NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN (SUPPLEMENT TO PSB D-21 DATED OCTOBER 9, 1952)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200030022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 3, 1953
• Content Type: STUDY

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SECURITY NFORMATION
DOC. NO. D-21/2
DATEFeb. 3,- 1953
COPY NO. 4 i.-
NSC review completed
PSYCH OLO GI CAL STRA'T'EGY BOARD
Vii'ashington
NATIOTAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRAWaGY WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN
(Supplement to PSB L)-21 dated October 9, 1952)
WARN NG
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,._Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
:SECURITY INFORMATION
;IP SE, M2
MORI/CDF Pages 1-15
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Security Information PSB D-21/2
TOP EE &T February 3, 1953
PSYCROLOGTCAL -9TR=GY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dated Oct. 9, 1952)
A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRXTEG' WITH #{ESPECT TO ' L
This Plan was approver. by the Board at its Seventeenth
Meeting., January 15, 1953. The Director was authorized to
coordinate any further coin ents which the PSP member-agencies
might wish to make. T is text represents such final. coordina-
tion.
Secretary to the Board.
Securttt Information
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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY
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SECT. RITY fl' PO11 TION
TOP SECEET COPY NO?
PSB D-21/2
February 3, 1953
(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dates? Oct. 9, 1952)
A NATIONa'1L PSYCIIOLOGTCAL STRATEGY
zwrith respect to
UlRL]N
Table of Contents
Section P
I
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2
IT
Applicable Apprrovel P01ie
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IV
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V TaF3~'i8???.ff??11PPf????f..F?f..1.1?....?af..
VI Administrative matters.. f ..... ? f ? P. f . ? .... 13
SECURA'Y 117OBM ION
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SECURITY 20MATION
TOP SECRET PSB D-21/'2
r6iruri-'3,IL93
('6 ,en t to PBB D-21
Dated Oct, 9, 1952)
To formulate a national, psy*cho3.ogiea , strategy with respect to Berlin.
#ECTION II
APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES
As set forth in NBC 139/1-
A. Summary and Analysis
I. The city of Berlin is divided between the Western Sectors
governed by a pro-Western city government working closely with the U.S.,
British, an& French authorities, and the Eastern Sector, completely
dominated by the Soviets and their Ger puppets.
2. As one of the free world's most exposed outposts, vulnerable to
Soviet harassments of many :kinds,, and dosing a constant change to
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TOP SECR1 T ?SB D-21/2
February 3, 1953
(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dated Oct, 9, 1952 )
Soviet efforts to consolidate their position and prestige in Eastern
Germ.my, Berlin will continue to be a focal point of pressures and counter-
pressures.
3. While ideally any planning for Berlin should take into account
Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to Berlin, both of these
and particularly the latter, can be estimated only in general terms. As
to the former, the Soviets are capable of molting the Western Allies'
position in Berlin untenable, either b i the use of force or by restricting
Western access to the city A major assumption regarding Soviet inten-
tioms with respect to Berlin is that the Soviets will not deliberately
provoke, or run a major risk of, war for the sake of Berlin, More
tentatively, it is believed the Soviets will not impose another full
blockade in view of: a) the failure of the last blockade, b) international
political reactions obstructing broader Soviet aims, and c) a Soviet
realization that such a course would stimulate western military programs
and increase the danger of amedl conflict. It is further assumed that
the Soviets intend to make ;Berlin the capital of the German Democratic
Republic, and eventually of a reunited, Soviet-dominated Germany as a
major step in strengthening the Soviet sphere, if they can do so without
incurring grave risk of war,
4+, Present Soviet efforts with respect to Berlin may be designed
either to put the Western Allies under pressure or to strengthen the Soviet
position in the East Zone, Current harassments,, such as barring Allied
highway patrols and interfering with transportation, appear to be de-
signed to probe Allied firmness and unity of purpose, and to undermine
Allied prestige as well as to threaten our right of access,
SEci rr nwimMATZON
TOP SEO.RET
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SECURTry. B OMVMION
TOP SECRET
RIB D-21/2
Fewua`Y 3 r 1953
(Supplement to :PSB D-21
Dated Oct. 9, 1,52)
;. The present paper identifies General policy objectives and
pro-poses a strategy adaptable to the following contingencies:
a. 'Jest-,ern access to Berlin is not seriously impeded;
b. Serious harassing r-easures short of a full blockade are em-
p1cTed:
c. A blockade or harassing rneas'La,es tantamount to a surface
blockade are imposed;
d. The Western position has becor.~e or is about to become un--
tenable;
e. A Soviet or satellite attack on the Western forces in Berlin
occurs.
B. West Berlin's situation. It is now estimated that West Berlin will
continue to be:
1. useful as a base behind the Iron Curtain for propaganda, intelli-
gence,and other activities;
2. a symbol of Western strength and determination in the face of
Soviet harassment and threat of aggressive tactics;
3. a symbol to the Germans
Bast and I-Test -- of the hone for the
eventual re-unification of Gerrnar3r in freedom;
1+. vulnerable to, and subjected to, a continued Soviet and East
German campaign of encroachment and Yiarassraent which could have dangerous
effects on the city's economic viability and morale, as well as discouraging
and poss:Lbly divisive effects on the three Allied Powers, the German
Federal 3epublic,and the West Berlin authorities;
5. subject (despite being strongly pro-Western) to a certain
amount of inter- and intra-party discord, special social problems, and
SECWrrry ID%E?ORMATION
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SECtUU11Y INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
PSB D-21/2
Febri-ry 3, 1953
(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dated Oct. 9, 1952 )
occasional irritation with the: Federal Republic and the Western Allies
due in part-to uncertainty concerning Berlin's future;
6, in need of continued subsidization of its economy and, moral
supporrt by the Western Allies and the Federal Republic; and
7. required by circumstances to have a special status.. separate from
the Federal Republic, and denied the degree of self-government which the
Federal Republic is to have under the Contractual. Agreements. (Despite
this, ties between West Berlin. and the Federal Republic will continue to
be strengthened and West Berlin will in practice be given even more free-
dom of action by the U.S... French, and U.K. authorities.)
To maintain and reinforce our political, military, cultural, and
psychological position in the Western Sectors of Berlin, and to exploit
that position in the furtherance of U.S. national interests.
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SECURIT'1 INFORMATION
TOP SECRET RSB tD"21/2
Fet=UM 3 7553
(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dated Oct, 9, 1952)
(NOTE: Tasks and the Objective in Section IV above supersede the
Objective (Page 7 fl, 1k ra. 2, ConcerninZ West Berlin) and
Tasks (Page 9, Para. 2, Concernin Berlin) outlined in PSB
D-21, The implementation ?f Tasks and nurses of Action
under Contingencies B through E may be subject to modifica*
tion 3.n the light of specific policy decisions made at the
time such contingencies arise.
Contingency A. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded.
Task One: To maintain and reinforce the U.S., U.K., and French post-
tion in the Western Sectors of Berlin and to buttress the
morale of West Berlin,
1. Utilize all appropriate measures to encourage and support
among the Governments and peoples of the free world,
especially in the Federal Republic and the remainder of
Western Europe, diplomatic and other actions intended
to foster continued interest in and a sense of responsi-
bility for West Berlin. 25X1
Action.- STATE
Support: DET'ENSE
2. Convince the West Berlin people that their awn deter*
mination and faith are power factors affecting the whole
struggle between the Soviet complex and the Western
democracies.
Action; STATE
Support; DEFENSE
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SECU112Y I Th OR14 TION
TOP SECRET
pSD D-21/2
8ebrue y73, X03
(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dated Oct. 9, 2952)
3. Assure the Went Berlin authorities and population of the
continued supi3ort of the free world by such actions as:
(a) official statements, (b) exchange, of prominent
personalities between Berlin and the West, (c) inter-
national distinction awards to the peoples of the city,
etc,
Action: STATE 25X1
Sup port : 17E 311SE
Provide a couxaterbal nce in West Berlin to the ill-
effects of Soviet econot1c warfare against Berlin.,
especially so as to maintain and improve, by interna-
tional action where possible., the standards-of-living
in West Berlin.
Action: MSA 25X1
Support : MATE,, 1 EFP..~l~i ;EE,
5. Publicize Allied and Fed oral Republic aid measures and
readiness to defend the city by informing the popula-
tion of West Berlin of the measures taken in their be-
half, and by giving a. pie recognition to their own
achievements in restoring, and maintaining their city.
Action: S'T'ATE
Sup-port : IEF EIISE
Tee% Two: To deter and neutralize Soviet or Soviet-inspired harassing
tactics.
1. Convey to the Soviets, U.S. and Allied determination to
remain in Berlin regardless of the consequences, thereby
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SECU ITY INFORMI rION
TOP SECRET PSB D-21/2
110= aey 3. X953
(3t pplcment to PSB D-21
Dated. Oct. 9, 1952 ))
giving evidence of Western unity regarding the
Western position in the city.
Action; STCTE
Support: DEFENSE
2. Demonstrate, Jointly with the French, British, and
Germans, where: appropriate, the futility of and grave
risks associated with amr Soviet tactics calculated
to cause an Allied withdrawal from Berlin.
Action: STATE, >NSE,
3?
Intensify Soviet doubts as to the reliability of the
GDR authorities, military forces, and population.
Action: STA`.'E, 1lE'FI;NSE,
communist actiLons.gainst the Western position in Berlin.
Make clear to all the world that the Western powers
will hold the Soviet Union responsible for any
91;Y1
5. he may be specific,::1l,y authorized by Washington, develop
and discreetly publicize, within the limitations of
security, Atli! ed c,:~pabilities for retaliation against
possible Soviet haressmeuLt measures. This should be
accomplished Jointly with the U.K., and French authorities
where possible.
Action: STATf1
. DEFENSE,
Support: MSA
25X1
6. Mobilize free-world public opinion, especially in
Western Europe, to confront the Soviet Union with a
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SECURiTy nr M1.0 ION
TOP BET
D-21/2
(Stpribrent to PSB N21
..t& tod Oct. 9, 1952)j
consolidated opposition to aggressive Soviet tactics
against BerlAn which endanger world peace, and to support
measures exposing Soviet actions*
action: STATE 25X1
Support : DrFEt'1SE
7? Develop p d exploit by all available means political,
military, economic, and/or psychological programs of free-
world support, for West Berlin, especially those under-
taken in consonance with existing collective security
agreements.
Action: STATE; DE'FENSE
Support: MvA
Task Three: To utilize West Berlin as a means of strengthening the
morale of the fwee-world and its determination to re-
sist Soviet pressures and possible aggression.
1. Exploit to the fullest, by all available means,
Western response to B?:rlin's situation as evidence of
Western strength, determination, and unity of purpose,
and as a demonstration of the principle of collective
security in action.
Action: MATE
25X1
kSupport: I ,FEPTSE and MSA
2. Communicate: to other marts of the free wvrldd evidences
of the resilience, courage, optimism, and anti-
com-munist sentiment of the people of Berlin.
91;Y1
SECiIMY fl F01 MPTION
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SECLUITY nWM: t,ATION PSB D-2l/2
TOP SECEET tl;V zE3
(upple nt to PSB D-21
Dated Oct. 9: 1952)
Contin ,'eney B:
Prepare for publications Jointly with the British and
French if advisable.* a White Paper., or such diplomatid
cc nunications an may be deemed appropriate) designed
to contrast the peaceful aims of Allied actions with
respect to Berlin with the unwarranted and hostile
actions of the USSR.
Action, STATE
Serious harars.*.nent short of
full blockade.
Task: To consolidate the Western position in Berlin in the face
of increased Soviet pressures.
~.. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingency A.
Action: As Stated
Support! As Stated
2. Make evident the Allies' preparedness to cope with a rew
blockades including their potential for retaliation and/or
circumvention,
Action-. ST:1TEs DEFENSE) and MSA
3. Utilize the crisis in West Berlin to accelerate and intensify
Western defense efferta and to strengthen Western unity,
with particular reference to the EDC and Atlantic Community
concepts.
Action: STATE. I F ISE~
Support: MSA
SECT ETY Il' 'ORATION
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SECUW TY INFORMATION
TOP SEMIT PSIS D-21/2
Ted- 3, $y3
fSupp3,ement to PSB D-21
3Xted Oct. 9, 1952 )
Displu.:y to the West German and West Berlin populations
A:,.Iied mi:Litury preparedness to resist any maneuvers
by the Soviet or East German mi.l itcry or pc ra-military
organizrst:Lons which would indicate that force is to be
applied to expel the Allies from Berlin.
Action: STATE ar:d DEFENSE
Contingency C. A 1loekade or hrassing measures tantamount to a surface
blockade, re imposed.
Task: To gain international recognition of the Berlin situation
of the aS. Oressive nature of Soviet actions.
1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingencie
A and. B.
Action; As Stated
Support: As Stated
2. Stimulate support umo:ig member nations of the UN to
consider the "Berlin question" in that body, with parti-
cular reference to the USSR's aggressive intentions.
Action: STATE
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S:ECUAITX IIVFiM MATION
TOP SEC'MT PSB D-21/2
Pebv 3, 1933
(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dated Oct. 9, 1952)
3?
Exploit by all available means throughout the free
world any joint approach by the U.S., British, and
French diplomatic representatives in Moscow to the
appropriate Soviet authorities concerning the severity
of the stbuation in Berlin.
Action: STATE
Support: DEFENSE
i. Apply and exploit by all available means such retalia-
tion and circumvention measures as were planned under
Contingency B. 25X1
Action: STATE., DEFENSE,F-7and MSA
Contingency D... The Westcria `t*4itinn
untenable.
has become or is at~c+ut becc no
Task: To lay the psychological groundwork for the possible use
of Allied military force in Berlin.
.. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contin,
gencies A, By and Co
Action: As Stated
Support; As Stated
2. By agreement with British and French authorities,
publish an appropriate diplomatic communication.
Action: FOAM
3. Stimulate :E'ree..world support for any ultimatum to the
USSR, which the U.S.ind its Allies will deliver in
opposition to Soviet aggression. 25X1
Action: M'ATE, DEFENSE
1, Employ all available psychological means to make clear
to the world that we are determined to prevent out-
3
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SECURTI'Y INFORMATION
TROP SECRET PSB D-21/2
jeft+nWy ,3
I .'33
(Supplement to P 3B D-21
Dated Oct. 90 1952)
break of general wars and that whatever Western action
may be taken in Berlin is to defend Berlin against
Soviet aggression.
Action: STATE,, DEFENSE,
Contingency E. A Soviet a,tack on i;estern forces in Berlin.
Task** k: To secure the support of all our Allies (includ4.n