THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF INVOLUNTARY POW REPATRIATION IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200010022-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 19, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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TOP SECRET
19 February 1952
ITEM 6
(Post-Agenda Item)
Iha Strate(?ic Significance of Involuntary POW
Repatriation in Korea
Summary: The Psychological Strategy Board Staff has become increasingly
concerned with the prospect that the United States will not
stand firm on the issue of opposing forced repatriation of prisoners of
war in Korea, particularly if this remains the sole determinant of whether
a truce is to be negotiated.
While we still retain the freedom of initiative and action, it is
believed feasible, as recommended in the 22 October 1951 study of the
Psychological Strategy Board, to parole certain POW's now.
Inasmuch as there are serious implications to involuntary repatria-
tion of POW's which would have an adverse impact on all future U. S.
psychological strategy, the Director of the Psychological Strategy
Board believes the Board should become seized with the problem, and the
item is therefore included for post-agenda discussion.
Recommendation: That the Psychological Strategy Board recommend that
consideration of this problem be formalized at the National
Security Council level.
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19 rebraary 1952
SBEJECT: The Streik lc i. tficazaci of I 1 n
rit RepoOn I
FEFESSN PSB D-10, dated 22 Octeber 1951, Sa subject.
1. Attached herewith please find suggested notes for
poet-agenda discussion at the Psychological Strategy Board
Footing of 21 February 1952.
2. Attention is particularly invited to PSS D-10,
wherein it is concluded that release or parole of prisoners
is feasible rnd prior to the cessation of hostilities. if
reexamination of Ihe pblea is irdicated, this action should
therefore be undertaken as a matter of urgency.
II
AL wan imrecw
Office of Evaluation and Review
Attachment: NOTES FOR POSSIBLE POST-AGENDA PSB DISCUSSION
The Strategic Significance of Involuntary PW
Repatriation in Korea.
cc: Mr, Barnes
Mr. Taylor
TOP Sit
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NOTES FOR FO$iIFLE POS -ACEDA PU 1SCJS3ION
SMSCT t The Strategic Signiricance InvoluntgTy 14141inUtri rea.
1. The PSB, on 22 October 1951, forwarded a staff study on the repatriation
of prisoners of war to the gational Security Council. It concluded in general
that involuntary repatriation of priseners of war was undesirable, that a means
of releasing such prisoners was available under the terms of the esneva Convel-
tion wherein they might be paroled or released unconditionally prior to the
cessation of hostilities, and recommended that this course of action be adopted.
2. During the past several months there has been extensive Official and
press discussion of this matter and it appears from current instructions to
General Ridgeway, the final US position on the subject may not have been taken.
A recent official estimate concludes that involuntary repatriation as opposed
to a renewal of open hostilities would not have a seriously adverse effect on
the DS psychological position with reseect to defectors, etc. These estieates
are open to considerable question. It is noted, however, that the decision
with respect to involuntary repatriatim can at the present time still be made
in conjunction with other items and that question of breakdown in the cease-
fire negotiations to not necessarily eteilaterally connected with the PW issue
but it appears that this is becoming more difficult daily.
3. At the present time teere is no widespread active concern in the DS
on the question of possible failure on the part of the Chinese to return all
American prisoners. But articles now beginning to appear in the press raise
the specter that the issue might be presented to the American public as an
*exchange of Chinese lives for American lives'. Should this develop, it Je
likely that the public outcry would obscure the basic moral issue and jeop-
ardise the effectiveness of the !IS policy decision.
4. At the present time, it appears that the Department of State and the
Department of Defense are engaged in tee collection and careful analysis of
the fasts pertaining to this problem. Preliminary indications are that per-
hens 3,000 Chinese and up to 10 percent of the North Korean PWs will fall
within the category of those Whose return to their homelands would result in
their death, or who for other reasons do not wish to be repatriated.
5. There are additional complications (aside from the abstract moral
issue) which are also under consideration. These include the not entirely
desirable conditions in the PW camps and the adverse psychological effect of
retnrning mistreated prisoners to their homeland; the unsillingnees of the
military commander in the field to release substantial numbers of prisoners
behind his lines; aed, the serious likelihood that Chinese released in South
Korea would themselves be unwelcome on Korean soil. It must also be seriously
considered that the psycholeeLesi effect of releasing such individeale without
adequate provision for their welfare might have a more serious adverse psycho-
logical effect in the long term than tee return to their homelands. The
problem of disposal is therefore one of critical importance:
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2.
6, There is a serious possibility that the question of involuntary
repatriation of prisormrs tiny again become an issue in the fhture, both
during the cold war, and in the event a general war should occur. Policy
guidance in this problem is lacking since the individuals and principles
involved do not fall entirely within US concepts of political asylum, or
within the Genova Convention. Me solution of the issue in torea? while of
critical immediate importance, is also likely therefore to provide a mid-
term or long-rang. strategic precedent.
PSIVR-IsMaGodelso
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