PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN FOR SOVIET ORBIT ESCAPEES PHASE A

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200030002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 20, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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WP SECPET
PSYCHOLOGICAL SMATEGY BOARD
PSB D.18/a
Copy No. 3 4
December 20, 1951
PSYCPOIAGICAL OPIMATIONS PLAN
FOR
SOVIET ORBIT ESCAPEES
PHASE A
This Guidance Was Approved
ty Action of the
Psychological Strategy Board
on December 20, 195ls
(THIS IS AN APPROVED POLICY otripaicE.7
S3.12Ar_ja oatp11
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22ULGLRET
PSB Nao
December 20, 1951
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPMATIONS PLAN
For
SOVIET ORBIT ESCAPEES
SECTION I
=MEd
To determine the best means under existing policy to employ,.
resettle, and care for current escapees from the Soviet orbit or its
controloli
v. For the purpos of this f)-aPer, escapees are those persons from the
territirry or conf.-6 cf the 'SR, the Baltic States, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania, who escape into
Western Europe, ranging from Turkey to Sweden, East Germans, Chinese,
and ethnic expellees, such as Turks, and Greeks, are not included,
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rURPOSE OF THE sTupy
1.. At its fourth meeting the Psychological Strategy Board took
the action set forth in Annex 1,
2. Pursuant to the Board's direction, a panel was established
on November 2, consisting of representatives of Department of State,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NATO Standing Group, the
joint Chiefs of Staff, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force,
CIA, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Bureau of the Budget. The
Assistant Director of PS B's Office of Coordination acted as steering
member.
3. In the light of the initial panel discussion, the PSB staff
determined that the total problem, which the Board had considered, must
be separated into two parts, each of which required separate study./
These separate studies are:
A study to determine the best means, under existing policy,
to employ, resettle, and care for current escapees from
the Soviet orbit.
This separation in the problem was made for two reasons: In the first
place, before the West can expect success from existing programs, let
alone new and expanded programs, designed to defect or to enlist the
support of persons in Iran Curtain countries, it must be able to demon-
strate on the basis of present practice that the West is, after all, a
desirable place to which to flee, or with which to cooperate. Thus, it
is clear that the adequate handling of all bona fide escapees bears
directly upon the flow and cooperation of such individuals who are
alified as sources of intelligence, intelligence agents, recruits for
psychological and para-military programs, as these have been developed
pursuant to NSC-10/2, 10/5, 801 and 1043. In the second place, until
the United States has formulated the objectives, the scope, and to some
extent, the pace of the strategic plans to which are related the future
programs involving escapees, present or potential, from the Iron
Curtain countries, it is questionable whether any effort should be made
to do more than carry out well existing programa under existing policy.
These over-all strategic plans are now being developed but they are not
yet far enough along to provide the guidance which is needed for the
development of possible plans for future action concerning escapees.
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In the light, of national psychological strategy, to
evaluate all existing policies and programs and to make
recommendations for new policies and programs, envisaging
the inducement of additional escapees or the utilization
of persons residing in the Soviet orbit*
It was further determined that an issue to be covered in the course of
both of these studies is the extent to which it will be desirable and
necessail for the Board to recommend recourse to the hundred million
dollars, authorivd for expenditure for these purposes from NSA funds
under the so?called Karsten Amendment to the Mhtual Security Act of
1951.
4. The report which follows deals with the first of these two
studies* It sets forth what is known of the character and numbers of
current escapees. It describes existing programs and facilities for
their employment and handling, and it recommends action to be taken
to improve their treatment.
5. The second of the two problems will be considered concurrent
with further progress in the formulation or a strategic concept and
plans which should provide a framework of requirements for the use
of escapees and of persons residing behind the Iron Curtain.
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IMJANELT PSB Dm1.06
=Mai
STATWNT 0F FACTS
Qlvplasienp er thejoeeele Probem
1. The number of escapees to be handled during the calendar year
1952 is estimated for the purposes of this study at 18,000. Included
in this number are 12,000 persons who fled the Soviet orbit from 1945
to 1951 and for whom no previous disposition has been made. Based on
the flow during 1951, it is estimated that 6,000 more will cross the
Curtain during 1952. Although this number is considered reasonable
for planning purposes, it might increase during 1952, as a result oft
(1) the psychological effect of better handling; (2) a more favorable
power position of the Went in relation to the USSR; or (3) the impact
of new programs of general or focused inducement of defection.
2. In order of importance, the
been and presumably will continue to
Western Austria, Trieste and Greece,
these escapees will, on the basis of
Western Germany and Western Austria,
existing points of escape have
be Western Germany, Berlin,
Sixty'-five percent or more of
past experience, come across int?
3. lattelezze_.-vermaskatue..t.lon Programs.
6, In November a Provisional Committee for the Movement Of
tigrants from Euiiia7rae established in Brussels. This
CEEnt475?TaTerin to arrange the resettlement of 115,00s
migrants and for this purpose will utilize the? 15 ships
converted for migration purposes by the IRO.A/ Although,
:7r The Interna;aaT aefugee Organization,. which since the end of World
War II has been hr agency primarily responsible for the handling of
refugees, will cease to exist not later than the end of February, 1952.
The IRO was establilaed for the purpose of care and resettlement of
the-Le persons dia3ptaeed by the war, but also helped with eocapeels.
Fourteen out of eery fifteen refugees were handled, including several
thousand escapees.. Of the 100d000 refugees not yet resettled, 12,000
are escapees from the Soviet
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principally concerned with the problem of alleviating
surplus populations in Europe, the Committee's charter
is broad enough to provide for movement overseas of
Soviet orbit escapees. However, the Committee will
probably concern itself only with escapees who are
capable of Tesettlement, and it is not expected that
escapees who, are of lesser interest for reasons of
security, political background, health, language, er
lack of required skills will be migrated under the
program. None the less/ since the U.S. has contributed
ten million dollars to the Committee's thirty.four
million dollar budget, and since the Director of the
Committee will probably be a citizen of the United
States :".t, is likely that the Department of 4tate
can int7menae the Comm..ttee's action in directions
which will assist in solving escapee problems.
Assuming that support of the Migrant Committee envie?
aged in this study is effected, it is estimated that
during 2952, in conjunction with other programs, 14,000
of the 18:,000 escapees will be resettled under the
program.
L.9411.W.W.Sies.
kesistaam_byEtirepsanammots and Abgerptpp,int'
E.A. Virtually all escapees pass, at one time or another,
through existing camps and/for hospitals maintained by
Western 7uropean governments or U. S. public and private
organizations. These facilities Are generally inadeouate
and morale is low. While the majority of persons enter.
ing these camps are ultimately absorbed, about 400 per.
year can not for reasons of health, age and security be
adequately disposed of. Present handling ef this group
is entirely inadequate.
4 In addition, approximately 1200 esoapees each year are
absorbed into the economies of local Western European
countries. These, individuals usually have special skills
knowledge of language and often have relatives in Western
Europe. Some of them are absorbed after a period of
training and indoctrination.
5. papablUtim4LILLYA4LOLSVIs VolattUMAILOMIallt
..r.a Fifteen United States private organizations contribute
several million dollars annually to the relief and welfare
of displaced persons and refugees. Mhch of this has been
carried out by Jewish, Catholic tind other religious welfare
organizations. All private United States -organization' in
1951 spent approximately 3irmillion dollars for the cafe
and resettlement of approximately 6,000 escapees. The
private organizations received considerable assistanee
through the facilities of the IRO, which will be rem,
placed in part by the Committee formed at Brussels. It
is estimated that the private organizations with existing
funds and facilities could significantly aid in the care
and resettlement of 5,006 escapees during 2952.
TQP
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TOPflEaRET PSB D-18/a
6. aggatalp,..EL&jInited St4es Government
25X1
gs. Lcsio.S411: The Lodge Bill passed in 1950 and amended in
1951 authorizes the enlistment in the United States Army
of 12,500 unmarried aliens. During 1950, no escapees
were enlisted. During 1951, 113 had been enlisted, 97
of whom are presently training in the United States.
Four thousand escapees have applied for enlistment and
of these 1500 are in the process of security screening.
Under the program as it is now being administered by
the Army, it is unlikely that a significant number of
the 18,000 escapees will be enlisted in the United States
Army during 1952.
7, glhar_gushilitle of the Up ..44.S9/21401e
Under the MUtual Security Act in the Kersten Amendment, Con-
gress authorized $100,000,000 which can be drawn upon for utiliza-
tion in the problem of escapees. Congress apparently intended
that these funds should be used primarily for training and equip..
ping escapee forces to be added to NATO, rather than for the care
of eecapees. However, the authorization is sufficiently broad
to permit the utilization of a portion of these funds for the
latter purpose in the implementation of the program contemplated
in this study. NSA and the Department of Defense may feel that
this authorization is in fact a requirement for the use of some
of these funds for the first purpose and it will be recommended
that programs of this character be considered in the second
PSB study.
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TOP SpOrn PSB
PelgLMV.LQ.EeaAE)?1'.,?C--aZaW.
1. It is estimated that some 13-15,000 escapees can be resettled
through the Migrant Committee aggressively encouraged by the U.S. and
with maximum support of voluntary agencies. Some 2)0004,500 can be
absorbed into the indigenous facilities of Europe; the Lodge Bill, while
it will, under present programs, absorb less than 300, has a consider. 25X1
ably larger authorization.1
While it is recognized that these program
can only satisfy those requirements if they are fully coordinated, ade.
quatay financed, ane aseeassively administered, it is apparent that the
programs are capable of absorbing the expected flow of escapees.
2. While it is possible that the psychological effect of adequate
handling of these escapees will increase the flow, it is equally likely
the Communists will increase the severity of repressive measures and that
this will reduoe the rate of escape. However, if the flow should increas,
there is sufficient flexibility in the programs envisaged above to absorb
some increase if they are carried out as recommended. It is therefore
concluded that there is little risk that these programs will require
extensive modifications or great expansion during the foreseeable future.
3. It is concluded, therefore, that the main problem to be solved
in connection with escapees are those of organization, control, financing,
administration and coordination, respite the existence of IRO, there has
never been an international or national or private organization with the
authority and capacity to deal with the escapee problem as a whole. With
the end of IRO and the expansion of U.S. psychological and intelligence
programs, the establishment of an adeouate agency with such authority
has become critical. It is clearly necessary to center the total coor.
dinating and administrative responsibility in one organization and providi
it with the authority and fenas necessary to carry out the job.
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4. Such an organization should be capable of insuring or
arranging the employment, resettlement, or dare of all escapees
from the Soviet orbit who are no otherwise used and at the same
time should be capable of providing certain necessary services to
assist U. S. operating programs. It should be capable of rapid
creation and should be insured of the necessary funds and an
experienced staff.
5. Specifically, this program should be responsible for:
a. Ooppartipn wi,th fortlga_gzarezIg.12...malet them
in th_o_cellection .1p.fzirsg,ti,_.s.L..1.20.2.1. All
escapee should be grouped and maintained in suitable
goverrelent reception centers. U. S. government offi-,'
cialo should assist in the registration 'aid alloca-
tion of escapees, for the purposes of insuring maximum
migration end local absorption and in order to screen
all qualified escapees for placement in U. S. opera-
tionsl programs. European governments will cooperate
with U. S. officials in these efforts because they are
anxious to have the escapees disposed of,
b. grapgementm_ar the provI4on qf_zuplemental care
and mainierapoe. Provision of immediate and interim
care and meintenance at the present inadequate and
minimum level carried out by local governments should
continue. However, in order to raise the standards
of this care to adequate levels an average of 150 per
annum must be provided by the U. S. Program. Officials
administering the program should provide necessary
mordination of U. S. private refugee organizations to
insure maxialum supplemental care from those sources in
the form of additional food, clothing medical supplies,
legal advice and other material assistance to give
escapees best possible care,
e a hefupds for part pf ovalk-
MALIElulattllsras.9111.0f the B41100 Drovideciala
tia_tilatat4043=22. The cost of emigration trans-
portation for the majority of individuals under the
Migrant Committee program will normally be charged
to the receiving governments. In order to insure the
handling of a maximum number of escapees,, however, the
escapee proTram should provide for tho subsidization of
a major prirt, of the transportation costs for escapees,
T(2P r."MET
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TOP SECRET PSIS D-184
It is considered that if the program provided three-
fourths of this cost, sufficient inducement would be
provided so that the receiving governments would
give special consideration to accepting escapees on
a priority basis. 1. Full cooperation of private organi-
zations in the regugee field should be sought to the
end that they finance the transportation of as many
escapees as possible with their own funds. It is
important that the escapee program arrange the neces-
sary screening of shills and job qualifications and
other processing steps connected with resettlement
so that qualified escapees can be brought to the
attention of receiving governments a$ rapidly as
possible.
d. Provpo sneginl condeleration to insure the adlaggft
care and pmnlozopnt of escazflos who cannot hp_m_lez.
This is the responsibility of the local governments. _
However, special aseistance will be required in situal'e
tions which the local governments are not handling
edequetely. U. S. counterpart funds will be required
as an added inducement for the local governments to
absorb escapees into their own economies, Private
refugee organizations should also be persuaded to
give special consideration to those cases for which
they have enecial quelifications, such as escapees
requiring hospitalization and old age care. There
will also be a group of tecapeee involving criminals
and politica security cases who will have to be
given special attention under this program in order
to avoid nrdecirable psychological repercussions.
These people will not be capable of normal migration
nor will they be welcomed by the local economies.
6. Excluding the cost of programs for direct U. S. Government
use of escapees (such as the Lodge Bill) and minding the cost of
care provided by local governments, it is estimated that the remain-
ing expenses to care for and_ resettle escapees in 1952 will be
approximately 7,200,000. This budget is admittedly generous and
provides for considerably better care than has been provided by
IRO. The budget breakdown is as follows: (a) 3,500,000 for in-
land and overseas transportation; (b) ;2,70C,000 for care and
maintenance in Europe; (c) el.,000,000 for administrativ.: expenses.
TOP SECPET
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PSB 11.18/S
This would provide for care and maintenance at a standard or living
equal to the particular Western European country to which the escape is
made, It would also provide ifor the full cost of transportation for
those escapees who are migrated.
7. Having in mind the reenirements set forth above, considera-
tion ha a been given to several different organizational means of pro-
viding the centralieed adminiatration of this operation. These are
,t
the United Nations, the U. S. Government, a private U. S. organize-
tion, NCFE and a new private organization consisting of all U. S.
refugee agencies concerned with escapees.
gguo Nation: The Commissioner for refugees of
the United rations has urged that the United Nations
be responsible for this program. From the stand-
point of strengthening the United Nations and inter-
national cooperation of the sort obtained in IRO,
this alternative has some merit. However, the
Commissioner for Refugees does not currently have
funds to carry out the job nor does he have full
confidence of the Department of State. United States
Congressional leaders interested in refugee problems
have indicated that they prefer to have the United
States act directly in this field. A United Nations
organization probebly could not provide the kind of
services required by various United States operations.
galiajjEtes Government:1/
(I) atee Peuertmeleti, The State Department will pre-
sumably administer the U. S. portion of the Migrant
Committee Brussels program. Concurrent administra-
tion of the escapee program will insure that high
priority is given at Brussels to the resettlement
or escapees.
1/ The following possibilities were considered and rejected:
(1) Laar_tuepey or the Displaced persons CompisaLqu Since each
of these alternatives reqaare Congressional action, both were rejected.
It is desirable to this program for 1952 not later than
February 1 to insure 14!' can be integrated with the Migrant Commi-
ttee program when it ete,-e ;peration. No Congressional action on
this program could be ree.listically anticipated before the addle of
1952.
(2) ALlattrigoLtrital ennmitteeA This alternative was rejected
on the ground that interdepartmental committees have great difficulty
in carrying out operating programs,
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T9P'S4OPT PSB Del8ii
The Department ot State has an office responsible
for maintaining idson with and coordination of
the activities o all U. S. voluntary agencies in
the refugee fiel Many of these agencies were
represented at Brussels and are anxious to use the
transportation facilities of the Migrant Committee
to resettle the individuals they are assisting.
Since the State Department has the authority to
ascertain which people are migrated with the funds
provided by the United States, it should be possible
to influence the private U, S. organizations to
give special attention to the escapee problem. 25X1
The State Department can draw on all of the U. 84
Government funds listed as possible for inclusion
in the budgetary considerations as possible sources
of financing this operation. Furthermore, the
State Department is in tho best position to advise
the private U. S. organizations concerned with
escapees in the use of their funds,
The State Dep4rtment, through its experience with
the Iao has more personnel trained in the work
required to administer this program than any other
U. S. agency, both in Washington and in the field.
A possible argument against the $tate Department
carrying out this program might be that such an
operation would conflict with the political function
of the Department. However, in view of the operations
currently carried out by the Department in the pro?
paganda field, in the Point TV Program, and formerly
in the MAP Program, there is ample precedent for the
assumption by State of this responsibility.
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lar..arsug D.01.8fa
(2) MMee The only feeeible alternative to the
Department of Sate within the United States
Government is the MUtuel Security Ageney.
From the standp4nt of administration, this,
alternetive has dome advantages, particularly
since the majoresource of funds-ethe $10,0p,000
for the Migran'teCommittee and $6,300,000 of
dollars and eounterport funds budgeted for this
program will. be ESA. NSA missions in thentad
are specifically set up for nperatienss
However, if ESA aseumed responsibility for this
program, it would be important that the whole
refegeosescapee program be administered bi ESA,
including the functions of the U. SO portion Of
the Migrant Committee formed at Brussels, It
would also be necessary for ESA to assume :the
coordination, of certain of theprivate U0 SO
refugee erganizations now carried on by the
State Department. Since the State Department
is currently planning and pregramming for the
Migrant Committee operation and for the coor-
dination of voluntary agencies, this transfer
of responsibility would appear to be undesirable.
4e2Lnele glivate RetweteCreenizegeou At the present
time, no single private organization has adequate funds
to handle the job and no one private organization is
responsible for assisting Soviet orbit escapees. The
International Reseue Committee, whose Board is chaired
by General Spaatz, hopes to receive 02 million for the
purpose of assisting escapees, The IRC has-been the
organization most active in this field and last year
spent more than 1/3 ef the money provided by prlInte
organizations for the assistance of eseapees. The
present Emeutive Director of IRO has not been rate,
able in dealing with the U. S. Government and is net
fully supported by the State Department,
UalioneleCompitteejgoeFrepineeell Although NUE is
not now concerned with escapee programs it might be
possible to establish a new office in the National
Committee to handle the escapee problem. An organizae
tion ueeer NOF E would have the advantage of being able
to get evto action rapidly since .a staff and space
alreado both here and abroad. It is known that
the Inoeeneeional Rescue Committee would be willing
to work e:sesely with NCFE, ' The main drawbacks of such
an orgeniestlen are that it does not presently have a
staff eLiiled in refugee matters and it is not likely
that seAe ef the private refugee organizations, particle.
laxly the religious ones, would be willing to tie their
programs in will a recognized cold war organization such
as NCFE,; For the same reason, it is unlikely that the
Ford Foundation would commit substantial fu74ds to NCFE
sinoe it is known that members of the Board of the Found.
ation are opposed to the support of aggressve cold war
operations. Furthermore, it is known that NOFE is already
heavily loaded down witleits present functions and it
might not be desirable to add to these.
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e. Algy Private Organization: In order to utilize the
existing funds and personnel of present private
organizations in this field, it might be desirable
to create an organization along the lines of the
Community Chest, with an Exentive Director and a
Board of Directors representing all of the private
U.S, organizations concerned with escapees from the
Soviet orbit, In order to create such an organiza-
tion it would be necessary to have a strong Executive
Director supported by the U. S. Government, as well
as by private organizations, and it weuld be neces-
sary to raise a substantial ram of money to serve
as a catalyst to persuade all organizations to parti-
cipate and cooperate. The Ford Foundation has in.
dieated that it is interested in exploring the
possibility of the creation of such a, new organization
and might be willing to give its sponsorship, In
addition, according to preliminary estimates, the
Foundation may be willing to place up to 0. million
at the disposal of such an organization. A major
disadvantage would be the time required to set up
such an organization and the resistance of many
private organizations to being associated with an
organization apparently engaged in cold war operations.
Another disadvantage of creating such an organization
would be the difficulty of insuring a coordinated
operation in the field, particularly since some of
the private organizations have very specialized
activities. For example, the American Fund for
Czech Refugees concerns itself only with Czech
escapees, Another possible problem would be the
adequate servicing by this organization of U. So
Government covert programs. It is absolutely
indispensible that any private organization estab-
lished for the handling of this program cooperate
with the U. Sc,Government, particularly in the
reception centers and also in the disposal of
escapees who can not be absorbed on a full-time
basis by the U. S. Government operations.
After considering the advantages and disadvantages
of each of those alternatives, it is concluded that
the most feasible alternative is that under which the
State Department would assume the over-all administra-
tive and coordinating responsibilities,
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pei....9A,.&_12.1form_at,i on
Tu.sIgagl PSB D..18/a
SECTION V
RE (y1110,i1 TIONS
It is recominnu the PE-ychological Strategy Board:
Request the Stat D9Dr"'all.Tt
(1) to accept the responsibility of administering
the eseapee program outlined in this study.
(2) to deirelop and put into effect as a matter or
urgency an operational plan under which the
functions set forth in Section IV, paragraph 5
will be carried out Among other actions this
plan should provide for:
(a) The necessary administrative action both
in Washington and in the field.
(b) ?CocrAnntion with other U. S. Government
rIepartmnnl,s and agencies to insure that
a(!eq,ate 2acilities. are pro-rj.ded for the
err.ynihg ?:pf all escapees for employment
in ',}'13 oc,e,.7a1 IL S. psychological, opera-
t5onni or ,n:-,elligence programs.
(c) Per-_,Ddie roports to the PSB on the implemen-
ttior of this program.
c. Request the Department of Defense:
(1) to request the Department of the Army to liberalize
the conditions under which escapees may be recruited
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under the authorization of the Lodge Bill and to take
all feasible steps to expand ouch recruiting.
Request the Mutual Security Agency:
(1) To coo,)orate with the Department of State in plan-
ning and programming for the necessary use of an
estimated 2 million dollars of counterpart and
Garioa funds.
(2) To provide an estimated 41300.000 of the funds
authorized by the Kersten Amendment for utiliza-
tion in effecting the implementation of the
escapee program.
e. Requsst the Director of the PSB:
(1) To insure that arragerents be made under which
the necessary interdepartmeata2. coordination of
this program will be effeced.
(2) To underteke the continuing evaluation of the
effectiveness of this program as a matter of
National psychological interest.
(3) To continue with the immediate preparation of the
additional studies and recommendations authorized
in the 4th meeting of the PSB.
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212NOW-glgionEWP
'..41.=
te1954-1E1/a
Otion of P813 on October 25, 1951, Regarding
Defectors, Refugees and Potential Guerrillas
from and in the Soviet Orbit
At its fourth meeting, PSB took the following action:
"wipn: In view of' the importance to psychological strategic and
operational planning, and to obtaining intelligence necessary
thereto, of arranging for the care of escapees from the Iron
Curtain countries and of dertloping a program or programs therefor,
and methods of fierncing the same, with minimum confusion and
waste-time. the Board approved the following actions, proposed
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"(1) That the Psychological Strategy Board call a joint ?
meeting of all agencies concerned with the problem of defectors,
refugees, and potential guerrillas now resident in the Iron
Curtain countries for the purpose of considering what, if any,
concrete projects and programs might le undertaken by the United
States Government wr_t respect to such defectors, refugees and
potential guerrillas if funds therefor were available.
"(2) That the Psychological Strategy Board provide a
steering member to a panel which is directed (a) to consider
what, if any projects and programs of the foregoing character
might further national strategic objectives: (b) to monitor the
development of specific projects and programs that meet this
requirement; (c) to coordinate any sech project or program with
national strategic objectives; and (d) to consider all possible
sources for the financing thereof.
"(3) In the event that the studios contemplated under (2)
above should indicate that certain spe%ific programs and projects
having merit cannot be financed without recource to section 101(a)
of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, that the Psychological Strategy
Board or such of its constituent agencies as may be primarily
involved submit such projects and programs for the consideration
of the Director of Mutual Security".
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