DRAFT OF 'AN EVALUATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE U.S. NATIONAL EFFORT IN ITALY' (PSB D-29)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200040008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 15, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
C.
WASHINGTON 23, D. C PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
N 15 1953
11MMOi-I.ACdDUM
TO: General T,Ira.lt,,r 13. ",mith, Director of Central Intel li Yf=nce,.
SUBJECT: Draft of "An Evala;.ation of the Psychological Effect of
the U.S. Nat5..onal ;ffort in Italy" (PSB D-29).
I attach a draft of PS3 D-29, bearing the above-quoted
title, for consideration and ar:propriate action by the Board
at its meeting on Januaxv 15. 3953.
This document had i,::,s oria in in the Boa.rdts decision on
June 12, 1952, to authorize a attest case's PSB evaluation on
one geographical area. 'ursuar.t to this decision, the staff
transmitted to the Board cropo:ed terms of reference for an
evaluation on Italy (P,B D-29, July 17, 1952), and the Board
indicated that the project shoiid be carried out. In view of the
Board's desire that the nro j ect not include field trips or
attitude surveys, the rresent cocument is based solely on con-
tributions by the member denartnents and a_,encies and by the
Office of the Director for Muttal Security.
In its final- form, after re-working it at a later date,
I believe that this evaluation. ,rill be useful as expressing a
consensus concerning the psychological impact of the total U.S.
effort in Italy. It also repre.3ents a step toward the develop-
ment of methods and crocedures ,n fulfill the evaluating responsi-
bilities of the Board.
I recommend acceptance of .his evaluation as a first step
of t_iis nature in the d welopme it of the PSB evaluation function.
Plan G. Kirk
director
Enclosure:
NSC review(s) completed.
P3B D-29, Copy No. 42.
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SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
Copy No.,
January .15, .1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David K. E. Bruce, Under Secretary of State
SUBJECT: Draft of "An Evaluation of Psychological Effect of U.S.
National Effort in Italy" (PSB D-29).
I attach a draft of PSB [3-29, bearing the above-quoted title, for
consideration and appropriate action by the Board at its meeting on
January 15, 1953.
This document had its origin in the Board's decision on June 12,
1952, to authorize a "test case" PSP evaluation on one geographical
area, Pursuant to this decision, the staff transmitted to the Board
proposed terms of reference for an evaluation on Italy (PSB D-29,
July 17, 1952), and the Board indicated that the project should be
carried out. In view of the Hoard's desire that the project not include
field trips or attitude surveys, the present document is based solely
on contributions by the member departments and agencies and by the
Office of the Director for Mutual Security.
In its final form, after re-working it at a later date, I believe
that this evaluation kill be useful as expressing a consensus"..Concern-
ing the psychological impact of the total U.S. effort in Italy. It
also represents a step toward the development of methods and procedures
to fulfill the evaluating reponsibilities of the Board,
I recommend acceptance of this evaluation as a first step of
this nature in the development of the PSB evaluation function.
S/Alan G. Kirk
Alan G. Kirk
Director
PSB D-29, dated January 14, 1953
(Note: Identical Memoranda sent to Mr. Foster and General Smith,)
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PSB D-29
January 114, 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
T UASHINGTO' ?, D. C,
AN EVALUATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF U.S.
NATIONAL EFFOPT IN ITALY
This paper, which is based upon contributions by the Department of
State, Department of Defense? Central Intelligence Agency and Mutual
Security Agency, is an attempt to assess the psychological impact and
results of our national effort in Itc.ly from 1945 to the present.
This paper is presented in four sections: a summary; a brief chrono-
logical account of major policies anc developments respecting Italy since
1945; a more detailed analysis of the relationship between U.S. policies
and programs and major Italian problems of a psychological nature in the
military, economic and political spheres; a discussion of information,
cultural and exchange program,
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PSB D-29
January 14, 1953
Summary and OT1c .
The psychological impact of U.S. dipi. economic and military
policies and programs, assisted by U.,a, information activities and
special operations, has aided materia',ly--perhaps decisively--this
achievement of the following situation in Italy:
1. There remains in power a bron.dly representative, moderate,
anti-Communist government friendly to the United States. The psychological
impact of imerican economic pro rams and the joint slmerican-British declara-
tion on Trieste were perhaps decisive factors in beating back the Communist
bid for power in 1948.
2. Conversely, the Italian Communist Party, although still very
strong, has been so circumscribed in its freedom of action that it now
poses a less immediate threat to the security of the country.
3. Italy is an enthusiastic supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty
and has been a leader in steps towards economic, political and military
integration of Europe.
4. The Italian Government gives support to basic U.S. foreign
policy, Despite Communist influence, there exists among the Italian
people, a large reservoir of good will for the United States and for
Americans.
Where popular or official Italian attitudes have run counter to our
national objectives, the psychological impact of our policies and programs
has been less pronounced&
1. The Italian Government has been slow to undertake various basic
reforms deemed essential to long-run economic stability.
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DRAFT SECRET
PSB D-29
January 14, 1953
2. The willingness of Italians to resist and prevent Communist
subversive activities such as political strikes has been strengthened,
but many Italians still look on the Italian Communist Party as a respect-
able party.
In two respects, the psychological impact of U.S. policies has
handicapped the achievement of objectives with respect to both the
Italian Government and the Italian people. Furthermore,., the Italian
Government, which has been identified by the Italian voters with the
United States, has lost popular support because of these failures.
1. Our failure to implement the Declaration on Trieste, which
had such a marked influence on the 1948 elections, has rankled in the
minds of all Italians. Together with the concurrent growth in our
support of Yugoslavia, the Trieste situation has aggravated our
psychological problems in Italy.
2. Despite a number of efforts to expand opportunities for Italian
emigration, U.S. immigration quotas for Italians remain a continuing
psychological handicap as well. as physical barrier. Recent visa policy
has been a further source of Italian resentment against the U.3.
Concli.,sion
U.S. policies and programs in s~.tpport of the present Italian
Government have contributed substantially to the attainment of our
national objectives in Italy. 'Nevertheless, the situation remains grave,
and withdrawal of our support might well lead to collapse of the present
Italian Government. It follows that there should be no slackening of
our effort in the crucial period ahead.
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January 14, 1953
A Chronological Account
19145-146
7orld War II ended with Allied forces occupying Italy, which had been
granted the status of co-belligerent .following the Armistice of 1943. It
was U.S. and U.K. policy to allow the Italian Government a wide measure of
freedom in the establishment of democratic government and the rehabilitation
of economic and social life. Liberated areas had been turned over to the
Italian Government for administration and military government had been
withdrawn as rapidly as rossibie,
In its first post-war winter, Italy was faced with the problem of
recovering from two paralyzing decades of Fascism capped by invasion, and,
in a sense, civil war. The country had suffered an overwhelming military
defeat, Allied troops were in occupation; the peace treaty was yet to be
negotiated; law and order were yet to be reestablished; industry and trade
were thoroughly disrupted; and the governmental future was still unknown.
During 1915-46, the Italians staggered through these difficulties on a
day-to-day basis. The government remained in the hands of a coalition of
anti-Fascist parties, including the Communists who at that time were joined
in-a war-created "united front".
U.S. policy at this time had as its long-range objective "enabling
Italy to become a constructive element in a peaceful Europe." Economic
relief proceeded on a piece-meal basis through private organizations, UNRRA
and direct U.S. Government programs for providing essential commodities.
These programs prevented actual starvation, but did not provide the basis
for real recovery. Moreover, they did not prevent a sharp deterioration
in the political climate during 19116. The Communists, still in the role
of collaborators, gradually shifted towards outright obstructionism and
denunciation of the Allies and the democratic moderate parties, In the
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DR,'.FT SECRI} T
PSB D-29
January 14, 1953
national elections in June 1946, the Communists won some 19 percent of
the vote, the Socialist 21. percent and the Christian Democrats 35 percent.
Municipal elections in November showed an accelerated trend to the left.
The economic situation also worsened rapidly.
Negotiation of the Peace Treaty, which imposed many sacrifices upon
Italy, was bitterly resented by many Italians who felt that their share
in the defeat of Germany had not been taken into sufficient account. The
U.S. attempted to counteract the developing mood of anger and despair by
increasing its diplomatic support of the Italian Government, by receiving
an official visit from DeGasperi, by concluding a commercial agreement with
Italy and by continuing economic aid. However, the current seemed strongly
against us.
1947-48
The year 1947 marked the low point in Italy's post-war fortunes.
DeGasperi, goaded beyond endurance by Communist tactics, finally managed
to eliminate them from the Government in May. The Communists thereupon
launched a nationwide campaign of strikes, riots and individual and col-
lective violence designed to sabotage recovery, destroy public confidence
and prepare the way for a :Legal or possibly violent overthrow of the gEvern-
ment. In this campaign they were considerably strengthened by their con-
trol over all organized labor, cemented at the first post-war convention
of the unified labor organization, the CGIL, in May. Also helpful to
the Communists was the mounting inflation and, in December, the with-
drawal of remaining Allied troops in accordance with terms of the treaty.
Despite certain counteracting developments--such as a split-off of a
minority of Socialists from the Communist-led "united front"--a halt to
the inflationary spiral brought about by massive imports and sweeping
credit restrictions, approval of the new Constitution and U.S. consideration
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DRAFT SECRET PSB D-29
January )J. , 1953
of the European Recovery Program,--circumstances led to a profound fear
late in 1917 both in Italy and abroad that the Communists had a very good
chance of winning power in tie spring elections of 1948.
In this situation, the U.S. Government determined that it should do
whatever it could do to;. (1) preserve the existence of Italy as an independ-
ent, democratic state, friendly to the U.B. and capable of effective partici-
pation in the effort to withstand Soviet expansion and Communist infiltration
and (2) support the current non Communist government in maintaining public
order and authority against the extreme left, and prevent a Communist-
Socialist bloc victory in the elections or the seizure of power by these
forces. Therefore, it was decided to bring about the economic recovery of
Italy and a rapid rise in the standard of living.
Actions in pursuance of these policies included stepped-up visits of
American warships to Italian ports; official statements stressing that
Italy would not receive U.S. economic aid should the Communists come to
power; clear indications of support for moderate anti-Communist political
forces, and assistance to Italian police forces. Private groups in the
U.S., with official encouragement, helped through gift-package campaigns,
letter-writing campaignsj, and radio broadcasts.
".dditionally, the U.S,, U.K., and France joined in a Declaration to
the effect that the provisions of the Peace Treaty with regard to Trieste
had proved unworkable and that the Entire Free Territory should be returned
to Italy. All of these actions, together with a massive campaign by the
moderate parties and Catholic lay groups in Italy, helped to give the
moderates a resounding victory in the April elections, Combined, they won
65 percent of the popular vote, the Christian Democrats alone receiving
nearly 50 percent,.
1948-52
Italian confidence, however, did not assert itself until, in the wake
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DRAFT SECR,T
PSB D-29
Jai uary 14, 1953
of the elections, the government proved itself capable of handling any
Communist resort to violence. Disorders and a national strike engineered
by the Communists following the attempt on Togliattits life on July lia, 19li.8
served to demonstrate that the government's security forces were in most
cases able to keep contreil, and that the workers would not follow the Com-
munists blindly in semi-insurrectionary strikes, It was then that Catholic:
dissidents broke away from the COL to establish the anti-Communist Free
Confederation of Workers. (The present anti-Communist union, CISL, is
composed of members of the Free Confederation of 1?Torkers and republican and
moderate socialist labor groups who split with the CGIL in 1919. A second
anti-Communist labor organization is the UIL made up of republican and
democratic socialist labor groups which refused t, join with the Catholic
CISL.) Finally, Congressional approval of the Marshall Plan assured the
Italians of substantial economic aid.
With the consolidation of the democratic victory, U.S. policy evolved
in terms of the following main objectivest
1. Maintenance in power of a broadly representative, moderate, anti-
Communist democratic government friendly to the U.S.
2. Encouragement of friendship for the U.Sa, and solicitation of the
support of the Italian Government anc the majority of the Italian people
for basic U.S. foreign policy.
3. Encouragement of economic and political integration of Italy into
the European and North Atlantic Communities and toward full fledged membership
in the Community of Nations,
1i. Strengthening of the potential of the Italian armed forces within
the limits of the Peace Treaty.
5. Encouragement of Italian economic recovery and of certain lasting
economic and social reforms essential to making Italy a viable economic
unit and to the establishment of long--run stability in Italy.
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DrLUT SECPET
PSB D-29
January 114, 1953
6. Strengthening of Italian democracy and of the will to resist
Communist subversion especially through encouragement to anti-C