STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AND FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200050002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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August 1, 1954
STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
AND FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Submitted to the President and the National Security
Council by the Psychological Strategy Board
pursuant to the following documents dated 29 May 1952
received from 14r. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary
of the National Security Council: (1) "Memorandum for
the Director, Psy thologiea.l Strategy Board - Status of
United States Programs for National Security," and (2)
"Outline for Progi:;ss and Statue Reports by the Psycho-
logical Strategy Board to the President and the National
Security Council.''
This report consists of:
(1) A statement on the status of the national psychological
effort as of 30 June 1952 in relation to objectives
contained in approved national policies. This section
considers both the implementation of approved objectives,
policies and programs by the departments and agencies
concerned, and salient developments in the psychological
situation abroad,
(2) Progress of the Psychological Strategy Board from its
inception through 30 June 1952 in formulating and uromul--
gating over-all-national psychological objectives, policies
and r~rograms, and other activities,
desires to emphasize the following general conclusions:
1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strategic
level should be based on. an agreed over-all strategic concept for the
national psychological effort. The development of such a concept, in
turn, can take place only in conjunction with a corresponding develop-
ment and clarification of basic national policy, which may not be pos-
I. STATUS OF THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
The Board presents below a statement on the status of national psycho-
logical programs as of 30 June 1952c In submitting this statement the Board
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2. The United States appears to be holding its own in the psycho-
logical struggle with the Soviet World but is not making significant
progress toward the objective of reduction and retraction of Soviet
power as laid down in NSC 20/4. The difficulty appears to lie partly
in the absence of fully r.eveloped plans for the implementation of
this national policy, and partly in the time required to develop the
necessary capabilities, especially in view of Soviet measures which
maintain the Iron Curtain with increasing effectiveness.
The statement which follows is based on an analysis of current reports
of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, of a report by field
staff representatives of the "utual Security Agency, and of a report by the
Central Intelligence Agency, concerning their activities related to the national
psychological effort during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952.*
This statement is not presented as a full evaluation of the national
psychological program during the period in question, the Board having decided
that such an evaluation is not possible at this time. However, the reports on
which it is based throw significant light on some aspects of the existing "cold
war" situation. There emerges from them a picture of some substantial progress,
mixed with many problems and obstacles which hinder a more complete achievement
of our psychological objectives.
A. Outside the Iron Curtain
The general psychological situation in the non-Soviet world is not bright,
but progress has been made in some areas.
In Western Europe the picture is spotty. On the one hand, progress is
reported in containing Soviet communism and in the development of unity and readi-
ness to build indigenous military strength in the area. On the other hand there
*For the text of the report of the Department of State to the NSC, and summaries
of the other three reports mentioned, see Annexes A, B. and C. and specially
classified Annex D.
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are disturbing reports of the growth of neutralism and anti -Americanism in France
and Britain, if not in Western Europe as a whole.
In the Middle East, United States capabilities for effective psychologic-
al action have declined, though some slow progress is reported in certain sections
of the Moslem world.
In _Urica, intensive communist efforts to gain control over the colored
races are having some success.. A modest start has been made at laying the ground-
work for future activities aimed at checking them.
In Latin Amer:i.ca, there has been a recent increase in our capabilities
for effective psychological action, and some indication of substantial progress
in combatting anti-American feeling in certain countries.
In South and Southeast Asia, anti-colonialism and associated racial re-
sentments have been far more Important elements in the psychological situation
than anti-communism, thus preventing full exploitation -f 4wnipp favorable devel,.
opments in the military struggle against rebel forces in the area. On the other
hand, communist electoral gains in India have forced the Nehru Government to
modify perceptibly its former position of neutrality in the East-West conflict.
In Formosa and Japan, some gains are reported as a result of United
States psychological activities.
In addition to the above comments on specific areas, the following general
observations on the non-Soviet world, drawn from the departmental reports, may be
warranted:
1. A steady operational trend toward the use of indigenous groups
for propaganda purposes reflects a recognition that in many areas, par-
ticularly but not solely Western Europe, overt propaganda bearing the
United States label is meeting with increasing indifference or resistance.
Further development of non-attributed psychological methods, together
with a de-emphasis of overt channels, appears to be logical in this
situation.
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2. In underdeveloped countries some progress has been made in
developing psychological approaches which appeal to local aspirations
and emphasize local participation and initiative. Such approaches
are particularly relevant; in these areas, where the memory or actuality
of domination by the white man is a far greater psychological reality
than the Soviet menace.
3. The overriding abhorrence of another possible war in some
areas, particularly Western Europe, constitutes an important psycho-
logical liability for the United States. This attitude tends to in-
hibit actions which may seem to involve any increased risk of war,
and manifests itself in neutralism, anti-Americanism, and extreme
sensitivity to occasional warlike statements by leading Americans.
The spread of this attitude makes possible the continued effective
use of "peace" as a leading theme in Soviet psychological aggression.
4. Certain national policies of the United States are psychological-
1,,- damaging in various areas of the non-Soviet world. In the Moslem
world this is true of United States policy toward Israel; in areas
under European domination it is true of United States acceptance of
the colonial policies of its NATO allies; in Britain and elsewhere
it is true of United States policy toward China.
The same may be said of certain primarily domestic matters.
For instance, efforts to counteract communist exploitation of the
race relations problem in the United States have not been fully suc-
cessful. Likewise, the :restrictive immigration policy of the United
States, most recently embodied in the McCarran Act, has damaging psycho-
logical repercussions abroad. Finally, United States tariff laws
severely hurt the ability of foreign countries to export to this
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coiuitry and thus are seen abroad as running directly counter to United
States policy of building up economic stability in the free world by
expanding international trade.
B. Behind the Iron Curtain
In the communist-domLinated areas of Europe and of the Far East, Soviet
power was probably as strong at the end of the fiscal. year 1952 as it was at the
beginning. There was no evidence of progress toward achievement of the basic
objectives set forth in NSC 20/!i, namely, the reduction and retraction of Soviet
communist power. Moreover, short-term possibilities of any improvement in this
respect appeared so slight as to be negligible. In this area of the world our
national psychological effort, both overt and covert, must continue for some
time to emphasize long-term objectives and the discovery of means to build up
resources and capabilities.
Among the many problems incident to this buildup, one in particular may
be mentioned. Our capabilities for effective action against the communist regime
in China are limited in part by the absence of a stable and more universal rally-
ing point outside China to which overseas Chinese could look for political and
psychological leadership, and by the related need for a thorough-going reform of
Nationalist Chinese military and political institutions.
In the overt information field behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice of
America emerges clearly from the reports as virtually the only remaining United
States psychological operation whose programs effectively reach the peoples of
both the USSR and the satellite countries. The reports are equally clear, how-
ever, as to the need for making the Voice still more powerful. Meanwhile there
are ominous indications that we may be falling behind in the electromagnetic war.
Some good use has been made of defectors and escapees from behind the
Iron Curtain during the year, both on the programs of the Voice of America and
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in non-attributable activities of other agencies. Results point to the desirabil-
ity of a still more highly organized effort in this direction.
C. Related Activities
Certain related activities of a highly restricted nature are not covered
in the body of this report. For an evaluative summary of these activities, refer-
ence is made to the specially classified Annex D.
D. Organizational. Prc~ress
An improvement is noted in the effectiveness of policy guidance during
the period covered by this report. In part, the improvement has resulted from
closer cooperation of the departments and agencies involved. Quicker and more
effective action both in Washington and in the field, and a consequent improve-
ment in the coordination of our psychological effort, has resulted from a number
of forward steps in organization. The reports make it clear, however, that much
still remains to be done.
II. PROGRESS IN FOtNNULATING AND PROMULGATING OVER-ALL NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
OBJECTIVES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
During its first year of operation the Psychological Strategy Board has
taken a number of steps to carry out its responsibility "for the formulation and
promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psycho-
logical operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and
programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological
effort." The major effort has been in the planning field. The chief steps taken
are as follows:*
A. Plans completed and in effect;
(1) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist
Power in France - designed to encourage and support French Government
efforts to reduce communist power in their country to a point where it
# or'a more detailed report on planning ac iivitties, see specially classified
Annex E. EYES ONLY
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will no longer threaten United States national objectives in the area.
Under this Plan and the parallel Plan for Italy (see below), the
initiative for the most important actions lies with the indigenous
governments. Supporting actions by the United States are under the
control of the Ambassador. Progress in France has been considerable
during the past two months and prospects for the future appear good.
(2) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist
Power in Italy - parallel to the above plan for France. Although
progress in Italy is less substantial than in France, the Italian
Government is actively considering further effective action in this
field.
B. Plans and guidances completed but not yet being executed:
(1) Plans for immediate execution: None
(2) Stand-by plans:
a. General wart
i. A plan for the conduct of psychological operations
in the event of general war has been submitted by
the Board to the National Security Council and was
under study by them as of 30 June 1952.*
This plan was approved by the President on 25 July 1952.
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ii. A national overt propaganda policy guidance for
general war has been approved by the Board and
serves as guidance for current operational plan-
ning on this subject in the Government*
b. Korean Armistice Negotiations:
Two psychological operations plans have been promul-
gated. One is partly operational at present and
provides for further actions in the event that an
armistice is achieved. The other plan provides for
the contingency that armistice negotiations are con-
clusively broken off and full hostilities are resumed.
C. Plans and projects authorized and in process of development involve
most of the critical areas in the world struggle.
A plan for national psychological strategy with respect to
Germany, nearly completed, is to deal tdth the integration of the
Federal Republic into Western Europe, the reduction of Soviet
capabilities in Western Germany, the problem of German unification,
and the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe.
Psychological strategy plans to advance national objectives
in the Middle East, Southeast Apia, and Japan are in earlier
stages of preparation. L?,;ith respect to the Soviet Union a psycho-
logical operations plan for exploiting Stalin's passing from power
has been drafted and is receiving further staff study.
Other plans and papers in preparation, not confined to any
geographic area, include:
(1) an over-all strategic concept for the national psycho-
logical effort;
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(2) a plan for stimulating and utilizing defection
from the Soviet Orbit beyond the existing flow
of escapees (this plan will supplement the
",Phase All plan mentioned in A. (3) above);
(3) an inventory of "cold war" instrumentalities,
some of them novel, with a view to harassment
and retaliation against the USSR and the Soviet
Orbit;
(Li) an analysis of communist "germ warfare" and other
"hate America" propaganda and the psychological
problems arising therefrom; and
(5) a plan designed both to gain greater acceptance
in the free world for United States economic
security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Orbit,
and to capitalize on and obstruct Soviet economic
exploitation of captive Europe and Communist China.
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THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM
Status Report for Fiscal Year 1952
Prepared by the Department of State.
August 1, 1952
30
ei A
1. TASKS. In performance of the -mission, the tasks of the Department of
State's foreign information and educational exchange programs, carried on
by the International Information Administration, continued to be those set
forth in Annex V to NSC 114/2, in order of priority as follows:
(i) "The first task is to multiply and intensify psychological
deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of
outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist
China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or in the form of
the subversion of existing free governments by civil forces acting
on behalf of Soviet Communism,"
(ii) "The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth
of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the
free world, especially in Western Europe, including Western Germany,
in their capability successfully to deter aggression of Soviet
Communism or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur and to inspire
concrete international, national and individual action accordingly."
(iii) "The third task is to combat, particularly in the Hear and
Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies
threatening the undermining oJ' the cohesion and the stability of
the free world and the withdrawal of governments and peoples into
neutralism,"
(iv) "The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held
captive by Soviet Comunism, including the peoples of the Soviet
Union, hope of ultimate liberction and identification with the free
world and to nourish, ~rithout provoking premature action, a popular
spirit disposed to timely resistance to regimes now in power."
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(v) "The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments
traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin
America, a continued recognition of mutual interdependence and to
promote national and individual action accordingly."
2. BUDGET. The budget available to the Department of State for informa-
tion programs for fiscal year 1952 was:
Requested by
the President
Allocations of
Congressional
Allowance
None requested
0;36,001,160)#
Operations
International Press
Service
X11,952,304
8,465,815
International Motion
Picture Service
13,074,035
10,194,554
International Broadcasting
Service
25,164,655
19,872,864
Information Service
Centers
7,133,909
4,647,780
Exchange of Persons
Service
10,652,960
6,515,802
Field Operations:
NEA 0'6038,231
1E 5,^SO,673
ATA 3,291,311
Eta. 5,793,877
27,329,737
20,4/8,504
Policy and Program
Direction
2,226,552
2,203,146
Administrative
Support
,17,L6848.
140226.535
;'15,000,000
:;86,575,000
Iranian pro am
(PL 861)
106,219
Finnish (PL 265)
298,697
*Carry-over available for obligations during FY 1952.
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Requested by
the Press1dent
Allocations of
Congressional
Allowance
Austria
2,024,650
1,879,800
Germany
14,653,381
13,675,020
Japan (Army Transfer, PL 37.5)
1,565,800
3, PLANS IN OPERATION.
A. Subs
1. During fiscal year 1952, the following actions were taken in
accordance with plans for every country and with special plans as noted, to
intensify paychological deterrents to aggression and subversion by Soviet
Communism:
(a) The growing strength and unity of the free world were
projected, primarily by broadcasts of the IBS, to the peoples and
gover.zraents of nations dominated by the Soviet Union. This involved
exploitation particularly of
(i) the progressive development of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (Special Information Guidance No. 83, March 16,
19510 NATO);
(ii) the Impetus given to the creation of ready defensive
capabilities among the free nations of Europe under the leader-
ship of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (ibid);
(iii) the economic and :military assistance extended to free
nations by the United States (Special Information Guidance
No. 91, May 23, 1951, Mutual Security Program);
(i.v) the maintenance by the United Nations Command of a strong
military position in Korea;
(v) the increasingly successful resistance to subversive
forces in Indochina and Malaya;
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(vi) the development of new weapons by the United States and
other free nations;
(vii) the progress achieved in establishing an effective
mobilization base in the United States;
(viii) the repeated warnings given by the United States,
Great Britain, and France that they will protect West Berlin
against aggression.
(b) The friendly disposition and the peaceful intentions of
the United States were concurrently projected. This involved exploita-
tion particularly of
(i) the proposal put forward by the United States, the
United Kingdom and France at the Sixth General Assembly of
the United Nations for study of the limitation and balanced
reduction of arms and armed forces (Special Information
Guidance No. 104, October 24, 1951);
(ii) the letter addressed by the President of the United States
to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR expressing the friendship of the people of the
United States for the people of the USSR (Emergency Plan for
Psychological Offt.niive (USSR), April 11, 1951);
(iii) the patience of the United Nations Command in seeking
an armistice in Korea on honorable terms (Special Guidance
No,, 106, December 17, 1951, Korean Armistice Negotiations).,
and
(iv) special efforts in Germany to strengthen democratic youth
and woments group, and development of democratic educational
activities and community life.
(c) Aggravation of the internal weaknesses of Soviet
Communism was sought, in accordance with Emergency Plan for Psyciolo?
gical Offensive, by exposition particularly of
(i) the ways in which the Soviet Union exploits its satellites
and its own people for the benefit of the regime;
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(ii) the ways in which the people of China are impoverished
and ordered to war in the interest of a foreign power (Special
Information Guidance No. 9$, August 10, 1951, Friction Between
Peiping and Moscow);
(iii) the steady reduction, because of the requirements of
adventurous imperialisn, of the standard of living in areas
controlled by Soviet Communism;
(iv) the contrast between conditions in those areas and con-
ditions in the free world as testified to by defectors from
Soviet Communism;
(v) the treatment mete:k out to racial and religious minorities
within areas controlled by Soviet Communism;
(vi) the attempted destruction by Soviet Communism of the
national traditions and the cultaral heritages of peoples
falling under its sway;
(vii) the refusual of the majority of the prisoners of war
in the hands of the United Nations Command in Korea to agree to
voluntary repatriation (Special Information Guidance No. 109,
February 5, 1951, Exchange of Prisoners of War);
(viii) the Congressional inquiry into the massacre at Katyn
in 1943.
(d) Particularly in areas not under the domination of the
Kremlin, exposing the myths surrounding and inspired by Soviet
Communism,, minimizing the fears as to the strength of eifth columns
acting on its behalf and recalling the fate of free peoples whose
governments have attempted to collaborate with Soviet Communism.
This has involved. particularly
(i) countering the allegations that the United States employee':
bacteriological warfare in Korea by seeking to compel the USSR
to accept or reject competent, impartial inquiry into the
charges;
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(ii) challenging the pretensions of peace of the USSR
(Special Information Guidance No. 50, July 27, 1950, The
Betrayal of Peace, Special Information Guidance No. 96,
July 31, 1951, International Youth Festival; Special Information
Guidance No. 66, November 13, 1950, Second World Peace Congress);
(iii) exposing the nature of the Moscow Economic Conference
(Special Information Guidance No. 112, Arch 17, 1952, The
Moscow Economic Conference);
(iv) exploiting evidence of the decline of membership in the
Communist Party outside the USSR and of the diminished effective-
ness of its activities, (Special Information Guidance No. 76,
February 2, 1951, Communist Strength in Western Europe; Special
Information Guidance I>1o. 81, March 10, 1951, Communist
Fallibility;
(v) keeping alive in the minds of others the fate of the
satellites of Eastern Europe.
2. The following actions were taken to accelerate the growth of con-
fidence in the free world in its capability to deter aggression or to defeat
it should it nonetheless occur.
(a) Convincing the peoples and the governments of the free world
of the need for continued building of ready military capabilities as
a deterrent to war and of the progress made in achieving them. This
involved
(i) continuous interpretation of the problems facing the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the progress made in solving
them. (Special Information Guidance No. 83, March 16, 1951,
The Crisis of'Confidence; Special Information Guidance No. 102,
September 11, 1951, NATO Meeting, Ottawa; Special Information
Guidance No. 110, February 6, 1952, Psychological Approach to
NAC, Lisbon);
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(ii) exploitation of the development of security arrangements
in the Pacific (Special Information Guidance No. 100, August 23,
1951, Peace Treaty with Japan.)
(b) Developing understanding of the advantage of and the neces-
sity for the participation of Japan, Germany, Yugoslavia and Spain in
the common defense of the free world (Special Information Guidance No.
65, November 16, 1950, Aid to Yugoslavia; Special Information Guidance
No. 68, November 30, 1950, German Participation in the Defense of
Western Europe; Special Information Guidance No. 78, February 2, 1951,
Germany and Europe Defense; Special Information Guidance No. 100,
August 28, 1951, Peace Treaty with Japan.)
(i) "neutralism and neo-Nazism in Germany".
(c) Encouraging the peoples and governments of Europe in the
development of common institutions for mutual welfrre-and defense. This
involved demonstrating the interest of the United States in
(i) the Schuman Plan (Special Information Guidance No. 77,
Schuman Plan Signing; Special Information Guidance No. 85,
March 27, 1951, Germany and the Schuman Plan).
(ii) the European Defense Community (Special Information
Guidance No, 101, August 28, 1951, The German Defense
Contribution).
(iii) the Council of Europe (Special Information Guidance No. W.
May 8, 1951? The Concept of Europe).
(d) Maintaining confidence in the peaceful intentions, the
consistent policies and the reliable leadership of the United States
and minimizing differences with its allies. This involved
(i) developing understanding of the responsible policies of the
United States in conducting, as United Nations Command, the war
and the armistice negotiations in Korea (Special Information
Guidance No, 106, December 17, 1951, Korean Armistice Negotia-
tions; Special Information Guidance No. 110, February 5, 1952,
Exchange of Prisoners of War; Special Information Guidance lb.
x.13, March 25, 1952, Chinese Irregular Troops in Burma).
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(ii) seeking to reduce points of friction and differences with
allies (Special Information Guidance No. 92, May 31, 1951,
US and NATO Posts Overseas; Special Information Guidance ho.
93, June 11, 1951, Danger Signals to Anglo-AmericanCooperati,Dn;
Sprr.ial Information Guidance No. 107, December 29, 1951,
Mr. Churchill's Visit to United States).
(iii) explaining policies of United States deeply affecting
other countries (Special Information Guidance No. 91, May 23t
1951, Mutual Security Program; Special Information Guidance
No. 94, June 16, 1951, Trade Act Extension; Special information
Guidance No. 83, March 16, 1951, NATO--DAP; Special Information
Guidance No. 63, October 27, 1950, U.S. Economic Mission to
Philippines).
(iv) exploiting the demonstrated willingness of the United State!
to seek to relax existing international tensions by peaceful
negotiation, as it the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers
in Paris, larch dune 1951, and in proposing at the Sixth
General Assembly an inquiry into the limitation and balanced
reduction of armaments.
3. The following actions were taken, largely as the result of daily
and weekly guidance and country plans, to combat, particularly in the Near
and Riddle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies, national-
istic and religious, threatening to undermine the cohesion and stablity cf
the free world (Special Information Guidance No. 89, May 21, 1951, South
Asia).
(a) Demonstration of the continuing interest of the United
States in the achievement of the legitimate national interests on
terms of safeguarding the security of the free world. This involved
(i) exploitation of technical assistance by the United States
and other free nations to underdeveloped areas;
(ii) exploitation of other assistance to free governments
(Special Information Guidance No. 82, March 19, 1951, U. S.
Grain to India);
c i or rr_a do
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(iii) exploitation of private efforts to improve conditions in
underdeveloped areas.
(b) Encouraging the peaceful settlement of disputes threatening
stability and order. This involved
(i) projection of the efforts of the United Nations to promote
a settlement of the dispute over Kashmir (Special Information
Guidance No. 103, September 18, 1951, Kashmir Dispute);
(ii) putting into correct perspective the attitudes and the
actions of the United States with regard to situations in
Egypt., Tunisia and Morocco.
(o) Encouraging the nations involved to take positive steps to
develop their own capabilities for defense.
(d) Increasing general knowledge of the aggressive intentions
of Soviet Communism and its hostility to national independence,
established religious and local cultures.
4. The following actions were taken, largely in accordance with
Special Information Guidance No. 105, November 14, 1951, The Soviet Satel-
lites of Eastern Europe, to maintain, without provoking premature deeds,
hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by Soviet
Communism:
(a) Making plain that the United States looks to the establish-
ment in nations dominated by Soviet Communism of governments comueand-
ing the confidence of their peoples, freely expressed through orderly
representative processes. This involved exploitation particularly of
(i) statements of responsible public officials and private
citizens of the United States condemning the Sovietization of
those nations and expressing the conviction that freedom will
be regained by them.
(ii) statements and actions by emigres of a responsible charac-
ter reflecting an undiminished interest in and a steady pre-
paration for the restoration of national sovereignty;
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(iii) actions taken by the United States to safeguard the
legitimate interests of its citizens subjected to illegal
persecutions by the governments in power,
(b) Promoting faith that the present situation in the world is
not permanent and that freedom will ultimately triumph through the
exploitation particularly of
(i) evidence of the illegitimacy and hence the impermanence of
existing regimes;
(ii) the actions listed in 2 above.
(c) Keeping alive national traditions and values linking captives
with the free world through the exploitation particularly of
(i) the literature, the music, the cultural and scientific
achievements of the captive peoples in the past and by
nationals of captive nations now living and working in the
free world;
(ii) evidence of appreciation of these achievements by the
peoples of the free world;
(iii) national and religious holidays, particularly those
the celebration of which is discouraged or prohibited by
regimes now in temporary power;
(iv) the growth for the development of communities of free
nations built upon traditions and values shared by the captive
peoples (Special Information Guidance No. 86, May 8, 1951,
7-e Concept of Europe),
(d) Keeping the captive peoples accurately informed of the
situation in the free world as a source of hope and a guide to timely
action through
(i) the wide dissemination of facts about the policies and
actions of the nations of the free world and of the reckless
acts and policies of the USSR; and
(ii) sober interpretation of both the news of the free world
and of Soviet Communism.
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5. The following actions were taken, largely in accordance with
country plans and daily guidance, to maintain among peoples and governments,
particularly in Latin America, traditionally linked with the United States
a continued recognition of mutual -interests;
(al Fostering conscious public support of the principles of
Pan.-Americanism. This involved
(i) sustained exploitation of the American Foreign Ministers
Meeting, March 1951 (Special Information Guidance No. 84,
March 27, 1951, American Foreign Ministers Meeting);
(ii) exploitation of the signing of bilateral military assis-
tance treaties with seven nations of Latin America;
(iii) exploitation of visits exchanged between leading per-
sonalities of nations of Latin America and the United States.
(iv) numerous special occasions to emphasize democratic and
historic solidarity of the hemisphere.
(b) Demonstration of the continuing interest of the United
States in the achievement of legitimate national aspirations. This
involved
U) exploitation of bonds of interest between labor in United
States and labor in Latin America;
(ii) exploitation of themes and developments as stated in
3(a) above.
(iii) the signing of Point IV agreements, and 10th Anniversary
of beginning of IIAA programs in Latin America.
(iv) exploitation of efforts and achievements of private U.S.
capital to help social and economic development in other Ameri-
can republics.
(c) Development of awareness of dangers of Soviet Communism.
This involved
(i) concentrated prograil in Panama of exposure of riyths sur-
rounding Soviet Communism, emlhasized by visit of ship-mounted
radio transmitter "=Courier,"
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(ii) exposure of myths as set forth in 1(d) above.
(iii) exploited participation of Colombian troops in Korea.
(d) Development of confidence in leadership of the United States.
This involved
(i) ei:ploitation as set forth in 2(d) above.
(ii) use of Puerto Rican example to show U.S. devotion to prin-
ciple of free determination of peoples.
B. Operates
The following represent major plans put into operation during Fiscal
Year 1952,
in stration
1. The United States Information and Educational Exchange Program
was reorganized into the United States International Information Administraa..
tion.
2, Integration of informational operations was begun with the Mutual
Security Administration in Y3A countries,
3, World-wide integration of informational operations was achieved
with the Technical Cooperation Administration,
4, Training:
(a) Selected overseas local personnel were brought to the United
States for indoctrination and intensive training. This program, be-
gun before Fiscal Year 1952, was continued during the year under
review,
(b) Orientation courses and media training for American per-
sonnel newly joining, the IIA program, and on-the-job re-training
were reorganized and strengthened;
(c) Coordinated training abroad of local personnel, especially
in American library techniques, was riide & regular feature of the
United States Information, Service (USIS) operations in France and
Italy.
5. Take-over of the Public Affairs Program in Germany and Austria
on June 30, 1952, was planned and put Into effect on the target date,
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6. Take--over of the Civil Information and Education program operated
by the Supreme Commander for the a lied Powers in Japan, was planned and
put into effect on the coming into-Force of the Peace Treaty between the
United States and Japan on April 28, 1952.
Genera
7. Decentralization of operations was accelerated, marked by
(a) Increased local radio programming abroad,
(b) Increased production of press and publications abroad now amounting to 80% of the total output ?-- from raw materials and
pilot models supplied from Washington,
(c) local production of moving pictures, carrying a propaganda
message, in twelve countries,
(d) increased translations of American books, totalling 163
titles in 23 languages.
8. Greater emphasis was placed on working with and through indigenous
groups and channels, to achieve greater audience acceptability of the
United States propaganda. message, and to encourage greater participation
by those groups in sprea-ding that message.
9. A plan was adopted to increase the acceptance of American troops
overseas and combat communist propaganda against them.
10. "to offset the Soviet "Hate America campaign" and the bacteriolo-
gical warfare charges".
11. An outstanding example of sharper country planning was the
"geographic concentration" program devised by USIS-Italy, calling for in-
tensified and tailored USIS efforts in area of special political importance
in the forthcoming national elections. This program has been under way
since the beginning of the period under review.
12. United States participation in international trade fairs was
furthered by the collection made by the Department of Comrr_erce with IIA
support, of an industrial exhibit which will be shown first at the Izmir
Fair and later in Asia and Europe,
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13. A working committee was established to coordinate Ilk pro-
amming and to stimulate output of special materials for the Middle East,
which will reflect United States interest in and understanding of Islamic
peoples for other than military or political reasons.
14, A plan was adopted to counter communist influences in Indian
universities and intellectual circles, where 20% are regarded as being
communist. According to the plan, a USIS officer will visit each univer-
sity twice annually, prominent americans will make lecture tours throughout
India, and Indian professors and students will receive special mailings,
including follow-up letters.
,road casting Service
15. IIA now operates 62 land-based transmitters, of which 35 are
located in the United States and 24 at various points overseas, programming
in 46 language
18. The primary responsibility for USIS television activity was as-
signed the Broadcasting Service in close collaboration with the Motion Pic-.
ture Service (I4S) through the mechanism of the IBS-IMS Television Board;
INS was made responsible for contacts with the film industry in procuring
films for TV use.
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Press Service
19. The Press Service was reorganized along regional instead of
media lines.
20. A series of background and action kits was planned and thirteen
were issued during the year for the use of USIS overseas missions, as
follows: Essentials of Peace (exposing the communist peace offensive),
Freedom or Slavery (the fate of man under communism),. Peace of Reconstruction
(the treaty with Japan), Pattern for Aggression'(Soviet strategy in North
Korea), hinorities (a progress report on minorities in the United States),
Warmongers) Imperialist! (the United States record and the Soviet record),
NATOls third anniversary (the purpose, progress and purely defensive
character of NATO), the United States elections (explanation of the United
States political system), Credo for a Free Country (the faith that lies
back of the United States fight for liberty), Partnership for Peace (the
United Nations), 14here all Americans Stand (the nature of bi-partisan
legislation), The Truth about BW (bacteriological warfare), Communism and
Sports.
21. Seven new magazines were planned and launched durinj,%the year,
including three in Europe where nova had been published before.
22. Several interpretive news columns were planned and started to
supply the interpretation and persp::ctive often lost through strict "news"
treatment.
23. Publication of AM ERIKA magazine in Russian was given careful
review because of mounting Soviet restrictions.
Nation -Picture Service
24. Planned production for th,a Fiscal Year under review was to
service 87 countries with 470 reels of new material produced or contracted
for, 4,439 foreign language reels in 40 languages with an estim=ated
92,000 print reels prepared for distribution. This planned production was
exceeded, with over 5,000 language reels and over 92,000 print reels
completed by Fiscal Year's end.
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25. A weekly newsreel unattributed to USIS was inaugurated during
the year. It is now distributed in the Middle and Far East in 20 language
editions to 16 countries.
Information Center Service
26. A book publishing corportttion, including on its board of directors
distinguished American publishers., was organized with a capital furnished
by IIA, of 3750,000. Its first area of attention will be translations into
Arabic.
27. Utilization of books to achieve psychological objectives was
expanded through:
(a) a presentation progr m totalling 2..010..000 volurrs;
(b) greater use of loan collections in government offices,,
universities and other community centers;
(c) circulating packet libraries.
28, The number of information centers operated by USIS overseas was
increased during the year by 38, for a total of 193 centers,
rational achan `e Service
29. The selection of grantees was sharpened to focus greater psycho-
logical impact on established high priority target groups. Special efforts
are being made by overseas missions to keep in touch with granges in their
return to their native lands,
Evaluation
30. The central Evaluation staff was made directly responsible to the
Administrator of IIA to increase its objective viewpoint by removing it from
planning and programming operations.
31. A series of evaluation studies and surveys have been completed.
Many of these were contracted for with private research organizations which
operate in foreign countries through indigenous research groups and
individuals.
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32. Extensive surveys into communication habits and their relation to
political and social motivations are being conducted in several countries.,
notably Brazil., Mexico, India and Panama.
C. Pro r,; ss Ty a.rds Ob ectives
The degree to which a series of specific actions have contributed to
the creation of a given psychologic.l situation can not be measured. The
broadcasts, news files, pamphlets, posters, exhibits, motion pictures,
translations, library facilities and leader and student exchanges sponsored
by the United States Government constitute only a small part of the sum of
influences affecting the attitudes of an individual, a group or the govern-
ment of another agency. Moreover, the official propaganda of the United
States is itself only a projection of decisions taken and measures executed
in the other fields of national and informational activity -- political,
d1;1cmatic, economic, military. Propaganda can seek to put these decisions
and actions in the best light, but it can not far exceed their inherent
limitations. Neither can it shut out from the minds and the emotions of
other peoples the influences directed at them from other sources. An
estimate as to how nearly a psychological task has been carried out and to
what extent a series of ;planned actions contributed must therefore be
highly qualified.
4. PLEINS COINPLETID TO DATE
A. Plans awaiting execution.
(a) Subsstanti. c
1. Plans to deal with the special problems in the relation-
ship between United States troops in Germany and the German
civ~lian population.
2. Plans for fairs and congresses in Berlin.
3. Plans to increase the power of the RIAS station in Berl:Ln.
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(b) rational
1. The portion of the Radio Construction Program approved
by the Congress but for which appropriations have not been
made includes the following tentative projects carrying the
code names of: Negate, Vagabond "B", Vagabond "C", George
Ocean, Peter, Alike, King and Tare,
2, The following ten projects prepared in accordance with
NSC Action No. 575-;t, and approved by the Bureau of the
Budget for submission to Congress.. but for which the neces-
sary funds were not authorized.
(i) Support for a book publishing and export house. As
reported in 3.E(25) above, the corporation has begun
to prepare Arabic translations. World-wide use of the
book corporation awaits further monies to be authorized
by the Congress.
(ii) A four-fold mass communication project involving
several media divisions. It was to consist essentially
(aa)travel and study grants to popular writers from.
30 priority countries,
(bb) an exchange involving some ninety individuals
in the field of radio from 30 priority countries.
(cc) an exchange involving some 150 individuals in
the field of press and publications, on the working
level,
(dd) bringing four-man teams to the United States
from countries where the motion picture industry
is either t :-x D
25X1
Auust 1, 1952
In Eastern Europe, Soviet power and influence have not bean roducod to any
measurable extent. However, U.S. capabilities for future covert operations
have increased, particularly in Poland and East Germany. Recent covert 25x1
operations have revealed that the Coumunist authorities do not have complete
control of the situation in these countries, and that the area can be
In the satellite countries of Southeastern Europe, CIA capabilities for
psychological operations have increased. considerably, though Soviet power and
influence have not been reduced in the area.
The power and influence of the Kremlin within the USSR has not been affected
by U.S. covert activities, and. short-tern possibilities in this direction are
so slight as to be insJg'nifa.ccnt. CIA,1 s effort in this area is now being
focused on progressively developing capabilities for long-term exploitation..
Pointing out that present policy provides for U.S. support of anti-reg;_ime
Wince of the Great Russians, CIA sees a definite need for resolving the
SECURITY INFOt`tM1,TION
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FSD D-30
Annex D
August 1, 1952
policy question of the extent to which it will be permitted to support
clandestinely and exploit operationally an group or individual actively
interested in the destruction of the Bolshevik regime.
MIDDLE EAST
decline in U.S. capabilities throughout most of the Middle East is noted.,
though this is felt to be only temporary. To some extent, the decrease in
U.S. covert capabilities in the Middle East is attributed to the policy con-
flict arising out of U.S. support for the maintenance of Francets position
in North Africa, which has psychological repercussions throughout the
At'rican, Arab, and Asian worlds. Siiai.larly, an impediment to U.S. capabilities
in the area is found in the disparity of our attitudes toward Israel and the
Arab States despite a stated policy of impartiality.
In the particularly important field of the Moslem world, some progress has
been achieved along the following lines:
1? In utilizing nationalist forces for our own purposes, by
endeavoring to direct thorn away from their more destructive tendencies
and into channels which will be relatively compatible with. U.S. interests;
noxiely, to endeavor to turn the foroe of nationalism against the Com-
munists, to direct it against polit:_cal corruption, to focus it upon
demands for social reform and economic progress..
2. In stir.:mulatin an increased awareness among the religious
hierarchy of the threat of international Communism;
3. In increasing the degree of understanding of the status of
Moslems living inside the Soviet orbit; and
4. In laying the groundwork for further expanded activities along
similar lines. Progress will continue to be slow in this field because
0,f the r..iost delicate and dangerous aspect of Near Eastern affairs from
the point of view of foreign intervention.
SECURITY INE'ORMLTION
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rSi3V D-30
Annex D
August 1, 1952
FAIR 11,&ST
Support of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa is described as
the most significant program now being undertaken by CIA in the Far East,
where the Agency is also actively arpporting the military authorities in
Korea, and laying the groundwork for penetration of Manchuria and North China,
While, on balance, the U.S. has achieved some psychological gains in the
overt field (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Pacific Military Alliances, etc.),
Soviet power has not been measurably reduced in the Far Eastern areas under
its dominance, and that progress toward our objectives in the field of covert
activities has been negli~ible,~
KOREA
CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and military authori-
ties in the field of psychological warfare as inadequate in certain respects.
A coordinating mechanism was sot up, for exemple, but failed to
include the operations of USIE services in Korea. Close cooperation with the
military exists in the field on intelligence and tactical psychological warfare
measures. However, a completely effective coordination of two major strategic
plans with respect to Korea has not berm realized with respect to coordination
of command and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy this
situation.
LLTIN Ai ICA
Despite evidence that the Soviet Union is now placing greater emphasis .)n
its covert r:ochanisr.ms in Latin America, U.S. covert capabilities have substan-,
tially increased there, thrcugh the expansion of personnel and facilities
du~-irr; tho past year. Such expansion, it is planned, may increasingly turn
toward .he formation or support of indigenous, nationalistic, free-enter--rise
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SECURITY INFORMLTION
.groups, or political parties. Same substantial results in combating pro-
Cc;n-:unist and anti- merican influences have been achieved 5X1
in Chile, Brazil,' Uruguay, Ncxico, and Panama. It is to be noted that Latin
America is an area unique for the United States, because of the overt Good
Neighbor and non-intervention policies of long standing, and in the powerful
reasons necessitating those overt policies. The security of covert operations,
and the further development cf policy and management systems which protect such
security both in Washington and in the field are of peculiar importance for
this area. Therefore, CIS capabilities have been developed to be operative
only under special conditions.
'AFI3 IC1:
In Africa a beginning has boon made in laying the groundwork for future
activities to check Communist efforts to get control over the colored races;
but this work has so far boon purely preparatory and no progress toward
actual achievement in that field is racorded.
GENIF&UL
In general, CIA emphasizes the importance of setting up increased capa-
bilities, particularly in the form of thoroughly trained American and
indigenous personnel and long term cover mechanisms. An apparent need exists
for establishing at all possible points radio broadcast facilities capable
of reachi n` the USSR.
CIL's capabilities need to be reinforced for building up an apparatus
capable of long; tern: exploitation, against the Chinese Communist regime. For
the shortor terms CIA has had only very limited success in the penetration
-t either of Communist China or the USSR itself.
CIA points up the vital importance of VOL as constituting at present the
only effective means the U.S. possesses for conducting psychological operations
within the confines of the USM. Covert penetration has been carried out
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SECURITY INFO tM TION
print:.ropily for the purpose of procuring intelligence, and because of the rigid
controls impeding the moven.ent of agents inside that country, no psychological
warfare under present conditions can be undertaken in the USSR by any other
medium excopt radio.
Through its covert channels CIA has discovered that VQL, broadcasts have
boon audible in the USSR throughout 1950 and 1951. Although Soviet ja ing
has considerably reduced the audibility of these broadcasts, nevertheless
information obtained from returning German prisoners of war and Soviet refugees
and :lefectors indicates that considerable segments of the Soviet peoples
continue to listen to VOA broadcasts despite technical difficulties and
personal risk. Some of these refugees have criticised the VQC, broadcasts for
not being sufficiently forceful and for devoting a considerable portion of the
prograras to irrelevant natters not bearing directly on the current East-West
stru gie. lurthornore, ethnic groups such as the Ukranians have complained
that the broadcasts are net sufficiently representative of the desires and
aspirations of the minority groups within the USSR. But when all this is
said, the fact remains that information obtained by CIA indicates that the VOA
broadcasts do play an important role in reminding the peoples of the Soviet
Union that there is an alternative way of life, and in providing them with.
dope of ultimate liberation,.
Despite a. marked increase in the amount of radio propaganda indirectly aim(
at encouraging Soviet defectcrs, there was no increase in the number of said
defectors over the last year. Greater emphasis on the psychological utiliza-
tion of defectors, particularly as the core of covert activist cadres would
be desi able.
In Western Europe especially, there was marked progress in CIA's efforts
to work through various anti--Communist groups - both urban and rural. At
tilt: some time, there have a,? yet been no very tangible results from attempts
SECURITY INFQRMr TION
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SECURITY INFGRMtkTION
to penetrate indigenous Comunist parties: On the other hand, efforts to
combat Communist influence In the labor unions, particularly through
encouraging anti-Communist labor organizations, have net with considerable
and the view is expressed that
capabilities in this direction should be increased,
SECURITY INFORNt TION
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C. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet
Orbit Escapees - Phasc, "A" (PSB D-18a).
This plan, approved by PSB December 20, 1;51, includes programs to care
for and resettle current escapees, and envisages maximum possible utilization
of escapees in CIA programs and under Public Law 51 (Lodge Amendment), which
s,v, permits recruitment of escapees into the U.S. Armed Forces. For discussion
of Phase "B" see paragraph 3A.
On April 7, pursuant to approval by the President, k4.3 million dollars
were made available by the Director of Mutual Security to the Department of
State, which had been given responsibility for the program.
The time since funds were made available has been used to build the
organization and staff for the continuing administration of the program; and
to identify and c?,1?e for the most urgent immediate needs of escapees,
Or&anization. Small staffs are, being established and activities.have begun
in each of the countries which border the iron curtain. A regional office
in HICOG and a policy and coordination unit in the Departi:e nt of State have
been established.
Resettlement and SuFPoletnental Car. A general contract was signed on June 16,
1952, with the Provisional ,iCommittee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
(PIC111E, an international body organized in November, 1951) for the overseas
transport of up to 14,000 escapees during one year at an estimated rate of
X100 per capita. The number thus far moved under tlr: program is negligible,
but it is anticipated that a scheduled flow may be attained in August.
Projects have been authorized to care for urgent immediate needs of
.- apees resic.ent in Greece, Germany, Austria, Turkey and Italy, such as
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 oecuritiy ini orrnatlon ANNEX E
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August 1., 1952
food, clothing, shoes, repair and decontamination of barracks, medical treat-
me:r~.t and the like. In every country of operation the immediate needs of the
escapees are being met.
2L)a g.nda Utilization. No general propaganda utilization of the plans and
activities of the escapee program is now contemplated by State Department.
Newsworthy projects^.nd assistance to key individuals will be used in media
reachi,:,g iron curtain areas when appropriate. When the program has greater
accomplishments to point to, the State Department plans more general treat-
ment. Similar policies govern domestic information activity.
Funds. Of the initial authorization of 4,300,000 an estimated ;1,500,000
was obligated during the fiscal year 1952. An additional :1,460,500 is being
requested to cover an increase in the estimated number of escapees already
requiring assi: tance.
Acco~.lishment of Other Purpo3es. As requested under this phase of the plan
the De.i-)artment of Defense has somewhat liberalized the conditions under which
escapees may be recruited under the authorization of the Lodge Amendment. Of
5194 applic,-_tions, 3916 have been rejected, 295 have been accepted (262 on active
duty) and 982 are being processed.
The program has not proceeded far enough to make a significant number
of referrals to CIA for use in its programs.
D. Public Statements with Respect to Certain
Weapons. (PSB D-17d)
In February 1952, following a series of conflicting statements by public
officials as to atomic and related developments, the PSB approved and forwarded
t.o the Executive Secretary,, NEC, recommendations for a guidance to appropriate
agencies on public statements with respect to certain weapons. On 9 May 1952
a memorandum on this subject was issued by the President setting forth the
cr!tori.a recommended by the PSB and directing compliance therewith. At present
V- PSE staff is reviewing the action which has been taken by the agencies and
ti:,; effect of the application of the criteria.
2114
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2. PLANS CO14 PLETED BUT NOT YET BEING E] CUTFD - STAND-BY PLANS
A. Psychological Operations Plan Incident to
Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c).
Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on October 25, 1951.
This plan is designed to establish special psychological objectives to
be implemented toward our allies as well as our adversaries, with respect to
the Korean conflict. Some of the desired courses of action are at present
in effect, but the majority of the recommended actions are directly related
to the progress made in connection with the cease-fire.
The operational planning is substantially complete. An alert network
has been established among the affected agencies so that the appropriate
action can be put into effect without delay as developments make this necessary.
B. Emergency Plan for Bree.koff of Korean Armistice
Negotiations (PSIS J-19d).
Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on September 18, 1951
This plan endeavors to establish for governmental departments and agencies
engaged in psychological operations courses of action for application in
preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice
negotiations.
The operational planning is substantially complete. The receipt of
certain assurances from the Far Eastern Coranand with respect to logistical
support is necessary in order that the affected agencies an establish the
appropriate contingent plan without delay, should developments make this
necessary,
C. Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSB D-8b).
This Project was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952 and sub-
n i I.,.1.,u to the National Security Council as NSC 127.
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