THE U.S. DOCTRINAL PROGRAM, PSB D-33/2, MAY 5, 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200050006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 5, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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_ECURITY IMR IATION
SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
4 3
ctPY NO.
PSB D-33/2
May 5, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCI-IOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD:
SUBJECT: The U.S. Doatrirdal Program, PSB D-33/2,
May 5, 1953
The attached draft of the U.S. Doctrinal Program is circulated for
vote slip action at your earliest convenience. This paper was prepared
and unanimously approved by a PSB Par-el established by the Board at its
Fifteenth Meeting on SepteLber 11, 1952, to study the problem of "doctrinal
warfare.," specifically as directed against Soviet doctrine, and to make
recommendations ,for U.S. action.
Annex "B" will receive special handling and limited distribution in
accordance with the wishes of the member agency principally concerned.
George A. Morgan
Acting Director
Enclosure:
F5B D-33/2, "U.S. Doctrinal
Program", TViay 5, 1953,
COPY NO. '* ,3
DIA review(s) completed.
NSC review(s) completed.
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PSB D-33/2
May 5, 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
U.S. DOCTRINAL PROGRAM
(FOR BCARU APPROVAL)
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U?,'~i. DOCTRINiL PROGRAM
SUMMar State ienntof the Problem: This U, S. * doc-
trinal program is a belated effort--35 years late--to
meet the Soviet influences in the doctrinal field. It
has been assumed that Communism has its greatest appeal
to the underprivileged and to the hungry masses. How-
ever, Corwmnism breeds less in empty bellies than in
empty rn;.inds. Comuranism. has effectively appealed to
thought leaders an.d.has been able to increase its in-
ternational influence because it has not had intelli-
gent, consistent and extensive refutation. Stalin's
death and the end of the personalized apostolic suc-
cession of Marx-Lenin-Stalin make it most appropriate
now that the U.S. undertake a doctrinal program with
clarity, determination and energy. An aggressive doc-
trinal program cannot increase the threat of war.
1. Lacholor,
Objectives for a U.S. Doctrinal program
(a) In its short-range activities, the doctrinal program (as defined
and justified in Annex NA") will seek to achieve the following results:
(1) to create confusion, doubts and loss of confidence in the
accepted thought patterns of convinced Communists, captive
careerists, including the military and managerial groups,
and people otherwise under Communist influence.
(2) to pave the way for multiple deviations from and schisms
in totalitarian thought patterns by stimulating intell-
ectual curiosity and free thought on political, scientific
and economic subjects,
(3) to weaken objectively the intellectual appeal of neutralism
and to predispose its adherents towards the spirit of the
West.
(b) In its medium-range activities, the doctrinal program will seek,
by providing a permanent literature and by fostering a long-term intell-
ectual movement, tos
(1) break down world-wide doctrinaire thought patterns which
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have provided a fertile intellectual basis for Cormuriist
and other doctrines hostile to American objectives.
(2) foster a world-wide syrmpathetic acceptance by free men of
the free mind as one solution for the world's problems.
(a) As its long-range objective, the U.S. doctrinal program will,
based on the accomplishments of the short- and medium-range activities,
predispose young, as well as developed, minds against any new versions of
Comrunism or other totalitarian doctrines, and encourage universal accep-
tance of the philosophy and spirit of the Free World.
3. Basic i'r nc es ~d9vet in Annex "Ans n. 2C 22
(a) To be effective, this U.S. doctrinal program requires the inter-
departmental development of:
(1) a long-range objective intellectual activity aimed at in-
fluencing the developed minds in all areas (See: Proposal I).
(2) provocative and stimulating doctrinal materials, in all
fields of human thought and interests which critically and
effectively analyze Cowunism and hostile doctrines, as well
as the American philosophy.
(3) new and improved distribution mechanisms for permanent lit-
erature, not only American (See Proposal II) but also foreign
materials, and other carriers of doctrinal materials.
(4) the positive as)ects of the American philosophy, as well as
the attack of hostile doctrines.
(b) Detailed government control over the production of most overt
doctrinal material, which is repressive to creative thought, will be
reduced to the minimum. Control over the production of other materials
must be flexible and not restrictive.
(c) Any U.6. doctrinal, program sufficient to forward substantially
the goals set forth in this paper requires budgetary allocation of new funds,
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not merely a shift. in current erlphases.
4. Summarized Basic Tasks
(a) This doctrinal program is not the "propagandizing" of the American
people, but it is the practical effort to develop materials which will be
acceptable to the world market and which, in their entirety, or with
minor modifications, can be widely distributed with expectation that they
will have a doctrinal impact.
(b) The following planning tasks are not listed in order of priority.
They indicate to the participating departments and agencies what will be
included in their implementing doctrinal plans. These tasks are only the
minimum activities to be undertaken in their implementing planst
(C)
,fro am
Department of State 'and or the agency inheri?in the information
All facilities will be employed, as feasible, to support and
further this doctrinal program. e.g.,
(a) increase the doctrinal aspects of information work;
(1)
()
(1) VOA to increase doctrinal inclusions, particularly
for publicizing and promoting interest.
(2) increased documentation and basic interpretations
in periodicals, particularly native language journal;
() extensively increased book programs, e.g., Franklin
Publications, Inc., and Arlington Press.
(~) increased doctrinal emphasis in the Exchange of
Persons Program.
Q,
promoting American publications through U'S li-
braries.
Cultural and cotmnercial attaches, and mission chiefs
will foster increased markets for American publications.
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(c) Explore with a view to administering a book distribution
guarantee program (See Proposal II) and attempt by all
means to increase the distribution of American books.
() Overseas personnel will cooperate in and with local doc-
trinal activities, which support or parallel American
objectives. Overseas personnel could give lectures,
provide publications and insure local contacts with
equivalent American institutions.
{e) Defectors and escapees will be exploited for doctrinal
purposes.
(f) Doctrinal developments will be regularly reported and
analyzed by all foreign missions.
(d) Central Intelli.g~onle Agency
The Agency will give high and continuing priority to all activi-
ties supporting the objectives of this program. (CIA's basic
tasks are presented in a separate annex "B" of limited distri-
bution).
(e) Department of Defense
(1)
All facilities will be employed, as feasible, to support and
further this doctrinal program, e.g.$
(a)
(b)
(.)
Doctrinal background will be given in all service
schools for officers and enlisted personnel. Organi-
zations and units will be provided doctrinal materials
through I&E activity.
Troop recreational Libraries, armed forces editions and
soldiers' publications, from the comic to the tome.,
will include doctrinal matters.
Each service will incorporate doctrinal aspects into its
strategic and tactical planning in the psychological
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May 5, 1953
warfare field. Corollary military activities, e.g.,
escape and evasion, and protective indoctrination in
case of capture, will employ doctrinal materials.
(d) American POW camps, in recreational, informational and
educational work, will incorporate doctrinal materials.
(e) Planning for occupied areas will recognize and take
steps to incorporate doctrinal aspects into its plan-
ning and training.
(f) Armed forces network will include doctrinal developments
to stimulate its major, and its 6spill-over" audiences
to read doctrinal books,
(g~ Doctrinal materials will be made available to military
chaplains for such use as they consider appropriate.
(h) Orientation materials for American troops in foreign
overseas stations will contain doctrinal materials
which arel suitable for circulation among foreign
audiences.
(i) Speeches and addresses by service and departmental of-
ficials will exploit doctrinal aspects.
(j,) Technical military ::agazines will be encouraged to
carry material of a doctrinal character.
(k) The Research and Development Board, or its possible suc-
cessor, will study the development of operational equip-
ment specifically required for doctrinal operations.
Other Departments and Agencies
(1) Policy and information planners in the other federal agencies
will be advised of the U."s. doctrinal program and its relation-
ship to their primarily domestic activity, i.e., policy
recommendations and regul-;rly published brochures and reports
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could have important doctrinal value overseas.
5. General Guidance
(a) New and stimulating ideas, even contradictory ideas, have self-
generative powers and are desired.
(b) Delays are crippling. There is a premium on swift and positive
action to galvanize the creation and distribution of ideas and a permanent
literature.
(c) Doctrinal production is not limited to political and philosophical
analyses. All fields of intellectual and cultural interests, from anthro-
pology and artistic creations to sociology and scientific methodology, come
within the gamut of the doctrinal program.
(d) The American doctrinal program is not limited to American materi-
als. Foreign production and activity, consistent with our doctrinal objec-
tives, will be fostered, promoted and distributed. Acceptability to Iestern
philosophy of life, and not strict American ideas, will be the criteria of
selecting non American materials.
6. Administrative Provisions
(a) Coordination of the U.S. Doctrinal Program
So that the U.S. doctrinal program may be initiated immediately,
pending the establishment of the permanent organization for the American
psychological effort, the Director of P3B will be responsible for the
initial coordination of the member agencies' implementation of this doc-
trinal program. When the pending reorgg~nization of informational and psycho-
logical activities has been directed, he will prepare a detailed reccmrenda-
tion to the PSB, or its responsible successor, for the permanent coordination
and implementation of this doctrinal program.
(b) Evaluation of the U.S, Doctrinal Program
The Office of Evaluation and Review, during the first year of
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the doctrinal effort, will undertake the-analysis of methodology required
to make an adequate evaluation and review of the U.S. doctrinal program.
An over-all evaluation and review will be made on a yearly basis, with the
expectation that if the Office of Evaluation and Review notices significant
trends, whether favorable or unfavorable, it will i nmediately develop a
special evaluation and review to so inform the Board.
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PROPOSAL
NTMIA 'TONAL DOCTRINAL INSTITUTE
1. The production of effective materials for a U.S. doctrinal program
requires:
(a) systematic, thorough and scientific analyses of Communism
and other hostile doctrines, the proper collation of these analyses, and,
if possible, their distribution.
(b) a planned, consistent and continuing production of objec-
tive scholarly studies emphasizing the contradictions, inconsistencies and
vulnerabilities of Communism.
(c) a continuing cadre of doctrinal experts who can not only
spot variations in hostile doctrines but who can rapidly publish devas-
tat,"ing documentary rebuttals.
(d) a doctrinal servicing center where foreign scholars can be
educated so that they will later produce doctrinal materials on return to
their native lands, and where the basic doctrinal materials are available
in readily accessible form, to assist scholars and writers.
(e) a center which will be informed of, and become the focal
point for, doctrinal develormenta: publications, seminars, forums, lecture
series, whether in U.S. or overseas and which can stimulate and foster in-
creased emphasis on doctrinal activity.
2. It is the panels considered view that these five requisites can
most economically., effectively and efficiently be provided, outside the
normal pattern of government machinery, by providing for the subsidizing
of a special scholarly effort in an existing university institute. This
special institute could be financed on a long-range basis through a budgetary
transfer to the National Science Foundation. In view of the current uncer-
tainty of the American psychological organization, the panel can not now
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make a recommendation as to whether one member agony or the Board should
provide the funds necessary to establish this institute. The National 5cienc,
Foundation (NSF) is proposed as a medium because it pro-rates funds over
several years since its activities are not restricted by fiscal years. NSF
has a tradition for dealing with universities which would make the establish-
ment of a doctrinal institute easier and more effective. Private foundations
would continue such an institute after its reputation was established.
3. It is visualized that this doctrinal institute would consist of
a relatively small group of specialists, American and foreign, in doctrinal
and, particularly Communist, matters. Under a Director, these specialists
would as their first major function, develop the complete analysis of Com-
munist doctrine. In this effort, they would collect analyses already in
existence and fill the gaps, not merely from Russian publications, but from
all Communist output throughout the world. Through conferences and seminars
at the institute, Communist techniques throughout the world would be classi-
fied and compared. This systematic analysis, after collation and organi-
zation, would provide the basic material for the U.S.doctrinal program
against Communism. In mimeographed form, these analyses could be sent
to deposit libraries and to centers of recional studies, so that they would
be more readily available to doctrinal students and to protect the doctrinal
program, if the institute might be destroyed.
4. Zile the analysis was in process, and definitely after the
Communist material had been thoroughly analyzed, the staff would be ex-
pected to produce objective studies based on the collated raw materials.
Not all objective production would be limited to institute personnel. The
Institute Director, aided by his staff, would know outside specialists who
could be provided with the collected doctrinal materials on a particular
feature of Communist doctrine. This specialist would then produce his own
manuscript, independent of the institute and its Director. Stress would be
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put on the development of manuscripts for those aspects of Communist doc-
trine which had not already been thoroughly covered. The manuscripts pro-
duced for the doctrinal program would be of a character that they could be
commercially published and sold on the open market. To insure that these
publications received the greater prestige of valid academic work, they
might be published as a special series of university publications. These
publications would be expected to maintain the highest standards of scholar-
ly objectivity and at the same time, they should be so readable that they
would be widely salable, not only on the domestic market, but also in the
foreign market.
5. In addition to the analytical research and the. manuscript pro-
duction work, the institute's staff would maintain a light teaching schedule
in the doctrinal field. In this way, they would maintain the spirit and
value of acadetrjc environment. Most importantly, these specialists could
thereby train Americans and visiting foreign students in doctrinal problems
and thereby increase the number of capable and productive specialists on
anti-Communist doctrine,
6. The institute would also develop and nurture American and inter-
national scholarly contacts which would provide useful information for ex-
ploitation under the doctrinal program. An annual prize (,,?300.00) with
publication' in the institute's series would provide the institute with
knowledge of manuscripts usable in the over-all doctrinal program. Such
contacts would enable the institute to foster doctrinal seminars, forums
and conferences, both national and international in character, in foreign
lands. Such gatherings and particularly the publicity about them would
increase the attention upon doctrinal developments.
7. A key factor in the success of the doctrinal institute is the
Director. He provides the inspiration, as well as the control, for the
production of overt doctrinal materials. The Director, who would have to
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be approved by the coordination mechanism for this doctrinal program, shoulc'
possess the following qualifications:
(a) widely accepted reputation as a sound, productive scholar.
(b) interest and imagination related to the field of doctrine.
(c) fair administrative ability, without tendencies to "empire
building".
sibility.
(d) receptive to guidance, but willing to accept major respon-
(e) deep knowledge of, and ability to push through, objective
doctrinal output.
(f) capable of the highest security clearances from all member
agencies.
Through the Director, the following controls would be maintained over the
program of doctrinal production=
(a) institute's program would be worked out in detail prior to
staffing and be cleared through the coordination mechanism for this program.
(b) unsatisfactory materials developed at the institute would
not be circulated and not be published in institute series.
(c) proposed distribution machinery for doctrinal program would
not be employed for overseas circulation of unsatisfactory publications.
The Director would not only be expected to be guided by the coordination
mechanism for this program, but he would be expected to keep the coordi-
nators informed of major developments of a doctrinal nature, so that ef-
fective advantage can be taken of such developments. He would indicate
when important contributions to the doctrinal program should be started or
would appear. He would interest and attract other scholars to use institute
research and facilities to produce their on doctrinal achievements. He
would recommend, or on request, assist in, the production of a provocative
or controversial contribution to the doctrinal program, which would not be
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attributed to the institute? While the Director of the institute is so
important, and his qualifications difficult to fulfill,it is not impossible
to find the necessary capable individual who can make a major success of this
proposal.
8. Financial estimates for the institute can only be approximations.
While the institute would have a small faculty, it would seek the out-
standing specialists, who would require a respectable honorarium. The
panel, after discussions of the cost factor, cannot reliably estimate the
amount of money ultimately required, but for a program of five years' dur-
ation, an allocation of about ;1,000,000 would got this effort underway.l
After five years, the increased enrollment of students at the institute,
the profit from its publication program, and grants and gifts from various
American foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, etc.) and university benefactors,
might be expected to maintain the institute on a basis independent of sub-
sequent government grants. This development is necessarily speculative,
but it has reasonable grounds for policy acceptance. The analysis of doc-
trines hostile to the U.S. certainly will have been accomplished within the
period of full government subsidy. The available analyses will provide a
continuing impetus for private production of doctrinal studies. A five-
year period will also give a fair indiction of the possibilities of this
institute developing into a self-maintaining institution.
1 An interesting comparison to this estimate is found in the fact that
each of America's three largest automotive companies annually provides
three times that amount merely for the publications aspects of their
much broader advertising effort.
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PROPOSAL II
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PROPOIAL II
jIQRZ QED CO ?EI3C [lil, DIS'~~IBts'PION OF AIDQICE NJ BOOKS:
AA EO()K DIS`i'R~BUTZG GUAS'A?T ++
1. Outside the United States, the book is considered as a window
to the national soul. Hence European publishers and governments foster
the foreign distribution and sale of books as an important profitable
subsidiary to the domestic national market. Most American publishers are
unconcerned with the foreign market, and few American books are extensively
distributed abroad through commercial channels. Hence America is not made
known to an important audience.
2. Factors which have militated against greater ccmmeroial distri-
bution of American books overseas are:
(a) indifference of most publishers to the audience potential
of the overseas market; American costs are pro-rated on domestic consumption.
(b) American books priced for the American market are out of the
price range for overseas markets, except for technical works which are re-
quired by the foreigners.
(c) use of foreign distributing agents who push the books of
their own country rather than American books.
(d) little overseas promotional activity which has built up the
domestic market.
(e) currency exchange probl=ems which have been mitigated by
State's currency exchange guarantee.
3. CommerciaJ,.distribution of American books is a normal and proper
concern of the national government. All major nations except U.S., act on
that principle. Commercial distribution is better than "give-away" prac-
tices, apart from its economics, because it insures greater and more perma-
nent reader interest. Foreigners habituated to buying and reading American
books cannot help but better understand America and the American way of life.
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PROPOa:~L II
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4. Proposal for the increased co rercial. distribution of American
(a) Arrangement by a government agency, probably ICS of IIA, vith
major American publishers and American overseas distributors to enter a
guarantee agreement:
(1) publishers to make "overruns" on American edition at
publication cost plus snail profit.
(2) publisher or distributor to bind as a special overseas
edition for sale "outside of U.S. territory".
(3) distributors to promote and push overseas sales at
varying prices coms:ensurate with foreign market.
(4) publisher and distributor to be guaranteed ba;ic costs
and expenses, but not their profit.
(5) returns on guaranteed books to be pooled so that balance
of year's issue can be made.
(6) pro-rated percentages of profits to be used to replace
original revolving fund set up for guaranteed distri-
bution.
(b) Coordinated prornrtional support of American book distribution
by the member agencies.
(c) Contribution to national objectives will be one criterion fox
a book's acceptability for guarantee.
5. A Revolving Fund for a distribution guarantee program would be
relatively small, about ?250,000 to carry on two years' operations before
the profits and losses were determined and the Fund recovered from the
operation itself. Gradually the fund would be returned to the govern-
ment as profits replaced the original grant.
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SECURITY IJ FORMATION ANNEX "A"
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May 5, 1953
Ana" s i s of t h e Problem ( x "A' ,
1. Definitions
(a) In order to understand the subject matter of the analysis and
to indicate certain limits within which the discussion will take place,
it is considered proper to give herein, without attempting to justify
their accuracy or completeness, certain basic definitions:
(1) Doctria P o gang: A planned and systematic attack against
a basic hostile doctrinal system conducted. concurrently with
a positive advocacy of the basic philosophy of onels own
system. In the n.in, the doctrinal program is directed at
a specifically defined group, rather than at the mass.
(2) o~otripEil S stem: An inter-related body of ideas, whether
consciously organized or not, which reflects the manner or
content of thinking characteristic of individuals or classes,
justifies a particular type of social belief and structure,
and provides as body of principles for human aspirations.
(3) Target for the Doctrinal Program.* Those higher government
officials, journalists, professors, students, teachers and
progressive business leaders, who are interested in and who
attempt to base their judgments on a philosophy or an ideology,
(a) In theory, any individual interested in, and capable of
utilizing, concepts of a doctrinal nature can be con-
sidered as the target for the doctrinal program. In
reality, however, the vast majority of even educated
and intelligent people are doctrinally passive; that
is, they accept the doctrine, not on the basis of per-
sonal rationalization or mental justification, but mainly
because it was put to them in their educational process
and because it is accepted by the society, traditions
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and environment in which they are accustomed to live.
While this group is capable of accepting different doc-
trinal materials, it rarely reacts to them even on an in-
dividual tasis. Even less frequently does this passive
group attempt to influence others to adopt these different
doctrinal approaches. Hence the passive group is a target
only in the sense of its capability of receiving and un-
derstanding doctrinal materials. In the sense of being
an effective target for which doctrinal materials should
be developed, it holds a low priority.
(b) The main and the effective target for the doctrinal pro-
gram is the more limited group of people who are capable
and interes'ed in mentally manipulating doctrinal matters
and who make their oum judgments from the doctrinal view-
point, and thereafter attempt to persuade other people
whom they can influence to modify their original doc-
trine. This latter group is the major target for the
doctrinal program inasmuch as it is this group which
is capable of being seriously influenced by the doctrinal
approach. It is this group also which is most likely
to continue the effectiveness of the doctrinal approach
started by the American effort so that it appears to
be a native development.
(c) Hence the major target of the doctrinal program is the
developed, articulate mind, This mind, engaged in de-
veloping concepts and rationalizations and capable of
projecting the same to others, possesses the ability to
classify, analyze and synthesize. The developed mind
contains a store of knowledge, prejudices, opinions, pre-
dispositions, and traditional use patterns of these
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elements. It is characterized by an active urge to
present to others the conclusions of its mental processes.
(d) The developed mind may occur in all professions and social
groups, e.,g., teachers, students, labor, farmer or busi-
ness leaders, etc., but membero of the elite most genera-
lly possess developed minds. This group regularly and in
their everyday business uses the developed mind as its
chief tool. Even thc:ugh the developed mind is more fre-
quent among the influential class, it is not a man's
position, however, but his proficiency in using his mind,
which designates him as a proper target for the doctrinal
program,
(b) The doctrinal program assumes that a relatively small group of in-
dividuals, through the use of their intellectual power, carries a weight and
influence in forming, or at least predisposing, the attitudes'and opinions
of the opinion-moulding leaders in an area. This intellectual elite secures
some of its doctrine from the traditional environment out of which it develops
but it also secures portions of its doctrine from the external influences,
pa:,t:Lcularly of an intellectual character, i th Which it corms in contact.
The doctrinal program is the consciously planned effort to bring this elite
into contact with thought-stimulating materials which will interpret that
elite's environmental ideologies into a pattern which will prepare those
intellectuals to accept an attitude favorable to, or predi.spos?.ng this elite
towards, the philosophy held by the planners of the doctrinal program.
2. Necessit:,r for a U.S. Doc trim. Frommeam
(aa.) A doctrinal program., like many other activities in psychological
operations, is not reducible to facts or statistics. However, the influence
of ideas has proven powerful in the long history of ma.n. One only has to
recall the rapid and significant spread of the religious ideas involved in
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Christianity, and in Mohammedanism, to appreciate that ideas have significance
in motivating human actions. Coming closer to the present, it is sufficient
to mention the importance of ideas to the American revolutionary movement
which not only separated us from Great Britain, but developed our unique
form of government. In the same trend, there is no one who will deny the
pervading influences of the French revolutionary ideology and even of the
1"arxi.an philosophy of revolution in the mid-19th Century. Attention should
also be given to the influence of the ideas of a few men in moderating human
courses of action. The influence of John Dewey in American edudation, the
influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes in the American tradition of legal liber-
alism, and the significance of Lenin as a demagogue to the Russian people,
are a few of many influential individuals who have demonstrated that in the
long run, the pen is much more influential than the sword. Hence history
establishes the significance of the importance of doctrinal developments in
the progress of man. America has supported this thesis for generations with-
out calling it doctrinal activity.
(b) Even if the historical record did not provide such logical justi-
fication for America's undertaking a conscious doctrinal program, an analysis
of the Communist efforts would be sufficient justification for our getting
into this activity with greater emphasis. For thirty-five years, the Bol-
sheviks have been engaged in a massive, comprehensive effort to make converts
to international Communism, as Communist doctrine is interpreted by them.
Throughout this period, they have consistently assumed that progress toward
world domination required the co-equal emphasis on three basic factors-iithe
military, the economic, and the ideological. This tripartite emphasis follows
the pattern of previous national expansions---theirs as well as our own--the
rifle, the plough, and the bib:Le.
(c) In our belated efforts to meet this challenge, we have greatly
strengthened two of our weapons--the military and the economic--but we have
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failed to emphasize to anything like the same degree the third element--
the doctrinal, or ideological--wliioh the Soviet leaders have developed,
through thirty-five years of intensive experimenting. It is hardly assumed
in the U.S. that Communism has its greatest appeal only to the underprivilege4
masses. It is true that hungry mobs are good material for the uses of the
Communist leadership, but it is also a fact that Communism breeds less in
empty bellies than in empty minds, The Communists could not possibly have
achieved their past conquest if they had not appealed to thought leaders
everywhere and to the sons and daughters of the influential intelligentsia,
In part, their success has been due to superior organization, and it vrill be
the work of years for us to rival the Party apparatus in this respect. On
the other hand, it has been due in even larger part to our neglect in meeting
the challenge wherever the organization has not yet taken hold.
(d) Basically, the problem is a simple one, Russia has nine men on
the diamond; we have two or three. Furthermore, they are playing the game
with a shrewd sense of audience reaction, and we are not. Our greatest handi
cap has been in assuming that opinions and convictions are formed in other
parts of the world in the same way that our own are formed. Because we
take most of our ideas from newspapers, television, radio and magazines,
we assume that others are influenced by the same means. This is a fatal
fallacy.
(e) In most parts of the world, the radio and television are still
novelties; magazines have low circulation; and newspapers circulate mostly
among political groups whose opinions are already formed. Almost everywhere
else, books--permanent literature--are by far the most powerful means of in-
fluencing attitudes and.. except for the Information Libraries of the State
Department, we have done little to promote the publication and circulation
of the books favorable to our cause and damaging to the Communist Party line.
The technique of the Communists has not been to promote free distribution of
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books which carry the inference of propaganda--but to subsidize the circu-
lation of.their books through regular commercial trade of every country in
which they can obtain a foothold..
(f) In this they have been highly successful. In recent years, the
largest selling book in the world--with the possible exception of the Bible--
has been the Short Histor of, the Communist Party which is the testament of
the Ccmmunists. Its circulation exceeds 41,000,000 copies. This book is
on sale in the U.S. bookstores for .,1.00 on fine paper, beautifully printed.
The latest attempt to reply to this basic testanent is Dr. Stefan T. Possony'
A Century of Con; 'lict, in which an effort is made to record the true story
of the Party history. This 'book sells for ;x7.50. There is no organized
promotion of its sale at home or abroad; and, like other books of similar
significance, it will undoubtedly sell no more than 6,000 copies in the
United States and throughout the world.
3. sumrlary of N a ona,l Pol:ic pp?licaule to a NatioDoctrinal Pro 2m
(a) NSC objectives, whale not explicitly mentioning a doctrinal pro-
gram, provide ample justification for the use of doctrinal warfare as a
means of accomplishing basic American objectives vis-a-vis USSR and its
Satellites. Three NSC papers, NSC 20/4, 68/2 and 135/3, provide the major
basis for national policy, while supplementary objectives towards Satellite
countries are indicated in NS0 58/2 and 48/5. Current national policy
provides for the reduction of. Soviet power, including that of its Satellites,
to a status which will not be a threat to the security of the U.S. or the
Free World. All methods "short of war" are implicitly included as means of
accomplishing this major objective. The most recent statement of American
objectives regarding Communism provides the U.S. should develop on a world-
wide basis, positive appeals which would be superior to Communism. The U.S.
should do everything possible: to exploit the difficulties which arise between
the Soviet leaders and other Communist states and those people whom they are
oppressing. 1Thile those NSC papers do not explicitly mention a doctrinal
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pro ;ream, it is clear that such a program is one means of accomplishing such
objectives since it can contribute to the reduction of Communist appeals and
influence on the intellectual elite, both within and without the Communist
orbit, and thereby contribute to the reduction of Soviet power.
4s. Armunist-Ung_of Doctrinal Warfare
(a) Before discussing specific Communist activities in doctrinal wa.r-
fare, attention should be given to the predisposition towards Communism en-
gendered by the wide emphasis given to the Marxian, or the economic, inter-
pretation of history and life, Before Leninism, much less Stalinism, had
developed their major theses, the materialistic philosophy of Karl Marx
had become a basic hypothesis of the world intellectuals. Marx+s inter-
pretation was particularly acceptable to the intellectuals from the so-
called colonial areas, who were being educated in the Western universities.
His theory of capitalism and economic determinism appeared to be a validly
rational explanation for colonial imperialism and the international rival-
ries and conflicts of the early Twentieth Century. The initial spread of
Marxism was not connected with any Soviet design or objective. In evaluating
Communist developments and in developing an American doctrinal program, the
.predisposition of intellectuals toward Uarxism must be recognized.
(b) Soviet Communism as organized into a political reality in Russia
by Lenin and subsequently by Stalin has been characterized as a political
fulfillment of Marrs Communist Manifesto. Lenin and Stalin, however, were
international revolutionaries, whereas Marx had been only a 2uropean revo-
lutionary. Marx expected the industrialized workors of the West to bring
about a new era. Lenin and Stalin, coming into power in an agrarian country
with few industrialized workers, discovered that Marx'.s doctrine had to be
modified. This modification became especially necessary when industrialized
Western Europe became less and less disposed in 1919-1920 to follow the
Russian example, Hence Lenin, and subsequently Stalin, found it necessary
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to re-interpret Marx and to develop a doctrine justifying their Soviet
political and social philosophy. Since they claimed to be disciples of
Marx, this new Soviet doctrine had to continue the appearance that Marx was
still its basic oracle. The desire to retain the connection with Marxism
was also undoubtedly due to the known widespread acceptance of Marxian phil-
osophy which would provide entre to Soviet interpretations of Marxism.
Hence, the development of a, whole series of writings by both Lenin and
Stalin, with subsequent popularizations by lesser Communist disciples, to
re-interpret INIarxfs philosophy in the terms and in the ideology of the new
Soviet regime.
(c) The Soviet regime, while limited to Russia for its political exis-
tence, had always been visualized as an international movement. From the
beginnings of the Soviet State, the maintenance of closely connected inter-
national cadres of local national Communists was visualized. Lacking con-
trol of communications which would insure close supervision of these widely
scattered and, at times, antagonized local organizations, Lenin and Stalin
visualized their written interpretations of Marx as the philosophical basis
which would be planned by Moscow. These re-interpretations would provide
the philosophic or doctrinal basis for properly orientating and training
local national Communists. They would be the equivalent of uniform text-
books for training and indoctrinating neophytes. They would also provide
source materials or documentation which might induce unsuspecting non-Ccm.-
munist Marxists to lock with favor upon the Soviet interpretation and be-
come pro-Soviet in viewpoint, if not in action.
(d) From the early 1920's the Soviet leaders have maintained two com-
plementary lines in the distribution of their printed material, The Foreign
Languages Publishing House or the International Book Publishers (I+ezhdunar-
ednaya Kni) was established in Moscow to produce Communist texts in the
major languages of those areas where the Communists hoped to be influential.
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In the past thirty-five years, the Soviets claim to have published
978,377,000 works of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. At the same time, national
Communist Parties under Soviet influence established their own publishing
companies to produce locally the same basic materials which would provide
the local ideological foundation for Soviet Comamnism. Production is only
one part of doctrinal warfare. The proper distribution to the potential ad-
herents is an equally important aspect of doctrinal warfare. The local Com-
munist Party is mainly responsible for the distribution of Communist materi-
als, either directly to peoples known to be interested in Communism or to
intellectual centers, where it will be available to professors and scholars
who have been trained to study all aspects of an intellectual subject. Hence.
it was that the Communists quite early in their ideological effort aired at
the intellectual elite as the group most likely to be interested in and in-
fluenced by a doctrinal or philosophical basis for Cor; aiunism. Hence they
concentrated on libraries, universities and research groups as locations
where their published material might be most extensively used and thereby
be most influential in predisposing intellectuals and their disciples towards
accepting Communist ideology.
(e) The material for estimating the current doctrinal warfare effort
of the Soviets is most difficult to isolate. The OIR series, Ana_ r s. of
Communist Propa.g,anda is excellent in its coverage of the Soviet publication
efforts, but only six countries have been covered. Evidence of the impor-
tance of doctrinal warfare to the Kremlin is Stalin's statement in his
article, "Economic Problems" in Bolshevik (October 1952):
I think that the comrades are not taking into
account the full significance of a Marxist textbook
on political economy. The textbook is needed not
only for our Soviet youth; it is particularly needed
for the Communists of all countries and for people
who sympathize with the Commmunists.
They want to know all this and mare other things
not simply out of curiosity but in order to learn from
us and to use our experience for their own countries.
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That is why the appearance of a good Mar:ist textbook
on political economy is not only of internal political
significance but also of major international signifi-
cance.
(f) A recent OIR article gives significant figures on Soviet book
production in the past thirty-five years. Soviet figures do not permit
breakdown of their total of a billion books into the copies per foreign
language, but it is establishable that Stalin's Problems of Leninism was
published in 55 languages, Stalin's On the Draft Constitution. in 89 lang-
uages, and Stalin's Short Hist in 67 languages, while his report to the
18th Congress of the Party appeared in 72 languages. (ID. No. 5630.108,
Feb 5, 1953). The Soviets have given evidence that they appreciate that
in every civilized society, the printed book has been the carrier of the
major attitudes and ideals on which the civilization rests. These publi-
cations are devoted to the task of instilling the conviction, even among
intelligent readers, that Communism possesses the key to our time and that
all other conceptions are false. By developing Narxian interpretations,
by references to a better futt;re world, and by maintaining a consistent
emphasis on the unquestionable truth of the Coaununist position, the Soviet
leaders have carefully distributed their books into the world's intellectual
centers where they get intensive attention from students and intellectuals.
Communist books possess a documentary character while available anti-Com-
munist books seem to be more diatribes. Communist publications thereby in-
fluence the intellectual elite with their relative monopoly in the publica-
tions field.
(g) Individuals may question whether the Soviet figures for the number
of books published is really valid inasmuch as they classify as a book, an
8 to 20 page excerpt or essay.. 1Jhat is important is not whether they are
books comparable in size with American books, but whether the world recipients
and users of Soviet books consider them to be permanent literature or merely
political pamphleteers. Unfortunately for the West, the reprint of a Stalin
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essay? because it has the form of a book, is considered as permanent litera-
ture whereas American reprints,, having the form of a pamphlet, are too fre-
quently viewed as ephemeral propaganda materials. The West, and particularly
America, need not compete with the millions of copies of so-called Soviet
books, but America should compete with the Canmunists in getting a more
thorough and influential distribution of better books prepared to combat
Soviet doctrine throughout the world.
(h) The Communists do not rely solely on books. Having gotten their
initial books distributed, they develop the technique of ?~Istudy groups" to
foster the detailed and intensive study and analysis of their books. It is
part of the Communist Party training program that membors, particularly
those of an intellectual caliber, must participate in regular "study group"
discussions. These "study groups" are not mass gatherings, but they are
small in number and consist of carefully selected individuals who are guided
along the road of the Lenin-Stalinist line by a trained Party worker. Using
the Ccnrnunist texts which each in?mber must read, analyze and corm-,ent upon,
the group leader guides the members to the right answers to all possible
non-Corazaunist objections to their system. Communism uses the "study group"
method for all its members, but this systez is most important for training
the intellectual Party members to become proficient in handling doctrine.,
theory and dogma. Reports on the Communist Party in the U.L). during the 30's,
on the Communist Party in China in the 20ts, in continental Europe in the 30?sl
and even now in Japan in the 50's, all testify that the compulsory reading
and discussion of the basic writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin by "study
groups" has been a major technique in training and indoctrinating the riore
intelligent Party members. A quotation from George E. Taylor's "Intellec-
tual. Climate of Asia" is equally applicable to Canraunist techniques through-
out the world:
Through long experience the Communists have acquired
considerable skill in influencing the intellectual climate.
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The leaders they train do not come from the poor peasantry
or the illiterate textile workers of the sweatshops, They
come from the professions, from the highly educated sons
and daughters of good families, from the frustrated ideal-
ists fired with dreams of social justice, from the young
men hungry for power. The politburo of the Hukbalahaps
includes some of the best blood of the Philippines; the
majority have been to college. In India, the aristocracy
has given quite a few of its sons and daughters to the
movement. The Chinese Communist movement was a peasant
movement only in the sense that it used peasants to get to
power; most of the :Leaders would not know the right end of
a plough. Mao Tse-tung was a librarian, not a farmer, and
Chou En-lai one of the smoothest intellectuals of modern
China,
(i) The "study group" indoctrination is tied in very closely with
Communist book stores as a method of insuring the proper distribution of
Communist books. There are lists by countries of the known Communist book
stores and centers which act as local distributors for Communist literature,
but our intelligence does not provide any real analysis of their sales pro-
cedures and of the arrangements between the Moscow publishers, the various
national wholesalers and the local Communist book store. A recent cable from
.suuyc_u1ea tinat the internat-
ional Publishing House in Moscow determines what books and in what quantities
wholesalers must take Communist publications. When wholesalers or retailers
request certain titles which they know thsoy can profitably sell, they are
only given those titles an csnditiou that they also take and distribute less
salable Communist literature, Similarly, the price variations and the par-
ticularly profitable discounts to dealers give. Lan indication of those books
which the Soviets really wished to be distributed in Israel. Full-sized
books, particularly the writings of Stalin and Lenin, are priced at ridicu-
lously low figures while scientific books or books with a current demand are
priced extremely high. It hardly semis that such maneuvers are strictly acci-
dental, particularly when funding or exchange arrangements are provided by
the local Soviet diplomatic office in proportion to the successful sale of
those Communist publications which they wish distributed in a particular area.
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5. Existin U. S. Doctrinal Proaam
(a) Even though the greatest emphasis in American informational and
psychological operations has been to make America better known and better
understood before the world, doctrinal activity has been a small part of this
general effort. Starting with Office of War Information's book program in
1943, there has been a continual effort to provide American books about Amer-
ican life in overseas libraries and likewise to foster their commercial sale
and distribution,, Most of these books, however, merely explain how we arrived
at the conditions under which we live, or how we do things. There were and
are histories of the U.S., of our political, economic and even labor devel-
opments. There are explanations of the American system and even theory of
government, but apart from the strictly literary books, novels, etc., the
majority of serious books are of a "know-how" type. Few books portraying
the basic philosophy of American life and American government and American
economics have been included in our book distribution programs. This situa-
tion is almost equally true today with the ICS program of IIA. It is most
difficult to classify books by doctrinal criteria, but it would be a fair
estimate to indicate that on an average, only a few of a hundred titles
distributed by ICS are properly of a doctrinal character.
(b) In this area, a major overt doctrinal effort can be developed by
the American government. It does not need the establishment of any new pro-
gram, but merely needs a re-emphasis or, doctrinal items in the selection of
books. There are already existent a sufficient number of the trritings of
leading Americans in one-volume editions, as well as one-volume editions
of the basic documents of American history. Greater attention might also
be given to the selection of theoretical studies of a fundamentally scholar-
ly character which explained the American attitude and philosophy, even the
apparent inconsistencies in such American approaches, to government, economic
problems, labor and sociological problems. These studies, rather than liianualE
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on irrigation, soil conservation, machine handling, etc., are the type of
books which the intellectual elite would find most. satisfactory and would
secure a more friendly and influential reaction towards the U.S.
(c) In addition to the book program, the radio and news operations from
its beginnings under Office of War Information until the present has used
the doctrinal approach as one method of attracting increased audiences and
of influencing basic thought. The emphasis on doctrine may have declined
between 1946 and 1951, but certainly at the present time, the Voice of
America (VOA) is including doctrinal aspects in its work. VOA has developed
a special ideological unit which prepares master scripts showing how current
news can be doctrinally interpreted to the embarrassment of Communist doctrine.
These master scripts are circulated to all the output desks and VOA direc-
tives urge the desks to give more and more attention to doctrinal items.
However, basic doctrinal materials can only be a small part of a VOA program.
Sincilarly, radio has the definite disadvantage that, being an ephemeral medium,
it can do hardly more than stimulate interest by an unconvinced person in a
new idea or give an already convinced anti.-Communist a jibe which he may
find useful. However, because the spoken word is very rapidly completed and
cannot be completely recalled for extended and analytical study, it makes
relatively little impression on the enli ghtenood mind which might be expected
to develop the doctrinal line and thereby influence others. This peculiar
limitation is characteristic of radio as a medium of information. 1,1everthe-?
less, VOA should increase its doctrinal emphasis. It should plan to develop
audience interest in permanent literature which contributes a strong doctrinal
argument against Communism. For example, any broadcast of a doctrinal chara-
cter could quote to the listener those passages of an important Communist
tract which are contradictory. It might also refer the listeners, especi-
ally in broadcasts to peripheral areas to a good locally available doctrinal
treatment of the particular issue under discussion. More importantly, the
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radio, by very carefully excerpting of new doctrinal publidations, might
stimulate its audiences to want to read the new book and right thereby de-
velop demand for books of a doctrinal nature, The VOA has definite limita-
tions within the doctrinal field, but the VOA can and should do more than it
is now doing for the doctrinal program.
(d) A similar generalization should be made for IIA's International
Press Service (IPS). Following the example of FICOG's Der Lona.t and Ost
Urob:Lw.ne, IPS has developed an English Language periodical entitled, Problems
of Communism, which is definitely an important facet of a U.a. doctrinal pro-
gram. Prepared in Washington, and aimed at the same general, target audience
as is proposed in this doctrinal program, Problems of CorrmiunbsI,, attempts to
cover all aspects of Communist; doctrine. It is emphasizing articles by named
intellectual leaders, and it is now increasing the number of non-American con-
tributors to have greater audience appeal. Recent issues have been delayed
by the department's directives regarding security clearances on all contri-
butors and by the limitation on the quotations from Commanist sources. The
periodical is increasing its circulation to the practical capacity for an
English language journal, i.e., 3,OCO copies. Problem.sof Co_r sm clearly
has made an impact on its target, the doctrinal elite.
(e) It can be visualized that in the coordination of this national
doctrinal program, greater use of Problems of Ccmmunien and similar publi-
cations can be made. Foreign :Language editions should be seriously considered,
so that doctrinal material would be available to the larger audience not now
controlling the English language. Probler:;s of Comrun sm,and similar doctrinal
periodicals should definitely be published on scheduled dates so that the
audience may expect issues at a particular time and habituate their antici-
pation of its reception. IFS so planned Fro_ bler,A or Commupism, but adminis-
trative and clearance difficulty s caused inordinate delays. There was
also the question as to whether Problems of Comrrunt.sm. might best be published
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as a government publidation, when its distribution is directly controlled by
the overseas missions or whether it should be published as a private or aca-
demic effort ti:ith some distribution through diplomatic missions, but mainly
by direct mailing from the publisher, or academic center. There is also
need for a more uniform, consistent effort by all overseas missions so that
the greatest distribution in all areas Is accomplished. It is hard to conceive
how 200 copies can be distributed in Finland, and only 100 in London; or how
500 can be distributed in India, and relatively few in France and in other
important pro-Western areas.
6. Feasibi_ity of Increased Doctrinal Pro am
(a) It has previously been stated that the Communists, through perma-
nent literature and documentary materials, have predisposed educated groups
to accept portions of Unmunist philosophy as the logical explanation for
world conditions. That Communist effort has provided an intellectual just3.-
fication for the Communist propaganda approach to the masses on practical
day--to-day problems. If Communism, which is an illogical, unrealistic system
which avoids facts about itself, is able to employ doctrinal instruments to
influence human judgments and human behavior, American efforts which concen-
trate on ascertainable facts :must necessarily be more effective inasmuch
as the American approach is logical and is based on a more widely accepted
appreciation of human nature. In other words, American philosophy is based
on logical and scientific truth and hence must be more acceptable to the in-
tellectual elite than a philosophy of authority and falsehood.
(b) The Soviet leaders have had success in the doctrinal field because
they have continuously supplied the basino, materials, books and thought-pro-
voking periodicals, whereby influential thought patterns were moulded towards
Communist goals. America has not concentrated on insuring that the merits of
our basic views were permanently available throughout the world. America has
let the Soviet philosophy be the major influence upon the developed minds.
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This doctrinal program is not a direct effort to sell the world on the
American system. It is a program to make the world aiare of the dangers of
the Communist philosophy and the advantages of the Free World's approach.
The doctrinal program is the effort to balance the availability of Communist
literature with objective studios which would be appealing to the enlightened
minds.
(c) Except for the hard-core Communist, educated people have a trained
intellectual curiosity. They wish to know more if they can have available
materials whose objective value they respect. This doctrinal program will
develop that material and through the improved distribution methods and
techniques will insure that the target audience learns that this material.
is readily and economically available. The natural curiosity of the devel-
oped mind will be stimulated to read more and more as doctrinal discussions
become increasingly significant, on both the local and international level.
Like other humans, the educated man wants to keep up with his confreres; he
hopes to be in on the "know"; and he desires to discuss new developments in-
telli;;:ently. It is this natural desire which will increase the market for
doctrinal materials and which will keep the market open for a continued pro-
gram which becomes self-generating of now and more stimulating ideas,
(d) There is little question that Americans are capable of producing
materials of the desired type. American scientific methodology is an ac-
cepted pattern throughout the world? Americans have had the practical ex.-
perience of selling their ideas on the domestic market and, with the language
of scientific methodology, the same basic American contributions can be a
stimulating influence throughout the world.
(e) The rain limitation on the American effort has been the lack of
determination to engage in a concentrated world-wide effort. Our writers
concentrate on discussing American problems for an American audience. More
impcrtantly, our publishers have concentrated on publishifg only for the
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May 5, 1953
American market and have not selected items which would have much broader
appeal. The doctrinal program will merely bring to the front and make con-
scious the fact that these same materials which are prepared and distributed
for the American market can have an important impact if they are made available
to the international market. Momentarily, a concentrated publicity and pro-
motional effort may have to be initiated in the overseas market to arouse
interest in American publications, but in view of the success of existing
promotional activities in the American book trade and in view of the greater
world interest in books, promotional activities are clearly feasible and fruit.-
full.
7. Thq Development of Basic Principles
(a) The doctrinal program is necessarily a long-range intellectual
activity which a must be continuously and consistently fostered and accelerated
to insure that all types of basic materials which will appeal to the intell-
ectual. elite are available in all areas. A doctrinal program requires time
to accomplish its desired imjaaet on influential groups in any area. It re-
quires more time for the doctrinal tr^rgets to influence the decision makers.
The doctrinal program cannot be expected to make an irm;fediate impact nor can
it expect to change doctrinal thought patterns quickly or as a result of a
short-term effort. In addition to a continuous effort, the doctrinal program
requires the development of published materials which will be recognized by
their overseas readers as critical and objective studies and analyses of Com-
munism and other totalitarian doctrines.
(b) Some such doctrinal material is already available and should be
revived and intensively re-distributed. However, enormous gaps exist in
such analyses, particularly doctrinal materials which the proposed target
group would not classify as mere propaganda fomentations against Communism.
Hence there is a need for a machinery which, on a systematic and scientific
basis, would itself produce and would stimulate the production by others at
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home and abroad of new studies, handbooks and documentary reprints which
critically and objectively analyze Communism and also portray the American
way of life. This material would be produced on a level of objectivity which
would be acceptable to the vast majority of tie educated :elite throughout the
world (See: Proposal I).
(a) In addition to such critical and objective production, additional
provocative material which would appeal to a reading public below the level
of the enlightened minds should also be produced. All literate people
world need:
to know what C