PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01731R003200010023-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 5, 2005
Sequence Number:
23
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 19, 1951
Content Type:
MF
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TOP SMOR1 T
PSYCrIOLOGICA:r, STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
ME'TORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
, Y6 )k
October 19, 1951
SUBJECT: Preliminary report on the Situation with Respect to Repatriation
of Prisoners of War
1. At the Senior. Security Council St:,.ff Meeting of Septo:,r
27, in connection with the discussion of United States courses of action
Korea, it was agreed that "the Psychological Strategy Board would
a.a.-a-iortake at once to prepare a pi el-ininary report on the position of the
iced States with respect to repatriation and to exchange of prisoners
c` war". This problem was first officially posed in a Joint Chiefs of
memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated F, August 1951,
,a r oct: "Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean .Pri,oon _ rs,~
.!t-'stance of this memorandum is described in Enclosure "A", Staff
5.,a of Repatriation of Prisoners of War in Korea.
2, In pursuance to this agreement I have had ray staff prepare
a staff study with recommendations on this subject, Enclosure "A". In
the preparation of this staff study, PSB received the advice of Mr.
Raymund Yingling and Mr. Arthur B. Emmons of Department of State, Major
J D chell, Office of the Secretary of Defense and
CIA, as well as the following outside Consul a n s.
a. Mr. Paul M. A. Linebarger
b. Mr. Charles A. H. Thomson.
3. During the period of preparation of this staff study the following,
related actions occurred:
a. The Secretary of State commented upon the Joint Chiefs of
staff memorandum to the Secretary of Defense by letter, August 2?, 1951.
The substance of these comments, which differed in several essential
respects with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is contained in
Enclosure "A".
b. The Secretary of Defense addressed a memorandum on this
subject to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which requested the incorporation of
his views into a re-exami-Aation of the problem by the Joint Chiefs of Sta.f?.
The substance of these comments appears also in Enclosure "A".
4. Enclosure "A" was prepared by the PSB Staff taking into cens.ira,
tion the aforementioned papers and advice.
5. Subsequent to the completion of this staff study, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff met (on 12 October) to reconsider this subject. On the
basis of decisions taken at that meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff
addressed a memorandun to the Secretary of Defense, 15 October 1951,
Subject: "Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners"
in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that:
NSC review(s) completed.
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a.. They accede to the views of the Secretary of State that
"our best hope for obtaining the prompt repatriation of United Nations
personnel in the Korean war, as well as future wars, lies in our con-
tinuing firm adherence to the terms of the Geneva Convention,"
b. They recommended the withdrawal of the proposed policy as
set forth in their memorandum of 8 August 1951, "pending further con-
sideration".
Co They are obtaining General Ridgway's views before preparing
a new recommendation,
d, They now consider that these policies can be resolved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Departments of State and Defense without
referring them to the National Security Council,
6, In the course of a Electing of the Interdepartmental Committee on
'::Lsoners of War, Mr. Yingling discussed the PSB staff study in order to
eb+,ain their views.
a. Memibers of the committee informally reiterated the necessity
of koeping small the number of enemy prisoners of war released by us prior
to the cessation of hostilities. This point is made in the staff study
b. They objected to the idea of undertaking to resettle releasc..
prisoners of war outside Korea. The staff study has been amended to
eliminate this recomi'iendation.
c, They objected to giving any publicity to the release of
prisoners of war. The staff study has not been changed to meet this
criticism, inasmuch as it would defeat the psychological purpose of re-
leasing such persons.
7, The PSB staff study (Enclosure "A") agrees with both the Joint
Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 15 October, and the Secretary of State letter
of August 27, to the effect that upon the cessation of hostilities the UN
commander must abide by the provisions of the Genova Convention of 194.9,
requiring the repatriation of prisoners of war.. The PSB staff study is,
however, more specific with respect to actions to be taken prior to cessa-
tion of hostilities, as well as psychological actions which might be
taken to assist in the protection of US/UN Prisoners of Wax,
RECOI IEITDATIONS:
8, It is recommended that the PSB staff study be made available
to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in connection with any future consideration
they may wish tc give to this subject.
9. It is further recommended that PSB take no further action in
this matter until requested by the National Security Council.
Gordon Gray
Director
Enclosure:
Staff Study
TOP SECRET
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18 October, 1951 18 Copy of 20 Copies
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
STAFF STUDY ON REPATRIATION OF
PRISONERS OF OF WAR IN XOE a,
I. THE PROBLEM
From the standpoint of psychological strategy to recommend U.S.
policies governing the repatriation and exchange of prisoners of war in
Korea.
II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The U.S. is a signatory of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, but has not yet
ratified the Convention.
2. Official views are set forth as follows:
a. View of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(1) By memoranda-i to the Secretary of Defense, 8 August 1951,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that
from the military point of view, no objection. was raised
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the adoption of a
policy authorizing the UN commander:
(a) Not to repatriate Chinese or North Korean prisoners
of war to Communist-controlled territory without
their hill consent;
(b) To repatriate to Formosa all Chinese prisoners of
war who were found to be acceptable to the Chinese
Nationalist Government and who claim to be ex-
Nationalists or Nationalists at heart and elect such
repatriation;
The adoption of such policies to be subject to the provi-
sion of adequate safeguards for United Nations prisoners
S
T
U
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in Communist hands.
b. View of the Secretary of State.
(1) By letter, August 27, 1951 to the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State reviewed the 8 August 1951
memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He expressed
serious concern over the feasibility of carrying out
the proposed policy without conflicting with the Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention of 1949. He suggested that,
in order to achieve the desired psychological warfare
and humanitarian objectives, individuals who had
rendered outstanding assistance to the United Nations
command or whose return to the Communists would in all
probability result in their deaths should be paroled an
provided for in the Geneva Convention prior to the
reaching of an armistice agreement.
(2) Additionally, the Secretary of State indicated that
under no circumstances should Republic of Korea person-
nel who were forcibly pressed into the North Korean
army (and subsonuently recovered by UN forces) be re-
turned to the Communists;.
c. View of the Socrotary of Defense:
By memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 September 1951
the Secretary of Defense indicated that while
he recognized the military advantages inherent in
General Ridgway's present instructions, authorizing
him to negotiate an exchange of prisoners of war on a one-
for-one basis, he felt that, in order to avoid any
solution which might involvo bargaining with the wel-
fare of our own prisoners, General Ridgway should be ad-
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TOP v.U IPYST
vised initially to soak exchange of prisoners of
war on a ono-for-one basis but that he be authorized
to agree to an overall ecchango, if such action were
deemed necessary in order to effect the release of our
own prisoners of war.
III. DISCUSSION
See TAB A.
IV.. CONCLUSIONS
1. There is no perfect safeguard to prevent Communist
reprisals against US/UN POW's short of forcibll lib-
orating than,. However, expectations with respect to
reprisals can be greatly influenced by the specific
psychological actions we take to put the Hostile Power
in a defensive position with respect to the treatment of
prisoners of war (See TAB B).
2. It appears from the Convention that parole of POW's
prior to the cessation of hostilities, as recommended
by the Secretary of State, can be accomplished in accor-
dance with the Geneva Prisoner of War. Convention of 1.949.
implication, prisoners of war can be
Furthermore, by
given the right of voluntary release without parole
prior to cessation of hostilitle$. The genuineness
of the voluntary character of the release can best be
shown by inspection and observance by a neutral body
such as the International Red Cross.
3. An all-for-.-tll principle of prisoner exchange offers a
better chance of the return of US/UN prisoners of war
than does any :Limited one-for-one method of exchange.
However, for administrative purposets CINCUNC might well
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be advised to exchange ?prisonors group-for-group,
composed of tuixod CCF