were pouring money in via ECG;. Now that we are
trying to get the French to accelerate their rearmament
program, the already unsatisfactory economic conditions
r'ern:: n-v -- Our desire to Get on with the defense of
es tern Frurone has made very bad traders of us in the
case of the rermans. We have failed to remember the
extent to which all Germany policy is dictated by the
sheerest type of opportunism. We have likewise under-
estimated the extent to which there will always be a
pull between West Germany and East Germany. Germar' s
recovery on .the economic front, has been remarkable
and we are really cone ront?ed with a new "German problem".
One of th most serious shortcomings of American policy
has been our lack of effective relations with the
:. oci list opposition. The TT... mv,s t look forward to
an increasingly difficult problem in Western Turope
because of the improved bargaining position of the
Germans x who will use their strength to the full.
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of the masses will probably deteriorate. The political
implications for the U.S. are obvious. Although most
Frenchmen are lookin4; for a "new deal", they have no
reason to expect that they can receive one via American
effort.
c. Itil -- If the situation in France is unsatisfactory,
that of Italy is definitely dangerous. There is a real
chance that the Communists may win a free election. As
in France, the overnment is uninterested or unable,
probably both, to tackle effectively important areas
where reforms are sorely needed. Even in plants run
completely with ECA funds, the government has not pre-
vented Communist trade unionists from getting a strangle-
hold. The only party that promises the workers anything
is the Communist Party. If the Communists should gain
a 40 odd percent 'vote , one must assume that some of the
weak politicos will try to join the bandwagon. The
situation remains most precarious.
d. Fns=lanndd -- The political situation is of an entirely
different order as far as the U.S. is concerned, as
compared with Germany France, and Italy. The British
are substantially united and are basically committed to
the same values as we are. However, their economy is
very taut. One must not overlook the fact that the
Scottish trade unions supported Aneurin Bevan. U.S.
policy must be careful not to push the British over the
economic brink as far as the internal domestic situation
is concerned. We may have an option of more loans and
more rearmament, or slower rearmament.
a. The U.S. has not become identified in Western Europe
with a "new deal" for the masses of the population.
b. Neither the U.S. nor its democratic allies have an
effective personality similar to Stalin. Eisenhower
has potentials but not as long as he is on active
military duty.
c. Our overanxiousness to get a German contribution for
defense has led to the creation of a new German problem.
d. As far as France and Italy are concerned, we must
be careful that our defense preoccupation does not
set the stage for what might be called a "Chinese
solution', in which we do a little and not enough and
eventually lose the country to our opponents.
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e. We have failed to date to differentiate short- and long-
run objectives and have paid insufficient attention to
the priority issues under both heads. We should be
pushing the French and the Italians much more than we
are to mess up their local Communists; on the other
hand, we ought to be at work on long-term pmoblems
such as Italian unemployment.
f. The frozen situation in France can give probably only
via a series of reforms which are supra-national
Likewise, there is probably no chance of keeping the
Germany problem under control except within a broader
context of Western European effort. Although the U.S.
.has begun to push along these lines, there is much
more which we can and should do.
g. There is a lack of effective integration of American
effort -- diplomatic, economic, and military. To the
extent that there is formal leadership aheSambassa-
dors , we suffer from the historically passive
Department approa;ch. -
Recommendations:
a. It is important to use every means at our disposal,
the Catholic Church, trade unions, editors, etc., to
correct the picture that most Americans now have that
ECA solved the Western European problem. We must Get
the country prepared for the long pull without permitting
it to become too discouraged,
b. There is the utmost need for organizational and leader-
ship changes to intensify the effectiveness of American
effort on the three fronts of diplomatic economic,
and military aid. Care should be taken In such a reform
to be sure that there is civilian control rather than
military control at the top.
cv Closely related to the foregoing is the need for some
tougher operators in countries where we must seek to
push the Communists back rapidly, as in Italy and
France. The search for proper personnel who combine
diplomatic, military, and psychological strength will
admittedly be very difficult.
d. To the extent that we still retain certain important
controls -over Germany, we should be careful to hold
on to them and not bargain them away foolishly. The
Germans should be forced to demonstrate over a consid-
erable period of time that they are really with us
before we trust them.
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e. The U.S. should accelerate the support which it has
begun to give to French leadership in working toward
Western European integration.
f. It is most important that in all future aid a conscious
effort be made to identify what the U.S. is doing in
Western Europe with a "new deal" for at least a part
of the population, There is no reason why we should
not establish minimum labor standards, etc. in our
current offshore procurement program, Every action
that the U.S. takes should have something positive
about it for the local population. In the last analysis
we must win this population or we lose everything,
Although I have tried to be as brief as possible, I regret that
the letter grew to four pages. But then Western Europe really
is quite a probleml
I am enclosing, as you requested I should, a copy of the
document prepared by the Vatican group on the Italian situa-
tion, which, as I mentioned to you takes anything but an
optimistic point of view, I cannot, however, refrain from
commenting on the fact that despite the quite pessimistic ap-
praisal, the solutions recommended -- food packages -- seem
hardly adequate, This reemphasizes the fact that the groups
that have the most to lose in Western Rurope are still looking
for a very cheap solution.
Is there anything on paper about the scope and responsibili-
ties of the Psychological Strategy Board? I would be much
interested to learn at least a little about the direction of
your present efforts.
With kind regards,
Sincerel.y- yours ,
f
Eli Ginzberg
Consultant
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 Approved For.Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300130
1 November 19q
The Honorable Gordon Gray
Director, P3grchological Strategy Board
708 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington, 9. C.
i have your note of 29 October 1951 enclosing
letter to you of 25 October 1951s which~-]
return herewith. I thoroughly agree with what you have
said tol Interesting as his project is,
it certainly requires careful review and aiend*ent before
it would fit into our scheme of psychological strategy.
In facrt, the real question is whether the basic idea of
the plan is susceptible of modification to a point where
it would fit in with existing poi . I enclose a copy
of the letter which I an sending
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
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